Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
S.Abdul Salam vs Shaik Farooq Basha 3 Others on 30 August, 2019
Bench: C.Praveen Kumar, Cheekati Manavendranath Roy
1
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
* THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
+ CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
% Dated 30-08-2019.
Crl. Appeal No.25 of 2013
# Shaik Farooq Basha
.....Appellant/A-1
Vs.
$ State of Andhra Pradesh
Rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh
..Respondent
! Counsel for the appellant/A-1 : Sri P.Nagendra Reddy
^ Counsel for the respondent : Public Prosecutor
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. AIR 1939 PC 47
2. AIR 1984 SC 1622
3. AIR 1977 SC 768
4. AIR 2010 SC 3391
5. 2007 (2) ALD (Cri) 264 (SC)
6. 2000 (2) ALD (Cri) 467 (SC)
7. 2007 (1) ALD (Cri) 514 (A.P.)
8. (2013) 2 SCC 224
9. AIR 1919 Privy Council 157
10. AIR 1988 SC 1998
2
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
Crl. Appeal No.25 of 2013
Shaik Farooq Basha
.....Appellant/A-1
Vs.
$ State of Andhra Pradesh
Rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh
..Respondent
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON:30-08-2019
* THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers ---
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to -Yes-
Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see - -Yes-
the fair copy of the Judgment?
JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
3
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
COMMON JUDGMENT:(per Hon'ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy) Both these Criminal Appeals arise out of the judgment dated 07.01.2013 rendered by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Nandyal, Kurnool District, in Sessions Case No.245 of 2012, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and ordered that both the sentences shall run concurrently. The learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 r/w.109 and 304-B r/w.34 of IPC.
(2) Accused No.1 has preferred Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2013 assailing judgment of conviction, and PW.1, father of deceased-Shaik Rizwana Begum, has preferred Criminal Appeal No.148 of 2013 dissatisfied with the quantum of punishment imposed against accused No.1 and also assailing the judgment of acquittal of accused Nos.2 and 3. Since both the appeals 4 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 arise out of the same judgment, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
(3) Prefatory facts of the prosecution case relevant to dispose of these Criminal Appeals may be stated as follows:
(a) Shaik Rizwana Begum (hereinafter referred as "the deceased") is the legally wedded wife of accused No.1. Their marriage was solemnized about six years prior to the death of the deceased. Accused No.2 is the mother and accused No.3 is the sister of accused No.1. At the time of marriage of accused No.1 with the deceased, the parents of the deceased gave an amount of Rs.5.00 Lakhs, 16 tolas of gold ornaments towards dowry to the accused as demanded by them. Out of lawful wedlock of accused No.1 with the deceased, they begot two children. They lived happily only for short time after the marriage. Thereafter, accused No.1, who is addicted to vices, particularly, consuming alcohol, started harassing the deceased by making illegal demand for additional dowry. He used to subject the deceased to torture at the instigation of accused Nos.2 and 3 to bring additional dowry from her parents.
Accused No.1, who is unable to meet the expenses of his vices, used to pressurize his wife to bring additional dowry from her parents. The deceased used to inform her parents about her suffering in the hands of the accused, that accused No.1 to 3 have been harassing her physically and mentally to bring additional dowry. Her parents used to pacify her and advise her to adjust with accused No.1 in the interest of her marital life. 5
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Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
(b) As the accused continued to harass her with demand for additional dowry, panchayats were also held in the presence of the elders. The elders advised accused No.1 to look after the deceased properly without making any such illegal demands and harassing her. Despite the advice of the elders, the accused continued to harass the deceased demanding her to bring additional dowry from her parents.
(c) Whileso, on 13.12.2011 at about 5.40 P.M. accused No.1 picked up a quarrel with the deceased as she is not complying with his demand to bring additional dowry from her parents and he beat her. Accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. Thereafter, he went away from the house. Unable to bear the pain as she was engulfed in the flames, she raised cries. Accused No.2, who is her mother-in-law, immediately tried to extinguish the fire on her. She shifted the deceased to the Government Hospital, Nandyal, and informed about the incident to the parents of the deceased. Immediately, her parents reached the Hospital.
(d) On the same day i.e. on 13.12.2011 at about 6.53 P.M. on the requisition given by the doctor, the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nandyal, visited the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. She stated in the said dying declaration that as her husband and sister-in-law abused her and as her husband has been daily subjecting her to torture that she poured kerosene on her and set herself ablaze. She further stated that her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in- law are responsible for the said incident.
6
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
(e) Thereafter, on the same day i.e. on 13.12.2011 at about 19.30 hours on receipt of M.L.C. intimation from the Government Hospital, the Head Constable of II Town Police Station, Nandyal, visited the Government Hospital, Nandyal and recorded the statement of the deceased. In her statement given to the police, she stated that her husband is addicted to vices like drinking alcohol and playing cards and used to subject her to cruelty - both physically and mentally by making illegal demand to bring additional dowry. Her mother-in-law and sister-in-law used to support him. When she informed about the harassment to her parents that they used to convince her to adjust and lead marital life with accused No.1. Even though panchayat was held in the presence of the elders regarding the said demand of additional dowry by the accused, there is no change in the attitude of her husband. He used to come to house daily in an inebriated condition and used to harass her. On 13.12.2011 also at about 5.40 P.M. while she was in the house, that her husband picked up a quarrel with her for not bringing additional dowry and beat her and poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and went away. Unable to bear the pain, when she raised cries that her mother-in-law came and put off the flames and her mother-in-law admitted her in the hospital. Ex.P11 is the said statement of the deceased recorded by the Head Constable.
