Meghalaya High Court
Shri. Ranjit Ch. Momin vs . State Of Meghalaya & Ors. on 11 March, 2021
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 23 of 2019
Date of Decision: 11.03.2021
Shri. Ranjit Ch. Momin Vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. B. Deb, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, AAG. with
Ms. I. Lyngwa, GA.
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
1. The Petitioner herein has stated that he was appointed in the Meghalaya Police Department in the year 1990 as a Cook and was in service for the last 13(thirteen) years.
2. According to his petition, the Petitioner has stated that the State Respondent has drawn up three separate disciplinary proceedings against him, the first one being D.P. No. 16 of 2012 for his unauthorized absence from Unit Hospital and was found loitering under the influence of liquor and creating trouble near a grocery shop on 14.11.2012 for which he was placed under suspension on 16.11.2012 and one Inspector Subir Sangma was appointed as the Enquiry Officer.
3. The second departmental proceedings relate to D.P. No 29/2014 on the charge that on the report submitted by S.M. & H.O. Police Hospital, Shillong on 27.01.2014 he had reported sick and on completion of treatment 1 by Orthopaedician, Civil Hospital, Shillong he was supposed to report back before S.M. & H.O. Police Hospital Shillong on 08.03.2014, but he failed to turn up and remained on unauthorized absence till the date of drawing up of the charge against him. In this regard, Inspector C.M. Ranee was appointed as the Enquiry Officer.
4. Yet again, the Petitioner was departmentally proceeded against vide D.P. No 02/2017 on the charge that he was found to have remained absent from duty with effect from 16.07.2015 till 30.01.2017 without authorization from the competent authority. Smti C.W. Lyngdoh, Deputy Superintendent of Police (City), East Khasi Hills District, Shillong was appointed as the Enquiry Officer in this case.
5. Records would show that for the D.P. No 16/ 2012 the Petitioner was awarded punishment to the effect that stoppage of 3(three) increment was imposed upon him and in the D.P. No 29/2014, again stoppage of 3(three) increment was also imposed.
6. As regard the last D.P. No 02/2017, the Petitioner herein was awarded the major penalty of 'Removal from Service' vide Order dated 08.11.2018. Against this order, the Petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Deputy Inspector General of Police (ER), Meghalaya, Shillong which was rejected vide Order dated 21.12.2018.
7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 08.11.2018 passed by the Superintendent of Police and Disciplinary and Punishing Authority, East Khasi Hills, Shillong as well as the order dated 21.12.2018 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (ER), the Appellate Authority, the Petitioner has approached this Court with this instant Writ Petition with a prayer to set aside and quash the orders referred to above whereby he has been removed from service and his appeal in this regard having also been rejected. The prayer is also for reinstatement to his service and to continue as Police Cook.
28. Mr. B. Deb, learned counsel for the Petitioner at the outset has submitted that the root of the matter lies in the transfer order dated 16.07.2015 by which order the Petitioner was transferred to Tura, West Garo Hills, whereby the Petitioner had filed a representation dated 21.07.2015 before the Superintendent of Police, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong for revocation of the same. Another representation on the same lines dated 29.08.2016 was preferred before the Director General of Police, Meghalaya. However, no action has been taken on the two representations of the Petitioner herein, non- approval of the same being duly communicated to the Petitioner would have prompted him to join his transferred post.
9. The ground cited by the Petitioner for his alleged absence is that, he has some family and health issues and the Respondents after failing to respond to his representations, after one and half year has initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. In this regard, the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India & Anr: (2012) 3 SCC 178 at paragraphs 17 & 18 was referred to by the Petitioner, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant.
18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct."
10. The learned counsel has also submitted that the Petitioner was prejudiced throughout the proceedings, inasmuch as, he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses nor was his right to engage a 3 defence counsel explained to him. The Enquiry Officer while recording the statement of the Petitioner has also failed to actually record what the Petitioner had stated and has infact threatened and intimidated the Petitioner during the proceedings.
11. Another contention raised by the Petitioner is that the departmental proceedings in question is vitiated, inasmuch as, there was no presenting officer and the Enquiry Officer herself has acted as the Prosecutor by putting questions to the Prosecution Witnesses and has thus failed to act fairly and impartially as an independent adjudicator. The case of Union of India & Ors v. Ram Lakhan Sharma: (2018) 7 SCC 670 at paragraphs 27, 30 & 32 was relied upon by the Petitioner on this issue.
