Madras High Court
Janakiammal And Ors. vs P.A.K. Natarajan And Ors. on 18 September, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR1989MAD88, AIR 1989 MADRAS 88, (1988) 101 MADLW 416 (1988) 24 REPORTS 277, (1988) 24 REPORTS 277
JUDGMENT Srinivasan, J.
1. The second appeal arises out of a suit for partition filed by the first respondent who purchased 9/16th share in the suit properties from defendants 14 to 16 who are respondents 2 to 4. The suit properties consist of two items the first of them being a house and the second a vacant site. The only question in this appeal is whether the appellants are entitled to purchase the share of the plaintiff under Section 4 of the Partition Act.
2. The plaintiff is the son of one Kayambu Nadar, whose brother was one Peria Karuppa Nadar. In a partition among the brothers, in 1934, the suit properties and two other items fell to the share of Peria Karuppa Nadar. He died leaving five sons and three daughters in 1960. One of his sons died in 1968 leaving defendants 1 to 4 as his heirs. Another son died in 1980 whose heirs are defendants 5 to 12. Defendants, 13, 17 and 18 are the three daughters of Peria Karuppa Nadar while defendants 14 to 16 are his surviving sons. Peria Karuppa Nadar's wife Sankara Avudai died in June 1981. It is admitted in the plaint that Sankara Avudai was living in suit item No. 1 till her death. After her death, her children and grandchildren wanted to divide the properties by metes and bounds. As they could not bring about an amicable division, defendants 14 to 16 sold their shares to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that he was put in possession of the property and that it was sought to be disturbed by defendants 1 to 12. It was in these circumstances, he filed the suit for partition. The suit was contested by defendants 1 to 13, 17 and 18. The written statement was filed by the 6th defendant. In para. 9 of the written statement, it was stated that the first item of the suit property is the ancestral dwelling house of the undivided family of defendants 1 to 18 and the second item is part and parcel of the first item and that it was used as dwelling house till 1982. In paragraph 11 of the written statement, an unconditional undertaking to repurchase the shares held by defendants 14 to 16 was given.
3. Both the Courts below held that item 2 did not form part of item No. 1 and that it was only a vacant site. As regards item No. 1, it was held by both the Courts that it should not be treated as a dwelling house of the undivided family as the members of the family had abandoned the idea of residing in the house and that it had ceased to be a dwelling house. Consequently, a preliminary decree for partition of the 9/16th share of the plaintiff was passed. It is the correctness of the said decree which is challenged in this second appeal.
4. During the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court, the appellants herein filed a petition under Section 4 of the Partition Act, for a direction to the first respondent herein to execute and register a sale deed in their favour with respect to his 9/16th share. That petition was filed in the trial Court in the final decree proceedings. The trial Court dismissed the said petition by an order dt. 30-7-1986 and against that order, the revision petition has been filed.
5. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the first item of the suit properties ceased to be a dwelling house and the entire approach made by the Courts below was vitiated. It is also argued that the second item is really appurtenant to the first item and should be treated as part and parcel thereof. It is contended by learned counsel that there is absolutely no evidence to support the finding that the members of the family had abandoned the idea of residing in the house. Learned counsel invited my attention to a number of decisions of various Courts under Section 4 of the Partition Act and submitted that the principles laid down in these decisions have been ignored by the Courts below. Per contra, learned counsel for the first respondent submits that there is sufficient evidence on record including certain admitted facts and circumstances to support the conclusion of the Courts below and that there is no warrant for interference with the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant would not be applicable to the facts of this case.
