Calcutta High Court
Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. ... vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 23 September, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)CHN390, (2005)IILLJ333CAL
Author: Altamas Kabir
Bench: Altamas Kabir
JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J.
1. These two appeals have been taken up together as they involve common questions of law and fact and the parties are also common.
2. Mr. B. G. Sampat, who has appeared in person in these appeals, was at the relevant point of time an employee of Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. On 1st August, 1988, while he was posted in Calcutta, he was served with a transfer order by the Bombay office of the Newspaper company transferring him from Calcutta to Bombay with effect from 5th August, 1988. Shri Sampat did not comply with the said order of transfer and made several representations to the Bombay office for reconsideration of the same on grounds of hardship. Such request was, however, turned down and it was made clear to Shri Sampat that he was required to join the Bombay office in terms of the transfer order.
3. Shri Sampat did not comply with the transfer order and he did not also challenge the same. He was thereafter issued a show-cause notice dated 22nd November, 1988, in connection with his conviction by the 11th Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta, in Case No. T.R. 888 of 1988, for gambling in a public street. Shri Sampat replied to the said show cause notice but, inasmuch as, the same was found to be unsatisfactory, he was served with a chargesheet dated 6th November, 1989, issued on behalf of the Newspaper company proposing to hold an enquiry at Bombay. The chargesheet consisted of two charges, namely, (i) Shri Sampat's failure to comply with the transfer order and (ii) his conviction in the criminal case filed against him for gambling in a public street. Inasmuch as, Shri Sampat did not participate in the domestic enquiry at Bombay, the same was conducted ex parte and the Enquiry Officer on the basis of the materials presented before him on behalf of the Newspaper company held in his Enquiry Report that the charges had been proved against Shri Sampat. The said Enquiry Report of the Enquiry Officer was sent to the Disciplinary Authority of the Newspaper company for its consideration. Concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer the Disciplinary Authority proposed to terminate Shri Sampat's service and by a letter dated 28th September, 1990, Shri Sampat was asked to show cause as to why the proposed punishment of termination from service should not be imposed. Shri Sampat duly showed cause to the second show-cause notice but ultimately the Disciplinary Authority terminated Shri Sampat from service and informed him accordingly by letter dated 9th November, 1990.
4. On receipt of such letter terminating his service, Shri Sampat raised an industrial dispute resulting in an order of reference by the Government of West Bengal dated 13th January, 1992, following the failure of conciliation proceedings. Shri Sampat filed his written statement before the learned 3rd Industrial Tribunal on 9th June, 1992. The Newspaper company also filed its written statement before the learned Tribunal on 14th September, 1992. While the reference was pending, Shri Sampat filed an application for interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on 7th April, 1993. The Newspaper company filed its objection to such petition for interim relief on 8th September, 1993. The learned Tribunal, however, by its order dated 13th August, 1995, rejected the prayer for interim relief and also held that the reference was, prima facie, not maintainable as the State of West Bengal was not the appropriate Government to make the reference.
5. The said decision of the learned Tribunal was challenged by Shri Sampat by way of a writ petition, being W.P. No. 116 of 1998, which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge on 18th December, 1998 by setting aside the findings of the learned Tribunal that the reference, prima facie, was not maintainable and holding that the Government of West Bengal is the appropriate Government for the purpose of making the reference. The question regarding the scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 15{2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was, however, referred by the learned Single Judge to a Larger Bench in view of the conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court.
6. The Newspaper company preferred an appeal against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge and a cross-objection was filed therein by Shri Sampat.
7. Both the appeal and the cross-objection were taken up for disposal by the Division Bench on 15th September, 2000. On the question regarding the scope and ambit of Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was observed that the same had been concluded by the Full Bench decision in its judgment which had since been reported in 2000 (1) CHN page 1. The Division Bench then went on to consider the finding of the learned Tribunal regarding the State Government's jurisdiction to make a reference on the dispute raised by Shri Sampat. The Division Bench was of the view that the said question required deeper consideration at the hand of the learned Tribunal and should be decided by the learned Tribunal as a preliminary issue. The Appeal Court directed that in the event such preliminary issue was decided in favour of the workman the learned Tribunal would then consider the matter relating to grant of interim relief in favour of the workman under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act afresh in the light of the Full Bench decision in terms of the direction given by the Division Bench in the aforesaid appeal preferred by M/s. Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Ltd.
