Punjab-Haryana High Court
Atul Casting Ltd. vs Lt. Col. Bawa Gurvachan Singh (Retd.) on 5 December, 2000
Author: J.S. Khehar
Bench: J.S. Khehar
ORDER J.S. Khehar, J.
1. The present controversy relates to House No. 199, Sector 16-A, Chandigarh. The aforesaid property belongs to a Hindu Undivided Family. Lt. Col. Bawa Gurvachan Singh filed an application before the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, seeking eviction of M/s Casting Ltd. from the aforesaid premises on account of alleged user of the building for a purpose other than one for which it was leased.
2. The relationship of landlord and tenant has not been a matter of dispute between the parties. It was alleged in the application that the premises was exclusively let out for residential purposes but it was being used for residence as well as office by the tenant M/s Atul Castings Ltd. In the statement, filed on behalf of the tenant M/s Atul Castings Ltd., it was denied that the premises was being used for a purpose other than the one for which it had been taken on ent. In para 6 of the original written statement it was stated:
"That the contents of para 6 are admitted that the premises was let out for the purposes of residence but a part of the premises is being used for office purpose also as provided in the agreements. It is denied that the respondent had started using the premises for purposes other than residence. It is submitted that Sh. R.K. Aggarwal, the Managing Director of the Company is living in the demised premises with his family from the inception of the tenancy and is still living there".
3. Although para 6 of the original rent application filed by the landlord, was amended and in the amended written statement filed by the tenant, the factual position expressed in para 6 of the original written statement (extracted above), was altered yet for the disposal of the present petition, it is not necessary to refer to para 6 of the amended written statement as the learned counsel for the tenant (M/s Atul Castings Ltd.) has addressed all arguments accepting the factual position expressed in para 6 of the original written statement (extracted above). In fact, it was conceded that despite amendment of para 6 of the written statement, the factual position as indicated in Para 6 of the original written statement, could not be withdrawn by the petitioner-tenant.
4. The Rent Controller vide his order dated 11.12.1995 accepted the plea of the landlord that the tenant had changed the user of the premises in question and accordingly, ordered the tenant to vacate the premises within two months. Dissatisfied with the decision rendered by the Rent Controller, the tenant preferred an appeal before Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the tenant by an order dated 23.9.2000. The Appellate Authority required the tenant to vacate the premises and hand over the possession thereof to the landlord within two months. Dissatisfied with the determination of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, the tenant (M/s Atul Castings Ltd.) has filed the instant petition impugning the orders of the Rent Controller as also of the Appellate Authority.
5. To buttress his argument, that the users of one room in the rented premises would not amount to change of user within the meaning of Section 13(2)(ii)(b)of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act, 1949, as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Act') reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant on a decision of this Court in Firm Himalayan Traders v. Narain Dass, 1966(68) P.L.R. 367. In the aforesaid case, the building in question was rented out to a firm for its own residence. As a matter of fact, no partner of the firm ever resided in the premises. The employees of the firm and others visiting it for business purposes had been residing there. One room of the premises was used as a godown. The argument on behalf of the landlord in the aforesaid case was that the tenant had changed the user of the building by using one room of the premises rented out for residential purposes as godown. While interpreting Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, this Court in the aforesaid case held as under:-
".....It is clear that if it was the intention of the Legislature that where a small part of the demised premises is not used for the purpose for which it has been let and that was to be the ground of ejectment, it would have used the same phraseology as in Section 13(2)(ii)(a) and then it would have used in Section 13(2)(ii)(b) also the words "any portion thereof". This it has not done. What it has done is that it has said that when the building is used for a purpose other than that for which it was leased and therefore unless the part so used can itself be described as a building, the building to which this part of the clause refers must be taken as a whole. So that user of one room as the godown does not come under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act."
