Madras High Court
N.P.K.S.Sheik Abdullah vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 23 February, 2011
Author: V.Dhanapalan
Bench: V.Dhanapalan
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 23/02/2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN W.P.(MD)No.12517 of 2009 and M.P.(MD).Nos.1&2 of 2009 and M.P.(MD).No.1 of 2010 N.P.K.S.Sheik Abdullah ... Petitioner Vs 1.The State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Fort.St.George, Chennai-600 009. 2.The Principal Secretary, & Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-600 005. 3.The District Collector, Theni District, Theni. ... Respondents Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the impugned charge memo issued by the third respondent in his proceedings Na.Ka.No.41594/2009/A5, dated 03.11.2009 and quash the same as illegal and consequently to direct the respondent to include the petitioner's name in the panel of Tahsildars fit for promotion to the post of Deputy Collectors for 2009 and to promote the petitioner to the said post. !For Petitioner ... Mr.M.Ajmalkhan ^For Respondents... Mr.V.Rajasekaran Spl.Govt.Pleader ***** :ORDER
By consent of the learned counsel on either side, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal.
2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the proceedings of the respondent in Na.Ka.No.41594/2009/A5, dated 03.11.2009.
3. Brief facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are stated hereunder:
(i) The petitioner states that presently he works as Huzur Sheristadar (Magisteria) in the cadre of Tahsildars, office of the District Collector, Theni. Prior to the present post, he worked as Tahsildar (Social Security Scheme) Theni. While so, when he was working as Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Theni, there were some allegations against the petitioner stating that he wrongly issued patta in favour of one R.Jeyabharathi and R.Veerachamy.
(ii) It is the grievance of the petitioner that for the alleged transfer of patta which was said to have taken place on 19.12.2002, the third respondent has chosen to issue a charge memo, after a gap of seven years. Though the petitioner was eligible to be promoted as Tahsildar, since there was no disciplinary proceedings pending against him on the crucial date of promotion, vis, January,2009, due to issuance of the charge memo, it was thwarted upon by the respondents. The petitioner further states in respect of transfer of patta as early as on 21.10.1928, the District Collector, Madurai, granted the said land in Survey No.1554, Allinagaram Village classified as Gopalasamudram Tank in favour of one Subbanaidu and two others. The legal heirs of the said Subba Naidu sold the property in favour of one Veerachamy Naidu by a registered sale deed dated 26.08.1933 and the same was inherited. Since the legal heirs of Veerachamy Naidu, viz., R.Jeyabharathi and R.Veerachamy wanted patta to be transferred in their name, on the basis of their application, under Section 10 of the Patta Pass book Act, a patta was granted by way of proceedings dated 19.12.2002. As such, it is not the case of reclassification of the land from Gopalasamudram Taluk as private property and issue of patta for the first time in favour of the holders of title over the said property. If any is aggrieve over the issuance of patta, the same can always be questioned by way of an appeal provided under Section 11 of the patta passbook act before the Revenue Divisional Officer / Deputy Collector and thereafter, a revision against the said order can also be filed under Section 12 of the said Act.
(iii) The petitioner further submits that the respondents ought to have seen that the transfer of patta was effected by the petitioner in a capacity of the Deputy Tahsildar, being a quasi judicial authority, under Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Passbook Act and as such, the power exercised by the quasi judicial authority under the statute cannot be questioned by way of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the same can be set aside in the manner provided under the Tamil Nadu Patta Passbook Act and as such, the issue of charge memo cannot be sustained in the eye of law. He further states that the impugned order has been issued after an inordinate delay of seven years by depriving the opportunities of defending the charge levelled against him. The evidence during the relevant period of time cannot be verified at this length of time. Therefore, finding that there is no other alternative remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court for the relief stated earlier.
4. The respondent has filed a vacate stay petition along with a counter affidavit stating as follows:-
(i) When the petitioner was working as Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Theni, it was brought to the notice that the land in Survey No.1554 of Allinagaram, originally classified and registered as Gopala Samudram Tank in revenue accounts during settlement was subsequently assigned through a grant of land by the composite Madurai District Collector in his D.Dis.No.75/1928, dated 21.10.1928 based on a Government order No.1752, dated 31.07.1916 in favour of Subbah Naidu and three others on certain conditions. However, these conditions have been found violated. The tank in question is to irrigate the assignees lands and not to hypothecate the tank to others for consideration.
