Madras High Court
S. Srimathi And 3 Ors. vs The Union Of India (Uoi), Represented By ... on 8 December, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1997)1MLJ440
ORDER Jagadeesan, J.
1. The petitioners herein filed these writ petitions seeking for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras from proceeding with several complaints filed against them on the ground that the Consumer Protection Act cannot be invoked against the Advocates. In fact the very same persons earlier filed W.P. Nos. 21557 and 21567 of 1994, W.P. Nos. 2109, 2110,4233 of 1995 challenging the validity of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, contending that the provision is invalid and cannot be invoked against the advocates. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 6.3.96 had dismissed those writ petitions, vide: Srimathi v. Union of India finding that Section 3 of the said Act is valid and the advocate profession will also fall within the definition of the service. Being a party to those proceedings and having suffered an order against them, now the petitioners have filed these present writ petitions with the same averments but modifying the relief sought for in the writ petition. A perusal of the affidavit clearly establishes that the petitioners have raised the same pleas raised in the earlier writ petition. Moreover, some of the O.Ps have been already disposed of by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and having failed to challenge the same by way of appeal, to get over the award passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, these writ petitions have been filed. What cannot be done directly now being sought for by indirect mode. The conduct of the petitioners is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. Following the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 6.3.1996 in W.P. No. 21557 of 1994 etc., I have no other option except to dismiss these writ petitions and accordingly they are dismissed.
2. In view of certain untoward incidents elaborate enquiry was conducted. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners who were said to be working for the legal aid cell. The reliefs have been sought for before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras against not only the Legal Aid Cell but also the individuals, since they were incharge of the matters. Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi who are the prime persons in the running of the Legal Aid Cell have been found guilty of certain malpractices. They were restrained from functioning or running the Legal Aid Cell by order dated 14.12.1993 in W.P. No. 17145 of 1993 which was later disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court. When these writ petitions came up for admission, in order to find out whether the Division Bench order has been given effect to or not, I directed the enquiry. In the enquiry it was revealed that the name of the "Legal Aid Cell" had been changed into "Legal Centre' and these two persons are carrying on the profession as advocates; especially when Mr. Jai Sudarsan had been debarred from practising, it necessitated me to call for the petitioners in person. Only Mr. Jambunathan, the petitioner in W.P. No. 4539 of 1996 and Mr. S.K. Rajagopalan, the petitioner in W.P.4542 of 1996 appeared. The other two did not appear. Hence Mr. Jai Sudarsan was asked to be present in Court. When he was enquired with regard to Mr. B.K. Moorthy and Mrs. Srimathi, he represented that both were at Delhi after the dissolution of the Legal Aid Cell in October, 1993 and to that effect he filed an affidavit before this Court. He also filed an affidavit that he will make every effort to trace them and bring them before the Court. But ultimately he filed an affidavit that he has signed the affidavit filed in the name of Mr. B.K. Moorthy and Mrs. Vasanthi, his wife had signed the affidavit in the name of Ms. Srimathi. But earlier they denied about their alias name in spite of the police report, which reveals that they are having several alias names and cheating the public. I have elaborately dealt with this aspect in my order in suo motu Contempt Application No. 182 of 1996. Hence I am not going to deal with them elaborately here.
3. When Mr. S.K. Rajagopalan appeared before this Court, he was enquired as to whether he has given instructions to Mr. Damodaran, the counsel on record. He denied the same. I also asked him whether he has seen the affidavit. He replied that he had seen the affidavit only in Court. His evidence has been recorded wherein he has categorically stated that he did not sign the affidavit and he did not know who has signed the vakalat and the affidavit filed in the writpetition (W.P. No. 4542 of 1996) is in his name. He also denied that he has signed the vakalat. Consequently I have to direct the counsel on record Mr. Damodaran to be present in court. He has filed an affidavit as follows:
I submit that in the W.P. Nos. 4538 to 4542 of 1996 my name has been misused as counsel on record. I did not sign either in the vakalat nor any "papers or documents in the said writ petitions. I do not know the contents of the writ petitions. In these circumstances, this Court may be pleased to dispense with my presence.
However, Mr. Jambunathan filed an affidavit stating that he instructed Mr. Damodaran, the counsel on record and he signed the affidavit filed in W.P. No. 4539 of 1996. In view of the controversy, the attesting advocate Mr. Vadamalai was called for. Mr. Vadamalai is said to have attested almost all the affidavits filed in these writ petitions and vakalats. He has filed an affidavit that on verification he found that the signature affixed in the above affidavits are not his and he had not signed as attestor any of the vakalat or any of the affidavits in these proceedings. Consequently the affidavits, the vakalats in these writ petitions have been sent for handwriting expert opinion along with admitted signatures of Mr. S.K. Rajagopalan, one of the petitioner, Mr. Damodaran, the counsel on record and that of Mr. Vadamalai, the advocate who is said to have attested the affidavits and the vakalats. The handwriting expert had submitted the report stating that the signatures of Mr. S.K. Rajagopalan, Mr. Damodaran and Mr. Vadamalai do not tally with the signatures said to have been affixed in the affidavits, petitions and the vakalats filed in these writ petitions. I have also compared the admitted signatures with that of the corresponding signatures of the respective advocates available in the affidavits, vakalats and petitions. Even for a naked eye, it is clear that the admitted signatures do not tally with the signatures found in the documents filed before this Court. There is no doubt that the signatures of M/s. Rajagopalan, Damodaran and Vadamalai in the affidavits petitions and the vakalats filed before this Court had been forged by some one.
