Madhya Pradesh High Court
Karan Kapoor vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 3 August, 2017
1 MCRC No. 660/2016
(Karan Kapoor & Ors. vs. State of M.P. & Anr.)
03.08.2017
Shri Anil Kumar Mishra with Shri Amit Arjariya,
Counsel for the applicants.
Shri Yogesh Parashar, Public Prosecutor for the
respondent No.1/State.
Shri K.P.S. Sengar, Counsel for the respondent No.2. This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the FIR in Crime No.37/2015 registered by Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior for offence under Section 406 of IPC.
The necessary facts for the disposal of the present application in short are that the respondent No.2 was married to the applicant No.1 and the respondent No.2 lodged a FIR at Mahila Police Station Padav, District Gwalior in the year 2014 alleging that she was married to the applicant No.1 on 28.11.2012 at Delhi and an amount of Rs. 60,00,000/- was spent by her father in her marriage and after some days of the marriage, the applicants started demanding dowry as well as money from the father of the respondent No.2 and when the respondent No.2 refused to fulfill their demand, then the applicants started harassing her and beating her. On 11.5.2014, the marriage of relative of the respondent No.2 was to be performed at Gwalior and, therefore, the respondent No.2 had come along with her husband/applicant No.1 and at that time also she was beaten by the applicant No.1 and her parents and brother were abused by the applicant No.1. On the very same day, the applicant No.1 forcibly took her back to Delhi and on 12.5.2014 also the 2 MCRC No. 660/2016 respondent No.2 was beaten by the applicants at Delhi and a threat was extended to the parents of the complainant on phone that if an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- is not deposited in the account of the respondent No.2 then she will be killed. It was further alleged that on various dates Rs. 50,000/-, Rs.1,45,000/-, Rs.1,05,000/-, Rs.30,000/-, Rs.30,000/-, Rs.40,000/-, Rs.45,000/-, Rs.45,000/-, Rs.10,000/- were deposited in the account of the respondent No.2 which have been withdrawn by the applicants for their personal use. On 19.6.2014, when the respondent No.2 came back to her parents house at Gwalior, then they were informed about the incident and she was got treated at Gwalior. In the month of September, 2014 also the respondent No.2 had written a letter to her parents about the atrocities being committed by the applicants. It was alleged that on 20.12.2014, the respondent No.2 has been turned out of her matrimonial house after assaulting her and, therefore, a written complaint was made. It appears that the police was of the view that the cause of action has arisen at Delhi, therefore, the complaint made by the respondent No.2 was transferred to Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi who registered the FIR in Crime No.1171/2014 for offence under Sections 498-A, 506, 294, 34 of IPC. It appears that thereafter the respondent No.2 filed a criminal complaint before the Court of JMFC, Gwalior for offence under Section 406 of IPC. An order under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. was passed by the Magistrate and accordingly the Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior registered the Crime No.37/2015 against the applicants 3 MCRC No. 660/2016 for offence under Section 406 of IPC. In this complaint, apart from making the allegations which were made at first instance, it was reiterated that not only the amount which was deposited in the account of the respondent No.2 by her parents from time to time was withdrawn by the applicants but the ornaments as well as other Stridhan has been misappropriated by the applicants. Thus, it is clear that in the complaint apart from misappropriation of amount which was deposited in the account of respondent No.2, additional allegations of misappropriation of the ornaments and other articles which were given at the time of marriage were also made.
Thereafter it appears that during the investigation in Crime No.1171/2014, the police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi added the offence under 406 of IPC in the months of May, 2015 whereas the FIR at Gwalior in Crime No.37/2015 was registered on 29.1.2015.
In Crime No.1171/2014, the police after concluding the investigation has filed the charge sheet whereas the investigation in Crime No.37/2015 registered by Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior is still pending.
It appears that the respondent No.2 had filed a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking a direction to the SHO, Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior for completing the investigation in Crime No.37/2015 and to file the charge sheet. The said petition was registered as M.Cr.C.No.13241/2015. It appears that by order dated 4.1.2017 passed in M.Cr.C.No.13241/2015, this Court passed the following order:-
"Mr. K.P.S. Sengar, learned counsel for the 4 MCRC No. 660/2016 petitioner.
Mr. Kamal Jain, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.
Heard.
This petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for completing the investigation in respect of Crime No.37/2015.