6. Before considering the authorities cited by learned counsel on both sides, it is necessary to refer to the reasoning of the Courts below for holding that the suit first item is not a dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partition Act and that the second item is not part and parcel of the first item. It is admitted that all the members of the family, viz., defendants 1 to 18 have been permanently residing in places outside Arupukottai, where the suit properties are situated. It is admitted that they are living separately in different places and carrying on different occupations. The wife of Peria Karuppa Nadar was the only person living in the suit first item till her death in 1981. Soon after her death, the members of the family did not only attempt to effect a division of all the properties by metes and bounds but also tried to sell their shares. The Courts below had referred to a letter written by the first defendant and marked as Ex.P. 11 offering purchase the entire house for herself. The plaintiff has given evidence as P.W. 1 that the members of the family had engaged the services of brokers for selling their shares separately. The comment made by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the evidence of P.W. 1 is only hearsay as he got know ledge only from the brokers. P.W. 1 undoubtedly entitled to speak about the fact that brokers made an attempt to procure purchasers for the house and that would not be hearsay in any sense of the term. In fact, he had himself purchased the shares of the three sons of Peria Karuppa Nadar. D.W. 1 is the 14th defendant and he has given evidence in support of the plaintiff. He has spoken about Ex.B. 11, the letter written by the first defendant. He has also deposed that the first defendant was trying to sell the share of her husband through a broker named Rathnam. The only witness examined in support of the appellants is the second defendant. There is no explanation as to why the first defendant did not go into the box. The circumstances under which Ex.B. 11 was written have not been explained. The second defendant admits that he has settled in Madras from 1969 though as claimed to have been in Aruppukottai in 1974. He admits that there is no record whatever to show that he was living in the suit first item after 1963. From the aforesaid circumstances the Courts below drew an inference that the members of the family had abandoned the idea of living in the house and it had ceased to be a dwelling house. It cannot be said that the reasoning of the Courts below is perverse or that no reasonable person could have come to such a conclusion. Where two inferences are possible and one such inference has been drawn by the Courts of fact, that cannot be interfered with by this Court sitting in second appeal. I am unable to persuade myself to hold that the Courts below have made entirely a wrong approach to the issue on hand and that the conclusion arrived at by them is wholly unsustainable or that there is absolutely no evidence in support of that conclusion. When there is acceptable evidence on record to sustain the finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below, it is not possible for this Court to disturb the said finding. Hence, the finding that item No. 1 of the suit properties is not a dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partition Act has to be confirmed.
7. As regards item No. 2, it is admitted by the second defendant as D.W. 1 that the superstructure in item No. 2 had fallen down even in 1980. Strangely he claims that the defendants are still residing in item No. 2, in spite of the collapse of the superstructure. Apart from that it is admitted that there is a Municipal street in between item No. 1 and item No. 2 and that the two properties are given separate door numbers by the Municipality. There is no evidence whatever that item No. 2 was appurtenant to item No. 1. By the very situation of the properties, it can be held that item No. 2 is not appurtenant to item No. 1. There is also no evidence to prove that the members of the family had lived in item No. 2 at any time. I have no doubt that in my mind that the conclusion of the Courts below that item No. 2 is not part and parcel of item No. 1 is absolutely correct.
8. Before referring to the authorities cited at the Bar, it has to be pointed out that Section 4 of the Partition Act was enacted having in mind the consideration of corporate property which existed at that time as a rule in the east particularly with reference to joint family property and social desire to preserve unity of joint family and maintain the indivisibility of joint status and integrity of joint property. The object of the section was to prevent fragmentation or disintegration of a family dwelling house at the instance of a transferee of a share therein. A sea change has taken place in the life style of the people in the country and what prevailed in 1893 when the Act was passed is a matter of ancient history. Joint family has ceased to be the unit of society and the concept of one family living in one house has practically disappeared. Modern buildings in major towns house many a family very often drawn from various parts of the country. People with different customs and habits are perforce living in one building. Even among the members of a family, the idea of a joint mess is fast disappearing. Whether the section which really curtails the rights of a person which are normally appended to ownership of property should continue in the statute book in the wake of modern progression is a matter for the Parliament to ponder. So long as the section continues to exist it has to be given effect to. Even in days of yore, it had been pointed out that the section should be strictly construed as it involves statutory, interference of legal rights (Vide Illias Ahmed v. Bulagichand, AIR 1917 All 2). In order that the section should apply the house in question should be a dwelling house of an undivided family.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants cited a number of decisions to which I will refer in the order of chronology. The earliest case cited was that of Nilkamal Bhattacharya v. Kamakshya Charan Bhattacharya, AIR 1928 Cal 539. In that case, Mukerji, J. held that the word 'family' in Section 4 of the Partition Act ought to be given a liberal and comprehensive meaning and it includes a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house under one head or management, and that it is not restricted to a body of persons who can trace their descent from a common ancestor. It was also observed by the learned Judge that it was not necessary for the members to constitute an undivided family, that they should constantly reside in the dwelling house, or that they should be joint in mess. It was observed 'that it is sufficient if the members of the family are undivided qua the dwelling house which they own; that it is the ownership of the dwelling house and not its actual occupation which brings the operation of the section into play; and that the object of the section is to prevent a transferee of a member of a family who is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which other members of his transferor's family have a right to live.' The question whether a dwelling house would continue to be a dwelling house even after the members had abandoned the idea of living therein, and had actually been living elsewhere for a long time, did not arise for consideration in that case.