4. In order to fix the concerned person, this Court has to consider the nature of the proceeding and the persons interested in the same. It may be difficult lo get the direct evidence to identify the culprit in the nature of the proceeding. Hence this Court has to draw an inference and fix the responsibility on the person who is going to be benefited by these writ proceedings, because except the concerned persons, no other person would be interested in creating such false documents to get the relief.
5. The burden is on the person who relies upon such fabricated document. Here these affidavits, petitions and vakalats containing forged signatures of three advocates, one is that of petitioner in W.P. No. 4542 of 1996, the other is that of counsel on record and the last is the one of attesting advocates, have been filed before this Court by the said J. Sudarssan and Vasanthi. Both are running the Legal Aid Cell which was later changed into Legal Centre.
6. For the offence of cheating, about 50 criminal cases are pending against these two persons. These two are the so called advocates, who are now suspended from the Rolls. When the production of fabricated documents by the litigants as general public itself cannot be tolerated, as it would amount to interference with the administration of Rule of Law, it is highly improper of these two who are said to belong to legal profession. The legal profession is always called as 'noble profession' as the members of the legal fraternity are said to be the guardians or the saviours of the rights of the Public as well as individuals and the society at large. If the members of such legal fraternity themselves indulge in these sort of activities, the society may loose its confidence in the profession and the profession would loose its dignity.
7. By filing this sort of forged affidavits, I am of the opinion that the conduct of the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4538,4540 and 4541 of 1996 would amount to fraud on courts. When the fraud had been played on Court it would be highly improbable to ask the Court to establish the offence against these two. When the probabilities are established before the Court by conducting necessary enquiries, about the involvement of those two individuals, then the burden is on these two to establish their innocence, because normal procedure of criminal law cannot be followed in the nature of these cases, Otherwise, the Court will also be a witness for the fraud committed on it being a passive spectator. It may not be possible for the Court to establish that the said two persons alone committed forgery. If such burden is placed, it is highly impossible to get at the culprit and the person who forged the signature may go scot free. Hence the burden should be only on the person who filed such documents before the Court enabling the Court to act on such documents as genuine one. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana the stream of justice has to be kept clean and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message percolates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the administration of justice.
8. As pointed out already, the proceedings have been initiated before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission against the Legal Aid Cell, in which the petitioners have been working. If any of the petitioners have been found to be fault, naturally only the Legal Aid Cell will be made responsible and made liable to pay the compensation to redress the aggrieved complainants. There is no doubt and more over admittedly the Legal Aid Cell had been taken care of primarily by Mr. Jai Sudarsan alias B.K. Moorthy and Mrs. Vasaathi alias Mrs. Srimathi, who are the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4538, 4540 and 4541 of 1996. Though Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Srimathi initially disputed their alias names as Mr. B.K. Moorthy and Mrs. Srimathi, but later on, they admitted the same. They also filed the affidavits to the effect that they have signed the affidavits in those W.Ps, as B.K. Moorthy and Srimathi.
9. Considering the admissions made by Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi stating that they signed the affidavits filed in the name of B.K. Moorthy and Mrs. Srimathi, there is no doubt that they are the concerned persons who want to evade their liability of facing the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, and only to avoid the same, these writ petitions have been filed before this Court challenging the validity of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act and seeking for prohibition restraining the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras from proceeding with the enquiry. If ultimately any award is going to be passed or to satisfy the awards already passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, only these two persons, primarily concerned with the Legal Aid Cell have to satisfy such awards and no one else is interested to challenge the proceeding. Further, it is admitted by Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi that the other two petitioners were working for the Legal Aid Cell as their agents. If the facts are analysed in this angle, there cannot be any doubt that these writ petitions have been filed only by these two viz., Mr. Jai Sundarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi and they only have committed forgery of the signatures of the advocates Mr. S.K. Rajagopal, Mr. Damodaran and Mr. Vadamalai.
10. In fact these two persons filed Crl. O.P. 5011 of 1996 seeking for bail, when they were remanded to custody pending further enquiry with regard to their criminal acts. When the bail application was argued, I directed Mr. Rammohan, their counsel to verily from his clients as to whether they are willing to tell the truth at least, at that stage. On 30.7.1996, Mr. Ratn Mohan informed the Court that Mr. Jai Sudarsan admitted that he forged the signatures of the three advocates. When I asked him to get an affidavit liorn his client, he represented that Mr. Jai Sudarsan is not inclined to file an affidavit, since he is entitled for the protection under Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution of India.
About this, I made a reference in my order dated 2.8.1996.
