Central Administrative Tribunal - Hyderabad
Madhavadhara Vuda Colony vs Apsrtc Reported In 2001 (5) Alt 180. ... on 5 December, 2008
IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HYDERABAD BENCH AT HYDERABAD O.A No. 853/ 2007 & 180/ 2008 DATE OF ORDER: THE 5TH DECEMBER, 2008 Between:
Shri B. Tata Rao S/o Seetaramaiah R/o D. 39-27-44/7 OA 853/ 2007 Madhavadhara Vuda Colony Visakhapatnam. ... Applicant And
1. The Union of India Rep. By its Secretary Ministry of Defence Nauseva Bhavan New Delhi.
2. Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Head Quarter Eastern Naval Command Naval Base, Visakhapatnam.
3. The Admiral Superintendent Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam.
4. Deputy General Manager (P&A) Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam. ... Respondents Counsel for Applicants : Mrs. Anitha Swain, Advocate Counsel for Respondents : Mr. P. Lakshmana Rao , SC Shri B. Tata Rao S/o Seetaramaiah R/o D. 39-27-44/7 OA 180/ 2008 Madhavadhara Vuda Colony Visakhapatnam. ... Applicant And
1. The Union of India Rep. By its Secretary Ministry of Defence South Block New Delhi.
2. Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Head Quarter Eastern Naval Command Naval Base, Visakhapatnam.
3. The Admiral Superintendent Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam.
4. Deputy General Manager (P&A) Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam.
5. The Inquiry Authority Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam. ... Respondents Counsel for Applicants : Mrs. Anitha Swain, Advocate Counsel for Respondents : Mr. A. Rajendra Babu , SC Coram :
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Lakshmana Reddy, Vice Chairman The Hon'ble Mr. R. Santhanam, Member (Admn.) (Order per Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Lakshmana Reddy, VC) Both these applications are filed by the same applicant. The issues involved in both these applications are inter connected. Therefore, we consider it expedient to dispose of both these OAs by a common order.
2. The OA 853/ 2007 is filed on 10.12.2007 aggrieved of non-payment of full salary for the period from 16.12.2000 to 6.8.2003 during which the applicant was kept under suspension in respect of the charge memo dated 15.5.2001 by an order dated 23.11.2005 passed by R-3 which was confirmed by R-2 by is order dated 13.6.2007. The applicant claimed that the suspension period shall be treated as on duty for all the purposes as the applicant is acquitted in the criminal case by a competent Criminal Court.
3. OA 180/ 2008 is filed on 25.3.2008 after the respondents proceeded to continue the inquiry even after the acquittal in the Criminal Court, but seeking the same relief prayed from in the earlier OA 853/ 2007, filed on 10.12.2207.
4. The relevant facts in brief are as follows:
The applicant was working as HSK II in the department of Apprentice School, Naval Dockyard, Visakhapatnam. The applicant being a union leader was serving as Secretary of a Co-operative Society, namely Defence Services Employees Consumers Co-operative Stores Limited. While so, on 16.12.2000, a criminal case was registered against the applicant under Section 420 IPC and also under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the CBI. In view of the registration of that criminal case, the third respondent kept the applicant under suspension on 16.12.2000. The applicant made repeated requests to revoke the suspension. He also addressed a letter dated 18.4.2001 seeking revocation of suspension stating that investigation was over and CBI filed charge sheet on 23.12.2000. Thereafter, the 4th respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings by issuing charge memo dated 15.5.2001 in respect of the same charge levelled by the CBI against the applicant in its charge sheet filed before the CBI Special Court. R-3 replied on 3.7.2001 that the suspension can be revoked only after the charges are framed by the Hon'ble CBI Court. As the articles of charge framed by the department in departmental inquiry and the charges in the charge sheet of the CBI are one and the same based on the same set of facts and evidence, the applicant challenged the departmental inquiry by filing OA 1085/ 2001 before this Tribunal to quash the charges framed by the department. This Tribunal vide its order dated 9.10.2001 disposed of the OA with a direction to keep the departmental proceedings in abeyance till the criminal proceedings are completed giving liberty to the respondents to move this Tribunal in case the criminal proceedings are unduly delayed, for necessary relief. But the applicant was continued under suspension. The applicant submitted another representation on 29.3.2002 seeking revocation of his suspension. The said request was rejected by order dated 25.2./ 7.3.2003 passed by R-2. Aggrieved by the said orders the applicant approached this Tribunal by way of OA 489/ 2003 to declare the said orders as illegal and arbitrary and to set aside the same. This Tribunal allowed the said OA on 11.7.2003 and set aside the impugned orders dated 25.2/ 7.3.2003 passed by R-2 and also revoked the suspension order dated 16.12.2000 and directed R-2 to reinstate the applicant forthwith with all consequential benefits.
