Delhi District Court
Manoj Kumar Dwivedi And Anr vs Deepak Tyagi And Ors on 25 April, 2026
Digitally signed
by
DHARMENDER
DHARMENDER RANA
RANA
Date:
2026.04.25
16:20:52 +0530
DLND010046712024
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE- 01,
NEW DELHI DISTRICT, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Presided over by :- SH. DHARMENDER RANA (DHJS)
Arbitration No. 418/2024
1. Mr. Manoj Kumar Dwivedi,
S/o Late Sh. H.N. Dwivedi,
R/o Plot no. 18, Adarsh Vihar, Ring Road,
Buddheswar, Alam Nagar,
Lucknow, U.P.- 226017.
2. Ms. Surajita Pattanaik,
R/o 1701, P.S. Subji Mandi,
Malkaganj,
Delhi- 110007. ......... Petitioners
Versus
1. Deepak Tyagi,
S/o Late DPS Tyagi,
A-2, LGF, Lajpat Nagar,
New Delhi- 110024.
2. Supreme Court Bar Association Multistate
Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd (Regd),
Through its ACEO M C Setavad Chambers
Arbitration Room 117, Bhagwan Dass Road,
New Delhi- 110001
3. Mr. Satish Pandey,
A-2631, Green Field Colony,
Sector-42, Faridabad, Haryana.
ARBTN/418/2024 Page 1 of 9
Digitally signed
by
DHARMENDER
DHARMENDER RANA
RANA Date:
2026.04.25
16:20:58
+0530
4. Mr. Vibhu Shankar Mishra,
3/63, Prem Nagar,
Safdarjung Terminal,
New Delhi- 110003. ........ Respondents
Petition presented on : 27.05.2024
Arguments Concluded on : 25.04.2026
Order Pronounced on : 25.04.2026
ORDER
1. Petitioners herein are aggreived by their dis- qualification in elections to the Member of Board of Supreme Court Bar Association Multistate Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. (respondent no.2), upon a petition filed by Mr. Deepak Tyagi (respondent no.1).
2. Shorn off all unnecessary details: Respondent no.1 invoked arbitration challenging the election of petitioners herein to the Members of Board of respondent no.2, primarily on the ground that they were ineligible to be elected as Board Members in wake of Section 43 (1) (e) of Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as MCS Act), as they had not been members of respondent no.2 for a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of elections.
2.1. Ld. Arbitrator found substance in the claim of respondent no.1 and accordingly held the petitioners to be ineligible as they have failed to fulfill the requisite condition of ARBTN/418/2024 Page 2 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date: 2026.04.25 16:21:03 +0530 Section 43 (1) (e) of MCS Act. Hence, the instant application under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act.
2.2. The main stay of the challenge was Section 43 (1)
(e) of Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as MCS Act), which is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
"43. Disqualifications for being a member of board (1) No member of any multi-State co-operative society or nominee of a member, society or a national co-operative society shall be eligible for being chosen as, or for being, a member of the board of such multi-State co-operative society or a national co-operative society, or of any other co-
operative society to which the multi-State co-operative society is affiliated, if such member--
(i) has been a member of the society for less than twelve months immediately preceding the date of such election or appointment"
3. Both the petitioners who are practicing advocates, have opted to address arguments in person. It is jointly argued that the citeria envisaged under Section 43 (1) (e) of MCS Act would only be attracted if the petitioners were 'chosen' as Members of Board, whereas they were 'elected' as Members of Board in accordance with bye-law no. 35 of bye-laws of Supreme Court Bar Association Multistate Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. It is forcefully argued that petition before Ld. Arbitrator was actuated with a political agenda and oblique intents. Relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, 1952 AIR 64, ARBTN/418/2024 Page 3 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:08 +0530 it is argued that it was the duty of the Returning Officer to meticulously scrutinize the nomination forms and once the petitioners were found to be eligible on scrutiny by Returning Officer, their eligibility was beyond the pale of any challenge before Ld. Arbitrator.
Both the petitioners submit that all their contentions have been duly noted and correctly paraphrased here as above.
4. On the other hand, all the respondents have forcefully argued that the illusionary disctinction attempted to be created by the petitioners between 'chosen' and 'elected', is non- existent in the statutory provisions. It is additionally argued that in case of any conflict between the bye-laws and the statute, the statutory provisions would prevail upon. It is submitted that a detailed and reasoned finding of Ld. Arbitrator calls for no interference.