(f) The Head Constable returned to the Police Station and registered the said statement as a case in Crime No.211 of 2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of 7 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
(g) Thereafter, the deceased succumbed to the said injuries in the hospital on 17.12.2011 at about 6.00 P.M. Her death intimation was received by the Police. So, the Section of law was altered from Sections 498-A and 307 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act to Sections 498-A, 302 r/w.34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Accordingly, altered FIR was registered. Thereafter, Sub- Divisional Police Officer, Nandyal took-up investigation in the case.
(h) Inquest was held over the deadbody of the deceased by the Tahsildar-and-Mandal Executive Magistrate, Kurnool in the presence of the inquest witnesses on 18.12.2011. Thereafter, autopsy was held over the deadbody of the deceased by the doctor and he opined that the deceased died due to "shock due to mixed degree flame burns".
(i) During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer seized half burnt langa and other clothes relating to the deceased under the cover of panchanama report. He prepared a scene of offence observation report and he found that the accused has already cleaned the scene of offence with acid mixed with water in a bucket and the said bottle was seized under the cover of mediators report.
(j) He has arrested accused No.1 to 3 and produced them before the Court and they were remanded to judicial custody. 8
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
(k) As the investigation revealed that accused No.1 at the instigation of accused Nos.2 and 3, harassed the deceased for additional dowry and committed murder of the deceased, on completion of investigation, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Nandyal, who investigated the case, filed charge-sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC against accused No.1, under Sections 302 r/w.109 IPC against accused Nos.2 and 3, under Section 304-B and under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against accused Nos.1 to 3 before the committal Court.
(l) The said charge-sheet was taken on to the file by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nandyal, in P.R.C.No.12 of 2012. As the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate committed the case for trial to the Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Kurnool. It was numbered as Sessions Case No.245 of 2012. Thereafter, it was made over to the Court of III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nandyal, for disposal according to law.
(m) The trial Court framed charges under Section 498-A IPC against accused Nos.1 to 3, under Section 302 IPC against accused No1, under Section 302 r/w.109 IPC against accused Nos.2 and 3, under Section 304-B IPC against accused No.1 and under Section 304-B r/w.34 IPC against accused Nos.2 and 3, read over the said charges to the accused and explained the substance of the charges to them in Telugu, for which, they abjured the guilt and claimed to be tried.
9
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013
(n) During the course of trial, prosecution got examined PWs.1 to 20 witnesses and got marked Exs.P1 to P18 documents and M.Os. 1 to 3 material objects to substantiate its case.
(o) After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to enable them to explain the incriminating evidence available against them in the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Accused Nos.1 to 3 denied the incriminating evidence adduced against them by the prosecution. Ex.D1 was marked on their behalf.
(p) Accused No.1 has submitted a statement under Section 233(2) Cr.P.C. at the time of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that 13.12.2011 is Tuesday and it is a working day and he was on duty in Loco-shed of Railways at Gooty. H returned to Nandyal as usual at about 9.00 P.M. on that day and learnt that his wife- Rizwana Begum suffered burn injuries due to accidental fire from gas stove and she was admitted in the hospital, Nandyal and from there she was shifted to Government General Hospital, Kurnool. He went to Kurnool Hospital and her parents and brothers did not allow him to see his wife. He further stated that he never harassed or tortured his wife at any time in any manner and he and his wife lived separately from his mother and sister in the same premises and that all of them were falsely implicated in the above case.
(q) Accused No.2 also submitted her statement under Section 233(2) Cr.P.C. at the time of her examination under 10 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 Section 313 Cr.P.C. and she stated that on 13.12.2011 at about 5.45 P.M. she saw her daughter-in-law running out of her residence engulfed in flames and immediately she tried to extinguish the flames. When she asked her as to how it happened that her daughter-in-law informed that she was accidentally caught fire from the gas stove. Immediately, she informed the same to the parents of her daughter-in-law and thereafter admitted her daughter-in-law in the hospital. Parents and brother of her daughter-in-law came there and they did not allow her to stay there and they have forcibly sent her away from that place. She along with her daughter is residing separately from her son and his wife. She further stated that none of them have harassed or tortured the deceased. Her son returned at about 9.00 P.M. from duty on that day from Gooty and she informed her son about the incident and he immediately went to hospital at Nandyal and he came to know that his wife was shifted to Government General Hospital, Kurnool and when he went to the said hospital that he was not allowed to see his wife by his in-laws.
(r) Accused No.3 also filed her statement under Section 233(2) Cr.P.C. at the time of her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein she stated that she is not married, living with her mother and her brother-accused No.1 and his wife are living separately from them. She further stated that on 13.12.2011 at about 5.45 P.M. while she and her mother were in their house that they heard cries of her sister-in-law-Rizwana Begum and when they came out, she saw her in flames and her mother 11 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 tried to extinguish the flames and informed the parents of Rizwana Begum about the incident and that thereafter her mother took Rizwana Begum to District Hospital, Nandyal and admitted her in the hospital. The parents of Rizwana Begum did not allow them to stay at the hospital and they have forcibly sent her away from the hospital. She further stated that she and her mother never harassed or tortured Rizwana Begum and they did not abet her brother to harass her.
