Delhi District Court
Rajeev Jain vs J. S. Rathore on 26 December, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUMIT DALAL
DISTRICT JUDGE-04, SOUTH-WEST DISTRICT
DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 10/25
CNR No.: DLSW01-000837-2025
In the matter of :
RAJEEV JAIN
S/o Sh. Ved Prakash Jain
R/o B-100, Siddhartha Kunj,
C. G. H. Society Ltd. Plot No. 17,
Sector - 7, Dwarka
New Delhi - 110075.
.....Appellant
Versus
J. S. Rathore
S/o Late Kaptan Singh Rathore
R/o B-77, Siddhartha Kunj,
C. G. H. Society, Plot No. 17
Sector- 7, Dwarka,
New Delhi - 110075.
.....Respondent
Date of institution of the appeal : 28.01.2025
Final Arguments Heard on : 10.12.2025
Date of Judgment : 26.12.2025
JUDGMENT
1. By way of the present regular civil appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Appellant (Plaintiff before the Ld. Trial Court) challenges the impugned judgment and decree dated Page 1 of 24 Digitally signed by SUMIT SUMIT Date:
DALAL DALAL 2025.12.26 16:03:33 +0530 21.12.2024 passed by the Court of Ld. Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, South-West District, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in Civil Suit No. 1344/2017 titled 'Rajeev Jain Vs. J.S. Rathore'. Vide the impugned judgment, the Ld. Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the Appellant wherein he had sought a decree of permanent and perpetual injunction restraining the Respondent/Defendant from entering the office of the Siddhartha Kunj C.G.H. Society and from writing defamatory letters to the Appellant's employer.
PLAINTIFF'S CASE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
2. The case of the Plaintiff, as set out in the plaint is summarized as follows:
a. The Plaintiff is the President of the Siddhartha Kunj C.G.H. Society, Plot No. 17, Sector-7, Dwarka, New Delhi, having been duly elected by the members of the society . The Defendant resides in Flat No. B-77 of the society, which is registered in the name of his son, Shri D.S. Rathore. The Plaintiff asserts that neither the Defendant nor his son is a member of the society, despite repeated requests for the son to apply for membership.
b. The Defendant is alleged to have repeatedly approached the society's office with motivated and frivolous complaints intended to harass the Plaintiff and disrupt the peaceful functioning of the office. It is further alleged that the Defendant is acting in collusion with an opposition group within the society to disturb its functions by threatening staff, trespassing, and manhandling employees.
c. On July 6, 2016, the Defendant allegedly entered the society office forcibly, manhandled the then-caretaker, Mr. Sunil, and threatened him with arrest. During this incident, the Defendant reportedly Page 2 of 24 disturbed office furniture and files. A report of this incident led to the registration of NCR No. 0032 dated August 2, 2016. d. The Defendant filed complaints on August 4, 2016, and September 26, 2016, with the higher officials of Engineers India Ltd. (EIL), where the Plaintiff is employed as a Deputy General Manager. The Plaintiff contends that these complaints, which mentioned the risk of arrest, were defamatory and caused serious professional repercussions.
e. Following an undertaking given by the Defendant in a previous civil suit (CS No. 121 of 2016) not to visit the office unlawfully, the Plaintiff alleges new incidents occurred:
- On November 30, 2016, the Defendant allegedly entered the office without permission and handed over a letter demanding ₹50,000 as "legal charges".
- On December 4, 2016, and December 6, 2017, the Defendant allegedly threatened the Plaintiff with further defamatory letters to EIL and continued harassment of staff to avenge the election defeat of his preferred candidates . f. Based on the continuous nature of these acts, the Plaintiff sought a decree of permanent and perpetual injunction to restrain the Defendant from entering the society office without permission and from making further defamatory complaints to the Plaintiff's employer .