8. The question of jurisdiction of the State Government to make the reference was taken up by the learned Tribunal for consideration as a preliminary issue. By its order dated 17lh November, 2000, the learned Tribunal reversed its earlier findings on the ground that situs of employment is one of the factors to determine jurisdiction but not the only factor. Another factor is whether the workmen have been served with the order of termination or discharged as a penal measure. The learned Tribunal held that while Shri Sampat's case may not depend on the question of situs of employment, the order of dismissal from service was served on him at Calcutta.
9. Relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, and another decision of the same Court in the case of Hindustan Samachar v. State of Orissa, reported in 1979 Lab IC page 106, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that in the present case the dispute arose at the Calcutta office where the workmen refused to comply with the order of transfer. The learned Tribunal also held that the mere fact that the head office exercised administrative control over the workmen does not confer jurisdiction on the Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the head office is located to make a reference under Section 10 of the aforesaid Act.
10. On the basis of the above, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government and had the jurisdiction to make the reference and the same was, therefore, maintainable.
11. The Newspaper company thereafter challenged the decision of the learned Tribunal in a fresh writ petition, being W.P. No. 228 of 2001. The learned Single Judge in deciding W.P. No. 228 of 2001 observed that the question of jurisdiction had been duly considered in the earlier writ application in detail and decided to follow the same. The learned Single Judge observed that the charge against Shri Sampat related to his failure to join the transferred post from Calcutta to Bombay. The learned Judge also observed that admittedly when the transfer order was passed Shri Sampat was posted at Calcutta. The learned Single Judge observed further that in such factual background the State of West Bengal had acquired the jurisdiction to make a reference in respect of the jurisdictional question on situs of employment; control of management and cause of action. The writ application was accordingly dismissed by the learned Single Judge on his aforesaid findings.
12. The present appeal has been preferred by Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. against the said decision of the learned Single Judge.
13. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Hirak Mitra, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the issue for determination in the instant appeal is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the State of West Bengal is the appropriate Government for making a reference on the dispute raised by Shri Sampat.
14. Mr. Mitra submitted that from the various cases on the point it would be seen that a decision on the aforesaid issue would depend mainly on three tests involving (a) situs of employment; (b) administrative control over the employee and (c) cause of action. Referring to the provisions of Sections 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Mr. Mitra submitted that the said provisions provide sufficient indication that the legislature intended that it is the control over the employee which should be the guiding factor in determining as to which Government would be the appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 on a dispute raised by the workmen.
15. Mr. Mitra urged that sub-clause (i) of Section 2(a) categorised the situation and the authorities in respect of which the Central Government would be the appropriate Government for the purpose of making a reference. Sub-clause (ii) provides that in relation to any other dispute it would be the State Government which would be the appropriate Government for the said purpose. Mr. Mitra submitted that the definition is inclusive and shows that the Central Government has been made the appropriate Government in relation to the specified industries over which it exercised control and the same analogy could be extended in the case of sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(a) of the said Act.
16. In support of his aforesaid submission Mr. Mitra relied strongly on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lipton Limited v. Their Employees, , where one of the points taken before the Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the employer was that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an award in respect of employees of the Delhi office who were employed outside the State of Delhi. On an analysis of the expression "appropriate Government" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that all the workmen of the Delhi office, whether they worked in Delhi or not, received their salaries from the Delhi office; were controlled from the Delhi office in the matter of leave, transfer, supervision etc. and, therefore, the Delhi State Government was the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2 in respect of the dispute which arose between Lipton Ltd. and the Union of India. It was held that the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute between Lipton Ltd. and its workmen of the Delhi Office.
17. Mr. Mitra submitted that the facts involved in the instant case were similar to those which were involved in the case of Lipton Ltd., inasmuch as, Shri Sampat was an employee of the Bombay office of the Newspaper company, as had been admitted by him all along and irrespective of the fact that he was employed in Calcutta, his Controlling Authority was the Bombay office and consequently it would be the Maharashtra State Government which would be the appropriate Government within the meaning of sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in the instant case.
18. In continuation of his aforesaid submission Mr. Mitra submitted that from the various correspondence which had been disclosed by the parties during the course of the hearing of the different writ applications all relevant action relating to Mr. Sampat's salary, leave salary for sick leave period, deduction of tax at source were taken from the Bombay office. Payments were released by the Calcutta office upon instruction being received from the Bombay office. In fact, Mr. Mitra submitted that the management had exhibited the Salary Register maintained by the Bombay office in respect of outside stationed staff before the learned Tribunal and it was shown that the name of Mr. Sampat appeared in the said Register against serial number 64. On the said basis Mr. Mitra urged that not only was control over Mr. Sampat exercised by the Bombay office of the Newspaper company but that his situs of employment was also in Bombay, particularly after he had been transferred from the Calcutta office to the Bombay office, which transfer had not been challenged by Mr. Sampat and did not, therefore, form the subject-matter of the reference before the learned Tribunal.