(s) At the culmination of the trial, after considering the evidence on record and on appreciation of the said evidence, and after hearing the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and the learned defence counsel, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, by the impugned judgment, acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 of the charges levelled against them and convicted accused No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B of IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment as detailed supra.
(t) Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction, accused No.1 has preferred Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2013 and PW.1, father of the deceased, has preferred Criminal Appeal No.148 of 2013 dissatisfied with the quantum of sentence imposed against accused No.1 and assailing the judgment of acquittal of accused Nos.2 and 3, questioning the legality and validity of the said judgment.
(4) When both these appeals came up for hearing, we have heard Sri P.Nagendra Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.25 of 2013 and for the respondent Nos.1 to 3- 12 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 accused Nos.1 to 3 in Crl.A.No.148 of 2013 and Sri H.Prahalad Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No.148 of 2013 and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent- State in both the appeals.
(5) The marital relationship between accused No.1 and the deceased is not in dispute. Admittedly, the deceased is the legally wedded wife of accused No.1. Similarly, the fact that the deceased met with an unnatural death and died on account of burn injuries sustained by her within seven years of her marriage is also not in controversy. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the marriage between accused No.1 and the deceased took place in the month of May, 2006 about six years prior to the date of her death. The said material fact is not controverted by the accused. Therefore, it can safely be held that the deceased who died on account of the burn injuries sustained by her, met with an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage.
(6) The precise case of the prosecution is that after few months of the marriage of accused No.1 with the deceased, accused No.1 started harassing the deceased both physically and mentally making an illegal demand for additional dowry and subjected her to torture daily. In order to substantiate its case that accused No.1 subjected the deceased to physical and mental cruelty and harassed her daily till her death, prosecution is mainly relying on the evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and PW.8 witnesses and on Ex.P9 dying declaration which was 13 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 recorded by the Magistrate, examined as PW.14 and on Ex.P11 statement of the deceased recorded by police.
(7) PWs.1 and 2 are the parents of the deceased. PWs.3 and 4 are the relatives of PWs.1 and 2 and also elders before whom a panchayat was convened regarding the harassment caused by accused No.1 to his wife by making an illegal demand for additional dowry. PW.8 is also the elder in the said panchayat.
(8) PW.1, who is the father of the deceased, stated in his evidence that he has performed the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1 in the month of May, 2006 and he has given a sum of Rs.5.00 Lakhs as dowry on the occasion of Zode and that he has given four tolas of gold to accused No.1 on the date of Nikha and also one Hero Honda motorcycle worth of Rs.48,500/- and that he also presented Jehej articles and clothes worth of Rs.10,000/- to accused No.1. Accused No.1 and the deceased led happy marital life only for two months after the marriage. Thereafter, accused No.1 used to harass the deceased to bring additional dowry. He further stated that accused No.1 harassed his daughter both physically and mentally by beating her to bring additional dowry. His daughter used to come to his house and at that time, she informed him about the harassment caused to her by the accused with the above demands and he used to advice his daughter to adjust with accused No.1 and his family members. He stated that the accused No.1 is addicted to vices and he requested accused No.1 to look after the deceased with love and affection through 14 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 the elders also. He raised a panchayat in this regard before elders and accused No.1 assured that he will look after his wife with love and affection.
(9) PW.2, who is the mother of the deceased, also deposed that the deceased used to inform her that accused No.1, who is addicted to vices, has been harassing her demanding additional dowry and that he used to beat her. She further stated that after convening a panchayat that they have sent their daughter along with accused No.1. However, again accused No.1 beat her daughter demanding additional dowry from her.
(10) Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of PWs.1 and 2 to discredit their testimony given regarding the fact that accused No.1 used to harass the deceased from two months after the marriage both physically and mentally by making an illegal demand for additional dowry. The testimony given by both PWs.1 and 2 regarding the fact that the deceased used to inform them about the illegal demand for additional dowry made by accused No.1 and about consequent harassment meted out by her in his hands in connection with the said illegal demand is not shaken in any way in their cross- examination.
(11) The evidence of PW.1 shows that he along with PW.2 is residing at Sai Baba Nagar in Nandyal, whereas, accused are residing in Bhagat Singh Colony of the same Nandyal town, and that it is also nearer to their house. Therefore, as both accused No.1 and his wife and PWs.1 and 2 are residing in the same town and as the house of accused is also near to the house of 15 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 PWs.1 and 2, their evidence that the deceased used to come to their house and inform them about the harassment caused to her both physically and mentally by accused No.1 with a demand for additional dowry can safely be believed. It is quite natural that the deceased being a daughter would approach her parents who are very much available in the same town to inform them about the harassment caused to her by the accused by demanding her to bring additional dowry. Therefore, this unimpeachable evidence of PWs.1 and 2 proves that accused No.1 harassed the deceased during her life time both physically and mentally to bring additional dowry from her parents.
(12) The said evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is also amply corroborated by the testimony of PWs.3, 4 and 8. PW.3 is the younger brother of PW.1. PW.4 is the husband of elder sister of PW.1. PW.8 is an independent elder. Though it is suggested to PW.8 in his cross-examination that PW.4 is his father-in-law, he denied the said suggestion. He denied the suggestion that the fourth daughter of PW.4 is his wife. So, it is evident that he is not related to PWs.1 and 2 and that he is an independent witness acted as an elder in the panchayat.
