Rishabhdev Kosma vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 January, 2025

[Cites 31, Cited by 0]

Chattisgarh High Court

Rishabhdev Kosma vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 January, 2025

1. Vide order dated 20.11.2024, notice was issued to the complainant/mother of victim, PW7, informing the pendency of appeal as well as application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant, revealing that she can appear on the date fixed and object the prayer in bail application through her counsel.

2. Learned counsel for the State submitted that notice issued to the complainant has been served upon her. Despite service of notice upon the complainant, no one appears either in person, or through any other mode for recording their submission. Although the matter is being listed Cra 1698 of 2024 2 for consideration of IA-1 of 2024, application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter has been heard finally.

3. Present appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment dated 23.08.2024, passed by the learned Special judge (POCSO), Balod, District-Balod, in Special Session Case-39 of 2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted, and sentenced in the following manner, with default stipulation:

        Conviction                      Sentence
        Under Section 363 of the IPC    RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-
        Under    Section   4(2)    of   RI for 20 years         and fine of
        POCSO Act, 2012                 Rs.3,000/-

4. Brief facts of the case are that on 07.03.2022, mother of the victim PW7 lodged a missing report Ex.P17 to the Police that her minor daughter is missing since 07.01.2022 at about 4 am, and despite her search at various places including her relatives house, her whereabouts could not be traced out. She suspected that her daughter was kidnapped by the present appellant. Offence under Section 363 of the IPC has been registered by the Police, and investigation commenced. During investigation, victim came back to her house on 08.03.2024, and her mother took her to the Police Station, where recovery Panchnama Ex.P4 was prepared, and the victim was sent for her medical examination to the District Hospital, Balod, where PW4 Dr Ankita Sahu has medically Cra 1698 of 2024 3 examined her and gave her report vide Ex.P11. According to said medical report of the victim, no injuries were found on her body, and the doctor has opined that no definite opinion can be given at present regarding occurrence of sexual contact. However, final opinion to be given after report form the Forensic Science Laboratory analysis of prepared slides, swab and other advised investigation. Two slides of her vaginal swabs were prepared, sealed and handed over to the Police for chemical examination. Victim also advised for UPT, USG Abd and Pelvis, Radiological examination of age, HIV, HBSAG, VDRL, CBC, and FSL analysis of prepared swab and slides. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim, Primary School Mark-sheet has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P16. School register from the Government Primary School, Chikhli has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P7, and after retaining its attested true copy Article A(C), original School Register was returned back to the School vide Ex.P8. According to the School Register, date of birth of the victim was recorded as 27.05.2005. Spot Map Ex.P17 was prepared by the Police, and Ex.P18 was prepared by the Patwari.

5. Appellant was arrested on 17.03.2022, and he too was sent for his medical examination to the Government Hospital, Daundi, District-Balod, where PW5 Dr NK Thakur has medically examined him, and found no injuries on his body. After his medical examination, the doctor has opined that appellant is competent to perform sexual intercourse and his report is, Ex.P12. The vaginal slides of the victim, and underwear of the Cra 1698 of 2024 4 appellant were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, from where, report Ex.P29 was received, and according to it, no semen and sperms were found on the sent articles.

6. Statement of witnesses under Section 161 of the CrPC, and statement of the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC have been recorded, and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 13.05.2022 for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 34 of the IPC, and Section 4, 5(l) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

7. The learned trial court has framed charges against the appellant, and another co-accused Dharmendra Nag, who is absconding. Learned trial court has framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 34 of the IPC, and Section 4, 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.

8. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses. The statement under section 313 of CrPC of the appellant was also recorded in which he denied the material appearing against him and pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. The victim was in love with appellant, but her mother does not like him, and for that reason, she has made complaint against him, and he prays for acquittal.

Cra 1698 of 2024 5

9. After appreciation of oral, as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal by the accused/appellant.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There is no cogent and legally admissible evidence available on the record to held the conviction of appellant for the alleged offence. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. There is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to age and date of birth of the victim. The School Register upon which the prosecution is relied upon for determination of age of the victim has not been proved in accordance with law, and there is no other evidence on record to held that the victim was minor on the date of incident. He would further submit that the victim was a major girl, having love affair with the appellant, and she on her own will and wish, eloped with him, and resided with him without making any complaint to anybody, or raising any alarm, and engaged in making consensual physical relation with him. There is no evidence of protest made by the victim during the entire period, while she was residing with him. No injuries were found on her body that she was subjected to forceful sexual intercourse. Therefore, no offence is made out against the appellant from the evidence led by the prosecution, and he is entitled for acquittal.

