Punjab-Haryana High Court
Piara Singh And Ors. vs The State on 24 May, 1960
Equivalent citations: 1960CRILJ1371, AIR 1960 PUNJAB 538, ILR (1960) 2 PUNJ 814
Author: I.D. Dua
Bench: I.D. Dua
ORDER Harbans Singh, J.
(1) In a public meeting held by the Communist Party in an open ground near Yamunagar, a loud-speaker was installed, in which Piara Singh and five others, who are petitioners in this revision, addressed a gathering. On the allegation that the pitch of the loud-speaker was high and the speeches and the poems could be heard across the road near the police post, they were challenged for the contravention of Section 3 of the Punjab Instruments (Control of Noises) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and they were convicted under Section 5 of the said Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 51/- each or in default, two weeks' simple imprisonment. The appeal filed by them was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, and they have come up in revision.
(2) It is not dispute that the Act came into force on the 11th January, 1958, vide a notification dated the 2nd of November, 1957, published by the Punjab Government on 11th of January, 1958, on which date the Act was enforced "in all the territories which immediately before 1-11-1956 were comprised in the State of Punjab". Section 3 of the Act runs as follows:
"No person shall use or operate any instrument in or upon any premises at such pitch or volume as to be audible beyond the precincts thereof except under the written permission of the District Magistrate.
* * * * * * * * * * *"
It is further not disputed that no permission was taken from the District Magistrate and the position taken by the accused was (1) that the pitch was not high and (2) that the provisions of Section 3 of the Act are inapplicable to the use of the loud-speaker in a meeting held in an open ground which is not enclosed. The finding of the Courts below is that the pitch was loud and the words spoken on the loud-speaker were heard beyond the road the Yamunanagar Police Post. The rough site plan, Exhibit P. B., shows that the meeting was held in the open ground towards the south of the petrol pump and the Yamunanagar Post is situated across Jagadhri road at some distance. The exact distance of the police post is not, however, given in the plan.
(3) The point urged by the learned counsel was as to what is the meaning of the words 'premises' and 'precincts' as used in Section 3 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the words 'premises' and 'precincts' necessarily mean some building or the adjuncts of a building or an enclosure and these words do not apply to an open space which is not enclosed. In support of this contention he mainly relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Rajanga Chetti, AIR 1954 Mad. 285. In that case the meaning of word 'premises' as used in Section 250 of the Madras District Municipalities Act was under consideration. According to that section "every person intending (a) * * * (b) to install in any premises any machinery * * * driven by steam water or other power * * * not being machinery * * * exempted by rules, shall, before beginning such * * * installation, make an application in writing to the Municipal Council for permission to undertake the intended work.
The respondents in that case had installed and worked an oil engine of five horse-power each on their agricultural land without obtaining any licence. Gobinda Menon J. (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, considered the meaning given to the word 'premises; in Wharton's and Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicons and in Bai Jamna v. Bai Jadav, ILR 4 Bom. 168 (F.B.), and other case, and came to the conclusion that though 'premises' has been defined as including land or houses, "the primary meaning of the word 'premises' is not open land under the sky, but something in the nature of a roofed construction with walls".
The learned Judge then went on to observe--
"We cannot, therefore, agree with the contention of Mr. Santanam that when the District Municipalities Act * * * uses the word 'premises' as such, any vacant or open land of whatever acreage it might be, would come within the meaning of the term 'premises'. If we accept the contention put forward on behalf of the State, then it comes to this, that wherever, within the State, a person installs an oil engine or a machinery, he should be compelled to take out a licence, for the entire State, except the City of Madras is * * * covered by the District Municipalities Act and the Local Boards Act."
Following an earlier decision of a Single Judge in Venkatachala Udayan v. Executive Officer, Rasipuram Panchayat Board, AIR 1950 Mad 38, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the word 'premises' as used in the abovementioned Act must be understood as meaning a building with land adjacent thereto and that a building is a necessary criterion for the application of the term.
(4) The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that in the present case also the Act applies to the entire State of Punjab, as it existed prior to the 1st of November, 1956, and that it would be giving too wide a meaning to the word 'premises', to include in it open land of whatever acreage it might be. He also referred to a judgment of Bhandari C. J. in Ram Sarup v. State, Criminal Revn. No. 1084 of 1959, D/- 5-11-1959, where it was held that working of a loud-speaker on a public thoroughfare was not hit by the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. On the basis of the authority of the Madras High Court and the decision of Bhandari C. J. abovementioned, it was urged that the word 'premises' must be confined to houses, buildings or some enclosed land and does not apply to open land.
(5)The learned counsel for the State, however, urged that the word 'premises' should be given a wider meaning as given in Wharton's Law Lexicon and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary. He urged that the decision in the criminal revision referred to above was not correct. He also referred to Emperor v. Ramchandra Bhaskar, 7 Ind Cas 935 (Bom), where while dealing with the word 'premises; as used in the City of Bombay Municipal Act, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that this word must be presumed to have been used in its legal sense as referring to both the buildings and sites, and that the idea behind the section is to avoid nuisance by the use of loudspeakers at an unnecessary high pitch.