(13) PW.3 deposed that after three months of the marriage that accused No.1 started harassing Rizwana Begum to bring additional dowry and that the deceased used to inform the same to him and also to PWs.1 and 2 whenever she used to visit the house of PWs.1 and 2, that accused No.1 was harassing her to bring additional dowry. He further stated that a panchayat was convened and accused No.1 assured that he will look after 16 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 Rizwana Begum with love and affection and that he participated in two panchayats. PW.4 also stated in his evidence that he attended the marriage of Rizwana Begum with accused No.1 and after marriage they both lived together and six months after the marriage that the accused started harassing the deceased for additional dowry and that accused No.1 used to send the deceased to her parents house to bring additional dowry. He also stated that panchayat was held to sort out the differences between the couple and that he also participated in the said panchayat and convinced accused No.1 to look after his wife with love and affection. However, accused No.1 continued to harass the deceased.
(14) PW.8 also stated in his evidence that he along with PW.4 convened panchayat on two or three occasions and they used to convince accused No.1 to look after the deceased well without demanding additional dowry. Nothing was also elicited in the cross-examination of PWs.3, 4 and 8 to discredit their testimony given regarding the fact that panchayats were convened in their presence regarding the harassment caused to the deceased by accused No.1 for additional dowry and the advice given by them to accused No.1 to look after his wife with love and affection and yet, he continued to harass her with the said demand for additional dowry. Simply because PWs.3 and 4 are related to PW.1, their testimony cannot be disbelieved and the same cannot be discarded. Normally, in all matrimonial disputes of like nature panchayats would be convened only in the presence of elders of the family. So, there is nothing 17 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 unnatural in convening a panchayat in the presence of PWs.3 and 4 as the elders of the said panchayat. As their evidence is corroborated by PW.8, who is another elder and who is an independent witness, the evidence of PWs.3, 4 and 8 can safely be believed. It appears from the evidence on record that several panchayats were raised. Some panchayats were raised before PW.3 and some panchayats were raised before PWs.4 and 8. So, the said trustworthy evidence of PWs.3, 4 and 8 proves that the deceased used to inform them also along with PWs.1 and 2, during her life time that accused No.1 has been harassing her physically and mentally for additional dowry. Inspite of the fact that the elders advised accused No.1 to look after his wife with love and affection without making any such demand for additional dowry, he continued to harass her.
(15) The aforesaid evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 parents of the deceased and PW.3 the elder of the panchayat that the deceased informed them several times during her life time that the accused harassed her for additional dowry is admissible in evidence under Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as they relate to circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the deceased. The Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor1 held that the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant will be admissible if such circumstances have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence. The said judgment of the Privy Council was quoted with approval in 1 AIR 1939 PC 47 18 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 many cases by the Supreme Court and in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2, the Supreme Court held that Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence and in view of the peculiar conditions in the Indian Society has widen the sphere to avoid injustice. Further held that where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statements would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and therefore are admissible in evidence and the distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statements irrelevant.
(16) In the case of Rattan Singh v. State of H.P3, the Apex Court held that even if the deceased was nowhere near expectation of death, still her statement would become admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, though not as a dying declaration as such, provided it satisfies one of the two conditions set forth in this sub-section.
(17) Following the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments of Pakala Narayana Swami1, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda2 and Rattan Singh3 cited supra, the Apex Court in Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan4 held as follows:
"The evidence of PW-4 (the mother of the deceased) and the evidence of PW-5 (the brother of the deceased) that after marriage, the deceased several times came and informed them about the demand of a Scooter and harassment by her mother-in-law and that the husband used to taunt her that she came from a hungry home and brought nothing and that about one month back 2 AIR 1984 SC 1622 3 AIR 1977 SC 768 4 AIR 2010 SC 3391 19 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 prior to the death that the deceased stayed for two days in their house and returned and one month thereafter she was murdered and that whenever the deceased used to come home that she used to complain that her in-laws have been harassing her demanding Scooter or Rs.25,000/- for a shop and the said evidence of PWs-4 and 5 (the mother and brother of the deceased) although hearsay is admissible in evidence under clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act."
(18) The argument of the defence in the said case that the evidence of PWs-4 and 5 (mother and brother of the deceased) given regarding the statements made by the deceased before them are hearsay and not admissible in evidence was rejected by the Supreme Court and held that the said argument is misconceived.
(19) The analogy and the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh4 case squarely apply to the present facts of the case. In the instant case also, the evidence of PW-1, PW.2 and PW.3 clinchingly proves that the deceased used to approach them during her lifetime as their house is also situate in the same town and inform them about the harassment caused by the accused to her in connection with a demand for additional dowry. The said evidence, in the light of the dictum laid down in the judgments cited supra, is clearly admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and proves that she was harassed by the accused making an illegal demand for additional dowry. The evidence of PW.4 and PW.8 along with the evidence of PW.3 also proves that panchayat was raised before them in this regard.
