Delhi District Court
State vs . Mithlesh Kumar Upadhyay on 26 February, 2022
IN THE COURT OF MS. APOORVA RANA, M.M-10,
DWARKA COURT (SOUTH WEST), NEW DELHI
CNR No. DLSW020015022014
Cr. Case 424840/2016
STATE Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upadhyay
FIR NO 26/2012
P.S Kapashera
26.02.2022
JUDGMENT
Case No. : 424840/2016
Date of commission of offence : 17.02.2012
Date of institution of the case : 07.10.2014
Name of the complainant : SI Vikas Pannu
Name of accused and address : Mithlesh Kumar
Upadhyay
S/o Bhola
Upadhyay
R/o Village-
Basudeva, P.S.-Chit
Bada, Village,
Tehsil & District-
Baliya, Uttar
Pradesh, presently
at: Indian Transport,
Tankers (P) Ltd., B-
1/3, Sector-15,
Gida-Gorakhpur,
Uttar Pradesh.
Offence complained of or proved : U/s 279/338/304A
IPC.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.1 / 20
Plea of the accused : Pleaded not guilty
Final order : Acquittal
Date reserved for judgment : 04.12.2021
Date of judgment : 26.02.2022(delay
was cause due to
restricted
functioning of
court due to Covid-
19 situation and
because the
accused failed to
appear on the
initial date
reserved for
judgment).
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS FOR DECISION:
1. The present case pertains to prosecution of accused Mithlesh Kumar Upadhyay (here-in-after referred to as the accused), pursuant to charge sheet filed qua him under Section 279/338/304A IPC (hereinafter IPC for sake of brevity) subsequent to the investigation carried out at P.S: Kapashera, in FIR no. 26/2012.
2. It is the case of the prosecution that on 17.02.2012, at about 1:40 AM, at Randhawa Farmhouse, Dwarka Link Road, Samalkha, New Delhi, the accused while driving a tanker bearing number UP-53-BT-7086, changed its lane suddenly and applied breaks. In doing so, the accused was found driving above vehicle State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.2 / 20 in a manner so rash or negligent so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others. Due to this act of the accused, the car of the deceased collided with the said tanker from behind, causing the death, not amounting to culpable homicide, of one Shankar Mittal and resulting in grievous injuries to Sonia Mittal and their child Amogh. Consequently, an FIR was registered in the present case and after investigation, the police filed the present charge sheet against the accused for commission of offence punishable u/s 279/304A/338 IPC.
3. Complete set of charge sheet and other documents were supplied to the accused. Notice for offence punishable u/s 279/304A/338 IPC was served upon the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Further, the accused, vide his statement u/s 294 Cr.P.C, had admitted the genuineness of MLC No. 296687, 296688 and 296689, which were exhibited as, Ex. P1, Ex. P2 and Ex. P3, respectively.
MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN BRIEF:
4. The prosecution, in support of the present case has examined fourteen witnesses in total.
5. PW-1 was Sh. Vishnu Aggarwal, who deposed that he had identified the dead body of his nephew Shankar who had passed away in the incident in question. Through him, document Ex. PW-1/A was taken on record.
6. PW-2 was Sh. Sanjay Gupta, who deposed that he State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.3 / 20 had identified the dead body of his brother-in-law Shankar who had passed away in the incident in question. Through him, document Ex. PW-2/A was taken on record.
7. PW-3 was Ms. Soniya Mittal, who was the victim herself and the wife of the deceased in the present case who deposed with respect to the manner and circumstances in which the incident in question occurred. She also deposed with respect to the liability of the accused with respect to the incident in question. Through her, photographs of the spot and offending vehicle were exhibited as Ex. PW 3/A1 to Ex. PW 3/A30(Colly).
8. PW-4 was Ct. Anand who was part of the investigation carried out with respect to the incident in question and deposed with respect to the investigation carried out by the IO in the present case and his own role therein. Through him, seizure memo of car was exhibited as Ex. PW-4/A, seizure memo of tanker was exhibited as Ex. PW-4/B, seizure memo of documents of car was exhibited as Ex. PW-4/C and photographs of vehicle and spot were collectively exhibited as Ex. PW-4/D.
9. PW-5 was Ct. Arun who deposed that on 17.02.2012, he, alongwith the crime team went to the spot of the accident where he took photographs of the car and the tanker, the negatives of which were collectively exhibited as Ex. PW-5/A.