19. In support of his aforesaid submission Mr. Mitra firstly relied on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1984 Lab. IC page 1254, wherein it was observed that territorial jurisdiction in respect of an industrial dispute arising from termination of employment of workman would have to be determined by the situs of employment of the workman concerned. Mr. Mitra pointed out that in the said decision it had been observed that there are three clear-cut principles or tests for determining jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, namely, (i) where does the order of termination of service operate? (ii) is there some nexus between the industrial dispute arising from termination of the service of the workman and the territory of the State? (iii) that the well-known test on jurisdiction of a Civil Court including the residence of the parties and the subject-matter of the Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) us. State of W. B. (A. Kabir, JJ) 397 dispute substantially arising therein would be applicable. Mr. Mitra urged that in the instant case, although, Mr. Sampat had been served with the notice of the termination of his service in Calcutta, his situs of employment was Bombay, and, accordingly, in terms of the Full Bench decision in the aforesaid case the industrial dispute should have been raised by Mr. Sampat in Bombay and not in Calcutta.
20. Several other decisions were also referred to by Mr. Mitra, wherein the consistent view was that the appropriate Government for the purpose of making a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is the Government of the place where the industrial dispute arises between the management and the workman. It was also observed in the said cases that the nexus should be between the dispute and the territory of the State within which such dispute had arisen consequent upon termination of service.
21. Mr. Mitra submitted that while Mr. Sampat may have been stationed in Calcutta, he was under the control of the Bombay office and after the order of transfer, transferring him from Calcutta to Bombay, the situs of employment as far as he was concerned had shifted to Bombay.
22. Mr. Mitra submitted that as had been decided in the Lipton case (supra), it was the controlled exercise over the workman which would decide as to which was the appropriate Government within the meaning of Sections 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Mitra urged that simply because Mr. Sampat had chosen to remain in Calcutta even after being served with the transfer order transferring him to Bombay, the State of West Bengal did not become the appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 of the aforesaid Act on the dispute raised by Mr. Sampat relating to his termination of service.
23. Mr. Mitra submitted that the learned Single Judge had not applied his mind to the questions as to whether the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government to make a reference in the instant case and had merely relied on the observations made in the earlier writ application by another learned Single Judge. Mr. Mitra submitted that the views expressed by the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ application had been questioned in appeal and the Appeal Court had thought it fit to send the matter back to the learned Tribunal to consider the same after deeper consideration as a preliminary issue. Mr. Mitra contended that thereafter, the matter had been decided by the learned Tribunal but in concurrence with the judgment of the learned Single Judge which had, in fact, been challenged in the appeal.
24. Mr. Mitra submitted that the entire approach in deciding the question of jurisdiction after the direction of the Division Bench was entirely perfunctory and not upon a deeper consideration as was directed by the Appeal Court and was, therefore, liable to be rejected.
25. Mr. B.G. Sampat, who appeared in person, placed strong reliance on the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 116 of 1998, in which the decision of the learned Tribunal holding that the reference was not maintainable was distinguished and set aside. Mr. Sampat urged that the learned Single Judge had considered the matter in great detail and the findings arrived at by him had not been interfered with by the Appeal Court and had, in fact, been reiterated not only by the learned Tribunal but also by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ application filed by the Newspaper company, being W.P. No. 228 of 2001.
26. Mr. Sampat submitted that the learned Single Judge had taken into consideration the question relating to situs of employment and had come to the finding that when the transfer order had been passed Mr. Sampat had, in fact, been posted at Calcutta and the effect of the transfer order was, therefore, felt by Mr. Sampat in Calcutta which vested the State of West Bengal with jurisdiction to make a reference on the dispute raised by Mr. Sampat in connection with the termination of his service.
27. Mr. Sampat also relied on several other decisions and in particular the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. v. Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. and Ors., . Mr. Sampat pointed out that in the said case it had been clearly held that there should be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerned. The dispute arises at the place where the workman is working and not at the Headquarter of the industry.
28. Mr. Sampat also placed reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Umasankar Chatterjee v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1986 C.W.N. Pago 348, in which it was held that the impugned order of removal having become effective in Calcutta, where it was received by the appellants, a part of the cause of action must be held to have arisen in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court.