6. On the basis of the aforesaid determination of this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that unless user of the entire premises is changed, eviction cannot be sought on account of change of user. The learned counsel has also relied on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand v. District Judge, Deharadun and others, 1977(1) R.C.R. 471. In the aforesaid case, the landlord rented out to the tenant two rooms for his residence. The tenant while residing in the premises, started using one of the rooms for carrying on the business of tailoring. It was submitted on behalf of the landlord that the tenant had changed the user for which the premises had been rented out to the tenant. While rejecting the claim of the landlord, the Apex Court observed as under:-
"We are unable to accept this submission. The appellant has only two small rooms in which he resides with his wife, two young sons and one daughter and although he may have a tailoring shop in one of his rooms it is not unlikely that the very room is utilised as bed room for one or two members of his family at night. The fact that he runs a tailoring shop in one of the rooms is not sufficient to convert what otherwise to all intents and purposes is a residential building into a non-residential building....."
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also relied on a judgment of this Court in Paramjit Singh and other v. Bawa Gurdas Ram and others, AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 349. In the aforesaid case, it was alleged on behalf of the landlord that the house had been rented out to the tenant for residence. After the death of the tenant; it was being used by his heirs in connection with business. In so far as issue of change of user is concerned, that the premises was being used as office-cum-residence. The legal heirs (of the original tenant) asserted that the original tenant was using the premises as office-cum residence and the legal heirs were also using the same as office-cum-residence. On of the legal heirs Paramjit Singh was found as a matter of fact using the premises for property dealer business. The Apex Court while examining the issue of change of user observed as under:-
".....The presence of a big notice board outside the house is indicative of the fact that some part of the business is also being carried on in the house itself. However, this kind of user of the house is not likely to cause damage to it or to change its nature from a residential building to a non-residential building. It has not been shown that the tenants are residing in some house other than the one in dispute. They are thus primarily using the house for residence though one of them is engaged in such business which requires the meeting of several other persons. A property dealer has only to hold a talk with a prospective customer and then to settle a bargain. Some record may have been there in one of the rooms pertaining to the correspondence which might have been made with different clients. It is, therefore, held that the tenants have not used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased."
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Shri Sagar Mal alias S.M. Aggarwal v. Shree Seeta Ram and another, 1980(1) RLR 33. This Court in the aforesaid case concluded as under:-
"9. From a perusal of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is evident that the ratio of this Court as well as the Supreme Court is that if a small portion of a building taken on lease for residential purpose is used for business or vice-versa, the nature of the building is not changed. Thus, each case has to be decided after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of that case.
10. Now I advert to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, three rooms were given on lease by the landlord to the petitioner for the purposes of business out of which two rooms are situated on the first floor and one at the second floor. Both the rooms on the first floor are being used for the purposes of business and the Baithak on the second floor for residence. It is, however, not clear on the record as to how much area of the premises is being used for the purposes of business and how much for the purposes of residence. Unfortunately, even the plan of the building ha snot been placed on the record by either of the parties. The learned appellate Court came to the conclusion that tenant was using one portion of the premises for the purposes of residence which cannot be said to be small portion. In view of that finding, the Appellate Authority ordered ejectment of the tenant. There is, however, no evidence on the record to show that the aforesaid observations of the learned Appellate Authority are correct. The litigation between the parties is pending since September, 173. In order to do complete justice between them, it is necessary that a report may be sent for from the learned Rent Controller as to how much portion was being used by the tenant for the purposes of business and how much for residence."