In compliance of the order dated 15.11.2016, SHO Police Station Kampoo, Gwalior is present in person and submitted the status report of the investigation in respect of Crime No.37/2015 registered under Section 406 of IPC.
On perusal of the status report, it appears that Assistant Inspector, Surendra Singh Pal has been sent to Delhi in respect of the investigation.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the FIR has been lodged on 29.01.2015 and the investigation is still incomplete and the police is not taking any effective steps to complete the investigation.
SHO, Police Station Kampoo, Gwalior assures that investigation would be completed within two months from today.
On his assurance, this petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondent to complete the investigation of said crime and submit its report within two months from today positively.
With the aforesaid observations, this petition is hereby disposed of."
It is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that it is well established principle of law that two FIRs for the same offence are not maintainable. In the present case, in the first FIR, apart from making the allegations of harassment and cruelty by the applicants because of non- fulfillment of their demand of dowry, the allegations of misappropriation of the amount deposited in the account 5 MCRC No. 660/2016 of the respondent No.2 were also made. Although the police at the initial stage did not register the case for offence under Section 406 of IPC but subsequently the Police Station Punjabi Bagh District West Delhi added the offence under Section 406 of IPC and the charge sheet has also been filed. It is submitted that so far as the second FIR in question for the offence under Section 406 of IPC is concerned, it is clear that the allegations of misappropriation of ornaments as well as other articles given at the time of marriage were not made by the respondent No.2 at the time of lodging of first FIR. Nothing had prevented the respondent No.2 to make such an allegation but for the reasons best known to her, she did not make these allegations which clearly shows that the allegations of misappropriation of the ornaments as well as the articles given at the time of marriage are false. It is further submitted that according to the respondent No.2, she was ousted from her matrimonial house in the month of December, 2014 and, therefore, it is clear that even if the allegations made in the second FIR are accepted, then it is clear that the offence under Section 406 of IPC was already committed on 20.12.2014 when the respondent No.2 was ousted from her matrimonial house. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Stridhan of the respondent No.2 is a second incident committed at different point of time involving different person. In the first FIR which was lodged on 20.12.2014, the respondent No.2 had also made allegations with regard to misappropriation of amount from the account of the applicant and the said allegation has also been made in 6 MCRC No. 660/2016 the second FIR also, therefore, it is clear that some of the allegations in both the FIRs are common. It is further submitted that once the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has already filed a charge sheet for offence under Section 406 of IPC apart from the other sections then the prosecution of the applicants for offence under Section 406 of IPC in Crime No.37/2015 would be bad in law. It is further submitted that so far as the order passed by this Court in M.Cr.C.No.13241/2015 is concerned, the applicants were not a party to the proceedings. It was never objected before this Court by the State that the second FIR for the similar offence is not maintainable, therefore, the question with regard to the maintainability of the second FIR by Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior was never under consideration. Thus, it is submitted that although this Court had directed that the investigation be completed within two months and to submit its report, on the assurance given by the SHO, Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior, but it is submitted that even otherwise, this Court has not directed the police to file the charge sheet and the direction has been given to submit the "report" and "report" would include closure report also. Thus it cannot be said that the order passed by this Court in M.Cr.C.No.13241/2015 on 4.1.2017 is binding in these proceedings.
Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the complainant that the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has not conducted the investigation in proper perspective and the proper investigation has been done by the Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior, therefore, the 7 MCRC No. 660/2016 FIR lodged at Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior should not be quashed. It is further submitted that although the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has filed the charge sheet for different offences including that of under Section 406 of IPC but in view of the fact that a superficial investigation has been done, therefore, the charge sheet filed by the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi may be ignored. However, it is fairly conceded by the counsel for the complainant that the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has already filed the charge sheet against the applicants for offence under Sections 498-A, 406, 506, 294, 34 of IPC.
The counsel for the State also could not dispute the fact that the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has already filed the charge sheet against the applicants on more or less the similar allegations.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The facts of this case can be summarized as under. The respondent No.2 lodged a FIR at Gwalior which was transferred by Gwalior police to Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi, as the police was of the view that the offence has been committed at Delhi and only the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the FIR the allegations of misappropriation of the money deposited by the parents of the respondent No.2 in her Bank account were specifically mentioned. Although the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi did not register the offence under Section 406 of IPC at the initial 8 MCRC No. 660/2016 stage but later on considering the statements made by the respondent No.2 and her witnesses, the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi also added the offence under Section 406 of IPC and undisputedly has filed the charge sheet against the applicants for different offences including the offence under Section 406 of IPC.