12. Again, another contention raised by the Petitioner is that he was submitted with a copy of the show cause notice dated 03.02.2017 received by him on 06.02.2017, whereas the D.P No. 2/2017 was initiated on 02.02.2017 and as such, the Departmental Proceeding against him was initiated before serving the copy of the Charge Sheet to him which is illegal.
13. Yet again, another contention of the Petitioner is that the findings of the D.P. No. 2/2017 was completed on 14.08.2018 and the impugned dismissal notice was issued on 20.08.2018 without giving him any opportunity to show cause against any such findings and as such, the dismissal notice was in violation of the principles of natural justice. The case of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya:
(2017) 1 SCC 768 at paragraphs 25, 29, 30 (iv) (v) was cited to support his contention.
14. The Appellate Authority on being preferred representation dated 13.08.2018 has also failed to appreciate the fact that the Petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses nor was he allowed to engage a counsel of his own choice to defend his case and also that no opportunity was given to file show cause against the departmental findings, has rejected his appeal and has therefore caused great injustice to the 4 Petitioner.
15. In his reply, Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, learned AAG on behalf of the State Respondent has submitted that what has been established is that the Petitioner had remained absent from duty w.e.f. 16.07.2015 to 30.01.2017 without authorization from the competent authority. It has been pointed out that the Petitioner is a habitual absentee for which two other departmental proceedings have been drawn up against him for unauthorized absence.
16. It is submitted that the contention of the Petitioner that he was not supplied with the charge sheet is incorrect since record would show that the show cause notice dated 03.02.2017 in D.P. No. 2/2017 containing the charges against him was duly received by him.
17. As regard the contention of the Petitioner that he was denied the opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses, it is submitted that records would show that the Petitioner himself has declined to cross-examine the witnesses when called upon to do so by the Enquiry Officer and has also declined to appoint a defence counsel on his behalf.
18. It is also submitted that the contention of the Petitioner that a Presenting Officer was not appointed and that the Enquiry Officer has played the role of the Prosecutor by putting questions to the prosecution witnesses, thereby causing prejudice to the Petitioner is also not correct since the Enquiry Officer had acted as an independent adjudicator and not as a representative of the department or disciplinary authority.
19. It is further submitted that the absence of a Presenting Officer by itself would not vitiate the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer in this case has simply recorded the statement of the prosecution witnesses and has not structured the same as questions and answers. The case of Ram Lakhan Sharma (supra) at paragraph 33 was relied upon in this regard.
20. Learned AAG has also submitted that in this instant case, this Court has a very limited scope as judicial review is not an appeal from a decision 5 but review of the manner in which the decision is made. The case of State of Karnataka & Anr. v. N. Gangaraj: (2020) 3 SCC 423 at paragraphs 8 to 15 was referred to in this connection.
21. As regard the contents in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the Petitioner, Mr. Bhattacharjee has submitted that the Petitioner cannot come forward with an entirely new case in the rejoinder and the original plea cannot be permitted to be altered under the garb of filing a rejoinder. The case of Gurjant Singh v. Krishan Chander & Ors: (2000) SCC Online Raj 237 at paragraphs 9 & 10 and the case of Ajanta Enterprises v. Bimla Charan Chatterjee & Anr: (1987) (2) WLN 172 at paragraph 8 was cited in this regard.
22. It is therefore prayed that this petition is devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.
23. On consideration of the submissions and contention advanced by the parties in this case, facts as narrated above need not be restated, suffice it to say that what this Court is to call upon is to examine the case of the parties and to come to a finding as to whether the Petitioner herein has been able to make out a case to set aside and quash the impugned orders under challenged.
24. The objection raised by the Petitioner is that the representation dated 21.07.2015 made before the Superintendent of Police, East Khasi Hills, Shillong as well as the subsequent representation dated 29.08.2016 before the Director General of Police for revocation/cancellation of the transfer order dated 16.07.2015 have not been dealt with, which if decided in the negative would have compelled him to join the post to where he was transferred, instead, the departmental proceedings was drawn up against him on 02.02.2017.