(20) Now, the crucial evidence on record which absolutely clinches the issue relating to the harassment meted out by the 20 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 deceased in the hands of accused No.1 to be considered is the dying declarations of the deceased which are marked as Ex.P9 and Ex.P11 statements given by the deceased to the learned Magistrate and the police. PW.14 is the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nandyal, who recorded Ex.P9 dying declaration. On receipt of Ex.P8-requisition from the Government Hospital, Nandyal on 13.12.2011 at about 6.40 P.M, he proceeded to the hospital and reached at 6.50 P.M. After putting some questions to ascertain the mental condition of the patient-Rizwana Begum, he recorded his satisfaction that she is in conscious and fit state of mind to give the statement. Doctor also certified that she is fit to give statement. PW.14 deposed in his evidence that the deceased stated as follows: "Her husband and sister- in-law abused her. Her husband has been subjecting her to torture everyday. Therefore, she poured kerosene on her and set herself ablaze in the evening. She further stated that her husband, mother-in-law and her sister-in-law are responsible for the said incident."
(21) As per the evidence of the learned Magistrate-PW.14, the medical officer was present throughout when the said statement of the deceased was recorded and he certified that the injured was conscious and coherent and in fit condition to give the statement.
(22) It is relevant to note here that the incident took place at 5.40 P.M. on 13.12.2011. Immediately at 6.40 P.M. within a span of an hour on the same day, the above dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by PW.14. So, this is the earliest 21 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 statement given by the deceased before the learned Magistrate. It is evident from the said dying declaration of the deceased that as accused No.1 was subjecting her to torture daily i.e. everyday that she committed suicide by pouring kerosene.
(23) Although the deceased in her dying declaration stated that as her husband was daily torturing her, it is a fact that she did not give details of the said torture in her dying declaration. However, that fact by itself is not sufficient to hold that the torture is not relating to a demand for additional dowry. The said Ex.P9 dying declaration cannot be read in isolation. It is to be considered along with the other evidence available on record i.e. the evidence of PWs.1 and 2, who are parents of the deceased, and the evidence of PWs.3, 4 and 8, who are the elders of the panchayat and also along with Ex.P11 statement given by her before the Police wherein she has elaborately given the details of torture.
(24) As already discussed supra, the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 3 clinchingly proves that the deceased informed them during her lifetime several times that the accused has been harassing her both physically and mentally demanding additional dowry from her. The evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and 8 further proves that inspite of raising panchayats and advising accused No.1 to look after the deceased with love and affection without making any such demand for additional dowry, that he continued to harass her. In the light of the said evidence available on record regarding the harassment caused by accused No.1 to the deceased demanding additional dowry from 22 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 her, it can safely be held that the torture that was spoken to by the deceased in her Ex.P9-dying declaration is relating to the said harassment caused to her by accused No.1 in connection with the demand for additional dowry. So, the details of the said torture spoken to by the deceased in Ex.P9-dying declaration can be gathered and culled out from the evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and 8 and from Ex.P11 statement of the deceased recorded by the police.
(25) After Ex.P9-dying declaration was recorded by PW.14 at 6.53 P.M, Ex.P11 statement of the deceased was recorded by the police on the same day. In Ex.P11 statement, the deceased has given elaborate details regarding the manner in which accused No.1 harassed her for additional dowry and subjected her to torture. She has unequivocally stated in the said statement that her husband-accused No.1 is addicted to consuming alcohol and gambling and he used to harass her physically and mentally demanding her to bring additional dowry from her parents. She also stated that panchayat was raised before elders after she informed about the said harassment to her parents and that there was no change in the attitude of her husband even after the said panchayat was raised. She further stated that accused No.1 used to visit the house everyday in a drunken state and used to torture her. Thus, she has given a detailed account in Ex.P11 statement as to how accused No.1 subjected her to torture everyday in connection with a demand for additional dowry. 23
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 (26) A combined reading of Ex.P9-dying declaration and Ex.P11 statement and the evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and 8 clinchingly proves beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to torture from three months after her marriage till 13.12.2011 when she set herself ablaze. The said continued harassment caused by accused No.1 to the deceased ultimately resulted into her death. It is evident from Ex.P9- dying declaration that as she was subjected to torture daily by accused No.1, that she poured kerosene on her and set herself ablaze on that day. Now, it is crucial to note the word "everyday" used by the deceased in her Ex.P9-dying declaration clearly proves that accused No.1 has been subjecting her to torture daily. So, this torture continued from three months after the marriage till the date of incident i.e. 13.12.2011. Therefore, it can safely be held that even soon before her death also that she was subjected to cruelty. In fact that evidence on record as discussed supra proves that not only soon before her death, but the harassment continued from three months after her marriage till her death.
(27) The words "soon before death" are not defined in the Code. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the elastic expression can refer to a period either immediately before the death of the deceased or within few days or few weeks before the death. There should be persistible nexus between the death of the deceased and dowry relating harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The said proposition of law was expounded by the Apex 24 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 Court in the case of Raja Lal Singh v. State of Jharkhand5 and Kans Raj v. State of Punjab6 and this Court in N.Krishna Moorthy v. State of A.P7, which are referred to by the trial Court in its judgment.
(28) In the instant case, there is evidence on record as discussed supra that there is a persistent harassment by accused No.1 to the deceased in connection with the demand for additional dowry throughout from three months after the marriage till the date of incident.
(29) Therefore, the ingredients contemplated under Section 304-B of IPC are clearly attracted to the present case. Therefore, we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that it is a clear case of dowry death.
(30) As the said dowry death of the deceased took place within seven years of her marriage with accused No.1, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act is to be invoked. When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and if it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. In the instant case, as the evidence on record established that the deceased was subjected to harassment by accused No.1 in connection with a demand for additional dowry and that the deceased committed suicide by 5 2007 (2) ALD (Cri) 264 (SC) 6 2000 (2) ALD (Cri) 467 (SC) 7 2007 (1) ALD (Cri) 514 (A.P.) 25 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 pouring kerosene on her and set herself ablaze unable to bear the said harassment, it shall be presumed under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that accused No.1 has caused the said dowry death.
