Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ballu @ Firoz Khan vs State Of M.P. on 8 February, 2022
Author: G.S. Ahluwalia
Bench: G.S. Ahluwalia
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
GWALIOR BENCH
DIVISION BENCH
G.S. AHLUWALIA
&
DEEPAK KUMAR AGARWAL J.J.
Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007
Ballu @ Firoz Khan
Vs.
State of M.P.
_______________________________________
Shri R.K.S. Kushwaha, Counsel for the Appellant
Shri C.P. Singh, Counsel for the State
Date of Hearing : 1-2-2022
Date of Judgment : 8-02-2022
Approved for Reporting :
Judgment
th
08 - February -2022
Per G.S. Ahluwalia J.
1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. has been
filed against the judgment and sentence dated 30-4-2007 passed by
IVth Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Shivpuri, in Sessions
Trial No. 192/2006 by which the appellant has been convicted under
Section 302 (On two counts) and under Section 307 of IPC and has
been sentenced to under Life Imprisonment for offence under Section
302 as well as for offence under Section 307 of IPC. Since, the Trial
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
Court did not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently,
therefore, in the light of Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. all the sentences
shall run consecutive.
2. It is not out of place to mention here that earlier by order dated
2-7-2021, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on the application
moved by the appellant from Central Jail, Gwalior so that he can avail
the benefit of remission in sentence on 15 th August 2021. Thereafter,
the appellant filed an application for restoration of appeal which was
registered as M.Cr.C. No. 60461 of 2021 and the said application was
allowed and by order dated 15-12-2021, the appeal was restored to its
original file.
3. The prosecution story in short is that on 5-7-2006 at about
18:10, the complainant Bhaiyyan lodged a report that he is the
resident of Maharana Pratap Colony and is having a tent house in the
name and style Taj Tent House. At about 9:30 in the morning, he
went to his shop without having breakfast. His wife Ruksana, his son
Sameer, and daughter Aarju aged about 7 years were in the house. At
about 5:45 in the evening he came along with his friend Banti for
taking out the tent material, and saw that the door was bolted from
outside. He enquired from the daughter of his neighbor as to whether
his wife is in her house or not, but she refused. Thereafter, he
unbolted the door and went to the first floor and found the door was
open and the goods were scattered. From the balcony, he saw that
Sameer and Aarju were lying in an injured condition in the front
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
balcony and they were alive. He lifted his children and called Banti
inside the house. He gave his son to Banti and lifted his daughter.
He also called Mohan Singh Bhadauria who was getting his house
constructed and took his children to hospital for treatment. His son
Sameer died. Thereafter, he sent his friend Banti and the appellant
Ballu to search for his wife. After returning back, they informed that
Ruksana too has been killed by somebody, and ornaments which She
was wearing are also missing. It was also mentioned that at about
4:45 P.M., his brother Ballu had seen his wife sitting on the roof. He
also expressed his suspicion towards Mohan Singh Bhadauria and
Ramesh Rathore.
4. On the above mentioned information, the police registered FIR
in crime No. 316/2006. The dead bodies of Ruksana and Sameer
were sent for post-mortem. Two sabbals stained with blood, blood
stained earth from three different places i.e., where Ruksana, Sameer
and Aarju were lying, and four pieces of bangles of the deceased were
recovered from the spot. During the investigation, the police arrested
the appellant. On his memorandum, his blood stained shirt and pant
were seized from the tent material. The Statements of the witnesses
were recorded. The injured Aarju survived. Her statement was also
recorded. The police after completing the investigation, filed charge
sheet for offence under Sections 302,307 of IPC.
5. The Trial Court by order dated 17-10-2006, framed charges
under Section 302 (On two counts) for committing murder of
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
Ruksana and Sameer as well as under Section 307 of IPC for making
an attempt to kill Aarju.
6. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded not guilty.
7. The prosecution examined Dr. Ratnesh Jain (P.W.1), Bhaiyyan
Khan (P.W.2), Chunne Khan (P.W.3), Aarju (P.W.4), Ramesh Chandra
Sharma (P.W.5), Bahadur Singh (P.W.6), Dr. M.L. Agrawal (P.W.7),
Vidyaram Upadhyaya (P.W.8), Sukhveer Singh (P.W.9), O.P.
Chandoriya (P.W.10), Maniram (P.W.11), Devendra Singh Kushwaha
(P.W.12), Satyabhan (P.W. 13), Mohanlal Sharma (P.W.14), J.S. Yadav
(P.W. 15), and Rajkumar Sharma (P.W.16).
8. The appellant examined Smile Khan (D.W.1) and Ahmad
(D.W.2) in his defence.
9. The Trial Court by the impugned judgment, convicted and
sentenced the appellant for the above mentioned offences.
10. Challenging the impugned judgment, it is submitted by the
Counsel for the appellant that the entire prosecution story hinges
around Aarju (P.W.4). She is a child witness and She appears to have
been tutored. It is not safe to record conviction on the basis of
solitary evidence of a child witness. It is further submitted that the
ocular evidence is contrary to medical evidence.
11. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the State that the
prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
12. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
13. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like
to find out as to whether the death of Ruksana and Sameer was
homicidal in nature or not?
14. Dr. Ratnesh Jain (P.W.1) is autopsy surgeon and found the
following injuries on the dead body of Ruksana :
(i) Incised wound over right side of face over forehead
and posterior region size 6 cm x 1 cm x bone deep.
Obliquely placed clotted with blood ;
(ii) Incised wound over forehead and parietal region
obliquely present size 4 cm x 1 ½ cm x 1 cm margins clean
cut clotted blood;
(iii) Incised wound over left side of fronto parietal region
obliquely placed 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep 2 cm right to 2 nd
wound;
(iv) Punctured wound over left side of face lateral to left
eye. Size 3 cm x 1 ½ cm x 2 ½ cm bone deep
(v) Incised wound over occipital region size 3 cm x 1 cm
x ½ cm clotted blood;
(vi) Punctured wound over left side of face over cheek ½
cm x ½ cm ;
(vii) Abrasion over neck size 2 cm x ½ cm anterior;
(viii) Contusion over neck size 2 cm x 2 cm just above
chest;
(ix) Contusion over chest on right side size 1 cm x 1cm
x1cm ;
(x) Incised wound over index finger of left hand size ½
cm x ½ cm x ½ cm.
On internal examination, fracture of left fronto parietal
temporal and right fronto parietal occipital bone was found
in multiple pieces. Laceration was in left cerebral
Hemisphere and intracranial hematoma was present on both
side.
Injuries no. 1,2,3,5 and 10 were caused by sharp object
whereas injuries no. 4 and 6 were caused by hard and
pointed objected and injuries no. 7,8 and 9 were caused by
hard and blunt object. All injuries were antemortem in
nature.
The Cause of death was Coma due to head injury.
Homicidal in nature.
15. The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.1.
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
16. The following injuries were found on the dead body of
Shahrukh :
(i) Incised wound over left parietal region.
Longitudinally placed size 5 cm x 1 cm x bone deep clotted
blood present;
(ii) Incised wound over occipital region size 4 cm x 1 cm
x bone deep transversely present;
(iii) Punctured wound over right side of forehead size 1
cm x ½ cm x bone deep;
(iv) Contusion over right fronto parietal region size 4 cm
x 3 cm.
Injuries are antemortem
On internal Examination, fracture of frontal, parietal and
occipital bone on both side in multiple pieces were found
subdural Hematoma was present on both side of head.
Injuries no. 1,2 were caused by sharp object whereas injury
no. 3 was caused by pointed weapon and injury no. 4 was
caused by hard and blunt object. The cause of death was
coma due to head injury and death was homicidal in nature.
17. The post-mortem report is Ex. P.2. This witness was cross-
examined.
In cross-examination, this witness stated that injuries no.
1,2,3,5, and 10 could have been caused to the deceased Ruksana by
Farsa, Axe, Sword etc, and stated that injuries no. 8 and 9 were
caused by hard and blunt, sharp edged and pointed weapon. He
further stated that injury no. 3 found on the body of Shahrukh (also
known as Sameer) could be caused by pointed weapon, whereas
injuries no. 1 and 2 were caused by sharp edged weapon and injury
no. 4 was caused by hard and blunt object.
18. Thus, it is clear that the death of Ruksana and Sameer was
homicidal in nature.
19. The next question for consideration is that whether the
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
appellant is the author of the offence or not?
20. Aarju (P.W.4) is the surviving victim. She was medically
examined by Dr. M.L. Agrawal (P.W. 7) who found following injuries
on her body :
(i) Incised wound on the Occipital region size of 4 inch
x 1/3 cm deep upto bone;
(ii) A incised wound on the left Parietal region, size of 1
cm x .3 x cm x deep deep ;
(iii) A incised wound on the right temple region size of 1
cm x .3 cm x deep upto bone;
(iv) A lacerated wound on the left head size of 1 cm x .3
cm deep
Injury no. 4 was caused by hard and blunt object whereas
injuries no. 1,2 and 3 were caused by sharp edged weapon.
The patient was admitted in female surgical ward. The
M.L.C. is Ex. P.15.
21. This witness was cross-examined. In cross-examination, this
witness stated that by mistake he could not mention in the M.L.C.,
that injuries no.1,2 and 3 were caused by sharp edged weapon.
However, he has stated so in his examination-in-chief on the basis of
M.L.C. It is true that injuries no.1,2 and 3 can be caused by Axe,
Sword, Farsa etc.
Whether Trial Court committed material illegality by not asking
certain questions under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.?
22. The prosecution case is based on the direct evidence of an
injured witness as well as on circumstantial evidence. It is not out of
place to mention here that on the disclosure made by the appellant,
his blood stained shirt and pant were seized vide seizure memo, Ex.