(ii) In the counter, it is further stated that the erring officials will be charged only at the time of invention of the malpractices committed by them and there is no time limit for taking action against an erring Government servant. The tank called 'Gopala Samudra Kulam' in S.No.1554 of Allinagaram village in Theni Taluk was assigned to Subba naidu and three others in the year 1928 to irrigate their ayacut lands and to maintain the tank properly. But it is learnt from the sale deeds presented to the revenue officials for transfer of right under Transfer of Registry Act that the assignees have violated the conditions and sold away the tank to others. Therefore, the act of the petitioner found to be mala fide and gross negligence of legitimate exercise of the power. Apart from this, the petitioner was also served with the charge memo vide Roc.No.41594/2009/A5, dated 03.01.2009 for having ordered a transfer of registry as per RTR No.799/2002, dated 19.12.2002 during his tenure as the Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Theni Taluk, Theni. Therefore, this Writ Petition may be liable to be dismissed.
5. On the above background pleadings, I have heard Mr.M.Ajmal Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.V.Rajasekaran, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents.
6. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that for the incident which took place in March 2002, a charge memo has been issued to the petitioner on 03.11.2009, after a lapse of seven years and therefore, there is inordinate and unexplained delay in initiation and conclusion of the proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner is fully eligible to be included in the panel of Tahsildars fit for promotion to the post of Deputy Collector, since as on the crucial date, i.e.01.01.2009, no charge was pending as against the petitioner nor he was under any currency of punishment.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there is not only inordinate delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, however, further proceedings also did not take off by the respondents. Added further, being a competent authority, under Section 10 of the Patta Pass Book Act, he had granted patta and therefore, the petitioner had only discharged his duties. If something is adversed against the order passed by the competent authority, the same can always be challenged in the manner known to law. No plausible explanation has been given by the respondents in the counter statement for the issuance of charge memo after a gap of seven years.
8. He would further contend that the inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings is a ground for quashing the charge memo unless the employer satisfactorily explains the delay, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of P.V.Mahadevan vs. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403 and in the case of Ranjeet Singh vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in 2008 (3) CTC 781.
8a. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that because of the delay in initiation of the proceedings, the petitioner's claim for promotion for the post of the Deputy Collector has not been considered on the ground that charges are pending against him; therefore, his name was not included in the panel for promotion and in no point of time, the petitioner has contributed any delay in initiation and conclusion of the proceedings.
8b. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied on the following:
(i) P.V.Mahadevan vs. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403
(ii) Ranjeet Singh vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in 2008 (3) CTC
781.
(iii) a Division Bench decision of this court reported in 2005 (2) CTC 169 (Union of India, Pondicherry vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench and another).
"3. ... With the above notings the inquiry authority returned the papers to the disciplinary authority for taking an appropriate action in that matter. Again, there was a long lull during which time no move at all was made by the disciplinary authority. Suddenly, on 26.12.2000, which is almost one year and nine months later, the second charge memo was issued.
4. ... According to the charge memo the alleged misconduct was during the year 1984-85 and twenty long years have since gone by from that and yet no progress whatsoever made by the Government till the Tribunal passed orders challenged in these writ petitions. In other words, there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 07.10.1994, the date on which O.A.No.1689 of 1993 was dismissed by the Tribunal, till 26.02.2000 when the Government issued the second charge memo. Again, we find there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 26.02.2000 till the employee again went before the Tribunal in the year 2002. The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Government to continue with the enquiry any further. Therefore, on that ground stated by us, the orders in challenge are sustained and the writ petitions are dismissed. ..."
(iv) another Division Bench decision of this court reported in 2005 (5) CTC 380 in the case of A.Obaidhullah vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai - 9 and another "15. Mr.K.V.Srinivasaraghavan has also brought to our notice a letter (Ms) No.1118/Per.N.87 dated 22.12.1987 issued by Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Government of Tamil Nadu to all the heads of departments how the disciplinary cases should be disposed of expeditiously and prescribed a revised time limit for disposal of disciplinary cases. A perusal of the communication shows the time limit has been prescribed for completion of investigation/enquiry at every stage, including report by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, etc. In the absence of explanation at all on the side of the Government, except change of Government then and there, we are of the view that the Tribunal ought to have accepted the case of the petitioner (A.Obaidhullah) and quashed the charge memo on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay. "
(v) yet another Division Bench judgment of this court reported in 2005 (5) CTC 451 in the case of The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk, Chennai and another vs. N.Sivasamy "14. ... We have already pointed out that though the applicant filed Original Application No.6284/97 challenging the charge memo dated 15.07.97, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with disciplinary proceedings; there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo dated 15.07.1997."