11. Considering the conduct of these two as narrated in the order in suo motu Contempt Application No. 182 of 1996,1 am of the opinion that these two persons cannot be let off for want of direct evidence. When the concerned advocates have denied their signatures in the documents filed before this Court, it is for these two Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi to satisfy the Court that as to who has forged these documents. In the absence of any explanation forthcoming from these two persons, there is no other go except to come to the conclusion that only these two beneficiaries under the proceeding had forged these documents and filed before the Court. When such conclusion is arrived at, it is unnecessary for framing any charges and sending the matter before the criminal court for any trial. The circumstances clearly established that barring these two Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi, no one coald have forged these documents i.e., the affidavits, petitions, and vakalats.
12. When the advocates' signatures have been forged in the affidavits and vakalats, it would be very difficult for the court to discharge its function; especially in dispensing justice, because day-in and day out orders are being passed on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties to the proceeding and when the affidavit filed by the party is found to be forged and the signature of the counsel who is said to have signed as counsel on record is found as false and the signature of the attesting person is also found to be forged, it will be highly impossible for the courts to act upon any document produced by any of the parties before the court. Hence I am of the opinion that this conduct of the concerned Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi has to be seriously viewed.
13. In fact the Supreme Court in the case reported in Afzal v. State of Haryana has found that the filing of forged documents would amount to contempt of court punishable under Article 129 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
The question then is: whether he committed contempt in the proceedings of this Court? Section 2(b) defines 'Contempt of court' to mean any Civil or Criminal contempt. 'Criminal contempt' defined in Section 2(c) means interference with the administration of justice in any other manner. A false "or a misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. It is seen that Ahlawat, respondent No. 3 to the main writ petition and incharge of the criminal administration, with his connivance caused two minor boys' wrongful detention. He made in averment in the counter-affidavit dated October, 30, 1993 that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they taken into custody which was later found to be false. He first used fabricated counter - affidavit, forged by Krishna Kumar in the proceedings to obtain a favourable order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him, he fabricated further false evidence to show that Krishna Kumar had forged his signature without his knowledge and filed the fabrication document. Thereby he further committed contempt of the judicial process. He has no regard for truth. From stage to stage, he committed contempt of the Court by making false statements. Being a responsible officer, he is required to make truthful statements before the Court, but he made obviously false statements. Thereby, he committed criminal contempt of judicial proceedings of this Court.
From the above discussion and conclusions the question is: What punishment is to be imposed on Randhir Singh (A.S.I), Ishwar Singh (S.I) and M.S. Ahlawat (Superintendent of Polke)? None of them made any candid admission nor tendered unqualified contrite apology. Police Officers, who are supposed to be the so-called disciplined force, have deliberately fabricated false records placed before this Court without any compunction. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to curb this tendency, particularly, when they have the temerity to fabricate the records with false affidavit and place the same before the highest Court of the land. Their depravity of the conduct is writ large. M.S. Ahlawat is unworthy to hold any Office of responsibility.
Therefore Randhir Singh (A.S.I) and Ishwar Singh (S.I) "shall be punishable under Section 193, I.P.C. and accordingly they are convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of three months and 6 months respectively. Ahlawat, the Superintendent of Police, is punishable under Section 193, I.P.C. He also committed contempt of the proceedings of this Court punishable under Article 129 of the Constitution. Accordingly, he is convicted and sentenced under Section 193, I.P.C, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year. He is convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 6 months under Article 129 of the Constitution. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. Krishna Kumar, Head Constable is exonerated of the charge under Section 193, I.P.C., with warning to show exemplary conduct thereafter. His bail bonds are discharged.
Since forgery is punishable under Section 193,1.P.C, both Jai Sudarsan as well as Mrs. Vasanthi who are the petitioners using their alias names in W.P. Nos. 4538, 4540 and 4541 of 1996 are liable to be punished for such offence.
14. As already pointed out, it is only these two persons who had signed all the affidavits forging the petitioner's signatures and that of the counsel on record and the attesting advocate whereby they have committed forgery of the signature of the concerned persons, I found them guilty of offence under Section 193, I.P.C. and sentence them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. The imprisonment is imposed taking into consideration the over all conduct detailed below of these two during the proceedings,
(i) denial of the knowledge of O.P. No. 396 of 1993, having filed a counter and suffered an order,
(ii) denial of the filing of counter in O.P. No. 396 of 1993.
(iii) after the disposal of the O.P. No. 396 of 1993 had filed the prtsent writ petitions, as if the same is pending and seeking for the relief of prohibition,
(iv) gave false particulars stating Moorthy and Sritnathy do not refer to them as they are different persons.
(v) In spite of the order of the Division Bench of this Court to close down the Legal Aid Centre, carried on the profession in the name of Legal Centre, in spite of Jai Sudarsan having been removed from the Rolls of advocates.
15. As pointed out already, the Supreme Court has held that the filing of forged documents which includes the affidavits before the Court will amount to criminal contempt. This Court, being the court of Record, is empowered to impose punishment for such contempt as per Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
16. Accordingly I punish Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi for contempt of court and, sentence them to undergo imprisonment for six months. The sentence imposed for the offence under Section 193, I.P.C. and for contempt is to run concurrently.