25. The State Respondent has submitted through their written argument at paragraph 10 that the Petitioner cannot be allowed to introduce new pleas in his plaint so as to alter the basis of his plaint, perhaps referring 6 to the above assertion of the Petitioner as regard the failure of the authorities to respond to his prayer for revocation of transfer, though nothing specific as to what are the new pleas introduced was cited, has failed to notice that the Petitioner has made reference to this particular point in the writ petition at paragraph 7 and as such, this Court cannot accept the contention of the State Respondent that new pleas were introduced by the Petitioner. In fact, from the record of the departmental proceedings produced before this Court, this Court on perusal of the same has also seen the Enquiry Report dated 14.08.2018 and under the heading of "Appreciation of Evidence:
Documentary", it is noticed that Exhibit-XI is the Appeal dated 29.08.2016 preferred before the DGP with a prayer for cancellation of the transfer order and release of salary and Exhibit- VII is the representation dated 21.07.2015 filed before the Superintendent of Police with a prayer for revocation of the transfer order to Tura. In fact, in the show cause dated 16.02.2017 filed by the Petitioner against the Show cause notice dated 03.02.2017, the above facts regarding the non-response to the two representations referred to above have also been highlighted. The same was also exhibited by the Enquiry Officer as Exhibit XXXVII. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an introduction of new plea or new facts in the lis. The authorities cited by the learned AAG in this regard are therefore not relevant in this case. Be that as it may, it is also again noticed that the Petitioner has failed to pursue this aspect of the matter and has chosen to take part in the enquiry proceedings and as such, the principle of waiver will be applicable in this case.
26. On the contention that the Enquiry Officer had also acted as the Presenting Officer and thus the imputation of bias can be assumed as far as the departmental proceedings against the Petitioner is concerned, the Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Ram Lakhan Sharma (supra) particularly paragraphs 27, 30 & 32 of the same which reads as follows:-
"27. In State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, 2010 (2) SCC 772 this Court had laid down that Enquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority, he has to act as an independent adjudicator and he is not a representative of the department/disciplinary 7 authority/Government. In paras 28 and 30 following has been held: (SCC p. 782) "28. An Enquiry Officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.
30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The Enquiry Officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service."
30. This Court had occasion to observe in Workmen v.
Lambabari Tea Estate, 1966 (2) LLJ 315, that if Enquiry Officer did not keep his function as Enquiry Officer but becomes prosecutor, the inquiry is vitiated. The following was observed:
(FLR p. 362) "The inquiry which was held by the management on the first charge was presided over by the manager himself. It was conducted in the presence of the assistant manager and two others. The enquiry was not correct in its procedure. The manager recorded the statements, cross-examined the labourers who were the offenders and made and recorded his own statements on facts and questioned the offending labourers about the truth of his own statements recorded by himself. The manager did not keep his function as the enquiring officer distinct but became witness, prosecutor and manager in turns. The record of the enquiry as a result is staccato and unsatisfactory."
32. The Division Bench further held that where the Enquiry 8 Officer acts as Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. Para 9 is as follows:
"9. A domestic inquiry must be held by an unbiased person who is unconnected with the incident so that he can be impartial and objective in deciding the subject- matters of inquiry. He should have an open mind till the inquiry is completed and should neither act with bias nor give an impression of bias. Where the Enquiry Officer acts as the Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. At all events, it clearly gives an impression of bias. An Enquiry Officer is in position of a Judge or Adjudicator. The Presenting Officer is in the position of a Prosecutor. If the Enquiry Officer acts as a Presenting Officer, then it would amount to Judge acting as the prosecutor. When the Enquiry Officer conducts the examination-in- chief of the prosecution witnesses and leads them through the facts so as to present the case of the disciplinary authority against the employee or cross- examines the delinquent employee or his witnesses to establish the case of the employer/disciplinary authority evidently, the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to have an open mind. The very fact that he presents the case of the employer and supports the case of the employer is sufficient to hold that the Enquiry Officer does not have an open mind."
27. In reply to this, the State Respondent has submitted that the Enquiry Officer on being appointed vide order dated 20.02.2017 had acted as an independent adjudicator and not a representative of the department or disciplinary authority. Moreover, there is no statutory rule to contemplate appointment of a Presenting Officer in disciplinary enquiries. It is further submitted that, absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not vitiate the enquiry. The case of Ram Lakhan Sharma (supra) at paragraph 33 was relied upon by the Respondent in this regard, which when read over would show that the Apex Court has endorsed the principle enumerated by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which has inter alia held that it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry. Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry. However, in the same case at paragraph 36, the Apex Court has observed that the conduct of the Enquiry Officer as to whether he has acted as a prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has 9 to be decided on the facts and proceedings of a particular case.
28. This Court has perused the deposition of the witnesses in the said D.P. No. 2/2017 and has noticed that the evidence recorded was in the form of a statement. No question was put to them, much less leading questions and the delinquent/Petitioner herein was also allowed to cross-examine, but he has declined to do so as is apparent from the record and as such, the conduct of the Enquiry Officer could not have been termed to be bias. The contention of the Petitioner that in the absence of a Presenting Officer, the Enquiry Officer has also acted as a Prosecutor in the proceedings cannot be accepted. The case law cited in this regard are therefore not applicable to the case in hand.