Cra 1698 of 2024 6

11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the state opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, and submitted that from the evidence led by the prosecution, guilt of the appellant has duly been proved beyond any reasonable doubt but for minor omissions and contradictions. Even if no injuries were found on the body of the victim, that itself is not sufficient to disbelieve their evidence, and to acquit the appellant. From the School record, it has duly been proved that the victim was minor on the date of incident, and she cannot give her consent in making physical relation with the appellant. Therefore, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial court has convicted the appellant, and sentenced him for the alleged offences, which is strictly in accordance with law, and the appeal of the appellant is liable to be dismissed.

12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.

13. The first and foremost question for consideration would be, age and date of birth of the victim, as to whether on the date of incident, she was minor or not.

14. With regard to age of the victim, the prosecution has mainly relied upon the school admission and discharge register Article A(C), which is sought to be proved by PW2, who is Assistant Teacher/In-charge Head Master of the School. He stated in his evidence that the Police has seized the School register from him vide seizure memo Ex.P7, and after Cra 1698 of 2024 7 retaining its attested true copy, Article A(C), original Register was returned back to him vide Ex.P8. In the said register, date of birth of the victim is recorded as 27.05.2005, and she got admitted in the School in Class-5 on 28.06.2014. In the register, date of birth of the victim was recorded on the basis of mark-sheet and TC of Class-4. In cross-examination he admitted that in the school register, date of birth of the victim is not in his handwriting. He posted in the school since 2015. He further admitted that who made the relevant entry in the register, he did not know. Even he did not know as to on what basis dater of birth of the victim is being recorded. He further admitted that there is correction in the register, on which whitener was applied. He further admitted that recorded date of birth of the victim is correct or not, he did not know. He also admitted that who got her admitted in the School, he did not know.

15. The admissibility, and relevancy of the school admission and discharge register came up for hearing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011(2) SCC 385, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Transfer Certificate which is issued by the Government School, and is duly signed by the Head Master, would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, admissibility of such a document would be of not much Cra 1698 of 2024 8 evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded.

16. In paragraphs 40 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.

48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:-

"38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes; namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum, e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he Cra 1698 of 2024 9 was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

17. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima Cra 1698 of 2024 10 facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

Cra 1698 of 2024 11 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

18. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

"14. Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the Cra 1698 of 2024 12 present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the Cra 1698 of 2024 13 absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely

(i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. "

17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court Cra 1698 of 2024 14 indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

19. Reverting to facts of the present case, except the school register Article A(C), there is no other evidence produced by the prosecution for determination of age of the victim. The said register is of Class-5, and as per evidence of PW2, relevant entries with regard to date of birth of the victim have been made in the register on the basis of her Class-4 Mark- sheet and TC but there is no document ie either Mark-sheet of Class-4, or TC of the victim. Even there is no any document of initial schooling of the victim. Therefore, it is very difficult to rely upon the said school register Article A(C) as the authentic document, to determine age of the victim, as to decide that on the date of incident, she was minor, less than 18 years of age.

20. The victim PW1 has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 27.05.2005. In her cross-examination, she admitted that in her Aadhar card, her date of birth was recorded as 01.01.2004. She further admitted that her father is not of sound mind, and therefore, her father's elder brother has got her admitted in the school. Later on, she stated that her maternal grant father has got her admitted in the school.

21. PW7, mother of the victim has stated in her evidence that victim is her elder daughter, and her date of birth is 27.05.2005. At the time of incident, victim was aged about 16 or 17 years. Police has seized the mark-sheet of the victim from her.

Cra 1698 of 2024 15 In her cross-examination, she admitted that her husband is not of sound mind, and he is not residing with them since long back. The victim is not acquainted with her father, and residing in her parents' house. She further admitted that after two years of birth of the victim, her father got prepared her Birth Certificate. She further admitted that at the instance of Kotwar of the village, year of birth of the victim was recorded as 2005, which is two years later from her actual year of birth. In further cross-examination, she stated that in the Aadhar Card of the victim, wrong date of birth has been recorded. Victim has got admitted in the School by her brother only. She stated that her father has got admitted the victim in the school. She further stated that date of birth of victim was recorded in the school on the basis of date of birth given by the Kotwar of the village.

22. From the evidence led by the prosecution, the victim herself has stated that in the Aadhar Card, her date of birth was recorded as 01.01.2003. Her maternal grand-father has got her admitted in the school. Her mother PW7 has stated that her daughter is aged about 16- 17 years, and after two years of her birth, her Birth Certificate was prepared on the instance of village Kotwar. Her date of birth was recorded as 27.05.2005.