(31) The learned counsel for the appellant-accused No.1 vehemently contended that as the deceased stated in Ex.P9- dying declaration that she poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze and as she stated in Ex.P11-statement given to the Police that accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze as she did not comply with his demand for additional dowry and in view of the said inconsistent versions given by her in Ex.P9 and Ex.P11, that the dying declaration of the deceased in Ex.P9 cannot be believed. We have given our earnest and thoughtful consideration to the said vital contention raised by the learned counsel for accused No.1. The said contention is devoid of merit.
(32) No doubt it is true that the deceased in Ex.P9 statement given before the learned Magistrate, she stated that accused No.1 has been subjecting her to torture everyday and as such on that evening she poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. It is also true that she made some embellishment in Ex.P11 statement recorded by the Head Constable that accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze as she did not comply with his illegal demand for additional dowry. In fact PW.1 and PW.2 also stated in their evidence that after they reached the Hospital that the deceased informed them also that the accused No.1 set her ablaze. 26
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 However, this improvement made by her in Ex.P11 by itself will not impeach the statement given by her in Ex.P9-dying declaration and also her statement given in Ex.P11 regarding other facts pertaining to the harassment caused to her by accused No.1 demanding additional dowry. Her statement given in Ex.P9, which is otherwise convincing, cannot be brushed aside and discarded on the sole ground that some improvement was subsequently made in Ex.P11. In fact the trial Court also did not believe her version given in Ex.P11 subsequently that accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. Therefore, accused No.1 was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. Having regard to the fact that she did not mention the said material fact in her earlier statement-Ex.P9- dying declaration, that accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, we are also not inclined to believe the said part of her statement given in Ex.P11 that accused No.1 poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze. However, the version given by the deceased regarding the harassment caused by accused No.1 to her with an illegal demand for additional dowry from three months after her marriage till her death is very much consistent in both the statements given by her before the learned Magistrate and also before the Police in Exs.P9 and P11. The said version in Ex.P9 and Ex.P11 is also amply corroborated by the unimpeachable evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and PW.8. So, when there is no inconsistency in the said version relating to the offence committed by accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC, the statements 27 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 given by her in both Exs.P9 and P11 to that effect which stood amply corroborated by the testimony of PW.1 to PW.4 and PW.8 can safely be relied on and they clinchingly prove that as accused No.1 subjected her to cruelty in connection with a demand for additional dowry that she committed suicide.
(33) It is well settled that when there are two or more dying declarations and if the deceased gives any exaggerated version in any one of the said statements, the said statement or the other statements given by the said person cannot be rejected in toto as not believable on the sole ground that exaggerated version is given in one of the statements. An effort is to be made by the Court while appreciating the said evidence to see from the said statements whether there is any ring of truth in the said statements relating to the main case and if the Court finds that the said multiple dying declarations of the deceased are true on the said aspects relating to the main case, the same can be relied on to that extent, despite the fact that there is an exaggerated version in one of the statements.
(34) In this context it is relevant to consider the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra8, wherein it is held that when there are multiple dying declarations and when there is complete consistency on major aspects of the incident and role played by the accused, even though in one of the statements the deceased implicated two more persons (who are acquitted by the trial Court) and when she was consistent about the role played by her mother- 8 (2013) 2 SCC 224 28 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 in-law and sister-in-law, which showed that she was subjected to torture as she had not conceived a child and when there are no contradictions as to this main aspect, merely because she mentioned the names of two other persons (who are acquitted by the trial Court), it cannot be presumed that her earlier statements were unacceptable.
(35) The ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court relating to appreciation of evidence of multiple dying declarations squarely applies to the present facts of the case.
(36) In the above referred case, almost four dying declarations were given by the deceased. Some were recorded by the Police and some were recorded by the Executive Magistrates. In one of the dying declarations recorded by the police, she implicated two more persons as culprits whose complicity in commission of the offence was not spoken to by her in her other statements. However, her statements were consistent relating to the role played by her mother-in-law and sister-in-law in subjecting her to torture. The other two persons, who were implicated in one of the dying declarations, were acquitted by the trial Court. Believing her statements given in all the dying declarations relating to the role played by her mother-in-law and sister-in-law which is consistent in all the dying declarations, both the trial Court and also the High Court held that the offence committed by the mother-in-law and sister-in-law is proved. The Supreme Court also confirmed the said findings on the ground that merely she implicated two other persons in one statement, that cannot be a ground to 29 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 disbelieve the statements given by her relating to the role played by the other accused when the said version is consistent in all the dying declarations.
(37) In the instant case also though the deceased in Ex.P11, statement recorded by the police, stated that accused No.1 poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze as she failed to comply with his illegal demand for additional dowry, on account of the said improvement made by her in Ex.P11, the dying declaration of the deceased relating to the role played by accused No.1 in harassing her and subjecting her to torture in connection with the illegal demand for dowry throughout till her death which is very much consistent in both the statements in Ex.P9 and Ex.P11, cannot be disbelieved. Particularly when said version finds corroboration from the testimony of PW.1 to PW.4 and PW.8 and the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out on the sole ground.