9. On the basis of the factual and legal position expressed above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the declared legal position in respect of the controversy between the parties is: if a small portion of the premises is used for a purpose other than the one for which it had been let out, the same could not be the basis of upholding the plea liable to eviction. In the case in hand, it was pointed out that only one room was being used as office in the premises let out to the petitioner by the respondent. The room which was being used for office was a very small part of the entire building. Consequently it was submitted that merely because one room was being used by the petitioner-tenant for office, the same could not be a valid ground of eviction on the plea of change of user. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant asserted that the consistent position of law emerging from the decisions referred to above, has recently been affirmed by this Court in Shri Bakshish Singh Nalwa and another v. Shri Harnam Singh, Property Dealer, 1993(1) PLR 576 : 1993(1) RCR (Rent) 541 (P&H). In the aforesaid case, the claim of the landlord was that the premises was leased out to the tenant for residential purposes whereas the tenant was transacting commercial activity as property dealer from the premises. He was also using the premises for storage and sale of broilers. This Court rejected the claim of the landlord holding that only a small portion of the building was being used for commercial purposes without changing the basis character of the building and as such the plea of change of user was rejected.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent has seriously contested the aforesaid legal position, asserting that the judgment relied upon are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has vehemently argued that the parties had executed two lease agreements which delineated the terms and conditions of the lease. Neither party could violate the conditions incorporated therein. Since it was specifically agreed upon between the parties that the premises could "only" be used for the purpose of residence, the petitioner-tenant was precluded from using even a small part of the premises for a purpose other than his own residence. In the connection, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has invited the pointed attention of this Court to rent note dated 1.5.1988 (Exhibit P-1) and the rent note dated 1.1.1992 (Exhibit P-3). Exhibit P-1 i.e. the rent agreement dated 1.5.1988 inter alia stipulated as under:-
"Whereas the first party has agreed to let out premises No. 199, Sector 16-A, Chandigarh shown in the plan attached with this agreement which shall form part of this agreement for a period of eleven months from 1st May, 1988 for the residence only of the second party. The party of the second part has taken the premises for residential purpose as stated above in the agreement from the party of the first part who is the owner/landlord of the premises on the following terms and conditions....."
The rent agreement dated 1.1.1992 (Exhibit P-3) was also to the same effect wherein the parties inter alia as under:-
"Whereas the first party has agreed to let out premises No. 199, Sector 16-A, Chandigarh, shown in the plan attached with this agreement which shall form part of this agreement for a period of eleven months from 1st January, 1992 for the residence only of the second party. The party of the second part has taken the premises for residential purpose only as stated above in the agreement from the party of the first part who is the owner/landlord of the premises on the following terms and conditions....."
11. While relying on the agreements dated 1.5.1988 and 1.1.1992, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord emphasised that the express use of the word "only" in the two rent agreements shall have the effect of absolutely prohibiting the petitioner-tenant from using the building for any other purpose.
To assert that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the present controversy, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has relied upon a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Telu Ram v. Om Prakash Garg, 1971(73) PLR 1. The attention of this Court was invited to the interpretation placed on Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act by the Division Bench which is reproduced as under:-
"The next contention of the learned counsel then was that so long as only a portion of the building is converted to a use from the one for which it was let and the original purpose is carried on in the remaining portion, clause (ii)(b) of Section 13(2) would not applicable. He pointed out the difference in the phraseology used in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (ii) to the effect that whereas in the case of sub-clause (a) dealing with subletting it has been provided that subletting of the entire building or any portion thereof would afford a ground for ejectment, but in sub-clause (b) the words used are the building and not the building or a portion thereof. His argument, therefore, was that so long as the building which in view of the wording of the earlier sub-clause (a) must be interpreted to mean the 'entire building' is not converted for a purpose other than the one for which it was leased, the tenant does not render himself liable to ejectment. This distinction between sub-clauses (a) and (b) has been noticed in a number of cases and it is this type of cases which create some difficulty. However, in none of the decided cases the words "the building" have been interpreted as 'the entire building'. It is true that the words 'a part of the building' do not exist in sub-clause (b) and, therefore, it would mean that merely because some slight change of use is made in a small part of the building that would not automatically render the tenant liable to be ejected under this sub-clause, but at the same time the word 'entire' is not used as qualifying the word 'building' as is the case in sub-clause (a). Taking into consideration the object of the legislation in inserting this sub-clause namely, that a tenant should not be allowed to make use of the demised premises for a purpose for which if at the time of the lease an enquiry had been made from the landlord, he would not have consented to give the same on lease....."