5. Thereafter on 18.7.2003 the applicant submitted a representation to the Admiral Superintendent (R-3) to implement the orders of this Tribunal passed in OA 489/ 2003. On 30.7.2003, R-3 passed order (Annexure A-VIII) revoking the suspension with immediate effect and reinstating the applicant but stating that the entitlement or otherwise of pay and allowances for the suspension period would be determined only after finalization of the criminal proceedings pending against the applicant.
6. Subsequently on 30.11.2004, the Special Court, CBI cases acquitted the applicant of the charges framed against him. Thereafter on 22.12.2004 and 23.2.2005 the applicant made representations to R-3 to withdraw the charge memo dated 15.5.2001 in view of the clean acquittal of the applicant by the Criminal Court and also to treat the entire period of suspension from 16.12.2000 to 6.8.2003 as on duty and to arrange payment of the difference in the pay and allowances. While so, on 7.7.2005, R-3 issued notice to the applicant stating that he examined the judgement of the Criminal Court and he proposes to regularize the period of suspension as follows:
(a) The period of suspension shall not be treated as `Duty' for any purpose.
(b) No additional amount other than what has been paid as subsistence allowance shall be paid to Shri B. Tata Rao for the period of suspension. The applicant was asked to submit his representation if any on the above said orders of regularization of the period of suspension. The applicant submitted his reply on 5.8.2005 citing several judgments of the Tribunals and also stating that he is a sufferer because of union rivalries and provocation by a lier in complaining to CBI and therefore his request may be considered sympathetically by treating the period of suspension as duty for all purposes and also dropping the department proceedings. Thereafter on 28.11.2005 R-3 passed an order stating that the period of suspension from 16.12.2000 to 6.8.2003 shall be treated as duty only for the purpose of terminal benefits such as, pension and gratuity and the applicant is not entitled for anything more than what has been paid as subsistence allowance regarding pay and allowances. Aggrieved by the said orders, the applicant filed an appeal to the appellate authority, viz. R-2 on 30.1.2006. The appellate authority passed orders on 13.6.2007 confirming the orders passed by R-3 and rejecting the appeal made by the applicant. Aggrieved by the same, the applicant filed OA 853/ 2007 on 10.12.2007 contending that continuation of disciplinary proceedings even after honourable acquittal by the Hon'ble Special Court, CBI Cases on identical and similar set of facts, charge and the evidence are arbitrary, illegal and in violation of Articles 16 and 311 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, the orders of R-2 and R-3 are not in accordance with law. The respondents never followed the provisions on fundamental rules and due process of law. The appellate authority rejected the appeal without application of mind and the appellate order is unjust and unfair and it is arbitrary and illegal. On the said grounds, the applicant prayed for quashing the orders of R-2 & R-3 and to direct them to treat the suspension period as duty for all purposes and to pay arrears of salary, allowances, increments, promotions, etc. according to rules as per his entitlement.