DEFENDANT'S DEFENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
3. The Defendant contested the suit by filing a detailed written statement. Defendant's defence before the Ld. Trial Court is summarized below:Page 3 of 24
a. The Defendant, a 78-year-old senior citizen and retired CRPF personnel, characterizes the suit as a vexatious and mischievous attempt to harass him. He contends that the Plaintiff has concealed material facts, including the dismissal of several prior legal proceedings initiated by the society and its office bearers against him .
b. The Defendant asserts that the core of the present dispute is an unjustified demand for ₹50,000 as "legal fees" made by the society's Hony. Secretary with the Plaintiff's consent. He maintains that his requests for the basis of this demand and information under the RTI Act were met with silence from the society .
c. The Defendant categorically denies forcibly entering the society office or manhandling the caretaker, Mr. Sunil. Instead, he alleges that on the said date, he was physically assaulted and manhandled by Sunil Kumar in the presence of the Plaintiff. He points out that his efforts to seek justice eventually led to the registration of NCR No. 0032/2016 under Section 323 IPC against both the Plaintiff and the caretaker .
d. Regarding the complaints sent to the Plaintiff's employer (EIL) and other high-ranking officials, the Defendant maintains that as a resident, he has a legal right to report grievances and the high- handedness of society officials to relevant authorities when local police fail to act . He denies that these communications are defamatory, stating they are based on true facts. e. While admitting the flat is in his son's name, the Defendant explains that his son's membership was stalled because the society's previous president misplaced the original share certificate. Despite this, the Page 4 of 24 Defendant emphasizes that he consistently pays all society dues, including maintenance and reserve funds.
f. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks the locus standi to file the suit in his individual capacity. He further contends that since the previous suits (CS No. 121/2016 and Misc-27/2017) were dismissed or withdrawn, no fresh cause of action has arisen to justify the present litigation.
REPLICATION BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
4. The Plaintiff filed a replication to the written statement of the Defendant, wherein he denied the preliminary objections and the parawise defense while reaffirming the contents of the plaint as follows:
a. The Plaintiff specifically denied concealing any material facts. He reiterated that neither the Defendant nor his son is a member of the Society. Regarding the Defendant's grievance over the share certificate, the Plaintiff contended that such certificates are the personal property of the shareholder and there was no occasion for the Society or its office bearers to keep the same. b. The Plaintiff asserted that under Section 139 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003, only a member or a creditor can seek information, which the Defendant is not. He further denied any personal consent in the demand for ₹50,000 legal fees, stating that the Defendant used this demand as a pretext to threaten the Plaintiff with defamatory letters to his employer .
c. The Plaintiff clarified that in the previous suit (CS No. 121/2016), the Defendant had given an undertaking not to visit the office unlawfully, but he continued to do so despite the same. He also clarified that Misc Page 5 of 24 No. 27/2017 was not a fresh suit but a review application filed by the Plaintiff, which was subsequently dismissed . d. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant's constant campaign of vilification and defamatory letters to Engineers India Ltd. (EIL) resulted in the Plaintiff being denied a promotion to the post of General Manager. He further submitted that due to this campaign, the Managing Committee had passed a resolution on August 11, 2016, limiting the Plaintiff's authority to statutory duties to avoid further controversy.
e. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant's complaints to the police and various authorities were a form of retaliation filed as an "afterthought" only after receiving the summons in the present matter. He maintained that senior citizenship does not confer a legal right to defame or blackmail individuals.
ISSUES BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 19.07.2018:
a. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in clause 1 of the plaint? OPP b. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in clause 2 of the plaint? OPP c. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in clause 3 of the plaint? OPP d. Relief.Page 6 of 24
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LD. COURT
6. To substantiate his case, the Plaintiff stepped into the witness box as PW-1 (Shri Rajeev Jain) and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, exhibited as Ex. PW1/A in which PW-1 reiterated the averments made in the plaint.
7. PW-1 also relied upon the following documents in his testimony:
a. Ex. PW1/1 (colly): Minutes of the SGM dated 27.03.2016 . b. Ex. PW1/2 to PW1/3: Official communications to the Defendant's son regarding membership.
c. Ex. PW1/4 to PW1/6: Complaints to local police and DCP regarding the Defendant's actions .
d. Ex. PW1/7 and Ex. PW1/8: Copies of letters dated 26.07.2016 and 02.07.2016.
e. Ex. PW1/13: Letter dated 30.11.2016 demanding ₹50,000. f. Ex. PW1/14: Complaint dated 15.12.2017 to SHO PS Sector-9. g. Mark A: Copy of Conveyance Deed h. Mark B: Copy of Letter dated 06.07.2016 to President of Society from Sunil Kumar Ex-Manager i. Mark C: Copy of FIR No. 0032/16.
j. Mark D: Copy of Letter dated 02.07.2016 k. Mark E: Copy of Letter dated 30.08.2016 l. Mark F: Copy of Letter dated 14.08.2015 m. Mark G: Copy of Letter dated 12.07.2016 n. Mark H: Copy of Letter dated 14.07.2016 o. Mark J: Copy of Legal notice dated 11.08.2016.
p. Mark L: Copy of Postal Receipt Page 7 of 24 q. Mark M: Copy of Order of the Ld. SCJ in CS No. 121/2016 .