10. PW-6 was HC Ranbir Singh who deposed that on 17.02.2012, he was the duty officer and registered the present FIR, copy of which was exhibited as Ex. PW-6/A(OSR) and his State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.4 / 20 endorsement on the rukka was exhibited as Ex. PW-6/B. Also, certificate u/s 65 B of Indian Evidence Act was exhibited as Ex. PW-6/C.
11. PW-7 was Sh. Puran Chand who was the mechanical inspector and who deposed that he had conducted the mechanical inspection of the two vehicles in question. His reports were exhibited as Ex. PW-7/A and Ex. PW-7/B and photographs of Verna car were exhibited as Ex. PW-7/C.
12. PW-8 was ASI Pradeep Kumar who deposed that on 28.02.2012, he joined the investigation of the present case and on that day, owner of the offending vehicle produced the accused at MACT Cell. Through him, arrest memo of accused was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/A, personal search memo of accused was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/B, seizure memo of RC, insurance, fitness and permit of offening vehicle was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/C and seizure memo of DL of accused was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/D.
13. PW-9 was Dr. Thejaswi who had conducted the post mortum on the dead body of deceased Shankar and through her, document Ex. PW-9/A was taken on record.
14. PW-10 was Inspector Vikas Pannu, who was the IO in the present case and who deposed with respect to the investigation carried out by him in the present case. Through him, site pan was exhibited as Ex. PW-10/A and inquest papers were exhibited as Ex. PW-10/B. State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.5 / 20
15. PW-11 was SI Suraj Pal who deposed with respect to the investigation proceedings against the accused carried out by him in the present case. Through him, reply to notice u/s 133 MV Act was exhibited as Ex. PW-11/A.
16. PW-12 was SI Girish Kumar who had submitted the DAR before the MACT and had submitted the charge-sheet before this Court.
17. PW-13 was Sh. Ram Dulare who was the registered owner of the offending vehicle and who deposed that on the date of the incident in question, the accused was the person who was driving the offending vehicle. Through him, Superdarinama pertaining to offending vehicle was exhibited as Ex. PW-13/A.
18. Lastly, PW-14 was Sh. Rajeev Aggarwal who was the Superdar of the vehicle of the deceased and through him, power of attorney for release of said vehicle on superdari was exhibited as Ex. PW-14/A and superdarinama was exhibited as Ex. PW-14/B.
19. On account of admission of accused u/s 294 Cr.P.C, PW at serial no. 9, Dr. Deepti, as per list of prosecution witnesses was dropped from the list of prosecution witnesses and the formal proof of the documents sought to be proved by her was dispensed with.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.6 / 20
20. No other PW was left to be examined, hence, P.E was closed.
STATEMENT OF ACCUSED U/S 313 Cr.P.C.:
21. Statement of the accused u/s 281 Cr.P.C read with Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded separately in which all the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence were put to him. The accused controverted and denied the allegations levelled against him and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. Accused further opted to not lead evidence in his defence.
FINAL ARGUMENTS:
22. Ld. APP for the State has argued that prosecution witnesses have supported the prosecution case and their testimony has remained unrebutted. It has been further argued that on the combined reading of the testimony of all the prosecution witnesses, offence u/s 279/304A/338 IPC has been proved beyond doubt.
23. Per contra, final arguments were not addressed on behalf of the accused by his counsel. Rather, the accused submitted that he has been false implicated in the present case and that there is no evidence against him showing his liability in the present case and thus, he is entitled to be acquitted in the present case.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.7 / 20 APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE AND CONSEQUENT FINDINGS:
24. Arguments adduced by Ld. APP for State and accused have been heard. The evidence and documents on record have been carefully perused.
25. I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by both the parties. Accused Mithlesh Kumar Upadhyay has been indicted for the offence u/s 279/338/304-A IPC. Section 279 IPC provides punishment for offence of driving a vehicle in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person; section 338 IPC provides punishment for causing grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others; section 304-A IPC provides punishment for causing death to any person by doing any rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide. To drive home the guilt of the accused under section 279/338/304A IPC in road accident cases resulting in death of a person, following ingredients are required to be proved:- a). That the accused was the person who was driving the offending vehicle at the time when the accident occurred. b). That the accused drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. c). That grievous hurt / death of the victim was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by way of rash and negligent driving of the accused. It must be causa causans - the immediate cause, and not enough that it may be causa sine qua State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.8 / 20 non - proximate cause. (Ref. Suleman Rahiman Mulam v. State of Maharasthra AIR 1968 SC 829; Ambalal D Bhatt v State of Gujarat AIR 1972 SC 1150). In case of an act resulting in death, the act should not amount to culpable homicide.
26. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the main ingredient upon which the said offences hinge upon is that the act of the accused should be done in a rash or negligent manner. These words "Rash" and "Negligent" have not been defined in the IPC. However, the meaning of the said terms have been exhaustively delineated by way of various judicial pronouncements. In Empress v. Idu Beg, (1881) ILR 3 All 776, Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various Courts, including the Apex Court:
"Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted".
Similarly, in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam vs State Of Andhra Pradesh (2000 SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia held the following:
"A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.9 / 20 deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution."
Again, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Rathnashalvan vs State Of Karnataka (2007 SC) that:
"Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors. A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused."
27. It is trite law that the burden always lies upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence and that the law does not permit the court to punish the accused on the basis of moral conviction or on account of suspicion alone. Also, it is well settled that accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt in the prosecution story and such doubt entitles him to acquittal.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.10 / 20
28. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it may be noted at the every outset that the entire case of prosecution hinges upon the testimony of PW3, the victim / the wife of the deceased, who deposed that on 16.02.2012, she along with her husband Shankar and son Amogh, were coming in their car (Hyundai Verna HR-72-0051) from Ballabhgarh to Dwarka, after attending a marriage. She further deposed that at about 01:00 AM, when they reached near Kapashera, one oil tanker came from behind and overtook their vehicle and changed its lane suddenly, due to which their car collided with the said tanker from behind. She further deposed that the said tanker dragged the car to some distance and after the tanker halted, the driver came down and ran away from the spot. She also deposed that due to the said accident, her husband became unconscious and she also received various injuries. She correctly identified the photographs of the spot and the offending vehicle, i.e., the oil tanker bearing registration no. UP-53-BF-7086, but, failed to identify the person who had caused the said accident. In order to establish the identity of the accused as being the person who was driving the vehicle in question at the time of the incident, prosecution examined one Ram Dulare, the registered owner of the offending vehicle, as PW13, who deposed that at the time of incident, the vehicle was being driven by the accused and also correctly identified the accused in the court and the photographs of the offending vehicle. Now, perusal of the cross-examination of the various prosecution witnesses and the cross-examination of PW3 in particular, as well as the overall defence taken by the accused in the present matter, including at the time of recording State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.11 / 20 of statement of accused under section 281 read with section 313 of Cr.P.C., it is amply clear that on 16.02.2012, a collision had taken place between the two vehicles in question. Further more, the registered owner of the vehicle, that is, PW 13, Ram Dulare, was not cross-examined on behalf of the accused and even otherwise, during the entire course of evidence, it has not even been once denied that the accused was not the person who was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the incident in question. In such a scenario, it would not be out of place to presume that the accused was the very same person who was driving the offending vehicle at the time of incident.
29. Again, since the accused himself has admitted the MLCs of the victims/ deceased, it is also not in question that one person had died after the said collision/accident and two other persons had sustained grievous injuries, as stated in their MLCs. Similarly, a holistic reading of the defence taken by the accused during the trial shows that it has not been disputed that the deceased as well as his wife Sonia and son Amogh, were sitting in the ill fated Hyundai Verna car bearing no. HR-72-0051, which had collided with the offending vehicle, bearing registration no. UP-53-BF-7086, which was being driven by the accused.
30. In such a scenario, where the fact that the offending vehicle was being driven by the accused has been proved and also the fact that the said collision had resulted in grievous injuries and death of persons, the only issue that remains to be determined is the fact whether the accused was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligent manner and whether the State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.12 / 20 grievous injuries to and death of the victims were a direct result of the said rash/negligent act of the present accused.
