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[Cites 4, Cited by 228]

Supreme Court of India

State Of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav & Ors on 26 August, 1987

Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 2135, 1987 SCR (3)1091, AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 2135, 1987 LAB IC 1899, 1987 (4) SCC 482, (1987) 2 CURCC 850, (1987) 2 GUJ LR 1286, (1987) 2 LAB LN 861, (1987) 2 CURLR 431, 1987 SCC (L&S) 460

Author: Misra Rangnath

Bench: Misra Rangnath, M.M. Dutt

           PETITIONER:
STATE OF GUJARAT

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
AKHILESH C. BHARGAV & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1987

BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:
 1987 AIR 2135		  1987 SCR  (3)1091
 1987 SCC  (4) 482	  1987 SCALE  (2)428


ACT:
    Indian  Police  Service (Probation) Rules,	1954:  Rules
3(1),  3(3)  and 12(bb)--Probationer continuing	 in  service
beyond period of probation--Effect of--Discharge from  serv-
ice of such probationer-Whether valid.
Administrative Law:
    Service  Rules--Administrative  Instructions  issued  to
cover gap where there be vacuum or lacuna--Whether valid.



HEADNOTE:
    The first respondent was appointed to the Indian  Police
Service on 4.7.1969 and allotted to the Gujarat State Cadre.
He  was on probation and there was no order of extention  of
probation.  He	was discharged by the impugned	order  dated
9.4.74.
    The	 order	of discharge was assailed by the  first	 re-
spondent.  A  Single Judge of the High	Court  annulled	 the
order. Two appeals were preferred by the Union of India	 and
the  State  to	the Division Bench which came  to  the	same
conclusion, though for different reasons.
	 The State filed an appeal before this Court,  which
was resisted by the respondent, contending that reference to
Rule 12(bb) of the Indian Police Service (Probation)  Rules,
1954  brought into the otherwise innocuous order  stigma  in
sufficient  measure  warranting a proceeding of	 the  nature
contemplated  under  Article 311(2) of the  Constitution  of
India and that the respondent should have been treated as  a
confirmed  officer  of the cadre at the time  the  order  of
discharge was made.
    On behalf of the State it was contended that no order of
extension  of  probation  was necessary to be  made  as	 the
process	 of confirmation was not automatic and even  if	 the
two  year period as provided in Rule 3(1) of  the  Probation
Rules had expired, confirmation would not ipso facto  follow
and a special order had to be made.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
1092
    HELD: 1. The first respondent having become a confirmed
officer	 of the Gujarat IPS cadre, under Rule 12(bb) of	 the
Indian Police Service Rules, 1954 his services could not  be
brought	 to an end by an order of discharge since  the	said
Rules had no application for officer confirmed in the cadre.
Proceedings  in accordance with law were, therefore,  neces-
sary to terminate his service. [1096A-C]
    2.1	 While	the Probation Rules  prescribed	 an  initial
period	of two years of probation they did not	provide	 any
optimum	 period	 of probation.	Administrative	instructions
issued by the Government of India on 16th March, 1973  indi-
cating the guidelines to be followed in the matter laid down
that, save for exceptional reasons, the period of  probation
should	not be extended by more than one year and no  member
of  the service should, by convention, be kept on  probation
for  more  than	 double	 the normal  period  i.e.  4  years.
[1094F-G; 1095A-B]
    2.2	 Within	 the limits of executive  powers  under	 the
Constitutional	scheme it is open to the apropriate  Govern-
ment  to issue instructions to cover the gap where there  be
any vacuum or lacuna. Since instructions do not run  counter
to the rules in existence, the validity of the	instructions
cannot be disputed. [1095C]
    In the instant case, there was no order of extension and
the  order  of discharge is about five years after  the	 ap-
pointment. The respondent, therefore, stood confirmed in the
cadre on the relevant date when he was discharged. [1096A]
    Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., [1968] 1
SCR 111; State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, [1968] 3 SCR 1 and
Moti  Ram  Deka etc. v. General	 Manager,  N.E.F.  Railways,
Maligaon, Pandu etc., [1964] 5 SCR 683, referred to.



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1273 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.11.1978 of the Gujarat High Court in L.P.A. No. 206 of 1978. T.U. Mehta, G.A. Shah, Mrs. H. Wahi, M.N. Shroff and K.M.M. Khan for the Appellant.

S.N. Kacker, Anil Kumar Gupta, Brij Bhushan Sharma and N.P. Mahindra for Respondent No. 1.

1093

V.C. Mahajan, C. Ramesh and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No.2.

