Delhi District Court
Mohinder Yadav vs Prince on 12 July, 2024
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE-04,
(PRESIDED OVER BY: ANIL CHANDHEL)
WEST DISTRICT, THC, DELHI
CNR NO. DLWT01-002837-2023
RCA NO. 26/2023
MOHINDER YADAV
S/o Late Kishan Chand,
R/o 94B, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar,
New Delhi-110063. ....Appellant.
Versus
1. PRINCE
S/o Jawahar Lal
2. CHUNNI LAL
S/o Chander Bhan
Both R/o
Shop No. 4B/4, Ground Floor,
Ch. Kishan Chand Complex,
4, Jawalaheri, Paschim Vihar,
New Delhi-110063. ...Respondents.
REGULAR CIVIL APPEAL UNDER
SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
21.03.2023, PASSED BY LD. CIVIL
JUDGE-01, WEST, TIS HAZARI COURTS, Digitally
DELHI IN CS SCJ No.926/2022 ANIL
signed by
ANIL
CHANDHEL
CHANDHEL Date:
2024.07.12
16:39:58
+0530
________________________________________________________________
Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 1 of 17
RCA NO. 26/2023
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 29.03.2023
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 01.07.2024
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 12.07.2024
Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. R. K. Alag, Advocate.
Counsel for the Respondents : Mr. Shaurya Gupta, Advocate.
JUDGMENT
1. This regular first Appeal, under Section 96 of CPC, has been preferred by the Appellant against the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2023, passed by Ld. Civil Judge-01, West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC, in CS SCJ No. 926/2022. In terms of the impugned judgment /decree, the Court of Ld. Civil Judge-01, has disposed off the suit, filed for eviction of the Defendants, by granting them benefit under Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act, 1881.
2. The facts in brief, relevant to the discussion, are that the Appellant has filed the civil suit for possession of property bearing no. 4B/4, Ground Floor, Ch. Kishan Chand Complex 4, Jawalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi-110063(hereinafter referred to as, "suit property"). It is the case of the Appellant that the Respondents are tenants since 1st of April, 2019 at the monthly rent of Rs.22,000/-, in the suit property. The rate of rent was revisable, and was subject to increase of 10% after every three years. It is admitted by the parties that the tenancy ________________________________________________________________ ANIL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 2 of 17 CHANDHEL RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:06 +0530 between the parties was created in terms of a compromise decree dated 03.04.2019 passed in Civil DJ No. 921/2018.
3. It is stated in the plaint that the Respondents did not pay the rent for the months of November and December, 2021 and the Appellant has issued a notice of termination dated 13.12.2021, which was duly received by the Respondents. It is stated that the aforesaid notice has terminated the tenancy and the Respondents were liable to hand over the possession to the Appellant.
4. The Respondents have filed the written statement, wherein they have admitted the factum of tenancy, the rate of rent, non-payment of the rent for the months of November and December, 2021 as well as the service of the legal notice, dated 13.12.2021. It is stated by the Respondents that they used to remit the rent electronically and also deposit the TDS. It is stated that the rent for the month of November and December, 2021 was paid electronically, however, the same was returned and was not paid to the account of the Appellant, on account of a technical issue. It is stated that there was no intention on the part of the Respondents to commit any violation of settlement dated 03.04.2019 and the aforesaid fact came to the knowledge of the Respondents, when they received the notice dated 13.12.2021 and the Respondents, immediately on 20.12.2021 made payment of the amount of rent for the months of November, 2021 and December, 2021.
Digitally ________________________________________________________________ ANIL signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 3 of 17 CHANDHEL Date:
2024.07.12 RCA NO. 26/2023 16:40:13 +0530
5. The Appellant has filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC for passing a decree for possession on the basis of admission of the Respondents. It is stated that in the application that the Respondents have admitted the Landlord- tenant relationship, the rate of rent and the service of notice for termination of tenancy and therefore, a decree for possession be passed in favour of the Appellant.