P.19. The cloths of the appellant and 2 sabbals were sent for forensic
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
examination, and the F.S.L. report was received by the Trial Court
after the statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was
recorded. As per the F.S.L. report, Human Blood was found on 2
sabbals and cloths of the appellant, but it was also mentioned that
result for ascertaining the blood group was inconclusive. The F.S.L.
report is admissible under Section 293 of Cr.P.C. From the order
sheet dated 20-4-2007, it is clear that the F.S.L. report was received
and the Counsel for the appellant expressed that he doesnot want to
file any reply. The order dated 23-4-2007 indicates that the Trial
Court considered the aspect as to whether any further question is to
be put to the appellant on the basis of F.S.L. report or not, and
without mentioning that human blood was found on the cloths of the
appellant, it was observed that since, the test for ascertaining blood
group was inconclusive, therefore, the F.S.L. report cannot be used
against the appellant, and held that there is no good reason to ask any
further question under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
23. In the considered opinion of this Court, this order of the Trial
Court was not in conformity with law. Whether any circumstance is
to be used against the accused or not, should not be decided at the
stage of examination of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
Presence of Human Blood on the cloths of the appellant could have
been used as a circumstance against him, but by not giving an
opportunity to the appellant to explain the circumstance of presence
of human blood on his cloths, the Trial Court has in fact restrained
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
this Court also from considering the circumstance of presence of
Human blood. The absence of blood group cannot be a sole basis to
discard said piece of evidence. It is for the Court to decide that
whether the presence of Human blood on the cloths of the appellant,
which were recovered on his disclosure, can be taken to be one of the
circumstance to prove the guilt of the accused or not? Outright
rejection of the circumstance of presence of Human blood on the
cloths of the appellant at the stage of 313 of Cr.P.C., was not correct.
However, this Court doesnot think it fit to remand the matter after 15
long years for the purposes of giving opportunity to the appellant to
explain under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Thus, as no question was put to
the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. regarding presence of
Human blood, therefore, this Court is helpless and cannot consider
the effect of presence of human blood on the cloths of the appellant.
Whether Aarju (P.W.4) is a trustworthy and reliable witness?
24. Aarju (P.W.4) is a 6 years old child witness. Certain questions
were put to this witness by the Court to verify as to whether this child
witness is able to understand the proceedings or not and after getting
satisfied, her evidence was recorded. Before recording the evidence
of the witness, the Court had recorded the demeanor of this witness
and observed that the witness is understanding the answers and is
deposing in a very serious manner. The witness is calm. She is not
naughty like other children and She is answering in her natural way.
25. This witness stated in her examination-in-chief that the name
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
of her mother is Ruksana, and Shahrukh is her brother. Earlier She
was residing in Shivpuri, however, the witness was not able to tell the
name of colony. She further stated that She was the studying in
Rajendra Memorial School. Her brother was also the student of same
school. However, for very long She has not gone to School at
Shivpuri. The Trial Court has appended a note that after looking at
the appellant, this witness stated that he is her uncle. Another note
has been appended that immediately after looking at the appellant, the
witness got frightened and started crying and rushed to her maternal
grand parents. Accordingly the recording of evidence of the witness
was stopped and it was decided that her remaining evidence would be
recorded on the next day.
26. On the next day, the case was taken up in chamber and the
appellant was kept at a place from where the witness may not get
frightened after looking at him.
27. She further stated that She and her brother had gone to the
school. On that day, the school was closed before the scheduled time.
They came to the balcony, where blood was oozing out from the head
of her mother. Thereafter, the appellant assaulted her brother
Shahrukh. The appellant had assaulted by Sabbal. Thereafter, the
appellant took her brother to balcony and assaulted on his head by
sabbal. He was beating after gagging his mouth. Thereafter, the
appellant gagged the mouth of this witness and also assaulted her by
sabbal. She too was assaulted on her head. Her mother was lying in
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
the balcony and this witness and her brother were also lying in the
balcony. This witness was cross-examined.
In cross-examination, this witness stated that her grand parents
are alive, however, She doesnot know as to whether her great grand
father is alive or not? She denied for want of knowledge as to
whether her great grand father was residing with appellant or not?
She has two uncles namely Ballu Uncle (Appellant) and Irshad Uncle.
The face cut of her father and uncles is similar. She doesnot know
that her father has how many sisters. However, She said that the
name of her Bua is Anjum. Anjum Bua has two children. She
doesnot know the name of her neighbour. She further stated that
Mohan Singh Bhadauria was residing in the adjoining house,
therefore, She knows him. However, She clarified that Bhadauria
uncle never visited her house. However, Bhadauria uncle used to
come to meet her father. On the fateful day, She and her brother had
gone to the school on foot. Generally, after they leave for the school,
her mother used to close down the door. On the date of incident, the
appellant had opened the door. Her mother and her brother were
lying nearer to each other. When the appellant took her brother inside
for assaulting him, her mother was already dead. The appellant had
assaulted her brother after closing the door. At that time, She was
outside the room. She admitted that at the time of incident, the house
of Bhadauria uncle was under construction and laborers were
working there. She did not shout. A note has been appended by the
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
Trial Court, that when a question was put to this witness that when
the appellant was assaulting her brother, then why did not raise an
alarm, but the witness kept quite and is not in a position to answer
anything. She is sitting quietly and is giving her evidence.