7. The respondents contested the OA and filed reply stating that on 13.12.2000 one Shri Durga Venkata Prasad filed a complaint with the CBI, Visakhapatnam against the applicant stating that the applicant demanded a bribe of Rs.10,000/- for influencing the concerned officer and getting the order for supply of uniform cloth to Durga Venkata Prasad. The CBI caught the applicant red handed on the same day while the applicant was demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs.10,000/- from Shri Durga Venkata Prasad and registered case in RC 28 (A)/ 2000. As per the advice of CBI, Visakhapatnam, the applicant was placed under suspension with effect from 16.12.2000 pending criminal proceedings. The CBI filed charge sheet against the applicant before the Special Judge for CBI Cases for offences of cheating and criminal misconduct by a public servant punishable under Section 420 IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. At the same time, the CBI advised R-3 to issue major penalty charge sheet as per the draft forwarded. Accordingly, the applicant was proceeded under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965. While so, the applicant filed OA 1085/ 2001 and obtained stay of disciplinary proceedings till the conclusion of criminal proceedings and he filed another OA 489/ 2003 and obtained directions for revocation of suspension. As per the orders in OA 1085/ 2001, the disciplinary proceedings were kept in abeyance. Thereafter the respondents field OA 788/ 2004 before this Tribunal seeking to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings even during the pendency of criminal proceedings and this Tribunal allowed the OA and vacated the stay granted in OA 1085/ 2001 and permitted to proceed with the departmental inquiry. In pursuance of the orders passed in OA 489/ 2003, the suspension of the applicant was revoked by order dated 30.7.2003 and the applicant joined duty on 7.8.2003. The applicant was paid subsistence allowance at 50 per cent during the period of suspension. The respondents admitted about the acquittal of the applicant in the criminal case by the Special Judge, CBI cases. The respondents narrated about the representation made by the applicant for treating the period of suspension as on duty and about the orders passed by the respondents. The respondents further pleaded that the Hon'ble CBI Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the applicant beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted him and therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant was honourably acquitted. As per the Apex Court's decision in CA 1868/ 1997 (arising out of SLP (C ) No. 598/ 1996), if the very cause for suspension against an individual was his conduct that led to the prosecution for the offence under IPC, even though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of evidence, reinstatement with all consequential benefits and back wages etc. should not be granted as a matter of course. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that it would be deleterious to the maintenance of the discipline, if a person suspended on valid consideration is given full back wages as a matter of course on his acquittal. Relying on that decision, the respondents pleaded that the cause for suspension in this case was for the applicant's involvement in an offence relating to cheating and criminal misconduct and therefore the competent authority after considering all the facts and circumstances, refused to grant full pay and allowances though treated the period as on duty for other purposes. The respondents pleaded that it is not incumbent upon the respondents to grant the applicant full benefits just because he was acquitted by the Court of Law. As per the judicial pronouncements, orders of acquittal alone would not be conclusive and it is no bar to institute domestic enquiry. In a criminal case guilt beyond reasonable doubt has to be established whereas in the domestic enquiry it is preponderance of probabilities as held in V.S. Rama Rao Vs. APSRTC reported in 2001 (5) ALT 180. Therefore, the question of dropping of disciplinary proceedings is not automatic on acquittal in criminal case and disciplinary proceedings can be continued even after acquittal by Criminal Court. Mere acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not entitle the applicant to claim full pay and allowances and consequential benefits etc. The respondents prayed for dismissal of the OA 853/ 2007 as devoid of merits.
8. Thereafter the applicant filed rejoinder on 5.9.2008 reiterating the contentions raised in the application. The applicant further pleaded that the orders of acquittal passed by the Special Judge, CBI Cases, was not challenged before any other forum and the judgement of the CBI Court has become final. Therefore, on the same allegation, the department cannot continue the departmental proceedings on the basis of same evidence. The applicant cited a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in GM Tank Vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 2006 SC 2120 wherein it is held that where the facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being an iota of difference, the departmental proceedings after the honourable acquittal in the criminal case cannot be initiated or continued.
9. During the pendency of the above said OA 853/ 2007 it appears that the inquiry officer (R-5) passed an order dated 22.2.2008 for continuance of the departmental inquiry. The applicant filed OA 180/ 2008 on 25.3.2008 seeking the same reliefs and on the same grounds as prayed for in OA 853/ 2007. Only in the interim prayer, the orders of R-5 dated 22.2.2008 is mentioned but the said order is not filed. The only difference between these two OAs is that the inquiry officer is not made party to OA 853/ 2007 whereas the inquiry officer is impleaded as R-5 in OA 180/ 2008. As the pleadings are same in both these cases, we consider it unnecessary to set out the same pleadings again in these orders.