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
8. To rebut the Plaintiff's case and substantiate his defense, the Defendant stepped into the witness box as DW-1 (Shri J.S. Rathore) and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, exhibited as Ex. DW1/A in which he reiterated the averments made in the written statement. The DW-1 also relied upon the documents as mentioned as Mark 'A' to 'I' in his evidence affidavit. DW-1 also relied upon Mark 'J' which is mentioned in his evidence affidavit as Ex. DW1/2.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
9. Vide the impugned judgment dated 21.12.2024, the Ld. Trial Court dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff in its entirety. The findings of the Ld. Trial Court on the issues framed are summarized as follows:
a. Findings on Issues No. 1 and 2 (Injunction against entering society premises): The Ld. Trial Court observed that the Plaintiff, while claiming to be the President of the Siddhartha Kunj CGH Society, failed to plead or prove that he was duly authorized by the society or its members to institute the present suit. It was further held that the society is a necessary party to the lis; however, the Plaintiff failed to join the society as a party. The Court concluded that the suit was filed in the individual capacity of the Plaintiff and was, therefore, bad for non-joinder of a necessary party. Consequently, these issues were decided against the Plaintiff.
b. Findings on Issue No. 3 (Injunction against defamatory letters): The Ld. Trial Court noted the pendency of another suit (CS No. 361/2016) between the same parties before the Ld. ADJ, wherein the Plaintiff Page 8 of 24 Digitally signed by SUMIT SUMIT Date:
DALAL DALAL 2025.12.26 15:59:20 +0530 sought damages of ₹10,00,000/- for defamation arising from the same cause of action. Applying the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, the Court held that the relief of permanent injunction was available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing the previous suit. The Court observed that the Plaintiff cannot be permitted to split his claims and remedies arising out of the same cause of action. Accordingly, it was held that the present suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, and this issue was also decided against the Plaintiff. c. Relief: In view of the findings on the aforementioned issues, the Ld. Trial Court held that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief, and the suit was dismissed with the parties left to bear their own costs.
APPEAL AND THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
10. The Appellant has challenged the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.2024 on the following grounds and supporting arguments:
a. Factual Misappreciation: The Appellant contends that the judgment is not well-founded and fails to reflect the correct facts of the case. It is argued that the Ld. Trial Court took into account extraneous matters that were not part of the pleadings, rendering the judgment unfounded and vexatious.
b. Locus Standi and Necessary Party: The Appellant argues that the Ld. Trial Court erred in law and fact by holding that the Society was a necessary party. The Appellant maintains that the cause of action was in personam rather than in rem, thus obviating the need to implead the Society as a party to the proceedings.
c. Distinct Nature of Remedy: It is asserted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to distinguish between the pending litigation for damages and Page 9 of 24 the present suit, which was filed under the Specific Relief Act. The Appellant argues that the current suit sought a distinct remedy to permanently restrain the Respondent from harassing the Plaintiff and the staff of the Society, which was not addressed in the prior litigation.
d. Allegations of Illegal Motives: The Appellant contends that the Ld. Trial Court ignored the underlying reason for the harassment, which was the Respondent's attempt to obtain membership in the Society through threats and illegal means. It is argued that the court's failure to provide findings on the prayer for permanent injunction was illegal and unjustified.
e. Failure to Consider Evidence: A specific grievance is raised that the Ld. Trial Court did not adequately consider the cross-examination of the Plaintiff and instead relied primarily on the examination-in-chief. The Appellant argues that this selective consideration of the record led to a judgment based on surmises and conjectures. f. Prayer: Based on these grounds, the Appellant prays that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and that the reliefs sought in the original plaint be granted in the interest of justice.