The following Order of the Court was delivered:

This appeal by Special leave is against the appellate order of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. Respondent No. 1 was appointed to the Indian Police Service on 4.7. 1969 and has been discharged by the impugned order dated 9.4.1974. After he was appointed by the Union of India he was allotted to the State cadre of Gujarat and the order of discharge has been made on the basis of steps taken by the State of Gujarat. The order of discharge was assailed by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitu- tion. The Single Judge annulled the order. To the Writ petition both the Union of India and the State of Gujarat were party-respondents. Against the Single Judge's decision, two appeals were preferred to the Division Bench. The Divi- sion Bench for reasons mostly different from what had been recorded by the learned Single Judge, came to the same conclusion. Before this Court, there is only one appeal by the State of Gujarat and the Union of India has been joined as a respondent. Initially a preliminary objection had been raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal in the absence of any appeal by the Union of India but Mr. Kacker appearing for respondent No. 1 has given up the same. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into that question. The order of discharge read as follows:
"Under clause (bb) of Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954, the President hereby discharges Shri A.C. Bhargav, a person appointed to the Indian Police Serv- ice, on probation, on the results of the I.A.S. etc. Examination held in 1968, and ,allocated to the service cadre of Gujarat from the said service with effect from the date on which this order is served on the said Shri A.C. Bhargav."

Reference to Rule 12(bb), it was contended on behalf of the respondent, brought into the otherwise innocuous order stigma in sufficient measure warranting a proceeding of the nature contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitu- tion. It is unnecessary for us to go into that question as in our opinion the view expressed by the High Court is 1094 quite sound. We may refer to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court reported in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. v. Ram Narayan Das, [1961] 1 SCR 606 wherein this Court considered the order of discharge of a police officer on probation and held that in the case of a probationer obser- vation like 'unsatisfactory work and conduct' would not amount to stigma.

The other aspect which has been convassed before us at length is as to whether the respondent should have been treated as a confirmed officer of the cadre at the time the order of discharge was made. Admittedly, the order of dis- charge is about five years after the appointment. Rule 3(1) of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954, provides that every person recruited to the service in accordance with Indian Police Service (Appoint- ment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955, ...... shall be appointed to the service on probation for a period of two years. At the relevant time, sub-rule (3) of the said Rules provided that the Central Government may, if it so thinks fit in any case or class of cases extend the period of probation. Admittedly, in this case there was no order of extention. It has been contended that no order of extension is necessary to be made as the process of confirmation is not automatic and even if the two year period as provided in Rule 3(1) has expired confirmation would not ipso facto follow and a special order has to be made.

Reliance has been placed on a series of decisions of this Court which have held that an order of confirmation has to be made and confirmation would not follow automatically. The position here, however, is somewhat different. While the Probation Rules prescribed an initial period of two years of probation it did not provide any optimum period of probation. Administrative instructions were issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, on 16th March, 1973, indicating the guidelines to be followed in the matter. The relevant portion thereof may be extract- ed:

".......
(ii) It is not desirable that a member of the service should be kept on probation for years as happens occasionally at present. Save for exceptional reasons, the period of proba-
1095

tion should not, therefore, be extended by more than one year and no member of the serv- ice should, by convertion, be kept on proba- tion for more than double the normal period i.e. four years. Accordingly, a probationer, who does not complete the probationers' final examination within a period of four years, should ordinarily be discharged from the service."

It is not disputed that the circular of the Home Minis- try was with reference to the Indian Police Service (Proba- tion) Rules. We have not been shown that these instructions run counter to the rules. It is well settled that within the limits of executive powers under the Constitutional scheme, it is open to the appropriate Government to issue instruc- tions to cover the gap where there be any vacuum or lacuna. Since instructions do not run counter to the rules in exist- ence, the validity of the instructions cannot be disputed. Reliance has been placed in the courts below on the consti- tution Bench Judgment of this Court, and which reported in [ 2968] 1 SCR 111 (Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and anr.) where Ramaswami J. speaking for the Court stated thus:

" ..... We are unable to accept this argu-
ment as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statu- tory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative in- structions regarding the principles to be followed in promotions of the officers con- cerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instruc- tions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue in- structions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.
We are of the view that the rules read with instructions create a situation as arose for consideration by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, [1968] 3 SCR
1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in that case inter- preted the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules and found that there was a maximum limit of three years beyond which the period of probation could not be extended. When an officer appointed initially on proba- tion was found to be continuing in service beyond three years without a written order of confirmation, this Court held that it tantamounts to confirmation. In view of what we have stated above we are in argee-
1096
ment with the High Court about the combined effect of the rules and instructions. We hold that the respondent stood confirmed in the cadre on the relevant date when he was discharged. For a confirmed officer in the cadre, the Proba- tion Rules did not apply and therefore, proceedings in accordance with law, were necessary to terminate service. That exactly was the ratio of the decision in Moti Ram Deka etc. v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, Pandu etc., [1964] 5 SCR 683. On the analysis indicated above, the net result, therefore, is that the respondent No. 1 had become a confirmed officer of the Gujarat I.P.S. cadre and under rule 12(bb) of the Probation Rules his services could not be brought to an end by the impugned order of discharge. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
N.P.V.						Appeal	dis-
missed.
1097