10. Learned counsel placed considerable reliance on the following observations of Walsh J. in Subramania Sastri v. Sheik Ghannu, AIR 1935 Mad 628 :-
"But it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that we must first look to the words of the statute itself and if these words are plain it is not permissible to consider what was the intention of the statute or its previous history of the law. Now the first point to be noted is that the section does not speak of 'a family dwelling house', though from the commentary quoted one might almost suppose that it did. Nor does it say that the 'dwelling house' must be occupied either permanently or even occasionally by the undivided family. The word 'dwelling house' has a perfectly well known add plain meaning and does not necessarily connote a dwelling house occupied by an undivided family, who also own it. The legislature might quite easily have used the term 'family dwelling house' if it had wished to do so but it contended itself with the simple word 'dwelling house'. So also the words 'belonging to an undivided family' are quite unqualified and do not per se at all import that the house must be occupied permanently or even temporarily by the undivided family."
The above observations were made by the learned Judge while interpreting Section 44(2) of the T.P. Act. The learned Judge while granting a preliminary decree for partition in favour of a purchaser of a share of the house negatived the claim for mesne profits on the ground that by the terms of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, the purchaser was disentitled to be in joint possession with the members of the family and therefore not entitled to mesne profits. A request for an account and share in the rents was negatived by the learned Judge on the ground that there was no prayer therefor in the appeal memo or in the arguments. The view taken by the learned Judge that a house which was completely let out to tenants could fall within the terms 'dwelling house' belonging to an undivided family' found in Section 44, T.P. Act was not supported by any authority as the learned Judge himself pointed out in that case. Though it is not necessary for me to do so in this case, I have to express my disagreement with the ratio of that decision. With respect I should point out that the learned Judge had interpreted the words found in the section independently and did not construe the section as such. A salient rule of judicial interpretation is that the construction to be adopted must be such that it would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy intended by the Legislature. It will be appropriate to extract the following passage from G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation' : --
"In case of doubt therefore it is always safe to have an eye on the object and purposes of the statute, or reason and spirit behind it. I say that we must look to what the purpose is" was said by Lord Cairns (Hill v. East and West India Dock Co., (1884) 9 AC 448 HL p. 455, and it was observed by Sir John Nicholl that the key to the opening of every law is the reason and the spirit of the law' (Brett v. Brett, (1826) 3 Add 218). This aspect of 'purpose' is the every foundation of the rule of Heydon's case reported by Lord Coke as far back as 1584. (Rule in Nyden's case title 3(h) Chapter 2) Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid said L. Hand J. 'but with imagination of purpose behind them' (Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yansavage 218 Fed 547 pp. 552, 553). 'Eachword, phrase or sentence' observed Mukerjea J. 'is to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself (Popatlal Shah v. State of Madras, ). For ascertaining the purpose of a statute one is not restricted to the internal aid furnished by the statute itself (Honrette v. A. G., AIR 1930 PC 120 at Pp. 121, 122) although the text of the statute taken as a whole is the most important material for ascertaining both the aspect of 'intention'. Without intending to lay down a precise and exhaustive list of external side, Lord Somervell has stated --The mischief against which the statute is directed and, perhaps though to an undefined extent the surrounding circumstances can be considered. Other statutes in pari materia and the state of the law at the time are admissible. (A. G. v. H.R.H. Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49 at p. 61). These external aids are also brought in by widening the concept of 'context' as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy' (A.G. v. H.R.H. Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49 at p. 53 -- Viscount Simonds). The principle as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes is to the following effect: 'You construe a particular clause or expression by construing the whole instrument and any dominant purposes that it may express. In fact, intention is a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids may be to interpretation besides the particular words and the dictionary (Cases and other Materials on Legislation, by Reid, Macdonald and Fardham, 2nd Edn page 1005".)