REPLY AND THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
11. Although the Respondent chose not to file a formal written reply to the appeal, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent appeared and orally argued in opposition to the appeal, asserting that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned and legally sound. The arguments raised by the Respondent are summarized as follows:
a. Support for Findings on Locus Standi: The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent argues that the Ld. Trial Court correctly identified the Page 10 of 24 lack of authorization as a fatal defect in the Plaintiff's case. It is contended that the Appellant, suing in his personal name, cannot seek an injunction to bar a resident from the common areas and office of a Society, which is a separate juristic entity, without a specific resolution from the Managing Committee.
b. Strict Application of Order II Rule 2 CPC: The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent asserts that the Appellant's attempt to split his remedies is a textbook violation of Order II Rule 2 CPC. It is argued that since the Appellant had already filed a suit for damages based on the alleged defamatory letters, he was legally obligated to seek the relief of injunction in that very suit . Having failed to do so or seek leave of the court, the present suit for injunction on the same cause of action is barred.
c. Absence of Independent Corroboration: The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent points out that the Appellant failed to examine the material witness, Mr. Sunil (Caretaker), who was allegedly at the center of the incident on 06.07.2016. It is argued that the Appellant's sole testimony (PW-1) is insufficient to prove the allegations of manhandling or threats, particularly in a word-against-word situation involving a 78-year-old senior citizen.
d. Vexatious Nature of Litigation: The Respondent maintains that the Appellant has used his position as President to launch a series of uncalled-for litigations to create mental tension and harassment. It is argued that the "fresh cause of action" pleaded by the Appellant is a fabrication intended to bypass the dismissal of earlier suits. e. Conclusion of Argument: The Respondent concludes that the Appellant failed to discharge the onus of proof on all issues and that Page 11 of 24 the Ld. Trial Court correctly appreciated the evidence and law. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
POINTS OF DETERMINATION
12. The following points arise for determination in the present appeal:
a. Whether the Appellant (Plaintiff) had the locus standi and authority to institute the suit for injunction regarding the Society's premises (restraining entry) in his individual capacity, and whether the Society was a necessary party to the suit?
b. Whether the relief of permanent injunction restraining the Respondent from writing defamatory letters is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in view of the prior instituted suit for damages (CS No. 361/2016)?
c. Whether the Appellant proved a fresh, distinct, and subsisting cause of action arising on 30.11.2016 and 06.12.2017 (subsequent to the filing of the previous suits) that would entitle him to the equitable relief of injunction?
d. Whether the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.2024 is liable to be set aside?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 1 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF) HAD THE LOCUS STANDI AND AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE THE SUIT FOR INJUNCTION REGARDING THE SOCIETY'S PREMISES (RESTRAINING ENTRY) IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND WHETHER THE SOCIETY WAS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THE SUIT?Page 12 of 24
13. The Appellant's case, as urged in the pleadings and in the memorandum of appeal, is that he was the duly elected President of Siddhartha Kunj CGHS; that the Respondent, though not a member, repeatedly visited the Society office, raised frivolous complaints, threatened/manhandled staff and disturbed the functioning of the office; and that the cause of action for restraint against such conduct was personal to the Appellant in his capacity as President and not a matter requiring impleadment of the Society.
14. Per contra, the Respondent has opposed the appeal at the stage of arguments, supporting the impugned dismissal, contending that the relief of restraining entry into or interference with the Society office essentially concerns the rights of the Society as a juristic entity, and therefore the suit could not have been competently instituted by the Appellant in his individual capacity without the Society being before the Court and without proof of Digitally signed SUMIT by SUMIT due authorization. DALAL DALAL Date:
2025.12.26 15:57:43 +0530
15. I have considered the rival submissions and examined the trial court record.
16. At the outset, it is material to notice the statutory status of a co-operative society under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003. The registration of a co-operative society confers upon it an independent corporate character with, inter alia, the power to hold property and to institute and defend legal proceedings.
17. The legal personality of such a body corporate is distinct from the personalities of its individual members or office bearers. The Hon'ble Page 13 of 24 Delhi High Court, in Narender Kr. Jain And Others vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Others, W.P.(C) No. 421/2010, decided on 09.05.2011 , while dealing with Section 43 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, has reiterated that a co-operative society is not merely an association of persons but a body corporate with a distinctive legal status; and that where an action is maintainable by the corporation, it ordinarily cannot be maintained by individual members in their natural capacities.
18. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the relief in the present suit insofar as it pertains to restraining the Respondent from forcibly visiting/trespassing the Society office or obstructing the functioning of the Society staff is, in substance, a relief aimed at protecting and regulating access to, and functioning of, premises and administration belonging to the Society. Such a right, prima facie, vests in the Society as a corporate body. The President or any office bearer may act for the Society, but such action must be traceable to the Society's internal authorization framework, i.e., its bye-laws and resolutions of the general body/management committee, as applicable.