6. The Court of Ld. Civil Judge disposed of the application of the Appellant holding that the non-payment of the rent was not intentional, on the part of the Respondents and upon realizing their mistake, they immediately remitted the due amount of rent to the account of the Appellant and have not since defaulted; therefore, the Respondents were entitled to benefit under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. In view of the aforementioned observations, the Court of Ld. Civil Judge disposed off the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and also disposed off the Plaintiff's suit by awarding cost of Rs.20,000/-, in view of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881.
7. The notice of the present appeal was issued to the Respondents, who have entered appearance. Subsequently, the arguments in the present appeal were heard.
8. Ld. Counsel for the parties have addressed their arguments.
Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the Court of Ld. Civil Judge has wrongly granted the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 to the Respondents, ________________________________________________________________ Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 4 of 17 ANIL CHANDHEL RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:19 +0530 as the same can only be granted in a lease for a fixed period, whereas the tenancy, being subject matter of the present suit was on month to month basis. He has further stated that a Court under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881, does not have any option of not to decree the suit, once the essential ingredients, i.e., landlord-tenant relationship, rate of rent, being more than Rs.3500/- and service of termination notice, are satisfied. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in "Hansraj vs. Bhajan Singh: 2010/DHC/ 6240."
9. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents have submitted that the tenancy in the present case was perpetual in nature, as is evident from the terms and tenor of the tenancy. It is submitted that benefit under Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act, 1881 is the discretion of the Court and in every case, the decree is not an automatic consequence, where the Defendants have remained honest. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has relied upon the following judgments:
i. R. S. Lala Praduman Kumar vs. Virender Goyal: 1969 (1) SCC 714.
ii. Overnight Express Ltd. vs. Kanwar Singh Pardhan:
FAO(OS) No. 107/2017 (12.04.2017).
iii. Anthony vs. K.C ITTOOP & Sons: (2000) 6 SCC 394. iv. Biswavani Pvt. Ltd. vs. Santosh Kumar Gupta: (1980) 1 SCC 185.
ANIL
________________________________________________________________ CHANDHEL
Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 5 of 17
RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by
ANIL CHANDHEL
Date: 2024.07.12
16:40:25 +0530
v. Pannalal Sagarmal vs. Central Bank of India: (2008)
SCC Online Cal 477.
10. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the parties. I have perused the record. The scheme of facts is not in dispute. The tenancy was created in terms of the compromise decree dated 03.04.2019. It is admitted that the Appellant is the Landlord and the Respondents are his tenants. It is admitted that the initial monthly rate of agreed rent was Rs.22,000/-, which was subject to increase of 10% after a period of three years. It is admitted that the Appellant was entitled to initiate legal proceedings, on account of two consecutive defaults in payment of rent. It is admitted that the Appellant has issued legal notice dated 13.12.2021 for termination of the tenancy and the same was served upon the Respondents. The Appellant has stated that the tenancy was on month to month basis, whereas the Respondents have stated that the tenancy was perpetual in nature.
11. The Respondents have raised the defence that the default of non-payment of the rent for the months of November and December, 2021 was not intentional and the aforesaid default occurred on account of technical error. It is stated that the Respondents have immediately made the payment of the aforesaid rent, when the aforesaid error came to their knowledge, after receiving the notice dated 13.12.2021.
ANIL ________________________________________________________________ CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 6 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:31 +0530
12. It has been held by the Court of Ld. Civil Judge-01 that since the error on the part of the Respondent was not intentional and they have immediately rectified the same and further have not committed any default thereafter; therefore, they were entitled to the benefits of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"114. Relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent:
Where a lease of immoveable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred."
Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in "Hans Raj Vs. Bhajan Singh":2010/DHC/6240", wherein it has been held that the Section 114 is not applicable to the cases of month to month tenancy and is only applicable where the written tenancies have been created for a fixed period and which contained a clause of forfeiture.