10. During the course of hearing, the counsel for the applicant reiterated the contentions raised in the applications and rejoinders whereas the counsel for the respondents reiterated the contentions raised in the replies filed in both the cases. The counsel for the respondents submitted that the OA 180/ 2008 is not maintainable as the reliefs prayed for therein is same as to that of the prayer in OA 853/ 2007.
11. The points that arise for consideration in these two applications are:
(i) Whether the respondents are entitled to continue the disciplinary proceedings even after the Special Judge, CBI Cases acquitted the applicant in respect of the same charge and on the same set of facts and evidence?
(ii) Whether the rejection of full pay and allowances for the period of suspension from 16.12.2000 to 6.8.2003 is not sustainable in law?
(iii) To what result?
12. Point No. (i):
The law is now well settled on this aspect in view of the latest decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 dated 10.4.2006 wherein, after thorough scrutiny of the earlier decisions, it is held that if an employee is acquitted in a criminal case by a competent Court of Law on merits, the punishment awarded in the departmental inquiry which was confirmed by the appellate authority and also by the Hon'ble High Court during the pendency of the criminal case, is not sustainable in law and the punishment in the departmental proceedings is liable to be set aside though it became final. The applicant herein stands on a much better footing than the applicant in the cited case. Because in the cited case, the disciplinary proceedings were already over and he was found guilty of the charges framed against the employee and it became final during the pendency of the criminal proceedings whereas in the instant case, even before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings the applicant obtained an acquittal in the criminal court. In the cited case, the Hon'ble High Court held that the charges levelled against the employee in the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are grounded on the same set of facts, charges, circumstances and evidence and the acquittal on merits by a competent court of law ip so facto absolve the appellant from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction. In the cited case, Their Lordships found that the charge framed in the disciplinary proceedings and also the charge framed in the criminal proceedings are grounded on the same set of facts and evidence and also pertains to the same allegation. Here, in the instant case also, it is not disputed that the charge framed in the disciplinary inquiry and the charge framed by the Criminal Court are exactly one and the same on the same set of facts and evidence. In fact, in the instant case, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated only at the instigation of CBI and the CBI itself sent the draft charges to the department and the department simply adopted the same. According to the respondents they wanted to proceed with the departmental inquiry even after the acquittal only on the suggestion made by the CBI and not on their own. In fact, para 16 of the Vigilance Manual deals with departmental action to be taken after acquittal. It is useful to reproduce the said paragraph in these orders for better appreciation.
16. Departmental action after acquittal 16.1 If the Government servant is acquitted by trial or appellate court and if it is decided that the acquittal should not be challenged in a higher court, the competent authority should decide whether or not despite the acquittal, the facts and circumstances of the case are such as to call for a departmental inquiry on the basis of the allegations on which he was previously charged and convicted. According to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Nagpur City Corporation Vs. Ram Chandra and other [SC 396 of 1980-SLR 1981 (2)], even where the accused public servant is acquitted and exonerated of an offence, such acquittal does not bar a departmental authority from holding or continuing disciplinary proceedings against the accused public servant.
16.2 One identical set of facts and allegations may constitute a criminal offence as well as misconduct punishable under the CCS (CCA) Rules or other corresponding rules. If the facts or allegations had been examined by a court of competent jurisdiction and if the court held that the allegations were not true, it will not be permissible to hold a departmental inquiry in respect of a charge based on the same facts or allegations.
16.3 If, on the other hand, the court has merely expressed a doubt about the correctness of the allegations, a departmental enquiry may be held into the same allegations, if better proof than what was produced before the court is forthcoming.
16.4 If the court has held that the allegations are proved but do not constitute the criminal offence with which the Government servant was charged, a departmental enquiry could be held on the basis of the same allegations if they are considered good and sufficient ground for departmental action. Departmental action could also be taken if the allegations were not examined by court, e.g., the discharge of the accused on technical grounds without going into the merits of the allegations, but if the allegations are considered good and sufficient for departmental action.
16.5 A departmental enquiry may be held after acquittal in respect of a charge which is not identical with or similar to the charge in the criminal case and is not based on any allegations which have been negatived by the criminal court.