19. In this context, the evidence of PW-1 assumes significance. PW-1 admitted in cross-examination that no General Body Meeting was conducted for filing the present case and that though a Management Committee meeting was held before filing the suit, he could not state whether the proceedings of the Management Committee in relation to authorization for this litigation were filed on record; and upon perusal of the judicial file, no such authorization document was found on record. Thus, the trial record does not reflect any resolution or formal authorization Page 14 of 24 empowering PW-1 to institute a suit on behalf of the Society for enforcement of rights relating to the Society office/premises.
20. While this Court is conscious that procedural objections regarding authorization should not be elevated to a purely technical weapon in every case, the distinction between signing/verifying pleadings and the authority to institute a suit on behalf of a juristic entity remains well recognized. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Nibro Ltd. vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. on 6 March, 1990 AIR 1991 DELHI 25 clearly drew this distinction, holding that the power under Order XXIX Rule 1 CPC relates to signing and verification, and does not, by itself, obviate the requirement of authorization to institute proceedings on behalf of the corporate body. Though Nibro Ltd. (supra) deals with a company, the underlying principle about juristic entities instituting litigation through duly authorized decision- makers is of general application and offers persuasive guidance while appreciating the requirement of authorization for a co-operative society as well.
21. This brings the Court to the question of whether the Society was a necessary party for the first branch of relief. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that a "necessary party" is one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed, and it has reiterated the twin tests for determining this issue. Applying these tests to the present controversy, the Society is not a peripheral or merely formal presence. The injunction sought in respect of entry into or interference with the Society office would directly relate to the Society's rights over its premises and internal administration. A decree issued in the absence of the Society may neither effectively bind the Society nor comprehensively settle the controversy regarding control and Page 15 of 24 access to its office, especially when the Appellant has instituted the suit in his individual capacity and not in the name of the Society.
22. Accordingly, I am of the considered view that:
a. The Appellant, in his individual capacity, did not establish due locus/authority to seek an injunction that, in essence, protects or regulates access to the Society's premises/office, a right that primarily inheres in the Society as a body corporate.
b. In the absence of the Society and in the absence of any proved authorization from the competent organ of the Society, the suit, to the extent it sought restraint concerning the Society office/premises, suffered from non-joinder of a necessary party and lack of proved authority to sue on behalf of the corporate entity. c. The Appellant's submission that the cause of action was purely in persona may have some relevance to the distinct relief relating to alleged personal defamation or personal harassment; however, that aspect falls for examination under the remaining points of determination. For the limited purpose of Point of Determination No. 1, the relief concerning restraint on entry into or interference with the Society office cannot be treated as a purely personal claim divorced from the Society's corporate rights.
23. Point of Determination No. 1 is therefore decided against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 2 - WHETHER THE RELIEF OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION RESTRAINING THE RESPONDENT Page 16 of 24 FROM WRITING DEFAMATORY LETTERS IS BARRED UNDER ORDER II RULE 2 CPC, 1908, IN VIEW OF THE PRIOR INSTITUTED SUIT FOR DAMAGES (CS NO. 361/2016)?
24. The Appellant challenges the dismissal of the prayer for permanent injunction (Relief No. 3) on the ground that the present suit is a distinct proceeding under the Specific Relief Act aimed at restraining ongoing harassment, whereas the prior suit, CS No. 361/2016, pending before the Ld. Additional District Judge, Dwarka, is a suit for recovery of damages. The Appellant contends that since the reliefs are different, the causes of action must be considered distinct.
25. To adjudicate this point, this Court must examine the foundational principle of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The rule mandates that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the same cause of action. Specifically, Order II Rule 2(3) stipulates that if a person is entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, they must sue for all such reliefs in one suit; failure to do so, without the leave of the court, precludes the plaintiff from afterwards suing for any relief so omitted.
26. The threshold inquiry is whether the cause of action in the prior damages suit and the present injunction suit is identical. A "cause of action" refers to the bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove to succeed in their claim. It is an admitted position across the pleadings and evidence that the Appellant had already instituted CS No. 361/2016 against the Respondent seeking compensation of ₹10,00,000/- for defamation. The factual basis for that suit was the Respondent's act of writing allegedly false Page 17 of 24 and defamatory complaints to the Plaintiff's employer, Engineers India Ltd. (EIL), in July and August 2016.