(6) The point that has arisen in the case is likely to arise in a number of other cases an is of considerable importance. I have been informed that a very large number of cases are already pending in the Courts below in which the same point is involved. I feel that it is a fit case in which this matter should be more authoritatively decided and I, consequently, direct that the records of this case be sent to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for placing the matter before a larger Bench.
ORDER OF DIVISION BENCH Dua, J.
(7) This case raises a question of considerable importance and difficulty, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been referred by the learned Singh Judge for decision by a larger Bench. This facts have been stated in the referring order and need not be repeated.
(8) The question which arises for consideration is whether the word 'premises' occurring in Section 3 of the Punjab Instruments (Control of Noises) Act (Act No. 36 of 1956) covers an open ground and, therefore, the petitioners have been rightly convicted for having committed an offence under the said sanction. It will be helpful at this stage to reproduce section 3.
"3. Restriction on the use of instruments.--No person shall use or operate any instrument in or upon any premises at such pitch or volume as to be audible beyond the precincts thereof except under the written permission of the District Magistrate or any officer authorised by him in this behalf and under such conditions as may be attached to it."
It is not disputed that no such permission of the District Magistrate or any officer authorised by him in this behalf was taken. The counsel for the petitioners has contended that the use of the word 'precincts' in this section suggests that the 'premises' could not have been intended to cover the case of open ground like the one in question. He has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in AIR 1954 Mad 285, where the word 'premises' as used in Madras District Municipalities Act and Local Boards Act was construed to mean a building with land adjacent to it and a building was in the context held to be a necessary criterion.
An installation of oil engine in an open filed was not held to be an installation in the premises within the meaning of the relevant statutes. Another case to which our attention has been invited is In re K. V. V. Sarma, 1953, Cri L. J. 532: (AIR 1953 Mad 269), also a decision of the Madras High Court by the same learned Judge who decided Rajanga Chetti's case, AIR 1954 Mad 285. In the last noted case the term 'precincts' was held to be usually understood as a space enclosed by walls. There also both the expression 'premises' and 'precincts' came up for consideration, though the precise question which the Court was called upon to decide was whether the buildings in question were factories or not.
(9) It is unfortunate that in the case in hand the Legislature has not chose to define the expression 'premises'. We have, therefore, to fall back upon other aids for finding the intention of the 'Legislature; for example by reference to the context and object and purpose of the legislative measure in question. We may further have resort to dictionaries and judicial interpretation of this word as used in other statutes; but it cannot be denied that these methods are not a satisfactory as a precise and clear legislative definition in the statute itself.
Dictionaries can hardly be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of thew words used in legislative enactment's, for the plainest words may be controlled by a reference to the context (vide Rup Lal Mehra v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Lah. 158). Similarly lexicons would only define an expression in terms of a decision given by a Court of law, and unless this decision was given under the Act in which the expression is used "it involves" in the words of Ram Lall J. (as he then was) in Firm Karam Narain Daulat Ram v. Volkart Bros., AIR 1946 Lah. 116 (F. B.) at page 128" a dangerous method of interpretation".
(10) The word 'premises' has obviously a wide and a narrow meaning and in order to get at the legislative intent the contents of a particular statute have to be examined (see Barnard v. Gorman, (1941) AC 378). Dealing first with the dictionary meanings, according to Oxford English Dictionary the word 'premises' means 'the matters or things stated or mentioned previously; what has just been said; the aforesaid, the foregoing'. In legal phraseology, according to this dictionary, it refers to that part in the beginning of a deed or conveyance which sets forth the names of the grantor, grantee, and things 'granted, together with the consideration or reason subject of a conveyance or bequest, specified in the premises of the deed: so expressed when referred to collectively in the later part of the document it means the houses, lands, or tenements above-said or beforementioned'.
It also means ' a house or building with its grounds or other appurtenances'. According to Webster's International Dictionary it means 'matters previously stated or set forth; hence : the part of a deed constituting all that precedes the habendum'. It also means 'the property conveyed in a deed; hence, in general, a piece of land or real estate; sometimes, especially in fire insurance papers, a building or buildings on land'. I have reproduced only those meanings which are relevant for our purposes. According to Roland Burrow's Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Volume 4, among other meanings, the word 'premises' is stated to be commonly used as comprising land and houses and other matters.
It then deals with the meaning of this word in various statutes, but at page 325 it is stated that "the word 'premises' although in popular language it is applied to buildings, in legal language means, the subject or thing previously expressed". In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 33, also various meanings of the word 'premises' are given. At page 35 it is stated that 'premises' often means the land and this is considered to be the popular and ordinary acceptation, when the subject requires such a meaning to be attached to it. For this view reliance is place don Smith v. Pollard, 19 Vt. 272, (277). In Rignall v. State (Supreme Court of Mississippi) 98 South 444, the following observations occurs--
"The word 'premises' has varying meanings, usually determined by the context, and when used with respect to property means land, tenements, * * * *"
In Smith v. State Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas also observed that the word 'premises; has no fixed legal significance.