28. She further admitted that her treatment for the injuries
sustained by her is still going on. She further stated that for the last
several days, She is residing with her maternal grand parents. She
admitted that her maternal grand parents have told her that the
appellant has killed her mother and brother.
29. A question was put to her as to whether She has witnessed the
incident of assault on her mother and brother, then She replied in a
high voice that "She has seen the incident".
30. Another note was appended by the Court that when a question
was put by the Court as to whether this witness is deposing on the
suggestion given by her maternal grand parents or not, then she
replied with confidence, that She is not deposing on the suggestions
given by her maternal grand-parents.
31. She further stated that yesterday, She went along with her
maternal grand parents to Lukwasa, and today She has come from
Lukwasa. After deboarding the bus, she had gone to some place
along with her maternal grand parents but was not in a position to say
that to which place She had gone. Another note was appended by the
Court, that the witness appears to be frightened and repeated
questions were put to her that she had gone to a place, where books
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
were kept, there was one advocate who had tutored her, but this
witness did not reply.
32. Another note was appended by the Trial Court, that the witness
did not reply to the question that an Advocate had told her about what
She has to state in the Court.
33. She further stated that now She doesnot feel dizziness. She
denied that the person who had assaulted was somebody else and not
her uncle. She had informed the police that her uncle Ballu has killed
her mother and brother. She further stated that her father and uncle
resides separately.
34. Challenging the evidence of Aarju (P.W.4), it is submitted that
She is the solitary eye witness and being the child witness, there is
every possibility of tutoring and since, She is residing with her
maternal grand parents, therefore, She must have been tutored by
them. The Counsel for the appellant, also referred to para 7 of her
cross-examination, in which She has admitted that her maternal grand
-parents had told her that the appellant has killed her mother and
brother.
35. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
appellant.
36. Aarju (P.W.4) is the injured eye witness. Therefore, her
presence on the spot is un-doubtful. This witness is only 6 years old.
The Court has recorded her demeanor at the very beginning of her
examination that the witness is very calm and is not naughty like any
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
other children. This clearly shows that the attack on the witness as
well as murder of her mother and brother, specifically when her
brother was assaulted in her presence, must have left a great impact
on her mind which has made her calm. The trauma of the incident
has taken away here childhood. Further, the Trial Court has
specifically mentioned that after looking at the appellant, the witness
got frightened and started crying and rushed towards her maternal
grand parents. As already observed, this witness is only 6 years of
age and is not an actor. If She was tutored, then she would not have
reacted after looking at her uncle. Getting frightened immediately
after looking at the appellant and rushing towards her maternal grand
parents, clearly indicates that she had very bad experience of the
appellant. Further, She is innocent enough to say, that her maternal
grand parents have also told her that the appellant has killed her
mother and brother. The Trial Court in order to clarify its doubts,
questioned the witness as to whether She is deposing on the
suggestion given by her maternal grand parents or not, then She
replied with confidence, that She is not deposing on the suggestions
given her maternal grand parents. Even when a question was put to
her as to whether She has witnessed the incident or not, then She
replied in a high voice that She has seen the incident. Thus, the
demeanor of the witness clearly establishes that She is a natural
witness and has not been tutored at all.
37. An identical situation was before the Supreme Court in the
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
case of State of H.P. Vs. Prem Chand reported in (2002) 10 SCC
518, where the grand mother and brother of the injured child witness
aged about 10 years were killed by Chacha, the Supreme Court held
that the testimony of child witness can be accepted. It has been held
as under :
7. Though PW 4 is a child witness, he has been clear and
cogent in giving his evidence. In spite of being put to severe
cross-examination he has come out clean and he has stuck
to the statements made by him. Whether he woke up at the
call of his grandmother is a matter which can be understood
because what he had stated earlier was that when his
grandmother was calling him to release the dog and when
he was about to run, he was beaten and by that time the
accused had already inflicted danda-blow on Dhobi Devi.
Therefore, the version given by him is consistent with what
he has stated earlier. The attempt of the learned amicus
curiae to attach importance to the presence of one Ramesh
on 10-2-1992 cannot assume any significance because PW
4 is categorical in identifying the accused as having
committed the offence. When he had clearly seen the
accused at least on two occasions whom he had known to
be his chacha there was no need to hold further test
identification parade. In what condition he was at the time
when PWs 5, 6 and 7 saw him or whether they could have
removed him to the hospital and what facilities they had
will not militate against the evidence tendered by PW 4
before the court. The contention that PW 4 having been
gagged in the mouth with a muffler was not stated earlier
but an improvement made before the court is not very
material as it is a detail of minor nature. The visit of the
accused on the night of 10-2-1992 appears to us only to
survey the situation and after ensuring himself that it was
possible for him to commit the crime, he returned the next
day. Non-examination of Binda, father of PW 4 and the
brother of the accused, will not carry the matter any further
because their evidence would not establish any connection
with the crime committed by the accused. The fact remains
that the accused had been apprehended and produced before
the court. In this background, we find no merit in any of the
contentions advanced by the learned amicus curiae on
behalf of the respondent.