All the respondents fairly endorse that their contentions have been duly noted and correctly paraphrased as above.
5. I have heard the rival submissions and carefully perused the record.
6. Before adverting to the rival claims of the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to remind itself of the scope of powers U/s 34 of the Arbitration Act. It has been held in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Metro Rail ARBTN/418/2024 Page 4 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:15 +0530 Corporation Ltd. Civil Appeal no. 5627 of 2021, Arising out of SLP (C) no. 4115 of 2019 decided on 09.09.2021 as under:
"...22. A cumulative reading of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made, Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to the grounds in Section 34. While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or re- appreciation of matters of fact as well as law. (See: Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited. v. Northern Coal Field Limited. 1, Bhaven Construction Through Authorised Signatory Premjibhai K. Shah v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. and Another2 and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran3 ).
23. For a better understanding of the role ascribed to courts in reviewing arbitral awards while considering applications filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it would be relevant to refer to a judgment of this Court in Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) 4 wherein R.F. Nariman, J. has in clear terms delineated the limited area for judicial interference, taking into account the amendments brought about by the 2015 Amendment Act. The relevant passages of the judgment in Ssangyong (supra) are noted as under:-
"34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression "public policy of India", whether contained in Section 34 or in Section 48, would now mean the "fundamental policy of Indian law" as explained in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] i.e. the fundamental policy of Indian law would be relegated to "Renusagar" understanding of this expression. This would necessarily mean that Western Geco [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] expansion has been done away with. In short, Western Geco [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] ,as explained in paras 28 and 29 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , would no longer obtain, as under the guise of 1 (2020) 2 SCC 455 2 2021 SCC OnLine SC 8 3 (2012) 5 SCC 306 4 (2019) 15 SCC 131 ARBTN/418/2024 Page 5 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:19 +0530 interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach, the Court's intervention would be on the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post amendment. However, insofar as principles of natural justice are concerned, as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2) (a)(iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge of an award, as is contained in para 30 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] .
35. It is important to notice that the ground for interference insofar as it concerns "interest of India" has since been deleted, and therefore, no longer obtains. Equally, the ground for interference on the basis that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is now to be understood as a conflict with the "most basic notions of morality or justice". This again would be in line with paras 36 to 39 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , as it is only such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court that can be set aside on this ground.
36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is now constricted to mean firstly, that a domestic award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], or secondly, that such award is against basic notions of justice or morality as understood in paras 36 to 39 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204]. Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b)(ii) was added by the Amendment Act only so that Western Geco [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] , as understood in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , and paras 28 and 29 in particular, is now done away with.
37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2- A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed within "the fundamental policy of Indian law", namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality.
ARBTN/418/2024 Page 6 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDERDHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:24 +0530
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.
40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , while no longer being a ground for challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse."...
25. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression 'patent illegality'. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of ARBTN/418/2024 Page 7 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:29 +0530 the expression 'patent illegality'. What is prohibited is for courts to re-appreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling within the expression 'patent illegality'...
7. It is not in dispute that Sh. Manoj Kumar Dwivedi (petitioner no.1) became a member of the society on 12.07.2023 and petitioner no.2 became a member on 18.10.2023. It is also not in dispute that the elections were held on 18.01.2024 and concluded on 20.01.2024.
8. Evidently, one of the essential pre-condition, as per Section 43 (1) (e) of MCS Act, to be chosen as a member of Board is a membership of the society for at least 12 months.
9. The petitioners have fairly admitted that on the date of elections, they have not served as a member for 12 months.
The word 'chosen' is a generic word and election or appointment is species of the said generic word. Therefore, whether the petitioners were 'appointed' or were 'elected', as a mandatory pre-requisite for being chosen, they should fulfil the essential ARBTN/418/2024 Page 8 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:35 +0530 eligibility condition, which they have admittedly failed. They cannot claim to earn any brownie points only on account of mere carelessness or indolence of the Returning Officer.
10. Thus, I have absolutely no reasons to entertain the challenge under Section 34 of the A & C Act against a well reasoned and detailed Award. The petition fails. Ordered accordingly. Copy of this order be given dasti to the parties.
11. File be consigned to record room after necessary compliance. Copy of this order be sent to Ld. Arbitrator.
Pronounced in open Court on 25.04.2026 (Dharmender Rana) District Judge - 01 PHC/New Delhi ARBTN/418/2024 Page 9 of 9