31. On the above said aspect of rash and negligent driving by the accused person, the only witness whose testimony is relevant in this regard is that of PW3, Sonia Mittal, as she is the sole eye witness to the accident in question. However, a careful full reading of her testimony brings to light certain inconsistencies and improvements in her version depicting the allegedly rash and negligent way in which the oil tanker / offending vehicle was being driven by the accused. During her examination in chief, she simply stated that the oil tanker came from behind and overtook their car and changed its lane suddenly, due to which their car collided in the said tanker. Now, mere changing of lanes, in the absence of any other facts, cannot be said to constitute a rash and negligent act, in the absence of any other details in that regard. It is not the case of the said witness that the oil tanker was being driven in a highly dangerous speed or that the oil tanker had changed its lens without giving any indicator. Further inconsistency is brought in the version of PW3 during her cross-examination, where in, she admitted the fact that during investigation, in her statement given by her to the police, she had not mentioned that the offending vehicle had overtaken their car. This fact, constitutes a material omission, as it throws light upon a very essential ingredient constituting the alleged offence, that is, the circumstances and the manner in which the oil tanker was being driven. Not only this, during the examination in chief, PW3 had merely stated that the oil tanker had changed its lane suddenly, due to which the collision State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.13 / 20 occurred. However, during her cross-examination, she also added that upon changing the lane, the oil tanker suddenly applied brakes, resulting in the collision.
32. There is also ambiguity on the point as to whether the oil tanker was already being driven in front of the car when it suddenly applied breaks, or whether it had come from behind and upon overtaking the vehicle of the deceased, he had changed lane and applied break suddenly. It has not been indicated by PW3 that no indicator was given by the accused while changing lanes. Furthermore, even if the testimony of PW3 with respect to the fact that the oil tanker had overtaken the car of the deceased, is to be taken into consideration, there still exists inconsistency with respect to the fact as to from which side the oil tanker had overtaken their car. On one hand, during her cross-examination, PW3 has stated that the oil tanker came in front of their car from their right side. At another instance, she has stated that the oil tanker came from behind and overtook their car from her side. In this case, since she was sitting in the seat next to the driver's and her husband was driving the car, in the Indian system of driving, it can only be presumed that the oil tanker had overtaken from the left side. This fact, is not only inconsistent with her earlier version, but is also improbable in view of the photographs of the site of accident, Ex. PW3/A1 to Ex. PW3/A30 (colly), placed on record, as per which, to the immediate left of the lane in which the accident appears to have occurred, there is a footpath and by no stretch of imagination can it be presumed that the oil tanker would have overtaken the car from the left side.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.14 / 20
33. Moreover, negligence of the accused in the present case is not attributed to sudden change of lanes alone, rather, fault of the driver has been affixed on account of sudden application of brakes after changing of lane. Now, two scenarios arise as per the version given by PW3--Firstly, is the version that the oil tanker was already moving in front of the car and it suddenly applied breaks resulting in the collision. Now, PW3 has failed to answer as to how much ahead the oil tanker was from them when the accident occurred. But, if this version is to be considered, then, in view of the admitted fact that the car was not being driven at a slow speed and both the vehicles were running in the same direction, probability arises that the car of the deceased which was following the oil tanker, was expected to maintain a safe distance, as envisaged in Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, which it failed to do and consequently, collided against the rear end of the oil tanker when the brakes were allegedly applied by the tanker.
34. Second scenario envisages a situation, where the oil tanker, which was coming from behind, overtook the car, and suddenly changed lanes and applied break. At the very outside, other than the inconsistent testimony of PW3 in this regard, there is no evidence on record to indicate that the driver of the truck suddenly applied his brake in the middle of the road. Even if presumingly, the breaks were applied suddenly, skid marks before the collision should also have been formed when the truck applied sudden break, presuming that the driver of the bus was driving at a high/normal speed, as alleged. However, as per the site plan Ex. PW10/A, and the photographs, Ex. PW3/A1 to Ex.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.15 / 20 PW3/A30 (colly), only skid marks post collision are visible. It cannot be denied that the investigation in this regard has remained faulty in the case as the IO failed to investigate upon the skid marks formed at the site of accident and to analyse the speed of the car and to collect other material information pertaining to the collision [Ram Chander V/s State (2017) 4 SCC 2676 amd Abdul Suham V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) 133 2006 DL 562 relied upon]. Since it was a rear end collision, the gravity with which the collision has taken place indicates that the car was also being driven at a considerable speed and the same has also been implicitly admitted by PW3, while at the same time stating that it was being driven at such a speed (more than 60 mph) as the road was empty and the same was under control of the driver. Also, if it was to be believed that deceased victim tried to control his car after sudden appearance and halting of oil tanker in front of him, then, since, the car was not being admittedly driven at a slow speed, the skid marks made by sudden application of brakes by car, prior to the collision should also have ordinarily surfaced. However, as per record, skid marks post collision are only visible in the site map as well as the photographs of accident placed on record, and not prior to the same.