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Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
38. The Supreme Court in the case of Prakash v. State of M.P., reported in (1992) 4 SCC 225 has held as under :
11.....In discarding the evidence of the brother of the deceased namely Ajay Singh the learned Additional Sessions Judge was influenced by the tender age of Ajay (about 14 years) and was of the view that he was likely to be tutored. We do not think that a boy of about 14 years of age cannot give a proper account of the murder of his brother if he has an occasion to witness the same and simply because the witness was a boy of 14 years it will not be proper to assume that he is likely to be tutored.....
39. The Supreme Court in the case of Dharamwati v. Jaibir, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 275 has held as under :
15. The High Court has rejected the testimony of Murli PW 2 without any justification. It is no doubt correct that Murli was about 8 years old at the time of occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge who recorded the statement of Murli stated as under:
"The child witness Kum. Murli was subjected to searching cross-examination and I had the occasion of watching the demeanour of the witness. I got full impression that she could not be a tutored witness. This impression was based upon the manner in which the witness was replying the questions. All attempt was made to the witness to suggest that she was taken to the State counsel, to the private counsel engaged by the complainant and also to the police but all these suggestions were negatived by the witness. Certain innocent utterances were made by this witness which go to show that she could not be tutored. For instance she has stated that after receiving injuries her father was unable to speak and he could only utter and enquire from his wife whether she had locked the house or not. The prosecution was not to gain anything by putting the suggestion in the mouth of the witness. On the other hand this statement shows that the witness had seen the occurrence and she cannot be described as tutored or imaginary witness. She has corroborated the prosecution story on all material particulars."
16. The High Court has given no reason whatsoever to reject the evidence of PW 3 Murli. We are of the view that 17 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) the High Court fell into error in rejecting the testimony of PW 3 on the ground that she was a child witness and she could be easily tutored. We agree with the abovequoted findings reached by the learned Sessions Judge regarding PW 3 Murli. The statement of Murli fully corroborates the prosecution story as unfolded by Dharamwati.
40. Further, if the Court comes to a conclusion that the testimony of a child witness is worth credence, then sole testimony can be the basis for conviction. The Supreme Court in the case of Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 129 has held as under :
5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-
examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no 18 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not.
6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P.; Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra).
7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit.
41. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Chandgi Ram, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 596 has held as under :
13. In this context, it is relevant to rely on a decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Ramesh wherein it laid down as to how the evidence of a child witness should be assessed.
Paras 7, 11 and 14 which are relevant for our purpose, are as under: (SCC pp. 790-92) "7. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of the Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that (AIR p. 55, para 7) every witness is competent to depose unless the court considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise. The Court further held as under: (AIR p. 56, para 11) '11. ... it is desirable that Judges and Magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that, otherwise the credibility of the witness may be seriously affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether the Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate.' * * * 19 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
11. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong. The court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting questions to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on oath and the import of the questions that were being put to him. (Vide Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh v. State of Maharashtra.) * * *
14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition."
(emphasis added)
14. To the same effect is the decision in Shivasharanappa v. State of Karnataka. Para 17 can be referred to as under:
(SCC p. 712) "17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say, the corroboration is not a must to record a conviction, but as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable."20
Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) (emphasis added)
42. Further, Aarju (P.W.4) is an injured eye-witness. An injured eye-witness enjoys a special status in comparison to other eye- witnesses as the injuries sustained by such witness is a guarantee of his/her presence on the spot. In the present case, Aarju (P.W.4) had sustained multiple injuries on her head. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that when her brother was being assaulted, they why this witness did not raise an alarm?
43. This Court cannot lose sight of a fact that Aarju (P.W.4) is a minor girl aged about 6 years. Her presence on the spot at the time of incident is undisputed. Every human being is not expected to act in an uniform manner. Some may react and some may stand still. Further, the appellant was her uncle and he was not a stranger. If She was unable to understand the things which were going on or She could not raise an alarm, then it would not mean, that She had not witnessed the incident.
44. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramvilas v. State of M.P., reported in (2016) 16 SCC 316 has held as under :
6......Evidence of the injured witnesses is entitled to a great weight and very cogent and convincing grounds are required to discard the evidence of the injured witnesses........
45. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Naresh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 324 has held as under :
27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence 21 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else.
The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, Balraje v. State of Maharashtra and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.)