On the basis of the aforesaid interpretation, placed on Section 13(2)(ii)(b) by the Division Bench, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord vehemently argued that the decision rendered by this Court in Himalayan Traders (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner-tenant cannot be considered to be good law. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also invited the attention of this Court to the following conclusions drawn by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case:-
"From the provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act and the various decisions discussed above, the position emerges out like this:-
(a) that if only a small part of a building is used for a purpose other than the one for which it was originally let, that, by itself, may not render the tenant liable to be evicted under the above-mentioned clause. In any case, a tenant would not be so liable if the purpose complained of can be said to be 'part of the purpose for which the premises were originally let;
(b) that if the result of the use of even a small portion of a building is such that the category of the premises is changed from residential, non-residential and scheduled, and it becomes a category different from the one for which the same had been let, the clause would be attracted;
(c) that if a substantial part of the demised premises is being utilized for a purpose other than the one for which the same had been leased, the tenant would render himself liable to eviction; whether, in a particular case, there has been a substantial conversion of the premises for a purpose different from the one for which the same were let, would be a question of fact to be determined in each particular case;
(d) that in determining whether the change has been substantial or not inter alia it would be necessary for the Court to direct itself to the question whether at the time of letting of the premises the landlord would or not have agreed to the premises being used for the changed purpose; and
(e) that if the entire premises are used for a purpose other than the one for which the same were originally let, the clause would be attracted."
On the basis of the aforesaid conclusions, it is submitted buy the learned counsel for the landlord that the factum of user of one room as office room in the premises would have the effect of change of charger/classification of the premises under the Rent Act, i.e. from "residential building" to "non-residential building". The plea of the petitioner-tenant that only a small part of the leased premises was being used as office, would not be relevant especially in the light of conclusion (b) extracted above. The aforesaid plea would have been relevant if the category of the premises despite the change of user would have remained the same. To buttress the argument, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submits that if a premises is let out, for non-residential purpose, but a part thereof is used for residential purposes, that by itself would not have the effect of changing the character/classification of the building in view of the definition of the term "non-residential building" in Section 2(d) of the Act as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh which is extracted hereunder:
"2(d). "non-residential building" means - (i) a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade.
(ii)(a) a building let under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or trade and also for the purposes of residence.
Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause, residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it, shall be deemed to convert a "non-residential building" to a "residential building."
12. The converse, however, is not correct. In case, a building is let out for residential purpose but a small part thereof is being used for office, that has the effect of chancing the character/classification of the building from "residential" to "non-residential". In view of this aforesaid legal position, learned counsel contends that none of the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are relevant to the present controversy as in none of those cases, the Court while examining the change of user had on occasion to consider whether the character/classification of the premises was changed under the Rent Act, by the alleged action at the behest of the tenant.
13. On the basis of the admitted factual position, noticed above, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord that the admission of the petitioner-tenant that he was using one room in the premises as office; while acknowledging the fact that the premises had been rented for use as residence "only" has the effect of changing of the character/classification of the premises under the Rent Act from "residential" to "non-residential". In this behalf, it is pointed out that the change of the category of the building has been consistently held to be a change of user; entitling a landlord the right to evict the tenant under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, if the same is without his written consent.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord relied upon Bishamber Dass Koshli (dead) by LRs. v. Smt. Satya Bhalla, 1993(1) Rent Control Reporter 259; Ranjit Singh Gill and another v. Gulwant Singh and another, 1984(2) RCR 429; Gulraj Singh Grewal v. Dr. Harbans Singh and another, AIR 1993 SC 1574 : 1993(1) RCR(Rent) 270 (SC). In Bishamber Dass Kohli's case (supra) the Supreme Court and in Ranjit Singh Gill's case (supra) a Single Bench of this Court, held that use of a small portion of the premises rented for residential purpose as lawyer's office has the effect of changing the category of the premises under the Rent Act from "residential building" to "scheduled building", and as such would constitute a change of user within the meaning of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. A similar conclusion was drawn in Gulraj Singh Grewal's case (supra), wherein the tenant after taking a building on rent for residential purposes started to use a part of the same as his professional office as a Consultant Engineer. The observations made by the Apex Court in Bishamber Das Kohli's case (supra) are extracted hereunder:-
"It is clear that if the change in user of the building is of the kind that it makes the residential building let out for residential purpose alone change its character and become a 'scheduled building' as a defined in Section 2(h) of the Act without the written consent of the landlord, the ground of eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) is made out."
