Madhya Pradesh High Court
Harvilas Shivhare vs Jahoor Khan on 17 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997(1)MPLJ23, 1997 A I H C 844, (1997) 1 RENCJ 549, (1997) 2 RENTLR 133, (1997) 1 MPLJ 23, (1996) 2 RENCR 265
ORDER T.S. Doabia, J.
1. This petition has been preferred under section 23-E of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as RCA) has come to the conclusion that the need of the respondent-landlord is bona fide. An order of eviction has been passed. This order is subject matter of this petition.
The brief facts for the purposes of this petition be noticed as under :
1. The respondent Jahoor Khan is said to be a retired Government servant. He is said to have retired on 30th of September, 1977. He sought eviction of the petitioner under Chapter III-A of the Act. He pleaded that after retirement he sought employment with a co-operative society as salesman. He had been getting a monthly salary of Rs. 2,000/-. According to him, he is unable to sustain himself and wants to start his own business. He wants to set up a flour mill in the premises in dispute.
2. Leave to defend was granted. The petitioner took a plea that the petition had not been preferred bona fide. According to him, this Petition was filed with an oblique motive. The motive is said to be to seek enhancement of the rent. It is sought to be contended that rent was enhanced from time to time. The first enhancement is said to have been made in the year 1979. The second enhancement is said to have been made in the year 1984 and the third enhancement is made in the year 1993. It was pleaded that the landlord wanted the rent to be increased again and the petitioner was not agreeable to enhance the rent. This led to the filing of the petition. The RCA has come to the conclusion that the case of the landlord do fall within the parameters set out in section 23-A of the Act. The need of the respondent landlord had been found to be bona fide. An order of eviction has been passed. It is against the above order, the present revision petition was filed.
3. The learned counsel for the tenant petitioner submits :
(i) that, the sole purpose for initiating this litigation is to seek enhancement of rent;
(ii) that, the respondent is having rental income from other sources and the respondent does not require the premises;
(iii) that, the petitioner is an old man of 75 years, and therefore, he cannot run the flour mill; and
(iv) that, the landlord has no experience of running a flour mill.
4. It is thus contended that the RCA has gone wrong in passing an order of eviction. It has also been argued that an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed. It was sought to be pointed out that a tenant similarly situated was asked to pay more rent. Some rent receipts had also been placed on the records. This tenant is one Hiralal.
5. The question to be decided in this petition is as to whether the need of the landlord is bona fide or not.
6. I am of the view that Rent Controlling Authority has not committed any error in recording a finding that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord. In this regard the law is well settled :-
"In Rekhachand Doogar v. J. R. D.'Cruz, AIR 1923 Cal. 223, Buckland, J., observed :-
I do not think it is enough that a plaintiff in order to defend a plea under the Calcutta Rent Act should merely say that he desires the premises bona fide for his occupation. The word in the Act is not desires but requires. This my opinion involved something more than a mere wish and it involves an element of need to some extent at least."
Thus the term "bona fide required connotes something more than desire to have something and much less than absolute necessity. This matter has also been dealt with and considered in Bhogi Lal M. Devya v. S.R. Subramanian Iyer, AIR 1954 Mad. 514".
In Firm Panju Ma Daulat Ram v. Shakhi Gopal, AIR 1977 SC 2077 it was observed :-
"That where a landlord is able to show that he requires the premises bona fide for his residential or non-residential requirement then order of eviction has to be passed. Likewise it was held that eviction of the non-residential portion which is an accommodation if he makes out a non-residential requirement." "In M. M. Quassim v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1981 SC 1113, the Supreme Court observed that the landlord does not possess an unfettered right to re-enter premises of choice. He must prove that available vacant premises is not suitable for his purpose."
The term "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulates that there must be some element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. This distinction between dire and need should always be kept in mind. See : Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272.
The genuineness of the need is to be seen and this need is never static. It varies from person to person, place to place and from profession to profession. The meaning to be given to the term need or requirement should neither be artificially extended nor its language should be unduly restricted as such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act. At the same time the proposition that the landlord is the sole arbitrator of his need is not to be accepted as the only view on the matter. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercised in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for additional accommodation is proved the Court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same business. See : Precision Steel and Engineers v. Prem Deva, AIR 1982 SC 1518.
