Patna High Court
Badri Narain Singh vs Under Secretary To The Govt. Of Bihar And ... on 7 April, 1972
Equivalent citations: AIR1972PAT361, AIR 1972 PATNA 361, ILR (1973) 52 PAT 77
Author: N.L. Untwalia
Bench: N.L. Untwalia
ORDER
1. The petitioner had a Stage Carriage permit to operate on the route Rohtas-Tilauthu-Sasaram-Kochas. The timing fixed for operation of his service was 8-30 a.m., i.e., the departure time of his bus from Rohtas was 8-30 a.m. He made an application to the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, respondent No. 3, to change the timing. He said that the departure time 8-30 a.m. was not suitable to him. The earliest bus which started from Rohtas was at 6-40 a.m. The prayer of the petitioner was to fix a time earlier than that, give an election to the senior operators to start their bus at an earlier time, 5-50 a.m.; if any of them agreed to do so then the petitioner may be fitted in his timing, but if any of them did not agree to do so then he should be permitted to start his bus from Rohtas at 5-50 a.m. Some of the operators of this route did not agree to start their bus at 5-50 a.m. Some others who had a longer route were prepared to do so but since their doing so would have affected the service on the longer routes at different points, respondent No. 3 did not accede to their prayer. A copy of the order of respondent No. 3 dated 11-12-65 is Annexure 1 to the writ application. In that situation the petitioner's prayer was allowed and his timing was changed from 8-30 a.m. to 5-50 a.m. Respondent No. 4 who was one of the operators on this route, filed an application in revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (Central). His revision has been allowed by the State Transport Authority by its order dated 16-10-69, a copy of which is Annexure 4 to the writ application. The petitioner went up in second revision before the Transport Minister of the Government of Bihar under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stands under the Bihar amendment. His revision has been dismissed by the State Government. Therefore, he has come up to this Court and has prayed that the order of the State Transport Authority contained in Annexure 4 should be called up and quashed by grant of a writ of certiorari.
2. Nobody has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 4 who was the only person interested in the matter. The hearing of this writ application was ex parte, but Mr. Amla Kant Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, has fairly placed all that was necessary to be placed for our consideration in this case. He has urged two points, (1) that an appeal lay to the Appellate Authority as it stood then under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act (Central) and hence respondent No. 4 could not go in revision direct to the State Transport Authority, and (2) that the order, Annexure 4, is erroneous in law on its face as it has not given any reason or sufficient reason to upset the order of the Regional Transport Authority.
3. Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') as it stood prior to its amendment by Central Act 100 of 1956, was couched in a different language. There under Clause (c) of Section 48 an express power was conferred in the Regional Transport Authority to regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages, whether they belonged to a single or more owners. Clause (d) of the old section empowered the authority to attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the conditions enumerated in the various sub-clauses of Clause (d). Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (d) was:
"that copies of the fare table and time table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the fare table and time table so exhibited shall be observed;"
The section was drastically amended by the Central Act 100 of 1956. The conditions which can be attached to a permit have now been enumerated in Sub-section (3) of Section 48. Sub-section (2) is not very relevant but it may only be mentioned here that Sub-section (2) which was introduced by Central Act 100 of 1956 has been deleted by Central Act 56 of 1969. Clause (a) of old Section 48 seems to have been taken in the amended Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act. We could not get any express language where Clause (c) of old Section 48 has been taken in the amended Act. Now Clause (iii) of Sub-section (3) of Section 48 as it stands after the amendment of 1956 runs as follows:
"that copies of the time-table of the service or of particular stage carriages approved by the Regional Transport Authority shall be exhibited on the vehicles and at specified stands and halts on the route or within the area."
It is, therefore, to be noticed that under old Section 48 the power to regulate timings of arrival was in Clause (c). The condition which could be attached to the permit was to exhibit the time table. Same is the condition now after amendment and Clause (iii) of Sub-section (3) envisages that the time table to be exhibited is as may be approved by the Regional Transport Authority. That shows that the power which was there in Clause (c) earlier to regulate timings has been supposed to exist while maintaining the condition of exhibition of the time table in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (3) of Section 48 as it stands after the amendment of 1956. Under the provisions of the old section it was held by a Bench of the Madras High Court in M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545 that fixing the time of stage carriage service is not attaching a condition to its permit. This case was followed by a Bench of this Court in Sukhdeo Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1959 Pat 580. The old Section 48 and the said section as it stood after the amendment of 1956 were both considered and yet it was held by the Bench of this Court in the Patna case that fixing the time is not the condition of the permit. That being so, no appeal lay under Section 64 of the Act. The Madras view seems to 'have been followed by the Kerala High Court, but the Mysore High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court have not followed that view. In K. Siddalingappa v. The Revenue Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1962 Mys 161 a view has been expressed that there is no difference in law as it stood before the amendment of 1956 or after- that amendment. But in View of their Lordships of the Mysore High Court the Madras case, so also the Patna case, were wrongly decided. In C. Venkatappa Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1968 Andh Pra 100 a distinction had been drawn between the old law and the law as it stood after the amendment of 1956. In the opinion of their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court the Madras case was rightly decided under the old law but the Patna case was wrongly decided tinder the new law. They preferred to follow their own view expressed in the year 1959. The Mysore as also the Andhra Pradesh cases have referred to the Kerala decisions which have followed the Madras view. Mr. Choudhary argued that the view expressed by the Madras and the Andhra Pradesh High Courts is correct and the Bench decision of this Court in S. Kumar's case required reconsideration by a larger Bench. On a careful consideration of the matter, we have come to the conclusion that the view expressed by a Bench of this Court in S. Kumar's case seems to be a better view. We may say that it is also possible to take the view which has been taken by the Mysore and the Andhra Pradesh High Courts but we are definitely of the opinion that on the state of law as it existed at the relevant time after the amendment of 1956, it is not possible to say that S. Kumar's case was wrongly decided and requires reconsideration. That being so, no appeal could be filed before the Appellate Authority and the revision under Section 64-A of the Act (Central) was competent.
4. It is not correct to say that the State Transport Authority has given no reason, in the impugned order (Annexure 4). It has given a reason that there was no occasion for the chairman to revise the timings fixed earlier. Moreover, if fixation of time is not a condition attaching to the permit it is doubtful whether the chairman or the Regional Transport Authority had power to revise the timing once fixed at the time of granting the permit. Be that as it may, the order, Annexure 4, in our opinion, does not suffer from an infirmity of the kind which would justify our interference either under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.