46. The Supreme Court in the case of Chandrashekhar Vs. State reported in (2017) 13 SCC 585 has held as under :
10. Criminal jurisprudence attaches great weightage to the evidence of a person injured in the same occurrence as it presumes that he was speaking the truth unless shown otherwise. Though the law is well settled and precedents abound, reference may usefully be made to Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. observing as follows: (SCC p. 302, para 28) "28. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone."
47. It is next submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant that the police statement of Aarju (P.W.4) was recorded belatedly and therefore, She had ample opportunity to cook up a false story against the appellant. It is submitted that although the incident took place on 5-7-2006, but the police statement of Aarju (P.W.4) was recorded on 9-9-2006, and the explanation given by Devendra Singh Kushwaha 22 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) (P.W.12) is not plausible.
48. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant.
49. Devendra Singh Kushwaha (P.W.12) who is the investigating officer, has stated that on 21-7-2006, Aarju (P.W.4) was discharged from hospital, but She was still unconscious. Thereafter, he went 2-3 times to record the statement of Aarju (P.W.4) but She was suffering from loss of memory. But denied that on 9-9-2006 also, her memory was not good.
50. It is submitted that once, Aarju (P.W.4) had lost her memory even for a short term, then it is clear that She must have been tutored by her maternal grand parents or in the alternative, the explanation given by Devendra Singh Kushwaha (P.W.12) is not plausible. As already pointed out, the appellant himself had asked a question to Aarju (P.W.4) that now She doesnot feel dizziness. Thus, it is clear that even the appellant knows that the health condition of Aarju (P.W.4) even after her discharge was not good and took lot of time to recover. Even Aarju (P.W.4) has stated in her cross-examination, that her treatment is still going on. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the explanation given by Devendra Kumar Kushwaha (P.W.12) for delay in recording her statement is plausible. So far as the argument regarding tutoring is concerned, the conduct of the witness is of the utmost importance. Aarju (P.W.4), immediately after looking at the appellant, got frightened and started crying and rushed 23 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) towards her maternal grand parents. Further, mere delay in recording the statement of a witness under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. is not always fatal to the prosecution story, provided the delay is plausibly explained.
51. The Supreme Court in the case of Prithvi (Minor) Vs. Mam Raj reported in (2004) 13 SCC 279 reads as under :
10........In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., SCC at p. 349, para 12, this Court observed that: (SCC p. 349, para 12) "Mere delay in examination of the witnesses for a few days cannot in all cases be termed to be fatal so far as the prosecution is concerned. There may be several reasons. When the delay is explained, whatever be the length of the delay, the court can act on the testimony of the witness if it is found to be cogent and credible."
* * * *
22. The respondents placed reliance on the observations of this Court in Balakrushna Swain v. State of Orissa and in State of Orissa v. Brahmananda Nanda, AIR at p. 2489, para 2 and contended that the evidence of appellant Prithvi was not believable because of the long delay in recording the statement. We are afraid that neither case lays down an absolute proposition of law that delay per se destroys the credibility of witnesses' statements. The judgments merely point out that unexplained delay in recording the statement gives rise to a doubt that the prosecution might have engineered it to rope the accused into the case. Delay in recording the statement of the witness can occur due to various reasons and can have several explanations. It is for the court to assess the explanation and if satisfied, accept the statement of the witness.
52. Thus, it is held that Aarju (P.W.4) is a reliable and trustworthy witness, and is not a tutored witness.
Discrepancy in Ocular and Medical Evidence
53. By referring to the post-mortem reports, Ex. P.1, Ex. P.2 as well as MLC, Ex. P.15 of Aarju (P.W. 4), it is submitted by the Counsel for 24 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) the appellant that the deceased and injured Aarju (P.W.4) had sustained three types of injuries i.e., incised, punctured and caused by hard and blunt object, whereas only two sabbals were found on the spot. Thus, it is clear that most probably the incident was committed by more than one person, and the appellant has been falsely implicated.
54. Sabbal is a big solid iron rod with pointed edge which is used for digging earth. If sabbal is used from its blunt side, then it would cause injuries which can be caused by hard and blunt object. If sabbal is used for piercing, then it would cause punctured wound and if the pointed edge of the sabbal is used like a sword, then it would cause incised wound. Thus, by a single sabbal, all three types of injuries can be caused. Two sabbals were recovered from the spot. Thus, the contention of the Counsel for the appellant that more than one assailant were involved in the offence is far fetched imagination having no basis for the same. Thus, it is held that the injuries which were sustained by the deceased persons and the injured can be caused by sabbal and the ocular evidence is fully corroborated by medical evidence.
Presence of the appellant on the spot
55. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant Ballu was present on the spot at the time of incident.
56. Bhaiyyan (P.W.2) had lodged the FIR, Ex.P.3. Bhaiyyan (P.W. 25 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007)
2) is the real brother of the appellant. In the FIR, it is specifically mentioned after taking his children to hospital, he sent the appellant and his friend Banti to his house to search out his wife Ruksana. It is further mentioned that his brother (Appellant) had informed him that at 4:45 P.M., he had seen deceased Ruksana on the roof. Thus, the presence of appellant was specifically mentioned in the FIR, Ex. P.3.