13. Therefore, the first and foremost aspect to be ascertained is whether the lease in question, is on month to month basis or is a lease for a fixed period/ or for a period of more than an year. ________________________________________________________________ ANIL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 7 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023 CHANDHEL Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:37 +0530 The lease between the parties have been created in terms of the compromise decree dated 03.04.2019, which was passed in the Civ DJ No. 921/2018, in view of the statement of the Appellant and the Respondents. The basis of the aforesaid compromise decree, i.e., the statement of the Appellant, is being reproduced hereinbelow:
" I say that I am the Plaintiff in the present suit and the owner/landlord of Shop bearing no. 4B/4, Chaudhary Kisahn Chand Shopping Complex, Jwala Heri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi-110063. I have settled the dispute with the defendants and accept them as my tenants in the said shop w.e.f. 01.04.2019 at a monthly rent of Rs.22,000/- which shall be subject to increase of 10% after every three years and the first such increase would be w.e.f. 01.04.2022. The said rent shall be payable directly to me in my bank account by RTGS by the defendants. I shall be at liberty to initiate legal proceedings against the defendants in case of their making default in payment of rent for two months in continuity. I further undertake to assist the defendants in quashing of the FIR No. 0239 dt. 11.07.2018 of PS Paschim Vihar, I waive off the entire arrears of the occupation charges as claimed by me from the defendants in the present suit and shall not claim the same in any proceedings in future. I further undertake to continue to pay/deposit the house tax of the said shop with the MCD, whereas the conversation charges for the same shall be deposited by the defendant. The defendant have already paid the one time parking fees and I shall not lay any claim upon it.
My suit may be decreed in terms of the above statement."
ANIL ________________________________________________________________ CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 8 of 17 Digitally signed by RCA NO. 26/2023 ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:43 +0530 The statement of the Respondents in the aforesaid suit is also on identical terms. The term of the lease has not specifically been mentioned in the above-referred statement/compromise decree. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has stated that the aforesaid lease is perpetual in nature and in any case, is not on month to month basis. He has submitted that the lease gives right for enhancement of the rent after every 3 years and if no default is committed by the Respondents in payment of the rent, the Appellant does not have any right to terminate the lease.
14. However, the aforementioned contention of the Ld. Counsel for the Respondents is not legally tenable. A perpetual lease or a lease for a period of more than an year can only be created in terms of the Section 107 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1881. In terms of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881, a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving an yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument and all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. The lease in the present case has been made, in terms of the compromise decree of the Court and the aforesaid decree is not a registered instrument. It has been held by Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in "Sumatibai Waman Kirtikar Vs. Anant Balkrishna Shirgaonkar: AIR1949Bom402", that a compromise decree creating a lease, for a period of more than an year, is also ________________________________________________________________ Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 9 of 17 ANIL RCA NO. 26/2023 CHANDHEL Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:49 +0530 required to be registered. The relevant observations and discussion of the Hon'ble Court in aforesaid judgment are being reproduced hereinbelow:
"1. The question that arises for consideration in this Letters Patent appeal is whether a compromise decree which operates as a lease requires registration.
4 ...........................Section 107 refers to those documents which are executed by parties and it lays down what is the mode to be adopted in order to make leases of that particular character. But when we turn to the Registration Act and when we find that all leases are compulsorily registrable we cannot cut down that directive of the Legislature and apply it merely to leases of a particular kind enacted in Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.
7. The next contention of Mr. Dharap is that assuming this consent decree operates as a lease, even so he is not precluded from executing his decree and obtaining possession of the property which the judgment-debtor was bound to hand over to him on the expiry of the period stated in the decree. Now, the consequences of non-registration are to be found in Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, and those consequences are that "No document required by Section 17 to be registered shall (a) affect any Immovable property comprised therein we are not concerned with (b), or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. Mr. Dharap argues that he does not want this decree which he is executing to be received in evidence. The decree is already on the record of the Court and therefore if the Court executes the decree it does not in any way contravene the provisions of Section 49(c). But it is ________________________________________________________________ ANIL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 10 of 17 CHANDHEL RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:40:55 +0530 not the provisions of Sub-clause (c) that Mr. Dharap has got to get over, but the provisions of Sub-clause (a), because by that sub-clause the decree cannot be permitted to affect any Immovable property which is comprised in that document, and it is difficult to see how Mr. Dharap's client can get possession of the property under the decree without the decree affecting that Immovable property, Mr. Dharap says that if the decree operates as a lease it is the lessee alone who is interested in relying on the terms of the decree for his possession. That again is incorrect because not only the possession of the lessee is attributable to the lease, but the right of the lessor to obtain possession on the efflux of time is also attributable to the terms of the lease, and therefore if the lessor seeks to obtain possession from his lessee at the end of the term of the lease, he is doing so by reason of the fact that the relations of landlord and tenant were established between him and his judgment-debtor. The Court cannot permit him to obtain possession because if it were to do so it is permitting the decree to affect the Immovable property which the law prohibits the Court from doing. It is not a case of the Court going behind the decree; it is not open to the executing Court to do so. But the executing Court must give effect to the provisions of the law, and one of the provisions of the law is that contained in Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act which will not permit any document which is compulsorily registrable and which has not been registered to affect any Immovable property comprised in that document.