(11) If this be the position, then we have obviously to consider both the object and purpose of the statute which were are construing, because in order to get at the true import of a statute, it is permissible to view the enactment in retrospect, to look at the reasons for enacting it, the evil it was to end the object to subserve; it is equally permissible for us to consider the meaning of the word 'precincts' which also occurs in the section in order to find the true legislative intent.
(12) The object of the enactment appears to be to meet the evil of the indiscriminate use of loud-speakers, amplifiers and such other apparatus emitting and transmitting sound which is the source of nuisance causing obstruction in streets and lanes and annoyance and injury to neighbors, and also endangering health of the aged and the infirm who cannot enjoy sound sleep. It is in order to control this nuisance that the enactment in question was brought on the statute book. It must also be borne in mind that statutes are not mere exercises in literary composition, but being instruments of Government, while construing them the general purposes underlying the enactment is of more important aid to their meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may suggest. More so, because the purpose is generally embedded in words which are not always pedantically expressed. In this sense statutory meaning is more to be felt than to be demonstrated. So far as the object and purpose of this statute are concerned, I would be inclined to place a broader rather than a narrower construction on the word 'premises'.
(13) Now the use of the word 'precincts' has also been contended to serve as some aid to the meaning of the word 'premises'. It is argued that if the word 'precincts' does not mean to open space of land, then it is strongly suggestive of the legislative intent that the word 'premises' also does not mean to open space of land. According to the Oxford Dictionary the word 'precinct' means the space enclosed by the walls or other boundaries of a particular place or building, or by an imaginary line drawn around it. According to Webster's International Dictionary the word 'precinct' means the enclosure bounded by the walls or other limits of a building or place or by an imaginary line around it.
It also means a surrounding or enclosing line or surface; a boundary. These meanings do not, in my view, confine the term 'precincts' to buildings alone; nor is it necessarily restricted to a place enclosed only by walls. The meaning of this word thus also depends on the context and its subject, the word having no fixed legal significance. In view of the above discussion, although the meaning of the word 'premises' is not as definite and clear as it ought to be in a statute, which creates offences and provides punishments, nevertheless, in my opinion, it does cover the case of an open or internal piece of land.
(14) This word appears to have been used in the statute before us in no more restricted sense than the word 'place'; being an elastic and inclusive term, in my view it is intended to cover, and is equally well adapted to designate, both land or building. While coming to this conclusion and in my attempt to find the key to this legislative enactment, I confess, I have been influenced, to some extent, by modern stress and strain in our civil life and the inoperative necessity of minimising, to the utmost extent, the evil of the indiscriminate use of loud-speakers, amplifiers and other similar instruments, by providing effective statutory control over their user. The necessity of the subject dealt with by the statute before us does require the wider meaning to be given to the word 'premises' so as to include open space of land.
(15) No arguments were addressed to us on the merits or facts of the case, and indeed, whether or not in a given case the precincts or the premises can with certainty be fixed has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. In the present case, this question has not been agitated before us, and after perusing the record of the case I do not think any plausible argument could possibly be advanced against the correctness or the validity of the impugned judgment on the facts and circumstances disclosed on this record.
(16) I have not referred to an unreported decision of Bhandari C. J. in Criminal Revn. No 1084 of 1959, D/- 5-11-1959 (Punj), because there the facts were entirely different and the decision is of no guidance in the present case. Similarly, 7 Ind Cas, 935 (Bom), is equally unavailing, because there the word 'premises' as used in City of Bombay Municipal Act was being construed, which obviously was in a different context. On similar grounds, AIR 1950 Mad. 38, is of little assistance. The facts in ILR 4 Bom. 168 (FB), were also very much different, and indeed there the word premises as used in Bombay Act III of 1876 was merely held to include houses for the purposes of that Act. It is clear that this decision is hardly of any assistance to us.
(17) I may at this stage also state that Wharton's Law Lexicon and Law Lexicon by R. Aiyar have been of no practical assistance in the present case as the decisions noticed in them merely construed the words in question, used in the various enactment's, in their own context and background. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 3, however, there is a reference to Andrews v. Andrews (1908) 2 K.B. 567, in which it is observed by Kennedy L. J. that "there are cases which indicate that 'premises' may have a wider meaning". But this general observation hardly affords any real guidance. It is precisely for this reason that I have refrained from referring to these books.
(18) In view of the foregoing discussion this revision must fail and is, therefore dismissed.
(19) Before concluding, however, I cannot help drawing the attention of the Government to the fact that in Criminal statutes it is always desirable to be specific, unambiguous, and precise and to use language with a well-recognised and definite meaning, so that the citizens may know as to when they are going to incur the liability in a penal statute.
Bishan Narain, J.
(20) I agree.
GD/R.G.D. (21) Revision dismissed.