57. Although Bhaiyyan (P.W.2) has supported his FIR, Ex. P.3, but he cleverly improved his version. He stated that after shifting his children to hospital, he requested his relatives and friends to look for his wife. He deliberately did not name his brother. Although Bhaiyyan (P.W. 2) was not declared hostile on this aspect, but the Counsel for the appellant filled up the lacuna. In para 12 of the cross-examination, the Counsel for the appellant himself asked certain questions about the FIR lodged by this witness and in reply, this witness stated that it was the appellant who was shouting that he has seen Ruksana in alive condition at 4:45 P.M. Thus, it is clear that immediately before the incident, the appellant was on the spot. Recovery of blood stained cloths
58. Devendra Singh Kushwaha (P.W. 12) has stated that he had arrested the appellant on 25-7-2006 and till that date, there was no evidence against the appellant. However, he clarified that because of certain discrepancies in the statements of appellant, he was taken into custody and accordingly he gave his memorandum and on the basis of the disclosure made by him, blood stained cloths were seized on 27- 26 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) 7-2006. The memorandum is Ex. P.18 and seizure memo is Ex. P.19. The cloths were kept by the appellant along with other goods of Tent House and were taken out from a hidden condition. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that since, the cloths were seized from an open space, therefore, the recovery is of no use. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant.
59. It is not the case of the prosecution that the cloths of the appellant were lying in an open condition. As per the seizure memo, Ex. P.19, the cloths were taken out from the other goods of tent house. Thus, it was the appellant only, who was aware of the fact that at which place, he has kept his cloths. The Supreme Court in the case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 13 SCC 1 has held as under :
1706. In State of H.P. v. Jeet Singh this Court dealt with the issue of recovery from the public place and held: (SCC p. 377, para 21) "21. The conduct of the accused has some relevance in the analysis of the whole circumstances against him.
PW 3 Santosh Singh, a member of the Panchayat hailing from the same ward, said in his evidence that he reached Jeet Singh's house at 6.15 a.m. on hearing the news of that tragedy and then accused Jeet Singh told him that Sudarshana complained of pain in the liver during the early morning hours. But when the accused was questioned by the trial court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he denied having said so to PW 3 and further said, for the first time, that he and Sudarshana did not sleep in the same room but they slept in two different rooms. Such a conduct on the part of the accused was taken into account by the Sessions Court in evaluating the incriminating circumstance spoken to by PW 10 that they were in the same room on the fateful night. We too give accord to the aforesaid approach made by the 27 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) trial court."
1707. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, this Court held: (SCC p. 629, para 22) "22. In the present case the grinding stone was found in tall grass. The pants and underwear were buried. They were out of visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until they were disinterred, at the instance of the respondent, their hidden state had remained unhampered. The respondent alone knew where they were until he disclosed it. Thus we see no substance in this submission also."
1708. In view of the above, it cannot be accepted that a recovery made from an open space or a public place which was accessible to everyone, should not be taken into consideration for any reason. The reasoning behind it, is that, it will be the accused alone who will be having knowledge of the place, where a thing is hidden. The other persons who had access to the place would not be aware of the fact that an accused, after the commission of an offence, had concealed contraband material beneath the earth, or in the garbage.
60. Thus, it is clear that the blood stained cloths were recovered on the disclosure made by the Appellant. However, it is once again mentioned that although human blood was found as per the FSL report, but the Trial Court prejudged the question of human blood and did not put this question to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., therefore, this Court cannot take note of the fact that the cloths of the appellant were found to be stained with human blood. But one thing is clear that the appellant took out his cloths which were kept in a hidden condition along with other tent material, and it was the appellant alone, who was aware of the fact that at which place he has kept his blood stained cloths.
61. No other argument is advanced by the Appellant.
62. Accordingly, it is held that the prosecution has succeeded in 28 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, his conviction for offence under Section 302 (On two Counts) and 307 of IPC is hereby affirmed.
Whether the Sentence should be consecutive or concurrent
63. On the question of sentence, the Counsel for the appellant submitted that since, the Trial Court has not observed that the sentences shall run concurrently, therefore, as a natural corollary, the sentences would run consecutively. It is, therefore, submitted that the sentences be made concurrent.
64. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant.
65. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. reads as under :
31. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.-- (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court:
Provided that--
(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years;
(b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence.
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the 29 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence.
66. From Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C., it is clear that unless and until the sentences are made concurrent, the sentences would run consecutively.