In Gulraj Singh Grewal's case (supra) the Apex Court while reiterating the position of law expressed in Bishamber Dass Kohli's case (supra), observed as under:-
"If the express terms of lease restrict the user solely for purpose of residence, then use of any part thereof for even a scheduled purpose without the written consent of the landlord may amount to use of the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. That, however, is a question of fact in each case."
15. On the basis of the admitted factual position, it is asserted, on the basis of the decisions referred to above, that by using one room as office in the premises let out to the petitioner-tenant only for the purpose of residence the petitioner-tenant altered the character/classification of the building from "residential building" to non-residential building."
16. Last of all, emphasising the significance of the obligation cast on the parties by the Rent agreement dated 1.5.1998 and 1.1.1992 (extracted above) it is submitted that the word "only" suffixed with the words residential purpose prevented the petitioner-tenant from using the premises for a purpose other than residence, and that even though only room in the entire building has been used for purpose of office by the petitioner-tenant, that itself would constitute change of user. To buttress the aforesaid argument, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in M. Arul Jothi and another v. Lajja Bal (deceased) and another, AIR 2000 SC 1122 : 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 278(SC). The facts in the aforesaid case were noticed in paragraph 2 wherein the relevant part of the agreement was extended. An extract from paragraph 2, is reproduced hereunder:
".....shall be used by the tenant only by carrying on his own business dealing in radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture and for non-residential purposes and the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the above said business."
After examining the aforesaid clause of the rent note, the Apex Court concluded as under;-
"So, we come to the conclusion that use of the words in the rent-deed 'not to use it for any other purpose', it has to be given effect to and hence Section 10(2)(ii)(b) has to be interpreted to mean that use of building shall not be for a purpose other than that for which the shop was given, there is specific clause restricting its user thus it has to be used for the purpose given and no other."
17. In so far as the applicability of the aforesaid decision wherein the claim was determined under the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960) to the present case (wherein the issue has to be determined under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh) is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has drawn the attention of this Court to the following observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 14 and 15:
"However, we find in Bishamber Dass Kohli (Dead) by LRs. v. Satya Bhalla (Smt.), 1993(1) SCC 566 : 1993 AIR SCW 643 where this question was raised that change of business was not in the substantial part of the building. The Court held (para 6 of AIR): Shri Mahajan contended that to constitute the ground under Section 13(2)(ii)(b), the change in user should be in respect of at least a substantial part of the building if not the entire building. The comparison of sub-clause (b) with sub-clause (a) shows that the omission of the word 'entire' before the word 'building' in sub-clause (b) when the word 'entire' has been used before the word 'building' in sub-clause (a) is deliberate. For this reason, the change in user of the building required to constitute the ground under sub-clause (b) need not be of entire building, the word 'entire' being deliberately omitted in sub-clause (b). Faced with this difficulty, Shri Mahajan submitted that the change of user should be of a substantial part of the building let out even though not of the entire building. This argument also cannot be accepted in this contest. The definition in Section 2 of the Act shows that even though a 'schedule building' continues to be a residential building as defined in Section 2(g), a residential building of which even a part is used for a scheduled purpose, becomes and is called a 'scheduled building' when user of the building is significant or the criterion. Thus, where user of the building is of significance, a distinction is made in the Act between a residential building which is not a scheduled building and that which is a scheduled building. This is so in Section 4 of the Act dealing with determination of fair rent wherein fixation of rent is made on the basis of user and for that purpose a 'scheduled building' is treated differently from a residential building which is not a scheduled building. Same is the position with regard to the ground of eviction contained in section 13(2)(ii)(b) wherein charge in user of the building is alone significant for constituting the ground."