11. Significantly, the learned Judge his himself in the earlier part of the judgment taken the view that Section 4 of the Partition Act should be construed strictly as it affects the legal rights of the plaintiff statutorily.
12. The decision of a single-Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Rukmi Sewak v. Munesari, , was cited for the purpose of showing that the fact of residing in the house is not one of the ingredients to the right to invoke the provisions of Section 4 of the Partition Act. There is no difficulty in agreeing with the proposition laid down in that decision as the section does not insist upon the particular sharer who is an applicant under Section 4 of the Partition Act residing in the house. The only requisite is that the house should be a 'dwelling house.'
13. Reliance was next placed on the decision of a Division Bench in Dulal Chandra Chatterjee v. Gosthebehari Mitta, , wherein it was held that the creation of a tenancy with respect to the house does not terminate the possibility of the owners of the House returning to its occupation and that as long as the tenancy was not a permanent and irrevocable one, the question of the house ceasing to be a 'dwelling house' did not arise. The decision cannot help the appellants in the present case as the question has to be decided with reference to the facts of each case.
14. My attention was next drawn to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kalyanmal v. Jaggadishprasad AIR 1953 Nag 130, wherein it was held that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the house ceased to be a dwelling house on the date of his acquisition of title and right to possession of his share of the house. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it can be safely held that the plaintiff has discharged the said burden in this case.
15. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Susila v. J.B. Baral, AIR 1956 Orissa 56, has held that while giving a liberal interpretation to the word 'family' in Section 4, it is not necessary to find that the members should be constantly residing in it, or that they should constitute an undivided family when the dwelling house is left undivided. It was observed that the section in clear terms refers to the, ownership of the dwelling house by an undivided, family; but whether the members of the family occupy it or not, it must be a dwelling house. It was held in that case that just because the house was let out to tenants, it did not cease to be a dwelling house. There was no finding in that case, that the members had abandoned the idea of residing in the house at any time, hence, that decision would not help the appellant in the present case.
16. Learned counsel sought refuge in the Division Bench decision in Rukia Bi v. Rajia Bibi, , where it was held that a female member born in a family did not cease to be a member of that family because she married into another family as marriage under Mohammedan Law was a contract, and not a question of any change of status from one family to another. That decision was concerned only with the question whether the applicant under Section 4 of the Partition Act, was a member of the family or not. There was no issue in that case whether the house was a dwelling house. The decision of the Bench will not in any manner help the appellants.
17. In Satyendu Kundu v. Amamath a Division Bench held that a house did not cease to be a dwelling house even when a major portion was let out to tenants and some of the daughters of the family had got married and began to live with their husband away from the father's house. The crucial fact in that case was that a portion of the house was retained for the residence of the head of the family permanently and that never went out of his occupation. There was no doubt in that case that the house continued to be a dwelling house.
