Uttarakhand High Court
Kailash Chandra Bhatt vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 24 July, 2025
2025:UHC:6566-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI G. NARENDAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ASHISH NAITHANI
24TH JULY, 2025
SPECIAL APPEAL No. 417 OF 2018
Kailash Chandra Bhatt .....Appellant.
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and others. ...Respondents
Counsel for the appellant. : Mr. Akshay Pradhan, learned counsel
for the appellant.
Counsel for the respondents : Mr. J.C. Pande, learned Standing
Counsel for the State.
JUDGMENT :(per Sri G. Narendar, C.J.) Heard learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State.
2. The parties are referred to by the nomenclature before the learned Single Judge.
3. Learned Standing Counsel for the State has preferred IA No. 7671 of 2025 to recall the order dated 10.07.2025, whereby costs of Rs. 10,000/- was imposed on the third respondent.
4. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of the Application and being satisfied with the cause shown in Paragraph 3, wherein it is stated that the e-mail had been wrongly e-mailed to e-mail I.D. of High Court (highcourt- [email protected]) instead of Chief Standing Counsel, the earlier order 1 2025:UHC:6566-DB of imposing costs of Rs. 10,000/- stands hereby recalled. The Application (IA No. 7671 of 2025) stands allowed.
5. The facts are not in dispute. Certain charges were framed against the petitioner on the ground that he had concealed material facts from the employer at the time of submission of the Application, i.e, he had pursued and obtained, two degrees simultaneously. In that regard, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice and, thereafter, a penalty of censure was imposed against the petitioner on 18.10.2003.
6. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed an Appeal, which came to be dismissed on 03.01.2004. Thereafter, he preferred a revision before the Additional Director General of Police (Administration). The same came to be rejected by order dated 03.09.2012, but while so dismissing, the Review Authority ordered holding of regular disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for imposition of major penalty. The said order came to be agitated before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge, by order dated 21.03.2018, was pleased to reject the writ petition on the short ground that the allegations leveled against the petitioner are serious in nature and require a thorough inquiry under the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, as 2 2025:UHC:6566-DB adapted by the State of Uttarakhand in the year 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules').
7. The short question that arises is, whether the review petitioner could have been placed worse off than he was prior to the review petition?
8. Addressing the issue, this Court, by order dated 19.06.2025, framed two issues-(i) Whether a de novo inquiry after lapse of nearly nine years was permissible and (ii) Whether it was within the powers of the Revisional Authority to direct a de novo inquiry?
9. In response to the said query, a clarification was sought by this Court.
10. Today, learned Standing Counsel for the State has produced the instructions received from the Inspector General of Police (Personnel). Both the questions, which were framed on 19.06.2025 and referred supra, are taken up for consideration together.
11. The facts, narrated above, are not in dispute. The respondents, in response to the questions framed by this Court, forwarded the instructions, wherein in Paragraph Nos. 2 and 3, it has been stated as under:-
"2- With reference to the above, it is to inform that Rule 23 & 24 of the Uttaranchal [Uttar Pradesh) Subordinate Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991] as adapted and promulgated under the 3 2025:UHC:6566-DB Adaptation and Re-enactment Order, 2002, provides as follows:-
"Rule 23 "Revision" (1) An officer whose appeal has rejected by any authority subordinate to the Government is entitled to submit an application for revision to the authority next in rank above by which his appeal has been rejected within the period of three months from the date rejection of appeal.
On such an application the power of revision may be exercised only when, in consequent of flagrant irregularity, there appears to have been material injustice or miscarriage of justice:
Provided that the revising authority may on its own motion call for and examine the records of any order passed in appeal against which no revision has been preferred under this rule for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit:
Provided further that no order the first proviso shall be made except after giving the person effected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.
Rule 24 "Enhancement of punishment -A punishment may be enhanced by--
(a) an appellate authority on appeal; or
(b) any authority superior to the authority to whom an application will lie ,in exercise of revisionary powers:
Provided that before enhancing the punishment such authority shall call upon the officer punished, to show cause why his punishment should not be so enhanced, and that an order by such authority so enhancing a punishment shall be deemed to be an original order of punishment."
3. Thus, it is evident from the provisions contained in the Punishment and Appeal Rules that the Revisional Authority is empowered to take any decision on a revision submitted by an officer. In accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Punishment and Appeal Rules, and in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Nainital in similar matters, namely Special Appeal 4 2025:UHC:6566-DB No. 81/08 Sarjeet Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, and Writ Petition No. 274/SB/2002 ajay Kumar vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others, a decision was taken by the Revisional Authority in the said revision filed against the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 31-01-2014 on the appeal submitted by the petitioner, Kailash Chandra Bhatt, against the censure entry and punishment order issued by the Senior Superintendent of Police, dated 18-10-2003, whereby it was decided to initiate a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner."
12. The charge was that the petitioner had pursued two degrees simultaneously and successfully completed and awarded degree certificates, and the other part of the charge is that he had not revealed the details of the case registered against him for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 504 of IPC, in which he came to be acquitted.
13. On these two grounds, a show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner and the Inquiry Authority submitted its report, and the Disciplinary Authority, taking note of the misconduct, was pleased to impose a punishment of censure and a second show cause notice was issued as to why the same should not be entered into the service record of the petitioner.