35. Even otherwise, upon glancing at the photographs of the incident in question, it is hard to comprehend as to why the oil tanker would apply breaks at night, on an admittedly empty road, in a sudden manner, and there is nothing on record to even remotely answer this question. It is not the case of the prosecution that there was a turn nearby on the road or that there State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.16 / 20 was some other place to stop by, where the truck would be intending to take a halt, and thus, did so, suddenly and negligently. Additionally, this court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the time of incident is stated to be around 1:00 AM at night, and the date of incident is alleged to be 16.02.2022, that is a winter day, and therefore, the visibility on the road cannot be conclusively and certainly said to be very good.
36. As per the version of PW3, public persons had gathered at the spot after the incident, however, no such person has been made witness by the investigating officer in the present case. In fact, quite incongruously, PW4 HC Anand Kumar, has very categorically stated during his cross-examination that when they reached at the spot, they did not find anyone. Further, as per the Rukka Ex. PW 6/B, when the IO reached at the spot of occurrence in furtherance of DD NO. 4A regarding an accident, he found the aforesaid vehicles in an accidental condition, but did not find any eyewitness at the spot. It is also stated that upon enquiry, it transpired that the deceased had been taken to the AIIMS Trauma Centre. However, no such person who informed about the said fact of the victim having been taken to the hospital, has been examined as a prosecution witness. In fact, the PCR caller who called at the 100 number regarding the accident, was also not examined by the IO as a prosecution witness. In fact, the IO, appearing as PW 10, stated during his cross- examination that the person who had dialed the 100 number was working as a loader at the airport and in a perfunctory manner, further stated that he did not examine the said PCR caller as a witness as he was not a witness to the incident in question. But, State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.17 / 20 even if so, the statement of the PCR Caller as regards his not witnessing the incident in question or as regards his presence at the spot at that point of time at night, was not recorded by the IO during the investigation of the case. Not only this, MLCs of the deceased as well as the other two victims at AIIMS Trauma Centre, Ex. P1, Ex. P2, and Ex. P3, mention the name of person in the relative column, being the person who brought the said persons to the hospital, as HC Vijay, who too, has not been examined as a prosecution witness.
37. Apart from the above, the testimony of no other witnesses touches upon the aspect of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the accused.
38. There is no gainsaying that if two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede to the existence of a reasonable doubt. The aforementioned lacunae in the story of the prosecution render the version of the prosecution doubtful, leading to the irresistible conclusion that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt has not been discharged by the prosecution. This court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the existence of rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle, at the relevant point of time, at the place of occurrence as there is material inconsistency in the entire case of prosecution to establish the rashness and negligence on part of the present accused. In the backdrop of the above discussion, one cannot rule out the possibility regarding the suggestion put forth on behalf of State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.18 / 20 accused that accident had taken place due to the car of the victims itself being driven at a high speed / negligently at night time, on a relatively empty road, and the collision being a result of loss of control of the car by its driver. Thus, this court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring on record any cogent evidence in order to prove the commission of and guilt of the accused for offence u/s 279/304A/338 IPC beyond reasonable doubt, thus, entitling the accused person to benefit of doubt and acquittal.
39. Accordingly, this court hereby accords the benefit of doubt to the accused for the offence u/s 279/304A/338 IPC and holds the accused not guilty of commission of the said offence. Accused Mithlesh Kumar Upadhyay is thus, acquitted of the offence u/s 279/304A/338 IPC.
40. It is pertinent to note that initially, this case was listed for pronouncement of judgment on 10.01.2022, however, on the said date, the regular functioning of the courts has been suspended due to Covid-19 pandemic situation and the court was held through VC on the said date. Further, the accused failed to appear before the court on the said date and subsequently as well, due to which NBWs were issued against the accused and the pronouncement of judgment was delayed. Since the accused appeared before the court today, the judgment was pronounced forthwith today.
State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.19 / 20
41. Copy of this judgment be given free of cost to the accused.
Announced in the open court on 26.02.2022, in presence of accused.
Digitally signed by APOORVAAPOORVA RANA RANA Date: 2022.02.26 16:53:03 +05'30' (APOORVA RANA) M.M-10/Dwarka Courts/26.02.2022 It is certified that this judgment contains 20 pages, all signed by the undersigned.
Digitally signed by APOORVAAPOORVA RANA RANA Date: 2022.02.26 16:53:20 +05'30' (APOORVA RANA) M.M-10/Dwarka Courts/26.02.2022 State Vs. Mithlesh Kumar Upahdyay Page Nos.20 / 20