Before the offence under Section 406 of IPC was added by Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi the respondent No.2 filed a criminal complaint before the Court of Magistrate, Gwalior who passed an order under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. In compliance of order under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. the Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior registered the FIR against the applicants for offence under Section 406 of IPC.
It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent No.2 that as the articles and money were given to the applicant at Gwalior and although the amount was misappropriated by withdrawing the same at Delhi and the articles which were given at the time of marriage as well as the ornaments are still lying at Delhi but the Court at Gwalior had also jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 406 of IPC as a part of cause of action has also arisen at Gwalior and, therefore, the Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior has rightly registered the FIR. As the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Police to register the FIR for offence under Section 406 of IPC has not been raised by the counsel for the applicants, therefore, this question is not being considered.
The crux of the matter is that the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi after considering the 9 MCRC No. 660/2016 allegations made by the respondent No.2 has also filed the chargesheet against the applicants for offence under Section 406 of IPC and the allegation made in the FIR bearing No. 37/2015 registered at Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior also contains the similar allegations. As the copy of the chargesheet as well as the Case Diary statements of the respondent No.2 and her witnesses in Crime No. 1171/2014 registered by Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi have not been placed on record, therefore, it is not clear that whether the allegation of misappropriation of ornaments and the articles given at the time of marriage have been made in the said case or not but the question is that whether the allegations made by the respondent No.2 against the applicants formed a part of same transaction or gives rise to a different offence.
The Supreme Court in the case of Anju Chaudhary Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384 has held as under:-
"14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the 10 MCRC No. 660/2016 police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it 11 MCRC No. 660/2016 would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali of the same date.)
15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case.
16. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) the Court was concerned with the registration of a second FIR in relation to the same facts but constituting different offences and where ambit and scope of the investigation was entirely different. Firstly, an FIR was registered and even the charge-sheet filed was primarily concerned with the offence of conspiracy to cheat and misappropriation by the two accused. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars (case property) out of the country. It was also not known that some other accused persons were parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the court, which subsequently surfaced in London. Earlier, it was only known to the police that the pillars were 12 MCRC No. 660/2016 stolen as the property within the meaning of Section 410 IPC and were in possession of the accused person (Narang brothers) in London.
17. The Court in Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhiu Admn.) (1979) 2 SCC 322 declined to grant relief of discharge to the petitioner in that case where the contention raised was that entire investigation in the FIR subsequently instituted was illegal as the case on same facts was already pending before the courts at Ambala and courts in Delhi were acting without jurisdiction. The fresh facts came to light and the scope of investigation broadened by the facts which came to be disclosed subsequently during the investigation of the first FIR. The comparison of the two FIRs has shown that the conspiracies were different. They were not identical and the subject-matter was different. The Court observed that there was a statutory duty upon the police to register every information relating to cognizable offence and the second FIR was not hit by the principle that it is impermissible to register a second FIR of the same offence.
18. The Court held as under: (Ram Lal Narang case, SCC pp. 337-38, paras 20-
22) "20. Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating 13 MCRC No. 660/2016 agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of CrPC in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard 14 MCRC No. 660/2016 against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light.
21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in CrPC, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate.
Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further 15 MCRC No. 660/2016 investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.
22. As in the present case, occasions may arise when a second investigation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range of offences including those covered by the first investigation. Where the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case, it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrates themselves may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. We do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge- sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 CrPC, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the 16 MCRC No. 660/2016 second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed."
19. In M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1999) 3 SCC 247, this Court took the view that even where the article of charge was similar but for a different period, there was nothing in the Code to debar registration of the second FIR. The Court opined that the FIR was registered for an offence under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act related to the period 1-8-1978 to 1-4-1989 and the investigation culminated into filing of a report which was accepted by the Court.
The second FIR and subsequent proceedings related to a later period which was 1-8-1978 to 25-7-1978 under similar charges. It was held that there was no provision which debar the filing of a subsequent FIR.
20. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181, the Court explained that an information given under sub- section (1) of Section 154 of the Code is commonly known as the first information report (FIR). Though this term is not used in the Code, it is a very important document. The Court concluded that second FIR for the same offence or occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences was not permissible. In this case, the Court discussed the judgments in Ram Lal Narang and M. Krishna in some detail, and while quashing the subsequent FIR held as under: (T.T. Antony case, SCC pp. 198-99 & 204, paras 23-25 & 35) "23. The right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is a statutory right over which the court does not possess any supervisory 17 MCRC No. 660/2016 jurisdiction under CrPC. In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (1943-44) 71 IA 203 the Privy Council spelt out the power of the investigation of the police, as follows: (IA p. 212) '... In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.'
24. This plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is, however, not unlimited. It is subject to certain well-recognised limitations. One of them, is pointed out by the Privy Council, thus: (Khwaja Nazir case, IA p.
213) '... if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation....'
25. Where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and this Court in an appropriate case can interdict the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
* * *
35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal 18 MCRC No. 660/2016 consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."
21. The judgment of this Court in T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 came to be further explained and clarified by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004) 13 SCC 292, wherein the Court stated as under: (Upkar Singh case (2004) 13 SCC 292, SCC pp. 297-300, paras 17-18 & 23-
25) "17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code. This prohibition 19 MCRC No. 660/2016 noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.
18. This Court in Kari Choudhary v.
Sita Devi (2002) 1 SCC 714 discussing this aspect of law held: (SCC p. 717, para 11) '11. The learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No.
208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it.' * * *
23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. 20 MCRC No. 660/2016 Antony case is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.
24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony case this Court did not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counterclaim, on the contrary from the observations found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing a counter-
complaint is permissible.
25. In the instant case, it is seen in regard to the incident which took place on 20-5-1995, the appellant and the first respondent herein have lodged separate complaints giving different versions but while the complaint of the respondent was registered by the police concerned, the complaint of the appellant was not so registered, hence on his prayer the learned Magistrate was justified in directing the police concerned to register a case and investigate the same and report back. In our opinion, both the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in 21 MCRC No. 660/2016 coming to the conclusion that the same is hit by Section 161 or 162 of the Code which, in our considered opinion, has absolutely no bearing on the question involved. Section 161 or 162 of the Code does not refer to registration of a case, it only speaks of a statement to be recorded by the police in the course of the investigation and its evidentiary value."
(emphasis in original)"
Thus, it is clear that two FIRs for the same offence are not permissible. However, where the incident is separate, a second FIR can be registered. In the present case, the allegations are that the respondent no.2 was ousted by the applicants from her matrimonial house on 20/12/2014 and on the said date, the respondent No.2 lodged a report at Gwalior which was transferred to Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi. It is not the case of the respondent No.2 that subsequent to lodging of the FIR which was transferred to Delhi, she had ever gone to her matrimonial house or had ever demanded her "Streedhan" from the applicants. No further incident is alleged to have taken place from which the inference can be drawn that the applicants committed an offence subsequent to lodging of the FIR on 20/12/2014. Even the allegations of misappropriation of money of respondent No.2 by the applicants were made by the respondent No.2 in the FIR which was registered for the first time on 20/12/2014 which stood transferred to Delhi. Merely because according to the applicants, the Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior has conducted the investigation for offence under Section 406 of IPC in a more efficient 22 MCRC No. 660/2016 manner then what has been done by the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi is concerned, suffice it to say that the better investigation cannot be a criteria for conferring a jurisdiction on a Police Station. It is undisputed that when a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of two different Police Stations, then both of them shall have a territorial jurisdiction to investigate the said offence.
It is fairly conceded by the counsel for the complainant that as the amount has been misappropriated at Delhi and the articles given to the respondent No.2 at the time of marriage are also lying at Delhi and the applicants are residing at Delhi, therefore, a part of cause of action has also arisen at Delhi. The counsel for the complainant tried to submit that the quality of investigation done by the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi was not upto the mark. However, as this Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the Police Station Punjabi Bagh, District West Delhi, therefore, this Court cannot consider the submissions made by the counsel for the complainant with regard to quality of investigation done by the said Police Station. If the complainant has any grievance then the proper forum would be to approach the competent jurisdiction at Delhi.
After considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the FIR in Crime No. 37/2015 registered by Police Station Kampoo, District Gwalior is bad because for the similar offence there cannot be two FIRs. Accordingly, the FIR in Crime No. 37/2015 registered by Police Station Kampoo, 23 MCRC No. 660/2016 District Gwalior is hereby quashed.
The application is allowed. No order as to costs.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
(alok) Judge