14. Aggrieved by the imposition of punishment of censure, an Appeal came to be preferred, which Appeal met with the fate of rejection. Thereafter, the revision petition came to be preferred.
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2025:UHC:6566-DB
15. It is not in dispute that the revision is at the instance of the petitioner and it is not a case of suo moto revision. (emphasis by this Court).
16. A plain reading of the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules leaves no doubt in the mind of the Court that an officer, whose Appeal has been rejected, is entitled to seek revision of the order, but while so enabling filing of a revision, the provision also circumscribes the power of the Revisional Authority and enables exercise of revisional powers only in the event of there being a flagrant irregularity resulting in material injustice or miscarriage of justice.
17. In the case on hand, a punishment came to be imposed. The severity of the punishment or inadequacy of punishment cannot be gone into by the Revisional Authority in exercise of the power under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Rules. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that the first proviso enables the Revisional Authority to also initiate suo moto revision or revision on its own motion after examining the records of any order in Appeal against which no revision has been preferred under this Rule for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit. The second proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Rules stipulates that no order 6 2025:UHC:6566-DB under the first proviso can be passed without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the effected person.
18. In the case on hand, there is no dispute that it is a revision at the instance of the affected person. The scope of the first proviso is also not unlimited. The Revisional Authority is entitled to initiate a suo moto revision only for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order or as to the regularity of such procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority. In the case on hand, the Revisional Authority has transgressed the limits imposed by the proviso itself and it is this proviso which enables him to exercise suo moto revision.
19. The conclusion drawn by the Revisional Authority is that the punishment imposed is grossly inadequate. Inadequacy of punishment is not a ground upon which the Revisional Authority could have exercised its powers on a revision petition preferred under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Rules.
20. In that view of the matter, the revision being at the instance of the appellant and being in compliance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Rules, the Revisional Authority was devoid of any competence to direct a de novo inquiry on the ground that punishment imposed is 7 2025:UHC:6566-DB inadequate or that the Original Authority and the Appellate Authority have shown leniency.
21. The other provision, upon which the reliance is placed, is Rule 24 of the Rules, which provides for 'Enhancement of punishment'.
22. A reading of Rule 24 of the Rules would demonstrate that such power is exercisable by the Appellate Authority either on an 'Appeal' under clause (a) of Rule 24 or by any Authority superior to the Authority to whom an Application will lie in exercise of revisionary power, i.e. the Authority which considered the review petition of the petitioner.
23. In the instant case, neither has clause (a) been invoked in the form of an Appeal, nor has clause (b) been invoked by application to an Authority higher in hierarchy to the Revisional Authority.
24. In that view, the reliance on Rules 23 and 24 of the Rules, in our considered view, is highly misconceived and misplaced. The facts of the case not being in dispute, reliance on Rule 24 of the Rules appears to be unfounded.
25. The Department, having neither preferred an Appeal under clause (a) of Rule 24 of the Rules, nor having preferred an Application to an Authority higher than the Revisional Authority, nor the Revisional Authority having exercised its suo moto power of revision, the decision of the Revisional 8 2025:UHC:6566-DB Authority to set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, in our considered opinion, is wholly beyond the scope of consideration of a revision under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the Rules. That apart, it is almost more than two decades since the appellant has entered service and the order on the review petition came to be passed after nearly a delay of more than 9 years, which, in our opinion, is fatal to the power of the Disciplinary Authority to frame any charge. That apart, the criminal case, in which he is alleged to be arrayed as an accused, is under Section 323 of IPC, which provides for a punishment of either description or with a fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees.
26. The fact remains that a punishment prescribed under the Act itself indicates that the offence is a minor offence and he has been acquitted of the same.
27. As regards the other allegation that he has pursued two degrees simultaneously, no material is placed before this Court that either or both of the degrees have been cancelled by the concerned Authorities/University.
28. In that view of the matter and in view of lack of competence in the Revisional Authority to set aside the punishment on a review petition preferred by the petitioner and as the same would amount to the petitioner being placed 9 2025:UHC:6566-DB in a worse off position than he was before he had approached the Authority, which, in our considered opinion, is impermissible, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned proceedings warrant interference by this court.
29. It is also pertinent to note that B.Ed. course is a day course and law is an evening college course and pursuing two degrees simultaneously does not in any manner contravene the provisions of U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, as adapted by the State of Uttarakhand in the year 2002.
30. In that view, the Appeal is allowed. The order dated 21.03.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No. 9 of 2013 is set aside. Consequently, the order dated 03.09.2012 passed by the Revisional Authority / respondent No. 2 is also set aside. The order of the Original Authority, i.e. the Disciplinary Authority dated 18.10.2003 stands restored.
31. There shall be no order as to costs.
32. Pending application, if any, also stands dismissed.
_______________ G. NARENDAR, C.J.
_________________ ASHISH NAITHANI, J.
Dt: 24th July, 2025 Rathour Digitally signed by PRAVINDRA SINGH RATHOUR DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, PRAVINDRA SINGH RATHOUR 2.5.4.20=23699ccc2fd40ad81b6fd13323 779d9e3aeb1097d17dbb53d481cabd25 946eed, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=1F65499E931DF71CDAF9 10 2A40CC6179B8E010331BA695239171F9 06FD5C45C4E8, cn=PRAVINDRA SINGH RATHOUR Date: 2025.07.31 10:54:37 +05'30'