The term bona fide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. It quite clearly does not convey the idea of absolute necessity in the sense that there should be no other possible alternative for the landlord for meeting his requirement except by occupying his property. The Rent Control Legislation is primarily meant for protecting the tenants against the tactics of greedy and unscrupulous landlords who are taking advantage of the difficulties and helplessness of the tenants extract exorbitant rents from them. It does not appear to be designed to penalise the owners by disabling them from occupying their own property when they bona fide require it. There is adequate provision in the Act safeguarding against a possible abuse of the privilege or the right of eviction on their part.
In Mattu Lal v. Radhe Lal, 1974 MPLJ 752 = 1974 Rent Control Reporter 441: "It was pointed out that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an clement of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required the accommodation. When the need can be said to be only a desire and when it is genuinely required, cannot be tested on the criteria of the absolute necessity. The meaning of bona fide requirement was considered in S. N. Datta v. VHth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1984 (1) ARC 113, as follows :-
"Mere desire or absolute need or necessity are both it has been held, erroneous approaches in this behalf, vide Janki Pd. v. Ilnd Additional District Judge and others, 1980 (UP) RCC 602. The word 'bona fide' means genuinely, sincerely, i.e., in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. A Full Bench of this Court construed this to mean to genuinely or 'in good faith' and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive, vide Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 RCR 274 = AIR 1976 Alld. 328 = 1977 ARC 142 (FB). It will not be bona fide requirement of the landlord if release is sought for an ulterior purpose or fanciful whim, vide Dr. Sita Ram Gandhi v. District Judge, Meerut, 1978 (2) All India RCJ 326; Smt. Kamla Ahuja v. Vllth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1981 ARC 371."
7. With a view to determine as to whether the need of the landlord is genuine or not, the Court is not to substitute its own view. From the totality of the facts, it can be said that the landlord has been able to establish his need. This need is bona fide. The requisite relief has been rightly granted to the landlord. It is accordingly held that the order passed by the RCA suffers from no legal infirmity.
8. The argument that the petitioner being 75 years or that he has no experience of running the flour mill be also examined. I am of the opinion that this cannot be made a ground for not granting relief to the petitioner. It is well settled that a person can start business and he need not have prior experience in this regard.
In Vinodilal v. Upbhokta Sahkari Bhandar Ltd., Guna, 1994 (2) Rent Control Reporter 386 it was observed as under :
"In the present case as noticed above, it has been brought on the record that the landlord wants to start his business at Guna. He was non suited as the Court below came to this conclusion that he was unable to specify as to when and what business he would start. As pointed out above the legal position is clear that eviction can be sought in contemplation of anticipated need. A tenant need not wait till the actual need arises. The need and the eviction may not coincide. In contemplation of starting his business the landlord could seek eviction. It has been brought on the record that the requirement of the landlord is genuine. There is no other impediment in the grant of relief to the landlord."
"It is not necessary that the need for starting business should exist on the date of the suit and the plaintiff can file a suit in respect of his requirement which is to arise in near future. This view was expressed by this Court in Hemraj Nima v. Rajnarayan, 1980 MPRCJ (NOC) 65."
"The fact that the tenant is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town was taken note of and it was held that ejectment can be ordered. See : Damodar v. Nand Ram, 1960 MPLJ 925 = AIR 1960 MP 345. In the above case the Court took note of the fact that grocery business of the landlord had grown and that the fact that the landlord required additional accommodation was a factor which was taken note of. Ultimately it was observed that the landlord seek eviction."
8. Another argument which has been raised is that the RCA has misread the evidence. It is argued that the landlord had rented out part of the building after his retirement. In this regard, the statement of the landlord is that some additional accommodation was let out in the year 1977-78. The landlord retired on 30th September, 1977. As such, the inference drawn by the RCA that the premises in question were let before his retirement cannot be faulted. This petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed with costs. Costs Rs. 500/-.