(38) It is settled law while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses, if any exaggerated versions are given by the witnesses, that by itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the testimony of the said witnesses in toto. Court has to separate the grain from the chaff and ascertain whether there is any ring of truth on the material particulars spoken to by the witnesses to establish the guilt of the accused for the charges leveled against them. In this context, it is apt to consider the judgment of the Privy Council rendered in the case of Bankim Bihari Maiti v. Shrimati Matangini Dasi9, wherein it is held as 9 AIR 1919 Privy Council 157 30 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 follows: "in Indian litigation it is not safe to assume that a case must be a false case if some of the evidence in support of it appears to be doubtful or is clearly untrue. There is on some occasions a tendency amongst litigants in India, as elsewhere, to back up a good case by false or exaggerated evidence."
(39) Although the above observation was made in connection with a civil litigation, the said judgment of the Privy Council was subsequently quoted with approval and relied on by the Supreme Court in a criminal case in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh10. The Apex Court held as follows: "that in the great majority of cases, the prosecution version is rejected either for want of corroboration by independent witnesses, or for some falsehood stated or embroidery added by witnesses. It is not proper to reject the case of the prosecution for want of corroboration by independent witnesses if the case made out is otherwise true and acceptable."
(40) It is apposite to note that the Apex Court further held in the above judgment thus: "with regard to falsehood stated or embellishments added by the prosecution witnesses, it is well to remember that there is a tendency amongst witnesses in our country to back up a good case by false or exaggerated version. It is also experienced that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to 10 AIR 1988 SC 1998 31 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 throw the case of the prosecution overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence."
(41) It is finally held by the Apex Court that it is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform.
(42) Therefore, from the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments of the Privy Council and the Apex Court, the legal position is now luculent that while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses, the testimony of the witnesses which is otherwise convincing, trustworthy and reliable, cannot be disbelieved or discarded on the simple ground that they have given some exaggerated version and added embroidery to the prosecution story, in their anxiety to improve the case or for the fear of being disbelieved. It is the duty of the Court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence. Ultimately, if the Court finds a ring of truth in the main version of the prosecution case, from the said evidence on record, the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown overboard causing grave injustice to the victims.
(43) Considering the observations and applying the principles enunciated in the above judgment of the Apex Court, if the case on hand is considered and the statement of the deceased in Ex.P11 is considered and appreciated, the said 32 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 embroidery added by the deceased in the said statement cannot be a valid ground to disbelieve the other part of the statement and facts spoken to by her relating to the torture to which she was subjected in the hands of accused No.1 in connection with demand for additional dowry which is well established and proved in the case from the other evidence as discussed supra. To that extent, we find that there is a ring of truth in her Ex.P11 statement relating to the main case. So, to that extent the statement of the deceased in Ex.P11 can be relied on.
(44) Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused No.1, holds no water and the same is hereby rejected. Both the statements given by the deceased in Ex.P9 and Ex.P11 clinchingly prove that the accused No.1 is responsible for her dowry death.
(45) The next contention is that the death of deceased is accidental. It is contended on behalf of the appellant-accused No.1 that the deceased has not committed suicide and she was caught fire accidentally at the gas stove. In fact, obviously, the statements given by accused Nos.1 to 3 under Section 233(2) Cr.P.C. in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is an attempt to introduce a belated defence of accidental death of the deceased as a result of afterthought. Firstly, the said belated version of accused Nos.1 and 2 given at the time of their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, at the fag end of the trial, that the deceased was accidentally caught fire at the gas stove in her house, cannot be believed for the reason that it is not even suggested to PWs.1 and 2, who are the parents of the 33 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 deceased, in their cross-examination at the earliest point of time that the deceased was accidentally caught fire at the gas stove in her house. Now, it is significant to note that a careful and combined reading of the statements given both by accused Nos.2 and 3, who are mother and sister of accused No.1, at the time of their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., clearly belies the version of accused Nos.1 and 2 that the deceased was caught fire accidentally. Accused No.2-mother of accused No.1 stated in her statement that on 13.12.2011 she saw her daughter-in-law Rizwana Begum running out of her residence in flames and immediately she tried to extinguish the flames and when she asked her as to how it happened that she told her that accidentally she was caught fire at the gas stove. So, this is the specific version given by accused No.2. Now, it is significant to note that in the statement given by her daughter- accused No.3, she stated that she is unmarried and she is living with her mother-accused No.2 and on 13.12.2011 at about 5.45 P.M., when she and her mother-accused No.2 were in the house, they heard cries of her sister-in-law Rizwana Begum and when they came out they saw Rizwana Begum in flames and her mother took Rizwana begum to the hospital and admitted her in the hospital. So, according to the statement of accused No.3, when both she and her mother-accused No.2 were together in their house, they heard cries of Rizwana Begum and they both came out together and they have seen Rizwana Begum in flames and her mother extinguished the flames and admitted her in the hospital. So, according to the statement of accused No.3, she is 34 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 along with her mother-accused No.2 throughout from the time of coming out from their house after hearing the cries of Rizwana Begum till Rizwana Begum was admitted in the hospital by her mother-accused No.2. Significantly this accused No.3 did not state in her statement that Rizwana Begum informed her mother-accused No.2 that she was caught fire accidentally at the gas stove. The said version is conspicuously silent in the statement of accused No.3. When both accused Nos.2 and 3 were together and they came out together out of the house after hearing the cries of Rizwana Begum and when they both were together till Rizwana Begum was admitted in the hospital, there cannot be two inconsistent versions between accused Nos.2 and 3. If really the deceased Rizwana Begum informed accused No.2 that she was caught fire accidentally at the gas stove, accused No.3 who was also present at that time along with her mother accused No.2 must speak regarding the said information said to have been given by Rizwana Begum i.e the deceased to accused No.2. Therefore, this material omission pertaining to the said material fact in the statement of accused No.3 clearly belies the version of accused No.2 given in her statement that it was a case where Rizwana Begum was accidentally caught fire at the gas stove.
