Gauhati High Court
The General Manager (Con) vs Harendra Kumar & Anr on 10 February, 2017
Author: Suman Shyam
Bench: Suman Shyam
MC 1510/2015 in SL. NO.200676 LA APP.
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM
10.02.2017
Heard Mrs. U. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the applicant (N. F. Railway). Also heard Mr. S. K. Medhi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties.
This application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 praying for condonation of delay of 1794 days in preferring the connected appeal against the judgment dated 28.03.2007 and decree dated 13-11-2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (FTC), Kamrup, Guwahati in Misc. Reference Case No.36/1995 thereby substantially enhancing the amount of compensation for the acquired land from Rs.65,000/- per bigha to Rs.3,00,000/- per bigha.
Mrs. Chakraborty, learned Standing Counsel, N.F.Railway, submits that although the money for satisfying the decree of the Court has to be provided by the applicant yet, the judgment and decree was passed by the court below in a proceeding where the applicant was not made a party. By referring to the statements made in the application, Mrs. Chakraborty submits that although there is a delay of 1794 days in preferring the appeal, yet, reckoned from the date of knowledge of the impugned decree, the delay is only of 921 days which has been properly explained in the application.
Mr. S. K. Medhi, learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed the prayer for condonation of delay stating that the applicant has been negligent in pursuing the appellate remedy within the prescribed period of limitation and has also failed to explain each day's delay, atleast from the date of knowledge of the impugned judgment, if not from the date of passing the decree. The learned counsel further submits that the opposite parties cannot be held responsible for not impleading the applicant since the Reference was made by the learned Collector and not the opposite parties.
From a perusal of the material available on record, it can be seen that the applicant was not made a party to the Reference Case and, therefore, it was neither heard by the court below before passing the impugned decree nor was it aware of the said proceeding. The applicant had acquired knowledge about the impugned judgment and decree only on receipt of the letter dated 29.09.2009 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, enclosing a copy of the judgment dated 28.03.2007 and decree dated 13.11.2007 calling upon the applicant to deposit the decreetal amount of Rs.8,98,844/-. Immediately thereafter, the applicant had obtained a certified copy of the judgment and decree. The papers were then put up before the competent authority for obtaining necessary legal opinion. Once the opinion to prefer an appeal against the impugned decree was obtained, the matter was then put up before the authorities for administrative approval to take further steps. Although a decision was taken to prefer an appeal, yet, a further issue had cropped up as regards deposit of 50% of decreetal amount for which another round of administrative approvals had to be taken. In between, certain vital documents were also misplaced which had resulted into further delay in taking steps in the matter. Since the relevant file had to travel from one place to another and from one table to another for obtaining the various rounds of clearances and approvals, there was a delay of 921 days in preferring the appeal.
In the case of Esha Bhattacharjere vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the term "sufficient cause" in delay condonation matter should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. It is also the settled law that while considering an application for condonation of delay, a liberal and pragmatic approach is required to be adopted and the courts should always make an endeavour to decide the lis on merits rather than on a technical point, unless of course, it is found that the explanation is wholly concocted or that the applicant was guilty of deliberate in action leading to the delay.
From the materials available on record I am of the view that, although in the present case, the decision making process has moved in a very slow pace, yet, it cannot be said that the applicant was guilty of deliberate inaction nor is the explanation for delay found to be a concocted one. The delay appears to be procedural rather than on account of sheer negligence on the part of the applicant.
In the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 2191(1), relied upon by Mrs. Chakraborty, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that while considering the sufficient cause explaining the delay, the Government and the private parties cannot be put on the same footing and having regard to the peculiar characteristics of functioning of a Government department, a pragmatic approach and certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Considering the fact that the impugned decree, imposing substantial financial burden upon the applicant, was passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the applicant, a lenient view of the court is called for in the matter.
Having regard to the explanation given in the application, I am of the view that the applicant has been able to furnish sufficient cause to condone the delay.
The delay of 1794 days in preferring the appeal is, therefore, condoned.
Office to register the connected appeal and list for admission after ten days.
The Misc. Case stands disposed of.
JUDGE TUC