(vi) a decision of the Madurai Bench of this court reported in 2006 (2) CTC 574 in the case of R.Tirupathy and others vs. The District Collector, Madurai District and others "36. Therefore, a combined reading of the communication of the first respondent to the second respondent and consequently, the impugned order passed by the third respondent based on the communication of the second respondent shows that the impugned charge memos have been framed not with an independent mind but with a pre-determined view. It is like a second show cause notice given normally for Government servants after conducting enquiry and finding the delinquent liable to be punished. In this case, without any enquiry and without giving any opportunity to the petitioners the impugned charge memos are issued which are really in the form of a second show cause notice as to why the petitioners should not be removed from service. ..."
(vii) yet another decision of the Madurai Bench of this court reported in 2006 (2) CTC 635 in the case of M.Elangovan vs. The Trichy District Central Co- operative Bank Ltd., Tiruchirappalli and another "12. Likewise in respect of the other case, the charge memo was issued on 19.11.2001 in respect of an incident namely granting of loan which is stated to have happened in the year 1992 namely nearly ten years before the said period. The second show cause notice in the case was issued on 03.10.2003 proposing the punishment of recovery of amount of Rs.2,74,303. The petitioner has also given his explanation on 22.02.2004. One has to appreciate that the case of petitioner is that even though, the charge memo has not been specifically challenged, the grievance is that during the verge of retirement, when the proposed punishment itself is only the stoppage of six months' increments and the recovery of amount, if the order has been passed even proposed punishment (and) the period of punishment would have been over and the petitioner would have been promoted to the next cadre. It is due to the inordinate delay even from the date the second show cause notice was issued the petitioner has incurred huge loss which cannot be compensated. In fact, the petitioner has given various incidents to show as to how this chance of the promotion has been obstructed due to the pendency of these proceedings.
16. ... it can safely be concluded that the petitioner has already suffered enough on account of the disciplinary proceedings and as pointed out and the mental agony and sufferings of the petitioner due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the proposed punishment itself. For the mistakes committed by the department in inordinate delay in the initiating proceedings and also during the conducting of the proceedings the petitioner shall not be made to suffer any further."
(viii) a decision of this court reported in 2007 (3) CTC 763 in the case of K.Kumaran vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai - 5 "9. In the above said two judgments, the Honourable Supreme Court held that normally the Disciplinary Proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per the relevant Rules, but then the delay defeats justice, delay cause prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to be blamed for the delay or where there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting Disciplinary Proceedings. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner has not caused any delay and the inordinate delay of 18 years is not properly explained by the respondents. It is also necessary to mention that earlier the petitioner has filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.20261/2004, seeking for a direction to the respondents therein to pass final orders, which was disposed of directing the respondents to pass final orders in the Disciplinary Proceedings on or before 30.09.2004, which was not complied with."
(ix) a Supreme Court decision reported in 2008 (3) CTC 781 in the case of Ranjeet Singh vs. State of Haryana & others "We find that the Trial Court decreed the suit primarily for three reasons : (a) There was an unexplained delay of nine years in issuing the charge-sheet;
(b) There was an unexplained delay of seven years in issuing show cause notice after the enquiry report was submitted in January 1985; (c) The appellant was promoted thrice between the dates of alleged misconduct and imposition of punishment (which was about nineteen years). This court has repeatedly held that inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings is a ground for quashing the enquiry unless the employer satisfactorily explains the delay. For example, where the matter is referred to CBI for investigation and there is delay in getting its report or where the charge is of misappropriation and the facts leading to misappropriation come to light belatedly, it can be said that the delay is not fatal. But where the alleged misconduct was known and there was no investigation pending and when no explanation is forthcoming in regard to the delay, necessarily the unexplained delay would cause serious prejudice to the employee and therefore, enquiry will have to be quashed. [Vide State of A.P. vs. N.Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevan vs. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4) CTC 403: 2005 (6) SCC 636]."