16.6 If it is decided that a departmental enquiry should be held in any of the circumstances mentioned above, further action should be taken in accordance with the procedure described in Chapters X to XII. Even from the above quoted para 16, it is clear that where the facts have been examined by a Court and if the Court has held that the allegations were not true, it may not be permissible to hold departmental inquiry in respect of the charge based on the same facts or allegations. Here, in the instant case, the Criminal Court has gone into the merits of the case and after due appreciation of evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution held that the allegations mentioned in the charge against the applicant is not true and he did not take any amount as bribe and that the applicant had taken the amount as loan from the de facto complainant therein. There is a categorical finding to the effect that the allegation made against the applicant by the de facto complainant there is not true and therefore on the same set of facts and on the same evidence of the de facto complainant the inquiry officer cannot give a different finding than that of the finding given by the Criminal Court. Therefore, even the instructions given in the Vigilance Manual also, do not permit the continuance of the disciplinary inquiry in a case like this where the applicant obtained an acquittal on merits and not on account of any technical grounds. Therefore, in our considered view, the respondents are not entitled to continue with the disciplinary inquiry after the acquittal of the applicant by the Special Judge, CBI Cases. Thus, this point is found in favour of the applicant.
13. Point No. (ii):
As per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vs. State of Maharashtra & others reported in 1997 SCC (L&S) 847, the acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a person to back wages, pensionary benefits and other consequential benefits on his reinstatement where suspension is ordered pending criminal case and that the competent authority is empowered to treat the suspension period as not spent on duty after following the principles of natural justice. So, it is clear that entitlement of back wages for the period of suspension is not automatic on acquittal in a criminal case and it depends upon facts of each case and that the competent authority has to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case and then pass appropriate order regulating the period of suspension. As seen from FR 54 (1) the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make an order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Govt. servant for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement. As per FR 54 (2) where the Govt. servant has been fully exonerated, the Govt.servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (6) be paid the full pay and allowances which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement provided where the proceedings instituted against the Govt. servant had not been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant. As seen from FR 54-B (1) when a Govt. servant who has been suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Govt. servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement and whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. As per FR 54-B (3) where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended provided that the proceedings had not been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Govt. servant. Thus, it is clear that the competent authority is expected to apply his mind to the facts of each case and consider whether the suspension in the facts and circumstances of such case was justified. As the applicant herein is not dismissed from service and later reinstated but he was only suspended and later reinstated, FR 54-B applies and not FR 54(1). As per FR 54-B (3) the competent authority has to decide whether the suspension was justified. In the instant case, the competent authority served a show cause notice before passing an order denying the full pay and allowances for the suspension period. But, according to the applicant, he submitted a representation to the said show cause notice inviting the attention of the competent authority about the orders passed by this Tribunal in OA 489/ 2003 dated 11.7.2003 wherein this Tribunal held that continuance of suspension even after the CBI completed investigation and filed charge sheet is not justified and in spite of such representation, the respondents have not revoked the suspension. It is the further case of the applicant that though the respondents at one stage informed him in writing that the suspension will be revoked after the CBI Court framed the charges, and even after framing the charges by the CBI Court, the respondents have not revoked suspension till this Tribunal found it unjustified and revoked the suspension on 11.7.2003 and directed the respondents to reinstate the applicant. It is not disputed that the applicant submitted repeated representations starting from 18.4.2001 stating that he has been falsely implicated in criminal cases on account of union rivalries and that the allegations made in the complaint given to the CBI is false as the applicant is not the authority who has got power to pass any order in favour of the applicant therein awarding the alleged contract of supply of khaki cloth to the department. The applicant's counsel contended that during the inquiry the Military Officer deposed that the department never contemplated to entrust the contract of supply of khaki cloth to any private contractor as the Govt. itself is supplying uniform cloth for the employees. It