29. On the merits of the case Mr. Sampat contended that by the letter dated 22nd November, 1988, he had only been asked to show cause in respect of his conviction by the 11th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, for gambling in a public street, but upon consideration of his reply thereto he was informed by a subsequent letter dated 6th November, 1989, that the Newspaper company proposed to hold an enquiry at Bombay for his failure to report for duty at the Bombay office pursuant to the transfer order dated 1st August, 1988, along with his conviction in connection with gambling in a public street.
30. Mr. Sampat submitted that as would be evident from the first letter requiring him to show cause, the charge relating to his failure to report for duty at Bombay had not been included, but for the purpose of enquiry the same had been included without giving him an opportunity of explaining his position. Mr. Sampat submitted that the charges on which his service had been terminated were not reflected in the notice to show cause and must, therefore, be held to be vitiated. Mr. Sampat also contended that it had been wrongly urged on behalf of the Newspaper company that he had not challenged the order of transfer dated lst August, 1988. Mr. Sampat urged that he had made several representations against the said transfer order which would in itself establish that he was posted in the Calcutta office and that the cause of action for the dispute raised by him arose as a consequence in Calcutta on being served with the impugned order terminating his service.
31. Mr. Sampat lastly contended that notwithstanding the submission made on behalf of the Newspaper company that he was employed by the Bombay office, from the materials on record it would be quite evident that he was being paid his salaries from the Calcutta office and was being given directions by the Calcutta office in connection with his duties.
32. Mr. Sampat submitted that the total effect of all the aforesaid facts would indicate that a part of the cause of action for the industrial dispute arose in Calcutta which gave jurisdiction to the State Government in West Bengal to make a reference within the meaning of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, relating to the termination of his service.
33. Mr. Sampat submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge did not warrant any interference and the appeal preferred by the Newspaper company was liable to be dismissed with costs.
34. Appearing for the State and the State respondents Mr. Oli Mohammed supported the case as made out by Mr. Sampat and reiterated that the State Government in West Bengal was the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a)(ii) for making a reference under Section 10 of the said Act, in connection with the order served upon Mr. Sampat terminating his services.
35. Mr. Oli Mohammed submitted that admittedly Mr. Sampat was stationed at Calcutta in connection with his services under the Newspaper company and, although, he was under the ultimate control of the Head office at Bombay, his activities in Calcutta were controlled by the branch office of the Newspaper company at Calcutta. It was urged that Mr. Sampat's salary was not being paid by the Bombay office but by the Calcutta Branch office on the instructions given by the Bombay office. He also placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in the case of the Workmen of Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. (supra) and Umasankar Chatterjee (supra) referred to and relied upon by Mr. Sampat. Mr. Oli Mohammed urged that in both the cases it had been held that the territorial jurisdiction would depend on where the dispute had arisen and that the effect of the termination of Mr. Sampat's service was felt not in Bombay but in Calcutta creating the nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State in which the dispute had arisen. Mr. Oli Mohammed submitted that the question regarding territorial jurisdiction in the instant case had been considered in detail by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 116 of 1998, and, thereafter in W.P. No. 228 of 2001.
36. Mr. Oli Mohammed concluded on the note that the Lipton case (supra) on which a great deal of reliance had been placed by Mr. Mitra had been decided only on the theory of "control" and had not taken into consideration the other two facets giving riso to territorial jurisdiction, namely (i) situs of employment and (ii) cause of action. Mr. Oli Mohammed also echoed Mr. Sampat's submissions that no interference was called for in these appeals with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.
37. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the law regarding jurisdiction which has been considered in various cases both from the view point of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Constitution of India. As was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Ranga Vilas case (supra) Jurisdiction would have to be "decided not only on the basis of the situs of employment, that is, where the dispute arises and the effects thereof are felt, but also on the interconnected question relating to cause of action. The question of control of an employee came up for consideration in the Lipton case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mitra, but as pointed out by Mr. Oli Mohammed, appearing for the State, the said matter was decided on the sole question of control and did not take into consideration either the question relating to situs of employment or cause of action. The aforesaid contention was considered by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Paritosh Kumar Pal (supra) in which while placing reliance on the Ranga Vilas case it was observed that the ratio of the Lipton case is confined to the point that the Tribunal where the Head office is situated would have jurisdiction to take cognizance of an industrial dispute but not for the converse that situs of employment would also have the same effect. In fact, it was also observed with reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Cable Company, reported in 1962 Lab. LJ page 409, that the Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision bearing on the question of cause of action, which must, consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings.