(46) Although accused No.1 also stated in his statement given at the time of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that his wife Rizwana Begum sustained burn injuries due to accidental fire at the gas stove, admittedly he was not present at that time. He has stated that he has learnt that his wife was 35 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 accidentally caught fire at the gas stove. At any rate, both the statements of accused Nos.1 and 2 are proved to be false from the vital omission made by accused No.3 in her statement. So, the said belated defence version introduced as a result of after thought at the fag end of the trial at the stage of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the deceased sustained burn injuries as she was accidentally caught fire at the gas stove cannot be believed and the said contention is hereby rejected.
(47) This false defence taken by accused No.1 adds additional link in the events relied on by the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused No.1 in commission of offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC.
(48) Accused No.1 also did not elicit anything in the medical evidence i.e. in the evidence of PW.13, the doctor, who conducted autopsy, that the deceased was accidentally caught fire.
(49) In Ex.P14 rough sketch of the scene of offence also, it is not shown that a gas stove is available in the house of the deceased at the scene of offence. Therefore, on that ground also, the version of accused No.1 that the deceased was accidentally caught fire at the gas stove cannot be believed.
(50) Although accused No.1 stated in his statement submitted at the time of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. for the first time that as it was a working day that he was on duty at Gooty on that day and thereby pleaded alibi, no evidence is adduced by him by examining any employee from his office or by producing any register/document from his office 36 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 to prove that he was in office on duty on that day. Burden to prove plea of alibi is on accused No.1. He failed to discharge his burden either by adducing direct evidence or by showing preponderance of probabilities from the evidence on record. Further, plea of alibi must be taken at the earliest point of time. Therefore, the said belated plea taken at the fag end of the trial cannot be believed and it is rejected.
(51) Considering the evidence on record and on appreciation of the same, the trial Court arrived at a right conclusion and recorded a finding of guilt against accused No.1 for the offence committed by him punishable under Section 498-A and 304-B of IPC. After considering the entire gamut of evidence on record and upon reappraisal of the said evidence on record, we also found that accused No.1 is responsible for the dowry death of the deceased and he is guilty of commission of offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B of IPC.
(52) Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction of accused No.1 rendered by the trial Court is perfectly sustainable under law and it warrants no interference in the appeal preferred by accused No.1.
(53) Apropos the appeal preferred by PW.1, the father of the deceased is concerned, the evidence on record shows that accused No.1 and his deceased-wife are living separately in one portion of the house and his mother-accused No.2 along with his sister-accused No.3 are living separately in other portion of the house. So, it is evident that they are all living separately. The deceased also did not state in her Ex.P9-dying declaration 37 HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 specifically that accused Nos.2 and 3 also subjected her to torture. In a vague manner she only stated that her sister-in- law abused her along with her husband and that her mother-in- law and sister-in-law along with her husband are responsible for the said incident. She only stated that her husband has been subjecting her to torture daily. Even in Ex.P11 statement also she only stated that accused No.1 has been subjecting her to harassment physically and mentally in connection with demand for additional dowry as he was addicted to vices. As against accused Nos.2 and 3 she only stated that they only used to support accused No.1. How they used to support accused No.1 and what is the specific role played by them are all not spoken to by the deceased in Ex.P11 statement also. Therefore, having regard to the fact that accused Nos.2 and 3 are living separately and as the allegations made against accused Nos.2 and 3 both in Ex.P9 and Ex.P11 are only vague, sans the details relating to the role played by them, it cannot be said that they have abetted accused No.1 to harass the deceased. In what way they supported accused No.1 is not made clear from the evidence on record. Therefore, at least they are entitled to benefit of doubt on account of the said vague evidence on record. Therefore, the trial Court rightly acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 and absolved them from the charges leveled against them. We do not see any illegality in acquitting accused Nos.2 and 3 by the trial Court. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the appeal preferred by PW.1.
38
HACJ & CMR, J.
Crl. Appeal Nos.25 and 148 of 2013 (54) In an appeal against acquittal only when the findings of the trial Court acquitting the accused are perverse and the judgment suffers from any manifest error of a law and patent illegality, the appellate Court will normally interfere. No such grounds are existing in this appeal warranting interference of this Court with the said findings of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
(55) Similarly, we also do not find any apparent error of law in imposing sentence of seven years of imprisonment against accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC. The minimum sentence of imprisonment prescribed under Section 304-B of IPC was imposed against accused No.1 by the trial Court. Therefore, there are also no valid grounds to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the trial Court.
(56) Ergo, both the Criminal Appeals are dismissed. As accused No.1 is on bail, his bail bonds shall stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the trial Court, to serve the remaining sentence, if any, forthwith.
Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand closed.
________________________________________________ ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR ________________________________________________ JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY Date:30.08.2019.
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