is not disputed that the applicant is in no way concerned for securing the cloth for the uniform of the employees in the Naval Dockyard. Therefore, the question of his taking bribe for doing any official favour to the de facto complainant in the criminal case does not arise. It is within the knowledge of the department about any contemplation to secure cloth for the uniforms of the employees by way of entrusting the contract to private individuals. Even if it is assumed that there was any contemplation of such contract to be entered into with private contractors, it is within the knowledge of the department that the applicant is in no way concerned with the entrustment of such contract. Therefore, the question of corruption punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act does not arise. The other charge against the applicant in the criminal case is cheating which is an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Even if the averments of the charges are taken as true, it does not attract the offence of cheating as according to the de facto complainant he paid Rs.10,000/- for the first time on that day for the purpose of getting work done in future. The offence of cheating comes into play only when the recipient of the amount did not fulfill the promise for which the amount was demanded and accepted. Even at the time of entrusting that money of Rs.10,000/- for the first time, the CBI people caught hold of the applicant while taking money from the de facto complainant. In fact, the applicant admitted about the receipt of money but pleaded that he took the amount as a loan from the de facto complainant. Without applying the mind to all these facts, the respondents continued to keep the applicant under suspension for a period of more than two years eight months on the ground that the matter is pending trial before the Special Judge, CBI Cases, in spite of several representations made by the applicant seeking revocation of suspension. Immediately after the charge sheet is filed by the CBI before the Special Judge, CBI Cases, the applicant submitted representation seeking revocation of suspension stating that the investigation is completed and there is no need to continue him under suspension. But the respondents gave reply stating that they would revoke suspension after the CBI Court framed the charges. There is absolutely no rationale behind such reply. When the investigation is completed and the CBI Court took cognizance of the offence, there was no need to wait for framing of charges by the CBI Court. Even after framing of charges by the CBI Court also, the respondents did not choose to revoke suspension. Then, the applicant had to approach this Tribunal by way of OA 489/ 2003. The applicant contended therein that there is no justification for the Admiral Superintendent, Naval Dockyard, Visakhapatnam who is R-3 herein to continue the suspension order even after the investigation in the corruption case has been completed and the case filed in the CBI Court is pending for trial. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and following the decision of the Principal Bench, CAT, New Delhi in OA 833/ 2000 dated 6.2.2001 this Tribunal held that this is a fit case to order for revocation of suspension and to declare the orders of rejection dated 7.3.2003 passed by R-3 herein as illegal and arbitrary and directed R-3 to reinstate the applicant to duty forthwith with all consequential benefits. The said orders of this Tribunal have become final. The respondents did not challenge the same. Therefore, while exercising the discretion under FR 54-B (3) the competent authority ought to have considered the orders of this Tribunal dated 11.7.2003 in OA 489/ 2003 whereunder the suspension was revoked with consequential benefits. There was no justification to continue the applicant under suspension after the investigation was completed and the CBI filed the charge sheet before the CBI Court. Had the competent authority followed the directions of this Tribunal given in OA 489/ 2003, he should have granted full pay and allowances for the period between the date of filing of the charge sheet by the CBI before the Special Judge, CBI Court and the date of reinstatement. But the respondent rejected payment of full pay and allowances even for that period. Therefore, in our considered view, the impugned order of rejection of full pay and allowances to the extent of that period is not sustainable in law and it is liable to be set aside. So far as the period between the date of suspension and the date of filing of the charge sheet by the CBI before the CBI Court, the order of rejection of full pay and allowances is sustainable in law even if the applicant is acquitted on merits by a Criminal Court as the payment of full pay and allowances for the entire period of suspension is not automatic. Thus, this point is found accordingly.
14. In the result, both the OAs are disposed of directing the respondents not to proceed with the departmental inquiry initiated against the applicant in respect of the same charge for which Criminal Court acquitted the applicant on merits and also directing the respondents to pay full pay and allowances for the period between the date of filing of the charge sheet by the CBI before the CBI Court and the date of reinstatement after deducting the subsistence allowance already paid. The applicant is not entitled for pay allowances for the period from 16.12.2000 to the date of filing of the charge sheet by the CBI other than the subsistence allowance already paid to the applicant. There shall be no order as to costs.
( R. Santhanam) (P. Lakshmana Reddy)
Member (A) Vice-Chairman
Dated: 5th December, 2008