Madras High Court
The Syndicate, Anna University, The ... vs Dr. N. Lingappan, Dr. Murugesan, Head Of ... on 26 September, 2006
Author: K. Chandru
Bench: A.P. Shah, K. Chandru
JUDGMENT K. Chandru, J.
1. The appellants are the Syndicate, Vice-Chancellor and Registrar of the Anna University. In this writ appeal, they have challenged the order of the learned single Judge dated 04.01.2006 made in W.P. No. 21834 of 2000 wherein and by which, the writ petition filed by the first respondent was allowed and the University was directed to hear the appeal filed by the first respondent dated 05.5.2000 in respect of the punishment of withholding of increment for a period of two years without cumulative effect imposed by the Vice-Chancellor.
2. The order of punishment dated 03.3.2000 was made by the second appellant Vice-Chancellor of Anna University after issuing show cause notice to the first respondent and after receiving explanation from him. In the same order, it was indicated that the first respondent can file an appeal to the first appellant / Syndicate of the University.
Accordingly, the first respondent filed an appeal to the Syndicate. It transpires that the first appellant Syndicate, at its 137th meeting held on 18.10.2000, resolved to uphold the decision taken by the Vice-Chancellor as well as the punishment imposed on the first respondent. The said resolution was challenged by the first respondent in the writ petition.
3. Apart from several grounds taken, the first respondent took up the plea that under Appendix 1 in Clause 6(iii), the procedure for hearing the appeal has been described and it is as follows:
6(iii) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in these statutes, the appellate authority shall consider,
(a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established.
(b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and
(c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and after such consideration, shall pass such order as it thinks proper.
4. It is further stated that while deciding the appeal in the Syndicate meeting held on 18.10.2000, which was communicated to the first respondent on 15.11.2000, the second appellant Vice-chancellor also participated and, therefore, according to the first respondent / writ petitioner, it vitiates the order of the appellate authority, viz., the first appellant Syndicate.
5. The learned Judge agreed with the submission of the first respondent and quashed the order passed by the appellate authority, viz., Syndicate, on the short ground that the punishing authority also participated while hearing of the appeal by the appellate authority. The learned Judge also directed the first appellant / Syndicate to hear the appeal afresh within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the said order passed in the writ petition. Aggrieved at the same, the appellants have filed the present writ appeal.
6. We have heard the arguments of Mr. V. Govardhan, learned Counsel representing Row and Reddy for the appellant and have also perused the records.
7. Mr. V. Govardhan, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Vice-Chancellor, being the Ex-officio Chairman of the Syndicate under Section 17(3) of the Anna University Act, 1978, is bound to be part of the Syndicate proceedings and there is nothing wrong in his participating in the Syndicate. He also stated that when disciplinary action was taken against the first respondent, he virtually admitted his charge and requested for lenient punishment. Therefore, there is nothing wrong for the appellate authority to consider the same.
8. We are unable to agree with the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is seen that under Clause 6(iii)(c) of the procedure referred to above, the appellate authority is bound to consider regarding the proportion of the punishment. It is not as if the Vice-Chancellor is the only member of the Syndicate and his presence is totally unavoidable. Therefore, when the appellate authority is empowered to interfere with the quantum of punishment, it will be against the canons of justice that the punishing authority is also part of appellate mechanism.
9. The position of law in this regard has been made clear by judgment of the Supreme Court [Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Ors.]. In that judgment, the Supreme Court clarified the position of an appellate authority with reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, a council established by an Act of Parliament. In this regard, it is useful to extract Paragraph Nos. 25 and 26 of the said judgment and the same is extracted below:
25. We must remember that the President and the Vice-President of the Council and three members of the Council compose the Disciplinary Committee. The President and the Vice-President do certainly hold significant status in the meetings of the Council. A member whose conduct has been the subject of enquiry by the Disciplinary Committee ending in conclusions adverse to him can legitimately entertain an apprehension that the President and the Vice-President of the Council and the other members of the Disciplinary Committee would maintain the opinion expressed by them in their report and would press for the acceptance of the report by the Council. To the member whose conduct has been investigated by the Committee, the possibility of the Council disagreeing with the report in the presence of the President and the Vice-President and the other members of the Committee would seem rather remote. His fears would be aggravated by the circumstances that the President would preside over the meeting of the Council, and would thus be in a position to control and possibly dominate the proceedings during the meeting. We do not doubt that the President and the Vice-President, and also the three other members of the Disciplinary Committee, should find it possible to act objectively during the decision-making process of the Council. But to the member accused of misconduct, the danger of partisan consideration being accorded to the report would seem very real indeed.
26. The objection on the ground of bias would have been excluded if the statute had expressed itself to the contrary. But nowhere do we find in the Act any evidence to establish such exclusion. It is true that by virtue of Section 17(3) it is obligatory that the Disciplinary Committee should be composed of the President and the Vice-President of the Council and three other members of the Council. While that is so, there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the meetings of the Council must always be presided over by the President or the Vice-President, and that no meeting can be held in their absence. We find that Regulation 140 framed under the Act contemplates that the Council may meet in the absence of the President and the Vice President, and provides that in their absence a member elected from among the members who are present should preside. There is an element of flexibility which makes it possible for the Council to consider the report of the Disciplinary Committee without the participation of the members of the Committee. Because of the 'flexibility' potential in the scheme, the doctrine of necessity, to which reference has been made on behalf of the Institute, cannot come into play. We must admit that it does appear anomalous that the President and the Vice-President of the Council should be disabled from participating in a meeting of the Council because they are bound by statute to function as the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee, and were it not for the factor of flexibility which we see in the scheme, we would have been compelled to the conclusion that the Act implies an exclusion of the doctrine of bias.
10. In the light of the above, we do not propose to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge and the writ appeal shall stand dismissed. In view of the same, W.A.M.P. No. 1718 of 2006 shall also stand dismissed.
11. However, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the time granted by the learned single Judge to hear the appeal, had already expired and requested further time to hear the appeal. Therefore, the appellants are hereby directed to hear the appeal filed by the first respondent within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order on merits and in accordance with law.