Himachal Pradesh High Court
Dalip Kumar vs Rajesh Sahani And Ors. on 15 July, 2004
Equivalent citations: III(2004)ACC714, 2005ACJ309
JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, C.J.
1. One of the grounds urged in this appeal for enhancement of the quantum of compensation as has been awarded by the Tribunal vide its judgment dated 15.10.2001 passed in M.A.C.C. No. 219-S/2 of 1998 is that the Claims Tribunal wrongly rejected the application of the appellant-claimant for permission to adduce additional evidence. I have seen the Tribunal's order dated 27.8.2001 and find that the claimant's prayer for permission to examine Dr. R.S. Yadav has been disallowed without properly appreciating the merits of the prayer. It appears that in a slipshod manner, the Tribunal disallowed the appellant's aforesaid prayer, despite the fact that the examination of Dr. R.S. Yadav as one of the claimant's witnesses was very highly relevant and material for proper adjudication of the issues involved in this case, especially for determining the quantum of compensation on the ground of, and related to the disability suffered by the claimant-appellant. Not only that the Tribunal does not appear to have assigned valid or cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's aforesaid prayer.
2. By now, it is a commonly accepted proposition of law that in trying claim petitions under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals established under Section 165 of the Act do not have to follow the rigours of procedural law as are prescribed either in the Civil Procedure Code or in other Acts and that these Tribunals should adopt and follow a liberal approach in pursuing, trying and disposing of claim petitions under Section 166 of the Act. It is commonly known and realized that persons in distress, who are victims of accidents, approach the Tribunals for succour and that the legislature in Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has purposely and deliberately excluded the application of procedural laws with respect to the proceedings in the Tribunals. Whereas Section 166 of the Act stipulates about the filing of an application for compensation by the victim of an accident, Section 168 talks of the Tribunals 'holding an inquiry' into the claim after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties, including the insurer an opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (1) of Section 168 of the Act reads thus:
"168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.- (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X."
3. Under Section 169 of the Act, it has specifically been laid down that a Tribunal in holding an inquiry under Section 168 may follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of Section 169 clothes the Tribunal with all the power of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and for enforcing attendance of witnesses, etc. Section 169 of the Act reads thus:
"169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.-(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry."
4. Merely clothing the Tribunals with the powers of civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, for enforcing attendance of witnesses, for compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, or for such other purposes as may be prescribed does not suggest or stipulate that the Tribunal shall be bound in the same rigmarole as the civil courts are or that the procedure prescribed in Civil Procedure Code or any other law, shall be applicable to the inquiry being held by a Tribunal. Actually, sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act has clearly laid down that the inquiry shall be of a summary nature.
5. Section 168 also clearly suggests that the Tribunal shall 'hold an inquiry into the claim' which means that the holding of an inquiry is clearly distinct than conducting a trial. That being the position, therefore, the Tribunal cannot be equated with a civil court in the sense that the rigours of procedural law are applicable to a Tribunal.
6. Viewed thus, if a claimant in a claim petition by his remissness or negligence omits or neglects to prosecute the claim petition in right earnest and in the process commits an error or makes a mistake, but later on, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings realises his mistakes and applies to the Tribunal for rectification, the Tribunal should not take a pedantic view of the matter like ordinary civil courts bound by the shackles of procedural law contained in statutes like the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act and throttle such a claim. Instead, by adopting a more realistic, pragmatic and liberal approach, keeping in mind the intent and purpose of the above referred welfare legislation and also knowing fully well that an inquiry under Section 168 of the Act has to be of a summary nature, as laid down in Section 169 of the Act, allow the prayer of claimant unless, for reasons to be recorded, and reasons which have to be cogent and logical, that allowing such a prayer would defeat the ends of justice or might inordinately delay the disposal of the claim petition.
7. As noticed in the earlier part of this judgment, the petitioners-appellants' application for summoning Dr. R.S. Yadav as one of the claimant's witnesses was incorrectly rejected by the Tribunal and that mistake/error deserves to be rectified in this appeal for the reason that Dr. R.S. Yadav is an essential witness in the case whose deposition would advance the cause of justice.
8. For the foregoing reasons, I, while keeping the appeal alive in this court, remit the matter to the Claims Tribunal with directions to it to permit the claimant the examination of Dr. R.S. Yadav as a claimant's witness. In fact if the claimant applies to the Tribunal within 2 weeks from today for the grant of permission to examine any additional witness or adduce any further evidence, with a view to establishing the claim of the claimant, and in such application the claimant assigns cogent reasons about his inability in the past to cite or summon such additional witness and if, in the application, the claimant also satisfies the court that indeed the examination of additional evidence would advance the case of the claimant, Claims Tribunal shall consider allowing the claimant's prayer for such additional evidence also. In any case the recording of additional evidence in all respects shall be concluded by the Tribunal well before 30.11.2004 and based on fresh evidence that may be adduced/produced by the claimant, Claims Tribunal shall redecide the issue regarding the quantum of compensation. Of course, re-examination and fresh decision on this issue shall be on its merits, based on evidence that might be adduced afresh and in accordance with well established principles of law.
9. Because of the aforesaid order and the directions regarding the claimant being entitled to lead additional/further evidence before the Tribunal, there is no need to pass any separate order in C.M.P. No. 65 of 2002, which is an application filed by the claimant-appellant in this court for permission to lead additional evidence in terms of Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. C.M.P, No. 65 of 2002, accordingly, is disposed of.
10. The record of the Claims Tribunal shall be sent back to it immediately where the parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear on 29.7.2004. The Tribunal after completion, in terms of the aforesaid directions shall re-submit the record to this court along with its judgment well before 30.11.2004.
11. This appeal along with F.A.O. No. 231 of 2002 shall be listed for further proceedings in this court on 3.12.2004.