8. The result, therefore, is that we agree with Mr. Justice Jahagirdar that the decree in question was intended to operate as a lease, that as a lease it was compulsorily registrable under Section 17(2)(d), and that as it was not registered the judgment creditor cannot obtain possession of the property in suit under the terms of this decree. The result ________________________________________________________________ ANIL CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 11 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:01 +0530 therefore is that this appeal will be dismissed with costs."
Therefore, even a decree, in order to create a valid lease for a period of more than an year, is required to be registered, in terms of Section 17(2)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, read with Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. The compromise decree dated 03.04.2019 is not a registered one and therefore, the same can neither create any perpetual lease or a lease, for a period of more than an year. The term of the lease is not stated in the compromise decree and merely a stipulation of enhancement of rent after a period of three years would not change the nature of such a lease. Accordingly, the lease in the present case is not an yearly lease or a lease for any fixed period and thus the lease remains to be one, on the month to month basis.
15. The Court of Ld. Civil Judge has also held that the tenancy in the present case is on month to month basis. The Respondents have also not challenged the aforesaid observations by filing any cross-objections against the same. Since the lease in question is on month to month basis, therefore, in view of the judgment, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in "Hans Raj Vs. Bhajan Singh":2010/DHC/6240", Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 is not applicable to the present case. The relevant part of the observations passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi are being reproduced hereinbelow:-
ANIL ________________________________________________________________ CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 12 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:07 +0530 "15. The intention on the part of the lessor to determine the lease of the lessee is clear and evident.
The twin requirements of a notice under Section 106 of the TPA i.e. tenancy terminating on the last day of the calendar month and a 15 days eviction period has been mentioned. It was a valid notice to quit. The plaintiff/lessor has not invoked the doctrine of forfeiture. Admittedly there is no document in writing between the parties qua this tenancy; in the absence of which it is clear that there could not have been any clause by virtue of which the plaintiff could have relied upon the same and invoked it to forfeit the tenancy. This document cannot in any manner be read as a determination of a lease under Section 111 (g). Forfeiture necessarily implies the loss of a legal right by reason of breach of a legal obligation. The Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 228 Namdeo Lokman Lodhi Vs. Narmadabai & Ors. had in fact held that the courts almost "abhor a forfeiture"; the Courts lean strongly against forfeiture. There should be an express covenant or a clause the breach of which entails a forfeiture. Section 111 (g) of the TPA had not been resorted to by the lessor in Ex.PW- 1/9.
16. The concept of the termination of tenancy on account of forfeiture and concept of termination of tenancy to quit under Section 106 of the TPA are two distinct and different concepts. Section 114 of the TPA does not come into play unless a forfeiture is incurred by a tenant in pursuance of a forfeiture clause contained in the agreement of lease. In the instant case, the question of resorting to a forfeiture clause did not arise as there was no agreement in writing between the parties. The tenancy between the parties was a monthly tenancy. Tenancy was not for any fixed period. Relief under Section 114 can be granted to a tenant only when the landlord invokes his right under a forfeiture clause and determines the lease by forfeiture, which may be for a fixed period. For example if the tenancy is for a fixed period of three years and it contains a forfeiture clause that if rent is not paid for one whole year the landlord can ________________________________________________________________ Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 13 of 17 ANIL RCA NO. 26/2023 CHANDHEL Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:15 +0530 forfeit the tenancy; the landlord may determine the tenancy if the tenant does not pay rent for the whole year; for such a purpose the landlord has no right to eject the tenant before the expiry of the said period; if however thereafter the tenant fails to pay rent for the one year the forfeiture clause will enable the landlord to determine the lease before the full period is expired. In such a case the tenant may seek relief against forfeiture. However, in a tenancy which is month to month no question of forfeiture arises if the landlord determines it with a valid notice to quit."