(x) yet another Division Bench decision of this court reported in 2009 (3) TLNJ 132 (Civil) in the case of State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai vs. R.Ramarajan and others "19. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, when initially an inquiry by the CB-CID to probe into the alleged involvement of the first respondent in running of illegal gambling dens and casinos in Karur District was ordered, which did not bring out any adverse findings against the first respondent and thereafter, even in the inquiry and re-inquiry ordered to be conducted by the DVAC on the allegation of accumulation of disproportionate wealth nothing incriminating was found against the first respondent, thirdly the delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings in respect of the events which took place in the year 2000-02, i.e. the alleged irregular transfers effected and finally prolonging the disciplinary proceedings for a considerable length of time, we have no hesitation to conclude that the very object of initiating the departmental proceedings and allowing it to prolong for a considerable length of time is nothing but to harass the first respondent and to deprive him the promotion and other benefits. ..."
9. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader would strenuously contend that the respondent has diligently followed the rules and procedures in respect of the initiation of the proceedings in issuing the charge memo; Normally charges will be framed against erring officials for malpractices, when it came to light and there is no time limit for taking action against the erring officials; and on the part of the respondent, there is no inordinate delay in initiation of the proceedings and they have taken all steps to conclude the proceedings at the earliest. It may be true that there was some delay on the part of the respondent to conclude the departmental proceedings, but this Court has to give due consideration for the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court is required to analyse and determined on its own facts particularly in view of the nature of the charges levelled against the petitioner.
9a. To substantiate his stand, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents has relied on the following :
(i) a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1995) 3 SCC 134 in the case of Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Faizabad vs. Sachindra Nath Pandey and others "7. On a perusal of charges, we find that the charges are very serious.
We are, therefore, not inclined to close the matter only on the ground that about 16 years have elapsed since the date of commencement of disciplinary proceedings, more particularly when the appellant alone cannot be held responsible for this delay. So far as the merits are concerned, we regret to say that the High Court has not dealt with the submissions - and fact in support of the submission of the appellant - that in spite of being given a number of opportunities the first respondent has failed to avail of them. If the appellant's allegations are true then the appellant cannot be faulted for not holding a regular inquiry (recording the evidence of witnesses and so on). ... In the circumstances, we have no alternative but to set aside the order under appeal and remit the matter to the High Court once again for disposal of the writ petition afresh in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matter is a very old one it is but appropriate that the matter is dealt with expeditiously. Perhaps, it would be appropriate if the Court looks into the records relating to the disciplinary proceedings also."
(ii) another decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2007 AIR SCW 1639 in the case of Government of A.P. And others vs. V.Appala Swamy "10. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts.
The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are :
(1) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee.
(2) Where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry Officer."
(iii) a decision of this court reported in (2007) 6 MLJ 700 (Mad) in the case of A.Petchimuthu vs. Chief Executive Officer, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, Kuralagam and another "11. Since the only ground on which the challenge to suspension was made in W.P.No.11316 of 2007 was that the charge memo was under stay by this court. Since the writ petition relating to the charge memo itself has been dismissed, there is no cause for warranting any interference any interference in the order of suspension, which is impugned in the W.P.No.11316 of 2007. ..."
(iv) yet another decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2008) 2 SCC 41 in the case of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others vs. Kamal Swaroop Tondon "30. In our opinion, Mahadevan (2005) 6 SCC 636 does not help the respondent. No rigid, inflexible or invariable test can be applied as to when the proceedings should be allowed to be continued and when they should be ordered to be dropped. In such cases there is neither lower limit nor upper limit. If on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court is satisfied that there was gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating departmental proceedings and continuation of such proceedings would seriously prejudice the employee and would result in miscarriage of justice, it may quash them. We may, however, hasten to add that it is an exception to the general rule that once the proceedings are initiated, they must be taken to the logical end. It, therefore, cannot be laid down as a proposition of law or a rule of universal application that if there is delay in initiation of proceedings for a particular period, they must necessarily be quashed."
(v) an unreported judgment of this court dated 22.07.2009 in the case of K.Vadivel Alagan vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and another "14. In the light of the above decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court and having regard to the fact that the delay is properly explained in the counter affidavit of the second respondent and similar charge levelled against other officers who worked during the relevant period i.e., from the date of commencement of the construction till the completion of the construction having been proved and the punishment having been imposed on them, the petitioner cannot be treated differently than the other officers. The delay in not passing final orders as against the petitioner from 2001 to till date on the part of the petitioner. If the charges against the petitioner are quashed in spite of punishment given to other officers, who were proceeded on the same charge, it will amount to giving premium for litigation. No case is made out to quash the charge memo. "
10. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the decisions relied on by them and the materials available on record.