18. This is a decision by three Hon'ble Judges of this Court. This completely dissolves the submission for the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant attempts to distinguish this decision that this was a case under Section 2(h) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It defines 'scheduled building' as one being used partly for business and partly for residence. So even if part is used for residence it continues to be scheduled building. This distinction would not distract the law laid down therein which is evident from the last line of the aforesaid quoted lines which holds, 'same is the position with regard to the ground of eviction contained in Section 10(2)(ii)(b) wherein change in user of the building is alone significant for constituting the ground.' It therefore, cannot be doubted that the decision in M. Arul Jothi's case (supra) is fully applicable to the present controversy.
19. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that rent agreements executed between the parties enjoined upon the petitioner-tenant to use the premises "only" for residential purposes. Admittedly, the petitioner-tenant had used one room of the premises as office. In my view, the theory of dominant purpose projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant by primarily relying on the decisions of this Court is wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case in view of the facts that the plea of dominant purpose can only be a valid plea, if the character of the building is not altered. Under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, buildings are classified as "residential building", "non-residential building" and "scheduled building". In my considered view, if the rented premises is being used for a purpose other than the purpose for which it has been rented out, in a certain circumstances, it can still be held that there is no change of user. As for instance, if a small portion of the premises is being used for a purpose ancillary to the purpose for which it has been leased, it would not constitute a change of user. There can be no exception to the conclusion of change of user as defined in Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, when the change has the effect of altering the character/classification of the building envisaged by the Rent Act. In view of the definition of the terms "residential building" and "non-residential building" extracted above, even if a small portion of a building is used for office, it would have the effect of changing the character/classification of the building from "residential building" to "non-residential building". Change of the user of the building without due authorisation will clearly attract the provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. Consequently, in view of the admitted user of one room for office by the petitioner-tenant, although the premises were let out "only" for residence, has the effect of change of the character/classification of the building as defined in the Act. This conclusion is primarily based on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Bishamber Dass Kohli's case (supra) and Gulraj Singh Grewal's case (supra) and by this Court in Ranjit Singh Gill's case (supra), wherefrom it is concluded that even if change of user is in respect of a small portion of the premises, the same would constitute change of user envisaged under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act as the change has the effect of change of character/classification of the building under this Act. Since the said change was not permitted in writing by the landlord, the plea of change of user advanced on behalf of the respondent-landlord must be deemed to have been fully substantiated.
20. Further, in so far as the instant case is concerned, the respondent-landlord in the written rent agreements executed with the petitioner-tenant expressly denied him the right to use the premises for a purpose other than for his residence. The word "only" used in the rent agreements dated 1.5.1988 and 1.1.1992 (extracted above) suffixed with the words "residential purpose" has the effect of preventing the tenant even from using one room in the entire premises as office. This conclusion is primarily based on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in M. Arul Jothi's case (supra). Even if in the instant case, there had been no change of character of the building i.e. even if the character/classification of the building had not been converted from "residential" to "non-residential" on account of the action of the petitioner-tenant in using one room as office, still the conclusion in the instant case would have been the same because the petitioner-tenant has certainly put the premises to a user which was not authorised by the rent agreements. Since, the said change was not permitted in writing by the landlord, the plea of change of user advanced on behalf of the respondent-landlord must be deemed to have been fully substantiated.
21. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in the petition. The same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
22. Petition dismissed.