16. In the present case, the tenancy is on month to month basis and as held in 'Hansraj Vs. Bhajan Singh' (supra), the same can be terminated by a notice of 15 days, in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. The Appellant has served the notice for termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881, which was duly served upon the Respondents. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents have submitted that the notice issued for termination was for non- payment of the rent and not a notice under Section 106 of the TPA. However the aforesaid notice has been issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 for claiming the arrears of the rent as well as the possession of the suit property.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Nopany Investments (P)Ltd. Vs. Santokh Singh (HUF) : 2008 (2) SCC 728", has held that the tenancy would stand terminated under general law on filing of a suit for eviction. The aforesaid proposition have been followed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in, "M/S. Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. ________________________________________________________________ ANIL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 14 of 17 CHANDHEL RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:21 +0530 vs M/S. Jasbir Singh Chadha (Huf) & Anr.: RFA No.179/2011 (25 March, 2011)", to hold that even assuming the notice terminating the tenancy was not served upon the landlord, the tenancy would stand terminated on filing of the suit for eviction.
18. Though the Appellant has served the notice for termination of the tenancy, under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. However even if it is to be assumed that the aforesaid notice was not sufficient, the Appellant has filed the suit for eviction and the same would amount the notice upon the Respondents, in view of the above-referred legal position. Therefore, the tenancy of the respondents stood terminated, when they received the summons in the suit.
19. Any contrary interpretation would take away the right of the landlord to terminate a month to month tenancy and the tenants will acquire a perpetual right to occupy the premises, if they do not commit the default in payment of rent. Thus it would practically result in creating a perpetual tenancy, which could only be created by a registered instrument. Such an interpretation will also negate the very objective of rights of the landlord under Section 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881. Therefore, this Court is in respectful disagreement with the findings of the Court of Ld. Civil Judge, in so far as the application of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 is concerned and the same is not applicable in view of ________________________________________________________________ ANIL CHANDHEL Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 15 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:28 +0530 the judgment passed in 'Hansraj Vs. Bhajan Singh'(supra), on the facts of the present case.
20. It has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in "Ashok Kumar Bagga vs Rajvinder Kaur:
AIRONline2021Delhi 724", in order to seek a decree of possession against a tenant, the landlord has to prove fulfill the following parameters :
(i) The relationship of landlord and tenant.
(ii) Tenancy is not a protected tenancy under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(iii) There is no registered subsisting lease agreement.
(iv) Tenancy has been terminated and the respondent tenant has failed to hand over possession.
All the above-mentioned factors have been made out in view of the pleadings of the parties and the material on record, which have been discussed in detail hereinabove and nothing remains to be tried, for the prayers of the suit. Consequently, the Application of the Appellant/Plaintiff, under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, deserves to be allowed and the suit has to be decreed for the prayer of the possession.
21. Accordingly, in view of the discussion and reasons stated hereinabove, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 21.03.2023, passed by the Court of Ld. Civil ________________________________________________________________ Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 16 of 17 ANIL CHANDHEL RCA NO. 26/2023 Digitally signed by ANIL CHANDHEL Date: 2024.07.12 16:41:34 +0530 Judge-01, West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, is set aside. The suit of the Plaintiff is decreed for possession of the suit property, i.e., bearing no. 4B/4, Ground Floor, Ch. Kishan Chand Complex 4, Jawalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi-110063. The decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. The TCR is directed to be sent back. The Appeal files be consigned to the record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ANIL
ANIL CHANDHEL
CHANDHEL Date:
2024.07.12
16:41:41
+0530
Announced in the open Court (ANIL CHANDHEL)
today on 12th of July, 2024 DISTRICT JUDGE-04
WEST DISTRICT
THC/DELHI/12.07.2024
________________________________________________________________ Mohinder Yadav vs. Prince & Anr. Page No. 17 of 17 RCA NO. 26/2023