27. In the present suit, the Appellant seeks to perpetually restrain the Respondent from making precisely the same nature of "false and frivolous complaints" to the "higher officials" of the same employer, EIL. The core grievance, the Respondent's alleged campaign to tarnish the Appellant's professional reputation through correspondence with his employer, remains the singular factual pivot in both litigations.
28. The Appellant's argument that an injunction is a "distinct remedy" does not mitigate the bar under Order II Rule 2. When the first suit for damages was filed in late 2016, the cause of action for defamation had already accrued. At that juncture, the Appellant was legally entitled to seek two distinct reliefs:
a. Compensatory Relief (Damages) for the injury already sustained to his reputation.
b. Preventive Relief (Injunction) to restrain the Respondent from continuing the same tortious conduct.
29. Both these reliefs flow from the same "bundle of facts"--the Respondent's conduct of sending defamatory letters. By electing to sue only for damages and omitting the prayer for an injunction without obtaining the Court's leave, the Appellant effectively split his remedies.
30. Furthermore, the Appellant's reliance on "fresh threats"
allegedly made on 30.11.2016 or 06.12.2017 is insufficient to establish a truly new cause of action. These incidents represent a mere continuation or Page 18 of 24 repetition of the same alleged tortious behavior that was already the subject matter of the damages suit. If the Appellant apprehended further defamation during the pendency of the first suit, the proper course of action was to seek interim injunctive relief or amend the existing plaint in the ADJ Court to include the prayer for permanent injunction. Instituting a second suit on the same underlying facts constitutes "splitting of claims," which is precisely what Order II Rule 2 aims to prevent to ensure a defendant is not vexed twice for the same cause.
31. The Ld. Trial Court correctly observed that the evidence required to support the claim for damages and the claim for injunction is not different, as both depend on the determination of whether the Respondent's letters were defamatory and unjustified. Therefore, the present suit, insofar as it relates to Relief No. 3, is clearly hit by the bar of Order II Rule 2 CPC.
32. Therefore, the Point of Determination No. 2 is decided against the Appellant. The Ld. Trial Court's finding that the prayer for permanent injunction against writing defamatory letters is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC is legally sound and is hereby upheld.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 3 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT PROVED A FRESH, DISTINCT, AND SUBSISTING CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING ON 30.11.2016 AND 06.12.2017 (SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF THE PREVIOUS SUITS) THAT WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO THE EQUITABLE RELIEF OF INJUNCTION?
Page 19 of 2433. The Appellant, through Grounds A and D of the appeal, contends that the Ld. Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence concerning the fresh cause of action that allegedly arose on 30.11.2016 and 06.12.2017. It is the Appellant's case that these specific incidents, involving a demand for ₹50,000 and subsequent threats, created a new and subsisting basis for seeking injunctive relief, independent of prior litigations.
34. It is a fundamental precept of civil jurisprudence that in a suit for permanent injunction, the Plaintiff carries the burden of proving a credible and subsisting threat to their legal rights. To establish a "fresh" cause of action sufficient to bypass the potential bars of res judicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC, the Appellant was required to prove the factual occurrence of these incidents through cogent evidence.
Re: The Incident of 30.11.2016:
35. The Appellant (PW-1) deposed in his evidence affidavit that on 30.11.2016, the Respondent visited the society office and handed a letter (Ex. PW1/13) to the "present caretaker" demanding ₹50,000 as legal charges.
36. The Appellant's testimony identifies the "present caretaker" as a direct witness to this unlawful entry and demand. However, the record reveals that the Appellant examined only himself as a witness (PW-1). The failure to summon or examine the caretaker, the only independent individual present during the alleged incident, constitutes a significant gap in the evidence. This omission to produce the "best evidence" available attracts an adverse inference against the Appellant under Section 114(g) of the Indian Page 20 of 24 Evidence Act, 1872, suggesting that the witness's testimony might not have supported the Appellant's version of events.
Re: The Incident of 06.12.2017:
37. The Appellant alleged that on 06.12.2017, the Respondent intercepted and threatened him in the surface car parking area of the society.