67. The Supreme Court in the case of O.M. Cherian Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2015) 2 SCC 501 has held as under :
12. The words in Section 31 CrPC "... sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the court may direct"
indicate that in case the court directs sentences to run one after the other, the court has to specify the order in which the sentences are to run. If the court directs running of sentences concurrently, order of running of sentences is not required to be mentioned. Discretion to order running of sentences concurrently or consecutively is judicial discretion of the court which is to be exercised as per the established law of sentencing. The court before exercising its discretion under Section 31 CrPC is required to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of those offences against the accused while deciding whether sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
13. Section 31(1) CrPC enjoins a further direction by the court to specify the order in which one particular sentence shall commence after the expiration of the other. Difficulties arise when the courts impose sentence of imprisonment for life and also sentences of imprisonment for fixed term. In such cases, if the court does not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently, then the sentences will run consecutively by operation of Section 31(1) CrPC. There is no question of the convict first undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life and thereafter undergoing the rest of the sentences of imprisonment for fixed term and any such direction would be unworkable. Since sentence of imprisonment for life means jail till the end of normal life of the convict, the sentence of imprisonment of fixed term has to necessarily run concurrently with life imprisonment.30
Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) In such case, it will be in order if the Sessions Judges exercise their discretion in issuing direction for concurrent running of sentences. Likewise if two life sentences are imposed on the convict, necessarily, the court has to direct those sentences to run concurrently.
68. The Supreme Court in the case of Muthuramalingam v. State, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 313 has held as under :
7. A careful reading of the above would show that the provision is attracted only in cases where two essentials are satisfied viz. (1) a person is convicted at one trial, and (2) the trial is for two or more offences. It is only when both these conditions are satisfied that the court can sentence the offender to several punishments prescribed for the offences committed by him provided the court is otherwise competent to impose such punishments. What is significant is that such punishments as the court may decide to award for several offences committed by the convict when comprising imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as the court may direct unless the court in its discretion orders that such punishment shall run concurrently. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 on a plain reading makes it unnecessary for the court to send the offender for trial before a higher court only because the aggregate punishment for several offences happens to be in excess of the punishment which such court is competent to award provided always that in no case can the person so sentenced be imprisoned for a period longer than 14 years and the aggregate punishment does not exceed twice the punishment which the court is competent to inflict for a single offence.
8. Interpreting Section 31(1), a three-Judge Bench of this Court in O.M. Cherian case declared that if two life sentences are imposed on a convict the court must necessarily direct those sentences to run concurrently. The Court said: (SCC pp. 509-10, para 13) "13. Section 31(1) CrPC enjoins a further direction by the court to specify the order in which one particular sentence shall commence after the expiration of the other. Difficulties arise when the courts impose sentence of imprisonment for life and also sentences of imprisonment for fixed term. In such cases, if the court does not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently, then the sentences will run consecutively by operation of Section 31(1) CrPC. There is no 31 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) question of the convict first undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life and thereafter undergoing the rest of the sentences of imprisonment for fixed term and any such direction would be unworkable. Since sentence of imprisonment for life means jail till the end of normal life of the convict, the sentence of imprisonment of fixed term has to necessarily run concurrently with life imprisonment. In such case, it will be in order if the Sessions Judges exercise their discretion in issuing direction for concurrent running of sentences. Likewise if two life sentences are imposed on the convict, necessarily, the court has to direct those sentences to run concurrently."
9. To the same effect is the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Duryodhan Rout case in which this Court took the view that since life imprisonment means imprisonment of full span of life there was no question of awarding consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial. Relying upon the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31, this Court held that where a person is convicted for several offences including one for which life sentences can be awarded the proviso to Section 31(2) shall forbid running of such sentences consecutively.
10. It would appear from the above two pronouncements that the logic behind life sentences not running consecutively lies in the fact that imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict. If that proposition is sound, the logic underlying the ratio of the decisions of this Court in O.M. Cherian and Duryodhan Rout cases would also be equally sound. What then needs to be examined is whether imprisonment for life does indeed imply imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict as observed in O.M. Cherian and Duryodhan Rout cases. That question, in our considered opinion, is no longer res integra, the same having been examined and answered in the affirmative by a long line of decisions handed down by this Court. We may gainfully refer to some of those decisions at this stage.
69. The Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 652 and Gagan Kumar Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2019) 5 SCC 154 has also held that if more than one offences are committed in one transaction, then the 32 Ballu @ Firoz Khan Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 426 of 2007) sentences can be made concurrent.
70. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the life sentence awarded by the Trial Court for offence under Section 302 of IPC and Life Imprisonment for offence under Section 307 of IPC must run concurrently.
71. Accordingly, it is directed that the sentence of Life Imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court for offence under Section 302 of IPC and 307 of IPC shall run concurrently.
72. With aforesaid modification, the judgment and sentence dated 30-4-2007 passed by IVth Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Shivpuri, in Sessions Trial No. 192/2006 is hereby Affirmed.
73. The appellant is in jail. He shall undergo the remaining jail sentence.
74. Let a copy of this judgment be immediately provided to the appellant, free of cost.
75. The record of the Trial Court be immediately send back along with a copy of this judgment for necessary information and compliance.
76. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed on merits, but is allowed in part to the extent of sentence and the sentences shall run concurrently.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) (Deepak Kumar Agarwal)
Judge Judge
ABHISHEK
CHATURVEDI
2022.02.08
17:14:08 +05'30'