18. In Manicklal v. Gourisankar, , a Division Bench held that a mere separation in mess will not make the family divided if the members of the family had a joint property and that it was not necessary that on the date of suit for partition, the property should belong to an undivided family. It was held in that case that it was sufficient if the members of the family were undivided on the date when the share of a member was transferred to a stranger. That decision does not apply to the facts of the present case.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants invited my attention to the decision of a single Judge of Patna High Court in Kaliapada v. Tagar Bala, in which it was held that the inference of abandonment of intention to use the disputed house as a dwelling house is not a pure question of fact and it can be interfered with in second appeal if found unsupported by any evidence. It was also held that a mere non-occupation of the house for some time by the members of the family will not be sufficient indication of their abandoning the intention of keeping the house as a dwelling house, more particularly where such house is admittedly an ancestral dwelling house. I have already referred to the facts of this case where from it can be seen that the inference of abandonment is not drawn from mere non-occupation of the house by the members of the family. There are other circumstances in this case which have been relied upon by the Courts below and it cannot be said that such inference is unsupported by any evidence.
20. In Santosh Kr. Mitra v. Kalipada Das, , a Division Bench held that the fact that a part of the house may be a considerable part of it, has been let out to tenants, does not by itself lead to the conclusion that the house has ceased to be a family dwelling house. This case is similar to the one decided in Satyendra Kundu v. Amarnath . That will not have any bearing on the present case.
21. Learned counsel for the respondent cited the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bai Fatma v. Gulmanbai, AIR 1936 Bom 197. It was held in that case that a person who is not in occupation of a house belonging to the an undivided family and who has no intention of occupying it in future, is not entitled to the benefits of Section 4 of the Partition Act merely because he is an owner of the house. It is not possible for me to agree with the proposition laid down in that case as the requirement of the section is not that the applicant under Section 4 of the partition Act should himself or herself be residing in the house in question. It is enough if the house is a dwelling house in the sense that it serves the purpose of residence for any member of the undivided family and that the house is owned by the undivided family.
22. The only other decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents is that of the Calcutta High Court in Durgapada v. Debidas, . In that case, the members of the family were separated in mess and were residing in different places. They used to stay in the house in the village for attending Kali Puja held in the adjoining plot and the house was otherwise used for collection of paddy. The Court held that the stray use of the property for short residence for a specific purpose will not make it a dwelling house. It will be useful to extract the following passage from the judgment --
"The ratio of the cases cited above appears to be that Section 4 is to be liberally construed in favour of the undivided family, who had the ownership of the property between its members. There must be an ancestral dwelling house in existence on the suit land at some point of time though the dwelling house may not be in existence at the material time and the land underneath may remain vacant for the time being. But it must be established that the members of the family have not abandoned the property for their use as the dwelling house and also have an intention of building a dwelling house thereon. The extreme view put forward by the Orissa High Court was not accepted by the decisions of this court as we have noted above. To this, it also has to be taken in consideration that stray use of the property for short residence for specific purpose will not make such property a dwelling house as contemplated in Section 4. A dwelling house connotes to some extent a permanent abode of the undivided family where such family resides or intends to reside generally and not a house for stray short or temporary residence for specified purposes."
23. There are two decisions referred to by the Courts below in their judgments but not cited by counsel on either side before me. The first is that of the Allahabad High Court in Bhagirath v. Afag Rasul . The principle was laid down by Kidwai J. in the following terms --
"It seems to me that the true principle for deciding such cases has been correctly appreciated by the learned Civil Judge. The question to be decided in each case is whether the family has abandoned all idea of occupying the house as residential house and not the state in which a house is. A person may not be able to reconstruct his house for a considerable length of time owing to poverty or owing as in this case, to disputes with strangers to the family regarding its occupation. The house may fall into a complete state of disrepair owing to these circumstances but it will nevertheless continue to be a family residential house if the members of the family intend to use it as such as soon as they can conveniently do so."
It was held by the learned Judge in that case that the mere fact that the ancestral family house was in a dilapidated condition did not affect the status of the house as a 'dwelling house'.
24. The second decision is that of Govinda Menon J. in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Nataraja Chettiar (1955) 1 Mad LJ 118. Accepting the proposition laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid case, Govinda Menon J. held that in order to determine whether a particular house is a family dwelling house within Section 4 of the Partition Act, the question is whether the family had abandoned all idea of occupying the house as a residential house. The facts were similar to those found in Bhagirath v. Afaq Rasul mentioned above. Even when the customary family house was in a dilapidated condition, the Court held that it was a dwelling house within the meaning of the section.