38. During cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that "no action was taken by the police against the defendant on the complaint dated 06.12.2017, Mark-B". The Respondent (DW-1) categorically denied these allegations in his pleadings and evidence affidavit, asserting that no such incident occurred. The Respondent contended that the complaint dated 15.12.2017 (Ex. PW1/14) was a fabricated "afterthought" filed only after the Plaintiff received notice that previous legal avenues had failed, specifically to create a sham cause of action for the present suit.
39. In a "word-against-word" scenario, the standard of proof for the discretionary and equitable relief of a perpetual injunction cannot be met by a self-serving affidavit that lacks corroboration. Furthermore, the core of this "fresh cause of action" appears to be a dispute over a demand for ₹50,000. The Respondent's evidence suggests that the issue of legal fees was actually initiated by the society via its letter dated 07.04.2017 (Mark 'A'). A civil dispute regarding legal expenditures or a demand for money, even if perceived as harassing, does not inherently constitute a threat of physical trespass or injury that would justify the drastic remedy of a permanent injunction barring a resident from a society office. As adjudicated in Point No. 1, the right to exclude individuals from the society office resides Page 21 of 24 with the Society as a corporate entity, not with the Plaintiff in his personal capacity.
40. This Court finds that the Appellant has failed to lead any independent evidence to prove that the Respondent's conduct on 30.11.2016 and 06.12.2017 constituted a new, actionable threat distinct from the long- standing personal animosity and litigation history between the parties. Consequently, the Appellant has not discharged the burden of proof required to establish a fresh cause of action.
41. Therefore, Point of Determination No. 3 is decided against the Appellant. The Appellant failed to prove the alleged fresh cause of action through cogent or corroborated evidence.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 4 - WHETHER THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.12.2024 IS LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE?
42. To adjudicate whether the judgment dated 21.12.2024 warrants interference, it is necessary to evaluate if the Ld. Trial Court's findings suffer from any legal perversity or factual error.
43. Under Point of Determination No. 1, this Court evaluated the Appellant's locus standi. It is an established fact that the society office and common areas are the property of the Siddhartha Kunj C.G.H. Society Ltd., a juristic entity. The Plaintiff, suing as "Rajeev Jain" without placing any authorization or resolution from the Managing Committee on record, failed to prove his capacity to represent the Society. The Ld. Trial Court correctly held that the suit was filed in an individual capacity and was bad for the non-
Page 22 of 24joinder of a necessary party, i.e., the Society. There is no legal infirmity in this finding.
44. Regarding Point of Determination No. 2, the application of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC is central. The Appellant's admission of the pendency of a prior suit for damages (CS No. 361/2016) arising from the same defamatory letters is a matter of record. The cause of action, the allegedly defamatory correspondence, is identical in both suits. The Appellant failed to seek leave from the Court to split his remedies (damages and injunction) at the time of filing the first suit . Therefore, the Ld. Trial Court rightly concluded that the prayer for injunction against writing defamatory letters is barred by law.
45. Under Point of Determination No. 3, this Court scrutinized the alleged fresh cause of action arising on 30.11.2016 and 06.12.2017. The Appellant's testimony as PW-1 remained entirely uncorroborated. Specifically, the failure to examine the caretaker, who was a material witness to the alleged incident on 30.11.2016, allows for an adverse inference to be drawn against the Appellant. In the absence of cogent evidence proving a fresh and subsisting threat, the Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof required for the grant of discretionary relief under the Specific Relief Act.
46. The Appellant's contention that the Ld. Trial Court relied on "extraneous matter" or failed to consider cross-examination is not supported by the record. The judgment reflects a comprehensive analysis of the pleadings and the legal bars applicable to the reliefs sought .
Page 23 of 2447. In light of the above, this Court is of the firm view that the Ld. Trial Court's decision to dismiss the suit is based on a correct appreciation of the law and the evidence led by the parties. The Appellant has failed to highlight any perversity or manifest error in the impugned judgment that would necessitate setting it aside.
ORDER
48. The appeal stands dismissed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.2024 passed by the Ld. SCJ-cum-RC, South-West, Dwarka, is hereby upheld.
49. Parties shall bear their own costs.
50. A decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
51. A copy of this judgment, along with the Trial Court Record, be sent back to the Ld. Trial Court for information.
52. Appeal file be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.
ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 26th December, 2025. Digitally signed by SUMIT SUMIT Date:
DALAL DALAL 2025.12.26 15:58:36 +0530 (SUMIT DALAL) District Judge-04 (SW) Dwarka Courts, New Delhi Page 24 of 24