29. The Petitioner has also submitted that the copy of the show cause notice dated 03.02.2017 was received by him only on 06.02.2017 whereas, the D.P. No. 2/2017 was initiated on 02.02.2017 and as such, the proceedings of the said D.P. No. 2/2017 is illegal and not maintainable in the eye of law. The case of A. Jalender Reddy v. State of Telengana 2017 SCC Online Hyd 161 at paragraph 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 was cited by the Petitioner in support of his contention. The same reads as under:
"6.2.1. Government of India notified office memorandum on 30.01.1082 laying guidelines for adopting sealed cover procedure. This memorandum was subject matter of challenge before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The decision rendered by the Full Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal and the benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal were assailed before the Supreme Court by the Union of India in batches of appeals in the case reported as Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman. The common questions involved in all the matters relate to sealed cover procedure. Three questions were considered by the Supreme Court: (1) What is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against an employee; (2) What is the course to be adopted when the employee is held guilty in such proceedings if the guilt merits punishment other than that of dismissal; (3) to what benefits an employee who is completely or partially exonerated is entitled to and from which date.10
6.2.2. Insofar as the present issue is concerned, the first question considered by the Supreme Court is relevant. On this issue, Supreme Court upheld the decision or the Full Bench of the Tribunal. Full Bench of the Tribunal held that only if a charge memo in disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against an employee."
30. The record would reveal that the Petitioner on receipt of the show cause notice dated 03.02.2017 also containing the statement of allegation has responded to the same by filing his show cause dated 16.02.2017. Nothing is stated in his show cause that he has been prejudiced by the said initiation of departmental proceeding on 02.02.2017 and as such, at this stage he cannot come up with a plea that an illegality has been perpetrated upon him in this regard. The case of A. Jalender Reddy (supra) cited by the Petitioner relates to the sealed cover procedure which is to be resorted to only after the charge- memo/charge-sheet is issued and as such, cannot help the Petitioner in this case as due procedure was followed by the Authorities concerned.
31. The Petitioner has also submitted that the findings of the D.P. No. 2/2017 was completed on 14.08.2018 and the impugned dismissal notice was issued on 20.08.2018 without giving him an opportunity to show cause to the findings of the D.P and as such, there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. The case of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited (supra) at paragraph 25 was relied upon in this regard. However, records would show that vide memorandum dated 20.08.2018, the Petitioner was given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to which he has replied vide his representation dated 30.08.2018 by which representation he has prayed for recalling of the proposed penalty of removal from service. This proves that due process was followed and as such there is no question of violation of natural justice. Paragraph 25 of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited case has observed that:
"25. The Constitution Bench in ECIl v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, after elaborately considering the principle of natural 11 justice in the context of the disciplinary inquiry laid down the following in paras 29, 30 (iv) and (v): (SCC pp. 756-58) "29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.
30. ..... (iv) In the view that we have taken viz. that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case (1991) 1 SCC 588, should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-
furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct 12 reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions.
Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice."
32. This Court is also in agreement with the submission of the learned AAG that the scope of judicial review as far as findings of disciplinary proceedings are concerned is very limited and that the High Court is not an Appellate Court in this regard. The case of N. Gangaraj (supra) paragraphs 8 to 15 cited in this regard has relevance, inasmuch as, the Apex Court in the said case has clearly demarcated the scope and ambit of judicial review which is confined to the decision-making process and is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. At paragraph 9 of the same, the Apex Court has observed as follows: -
"9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1936 SC 1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under: (AIR pp. 1726, para 7) "7. ...The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is 13 concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
Again at paragraph 13 it has been observed as :-
"13. In another judgement reported as Union of India v. P.Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings:
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
33. However, at paragraph 11 of the said N. Gangaraj case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that interference with decision of departmental authorities is permitted, if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
34. In respect of the case of the Petitioner before the authorities who has conducted the said departmental proceedings against him, this Court on 14 its findings and observations above has no occasion to encounter or discover any violation of the principles of natural justice or statutory regulations which would warrant interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and as such, the Petitioner has not been able to make out a case in his favour.
35. Consequently, this writ petition is found to be devoid of merits and the same is hereby dismissed.
36. The records of the said D. P. No. 2/2017 produced before this Court are directed to be returned to the authorities concerned.
37. Case disposed of. No cost.
Judge Meghalaya 11.03.2021 "D. Nary, PS"
15