25. Thus, the test is whether the members of the family have abandoned all idea of occupying the house. On the facts of this case, it has been found on evidence concurrently by both the courts below that the members of the family had abandoned the idea of residing in the suit property and it ceased to be a dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partition Act. As stated earlier, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said findings of fact.
26. In the result the second appeal fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
27. Consequently, the civil revision petition has to be dismissed However, it has to be mentioned that learned counsel for the, petitioner has in the revision petition put forward a strange argument that the question whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of Section 4 of the Partition Act has to be decided only in the application filed by them" in the course of the final decree proceedings in the trial Court and that the finding given in the suit and confirmed by the lower appellate Court that the house in question is not a dwelling house will not be res judicata. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioners commenced his arguments by submitting that the revision petition has to be heard and decided first before the second appeal could be taken up for hearing. It was his contention that the question has to be decided independently of the finding given in the suit out of which the second appeal has arisen. In support of this strange proposition, learned counsel relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mohamed Hanifa v. Abdul Latheef (1987) 100 Mad LW 438. In that case, a suit for partition filed by a purchaser from a sharer was decreed by the trial court and confirmed by the lower appellate Court. When the second appeal was pending in this court, an application was filed by the members of the family under Section 4 of the Partition Act. It was contended by the plaintiff in that case, who was the respondent in the second appeal that the right under Section 4 of the Partition Act was not available to the members of the family at that stage as there was a decree for partition which was affirmed by the lower appellate Court. While negativing the said contention it was observed by the Division Bench as follows --
"In view of the above pronouncements, it is clear that the pendency of the second appeal will tantamount to the suit being pending and an application under Section 4 of the Act can be filed before the suit is finally concluded Since in this case, application under Section 4 of the Act a filed when the second appeal is pending, the, petitioner, viz, the appellant herein is entitled to enforce the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Act."
Another contention urged in that case was that in view of the amendment to Section 100, C.P. Code, a second appeal could be filed only on a substantial question of law and that such an, appeal could be heard only on the question of law so formulated and the appellant should not be allowed to argue matters which did not relate to the questions of law formulated.
In other words, it was contended that the application of the Partition Act was not a question of law which had been formulated in the case, and therefore, the appellant was debarred from contending that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act.
Rejecting that argument, the Bench observed as follows --
"But Section 4 of the Act gives rise to separate proceedings by means of application, apart from the second appeal. It is a statutory right given to the family members and it is open to them to exercise the same at any time before the partition decree becomes conclusive. In this case, in view of the pendency of the second appeal, the matter is not concluded and as such, the appellant has got every right to file an application under Section 4 of Act, which he did in this case. In view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the matter is not yet concluded and as such the appellant is entitled to file an application under Section 4 of the Act. Accordingly, our answers to the questions formulated are as follows --
(1) Application under Section 4 of the Partition Act can be filed at any time before the final decree becomes conclusive, even during the state of second appeal.
(2) The provisions contained in Section 100 C.P.C. are not applicable to applications under Section 4 of the Partition Act since the cause of action for Section 4 application is entirely different and is based upon the provisions of the Act.
(3) Application under Section 4 of the Act will have to be decided before concluding the shares between the parties."
In that case, neither in the trial Court nor in the lower appellate Court there was any issue with regard to the entitlement of the family members to the benefits of Section 4 of the Partition Act, The question was raised for the first time by an application filed in this court. As there was no prior decision of the issue in these proceedings, the Bench held that it was open to the appellant therein to raise the issue and agitate their right under Section 4 of the Partition Act. That will not help the petitioners in the revision petition to ignore the finding given by the courts below after considering the evidence recorded. There was a specific issue in the trial Court on this question and a finding was given and that was canvassed fully before the lower appellate Court and confirmed. The contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners is wholly untenable.
28. In the circumstances, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500.