23. From the aforesaid evidences, there appears some discrepancy in actual date of birth of the victim, as it was not supported by any documentary evidence. Even there is no any ossification report, Kotwari Cra 1698 of 2024 16 register or birth certificate produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. Despite having referred for her radiological examination, prosecution has not conducted her examination. Therefore, in absence of any cogent or clinching evidence regarding date of birth of the victim, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was minor, less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. Yet, learned trial Court held her minor.

24. So far as offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, we again examine the evidence of PW1, victim. She stated in her evidence that she knows the appellant since last five years. He proposed her that he likes her and wanted to marry her. Both of them were used to meet each other, and made physical relation with each other. On 28.12.2021, appellant took the victim to Bhilai to a private hospital, where she came to know after her examination, that she was conceived, and carrying pregnancy of about 7 months. The appellant got terminated her pregnancy, and took her to Nevoibhata, to his brother's house and kept her for about a month. On 30.01.2022, father of the appellant and other persons of the vicinity took her to Devgaon (Kondagaon), where the maternal uncle of the appellant has also made physical relation with her. Thereafter, she informed her parents about the incident, and then her mother came there. At that time, the maternal uncle of the appellant took her to an Advocate, and obtained her signature in some papers. She was being sent to her parents' house by the maternal uncle of the appellant, and asked to withdraw her case. A village meeting was also convened, Cra 1698 of 2024 17 and the Police was informed that the victim was returned back to her house. Thereafter, Police proceeding was drawn. In her cross-examination she admitted that she and the appellant were in love affair, but the maternal uncle of the appellant does not like their affair. She further admitted that during her stay at Devgaon (Kondagaon), appellant has not made any physical relation with her but it is his maternal uncle, who made physical relation with her. She further admitted that if the maternal uncle of the appellant would not intervene in between them, she would have not lodged any report. Physical relation of maternal uncle of the appellant was not in knowledge of the appellant. She further admitted that during their stay at Devgaon, both of them were earning their livelihood by working as labourers. She further stated that the statement about her pregnancy, about abortion, and her taking by the appellant to his maternal uncle house at Devgaon, have been stated in her police statement Ex D1 but if it is not there, she could not know the reason. Even the statement about taking her to an advocate and obtaining her signature on certain papers, and thereafter, his maternal uncle left her at her parents house has been disclosed before the Police, and if it is not there in the Police statement, Ex.D1, she could not know the reason. She further admitted that it is is not like the appellant.

25. From the evidence of victim PW1, it is quite vivid that she was in love affair with the appellant, and she had gone with him on her own will Cra 1698 of 2024 18 and wish. Her abortion was being done at Bhilai, thereafter, she started residing with the appellant at Nevoibhata, she stayed there for about a month, thereafter, both of them had gone to Devgaon (Kondagaon), where both of them have earned their livelihood. Although she raised allegation that at village Devgaon, his maternal uncle has sexually exploited her but the fact remains that up to Devgaon, she stayed with the appellant and has not made any allegation of her kidnapping or forceful sexual intercourse with her. Rather, it appears that she was in love affair with the appellant since last five years, and both of them frequently engaged in making physical relation without raising any objection. Prosecution could not establish that she was minor on the date of incident, hence, it can safely be held that she is major on the date of incident, and when she herself had gone with the appellant, no offence of kidnapping also not made out against the appellant.

26. So far as the kidnapping, or taking away the minor girl is concerned, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of S. Varadarajan Vs State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, observed in paras 9 & 10 as below :

"9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was Cra 1698 of 2024 19 doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian.

10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking"."

27. From the evidence of victim PW1, her mother PW7, as also the evidence of PW4, Dr Ankita Sahu, who medically examined the victim who did not find any external injury on the body of the victim, further in absence of any protest or complaint by the victim, it can be held that she was a consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant, which does not come under definition of 'rape', and the appellant is entitled for 'benefit of doubt'.

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28. From aforesaid discussion, we are unable to upheld the conviction of appellant for the alleged offence, and consequently, by giving benefit of doubt, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted from all the alleged offences.

29. Appellant is reported to be in jail since 17.03.2022. He be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.

30. Keeping in view the provisions of section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the court concerned forthwith, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

31. The lower court records along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned, for compliance and necessary action.

                         Sd/-                                           Sd/-
              (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                          (Ramesh Sinha)
                       Judge                                     Chief Justice

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