11. In this case, it is seen that when the petitioner was working as Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Theni, there were some allegations against the petitioner stating that he had wrongly issued patta in favour of one R.Jeyabharathi and R.Veerachamy. Pursuant to that, for the alleged occurrence took place in the year 2002, a charge memo came to be issued on 03.11.2009. In the counter of the respondent, except to state that there is no time limit for taking action against the erring officials, nothing has been stated further to explain as to why there was a delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings and conclude it within a reasonable time. The delay caused has not been properly and satisfactorily explained by the respondent as to how much time was taken to initiate the proceedings for the incident which took place in 2002, by issuing the charge memo on 03.11.2009. Even assuming that the delay was due to some reason or other, it was not explained as to why there was no action on the part of the respondents between 2002 and 2009. In the absence of any explanation for the delay, the delay would cause a great prejudice to the petitioner. Due to the delay in initiation of the departmental proceedings, the petitioner's name was not included for promotion on the ground that a charge memo against the petitioner was the reason for non-inclusion. It is not proper on the part of the respondent to issue the charge memo, after a lapse of seven years, as and when, they think it fit. It is expected that any disciplinary proceedings is reasonably concluded so as to meet the ends of justice at both ends. Such is not the case in the case on hand.
12. The Supreme Court repeatedly held that the inordinate delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is a ground for quashing the charge memo unless the respondent satisfactorily explains the delay. When no explanation is forthcoming with regard to the delay, necessarily the unexplained delay would cause serious prejudice to the employee. Thereafter, the charge memo will have to be quashed as held by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N.Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154; P.V.Mahadevan vs. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4) CTC 403 and Ranjeet Singh vs. State of Haryana & others, 2008 (3) CTC 781. There are no special circumstances to explain the inordinate delay and therefore, the charge memo is vitiated.
13. It is the cardinal principle that it is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest termination after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. The protracted disciplinary proceedings against the Government employee should be avoided not only in the interest of the Government employee but in public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. Apart from that, it is well settled law that any omission or commission in the bona fide discharge of quasi judicial function cannot form basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings with an inordinate delay of seven years. Since the petitioner effected patta transfer under Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983, (for short 'the Act') the power exercised by the quasi judicial authority under the statute cannot be questioned by way of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the same could be set aside in the manner provided under the Act by initiating appropriate proceedings at an appropriate stage and conclude the same within a reasonable time.
14. Normally, the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per the relevant rules, but then the delay defeats justice, delay causes prejudice to the charged officer, unless it can be shown that he is to be blamed for the delay or where there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. In this case, the respondent has not explained the reason as to why there was an inordinate delay for the issuance of the charge dated 03.11.2009. Therefore, the delay caused in initiating the disciplinary proceedings for more than seven years appears to be inordinate and unexplained.
15. It is pertinent to note that in similar circumstances this Court considered a Writ Petition in W.P.No.22369 of 2009, dated 16.12.2009, in the case of K.Vijhay Saai Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by its Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009 and others, wherein, this Court after analysing all the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court, ultimately held that the inordinate and unexplained delay will defeat the justice at the threshold and the charges framed therein were quashed. The view elucidated by this Court was also affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in in W.A.No.1669 of 2010, dated 29.09.2010 in the case of State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by its Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009 and others Vs K.Vijhay Saai and as such, the impugned charge memo cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is liable to be quashed. Taking into account of the fact that no disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner as on the crucial date viz., 01.01.2009 and as such, by issue of the impugned charge memo, the third respondent has deprived the petitioner from being included in the panel of Tahsildar fit for promotion to the post of Deputy Collector.
16. For the foregoing reasons and the discussions made above, I am of the considered view that the charge memo issued is vitiated on the ground that there was unexplained and unsatisfactory delay for initiating the proceedings for the incident which took place in the year 2002 and the charge memo came to be issued on 03.11.2009. Therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, it is absolutely necessary to quash the charge memo issued against the petitioner and accordingly, it is quashed.
17. The writ petition is allowed with a direction to the respondents to include the petitioner name in the panel of Tahsildar fit for promotion to the post of Deputy Collectors for the year 2009 and promote to the said post. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also closed. No costs.
ssm To
1.The Secretary, The State of Tamil Nadu, Revenue Department, Fort.St.George, Chennai-600 009.
2.The Principal Secretary, & Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-600 005.
3.The District Collector, Theni District, Theni.