38. While the questions relating to how a judicial forum is to acquire jurisdiction over a matter within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, as also the question as to which would be the appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, appears to have been more or less settled, the question with which we are concerned in the instant appeal is whether applying the said principles it can be held, as had been held by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge that the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, to make a reference under Section 10 thereof.
39. It has to be kept in mind that the initial findings of the learned Single Judge holding that the Government of West Bengal was the appropriate Government for the aforesaid purpose had not been accepted by the Division Bench which had remanded the matter to the Tribunal for a decision on the said question as a preliminary issue upon deep and proper consideration thereof. It is no doubt true that the Division Bench did not categorically set aside the findings of the learned Single Judge, but the very fact that the question relating to jurisdiction was referred back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision impliedly overturned the finding of the learned Single Judge in that regard. The subsequent finding of the learned Tribunal based on the observations made by the learned Single Judge is not really an independent assessment of the matter. The subsequent decision of the learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the Newspaper company was also not an independent adjudication of the question at issue but was based on the findings of the learned Single Judge in the first writ application. In our view, the object with which the Division Bench had remanded the question to the learned Tribunal was not really fulfilled and, therefore, calls for a detailed examination by us.
40. The basis of the findings of the learned Single Judge in the first writ application and that of the Tribunal thereafter on remand and the subsequent findings of the learned Single Judge on the second writ application is that when Mr. Sampat's services were terminated he was stationed in the Calcutta office of the Newspaper company. While Mr. Sampat was no doubt served with the order of termination of his service in Calcutta, we are constrained to say that the same would not vest the State Government in West Bengal with authority under Section 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act to make a reference under Section 10 of the said Act. Firstly, at the said point of time the Calcutta office of the Newspaper company no longer had control over Mr. Sampat whose services had been transferred to Bombay and it was the Bombay office which had control over his services. That Mr. Sampat was in Calcutta and was served with the notice of the order of termination of his service in Calcutta is only because of the fact that he had chosen not to comply with the order of transfer dated 1st August, 1988, by which he had been transferred to Bombay with effect from 5lh August, 1988, and had not also challenged the same before any forum. Mr. Sampat may have made representations to the Bombay office with regard to such order of transfer, but the same was never the subject-matter of any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding and it is only after he was served with the order of termination of his service that Mr. Sampat raised a dispute in respect thereof. In our view, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Sampat had been served with such order in Calcutta, his situs of employment being Bombay, he ought to have raised an industrial dispute relating to the termination of his services in Bombay and the Government of Maharashtra would have been the appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 of the aforesaid Act in respect of such dispute.
41. The matter relating to cause of action would have had relevance if the situs of employment of Mr. Sampat was in Calcutta. Since after the order of transfer Mr. Sampat's situs of employment shifted to Bombay, the mere service of the order of termination of his service in Calcutta would not give rise to a cause of action for action to be taken by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
42. Cause of action is basically a concept within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure as also Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As was pointed out in Umasankar Chatterjee's case (supra), the order of removal undoubtedly gave rise to a cause of action for the appellant therein to institute an action for the establishment of his right to be in service. The impugned order of removal having become effective in Calcutta where it was received by the appellants a part of the cause of action must be held to have arisen in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. As was pointed out by Mr. Mitra, Umasankar Chatterjee's case was one under Article 226 of the Constitution and clause (ii) of Article 226 was under consideration in the said case. The position under the Industrial Disputes Act is a little different and cause of action will have to be related to either the theory of 'control' or the theory relating to 'situs of employment1. In view of the facts disclosed in the instant case, not only control but also situs of employment as far as Mr, Sampat's service is concerned was in Bombay. Two of the main tests in deciding jurisdiction, in our view, indicate that the State of Maharashtra and not the State of West Bengal would have been the appropriate Government before whom Mr. Sampat should have raised the dispute with regard to the termination of his services. We are unable to agree with the views expressed either by the learned Tribunal or the two learned Single Judges while disposing of the two writ petitions, being W.P. No. 116 of 1998, and W.P. No. 228 of 2001. In our view, the State of West Bengal was not the appropriate Government to make the reference on the dispute raised by Mr. Sampat and the same was without jurisdiction.
43. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the award of the learned Tribunal as also the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge impugned in the appeal. Consequently, the writ application filed by the Newspaper company is also allowed.
44. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
45. All parties to act on the xerox signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertaking.
Asit Kumar Bisi, J.
46. I agree.