Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ajay Kumar Gupta vs Delhi Development Authority Delhi on 22 September, 2025
1
Item No.34- (C-2)
O.A. No. 3043/2015
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 3043/2015
Reserved on: 17.07.2025
Pronounced on: 22.09.2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Shri Ajay Kumar Gupta,
S/o Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta,
Accounts Officer/DDA,
Presently posted at: CAU, (P&CWG),
Siri Fort, Asian Village Complex, New Delhi
R/o SE-495, Shastri Nagar,
Ghaziabad, UP - Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar)
VERSUS
Delhi Development Authority,
Through its Vice Chairman,
Vikas Sadan, New Delhi - Respondent
(By Advocates: Mr. J.P. Tiwari)
2
Item No.34- (C-2)
O.A. No. 3043/2015
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. B.Anand, Member (A):
While working as Assistant Accounts Officer (AAO) with Delhi Development Authority (DDA), the applicant was served with a charge memo dated 07.06.2007 initiating disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 25 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations, 1999. He was required to submit his written statement of defence within 10 days. The charge memo was accompanied with statement of articles of charge framed against the applicant, as also the statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior, list of documents and list of witnesses as required under the relevant rules. Following five articles of charge were framed:-
"Article-I:
Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta, AAO while working as AAO/ED-5 during the period from 2004-2005 and 2005-06 was Financial Advisor to EE/ED-5 in respect of the above mentioned work, had processed and recommended award of the subject work without A/E & E/S or even permission to take up the work in anticipation of A/A & E/S. Article-II:
Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta, AAO while working as AA/ED-5 during the period from 2004-2005 and 2005-06 was Financial Advisor to EE/ED-5 in respect of the above mentioned work recommended release of payment to the tune of Rs.204 crores against the budget slip for Rs.10.5 lacs.
Article-III Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta, AAO while working as AAO/ED-5 during the period from 2004-2005 and 2005-06 was Financial Advisor to EE/ED-5 in respect of the above mentioned work, failed to point out to EE regarding payment of extra item beyond the sanctioned quantity.3
Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 Article-IV:
Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta, AAO while working as AAO/ED-5 during the period from 2004-2005 and 2005-06 was Financial Advisor to EE/ED-5 in respect of the above mentioned work, recommended payments during 2004-05 beyond the provision available in RBE 2004-05.
Article-V:
Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta, AAO while working as AAO/ED-5 during the period from 2004-2005 and 2005-06 was Financial Advisor to EE/ED-5 in respect of the above mentioned work, booked expenditure of Rs.2.60 crores for Khichri Pur without ensuring availability of A/A & E/S."
2. The Disciplinary Authority (DA) on consideration of the written statement of the applicant appointed an inquiry officer and also appointed Presenting Officer. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 21.10.2009 to the Disciplinary Authority holding Charge No.1 as partly proved and Charge Nos.2,3,4 & 5 as proved. The inquiry report was served upon the applicant for his response. On receipt of the inquiry report, the applicant submitted his representation dated 30.12.2009. The Disciplinary Authority (DA), not satisfied with the representation of the applicant passed the impugned order dated 12.07.2010 imposing "penalty of reduction of pay by two stages (equivalent to two increments) with cumulative effect for two years immediately on the applicant." During the penalty period, he will not earn increment and on expiry of the said period, the reduction will have the effect of postponement of his future increments.
3. An appeal preferred against the penalty order dated 25.08.2010 was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19.04.2012 (Annexure A/4). Aggrieved by this order, the applicant had approached 4 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 the Revisionary Authority vide his revision petition dated 27.11.2014, which the Revisionary Authority had rejected, by order dated 08.05.2015.
4. Hence, in the above background, this Original Application has been filed by the applicant claiming the following reliefs:-
"A) To quash and set aside the impugned Memo (Annexure A/1) and subsequent Inquiry Proceedings/Findings of Inquiry Officer (Annexure A/2), in the interest of justice. B) To quash and set aside the orders of Disciplinary Authority (Annexure A/3), Appellate Authority (Annexure A/4) and Revisionary Authority (Annexure A/5).
C) Such other/further order this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case be also passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents, in the interest of justice."
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the "appellate and revisionary authority has failed to appreciate that as per the findings of DA at para 6(a), there is no lapse on the part of the applicant despite of which appellate and revisionary authority have justified the penalty imposed by the DA as just".
6. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that "the applicant has not been accused of any ill motivation and there is hardly any act of omission/commission of violation of rules/procedure with a motive". In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1970 SC 1022 that misconduct means misconduct arising from ill- motive; he states that act of negligence, error of judgment or innocent mistake do not constitute such misconduct.
5Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015
7. Learned counsel for the applicant adds that the action of the respondent is bad in law and facts of the case, especially when the applicant is innocent facing great humiliation for last several years in his working place. He submits that all the orders passed by the Disciplinary, Appellate and Revisionary authorities are non-sustainable as well as cryptic, non speaking and is against the findings of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors., 2009(1) SCALE 284 in which Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that departmental authorities being quasi judicial authorities are obligatory to pass a speaking and reasoned order.
8. Learned counsel further adds that in so far as appellate and revisionary Authorities are concerned, nothing in the rules dispenses with the requirement of passing a reasoned order. Non speaking orders passed by both the appellate and revisionary Authorities countenanced in view of the decision of Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal& Ors. vs. Kharak Singh, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 and in case of Divl. Forest Officer, Kothagudem & Ors. vs. Madhusudan Rao, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 469. Hence, the OA deserves to be allowed.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of G. Vallokumari Vs. Andhra Education Society & Ors., reported in (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 406, the impugned orders are required to be set aside and quashed.
10. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the respondents would not have proceeded further by appointing the Inquiry Officer 6 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 against the Charge Sheet had they considered the fact that the applicant has to act at the instance of the Chief Engineer who has sanctioned the work and applicant thus, has not acted against the department and has not violated any provisions of DDA Conduct Disciplinary Appeal Regulations 1999. By referring to the Apex Court decision in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. H.C. Goyal, AIR 1964 SC 364 and Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors., reported in JT 1998 (8) SC 603, he submits that the orders are illegal and liable to be quashed.
11. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the issue involved in the present case is identical to that of OA No. 962/2012 relating to the same respondents which has been allowed vide CAT, Principal Bench order dated 15.02.2017.
12. The applicant has also submitted the reply from the Executive Engineer EMD-2/DDA dated 29.07.2022 addressed to the Executive Engineer (HQ), PIO, ECC-1, DDA, Vikas Minar, New Delhi-110001 obtained under Right to Information Act (RTI). The relevant para no. 3 from the reply dated 29.07.2022 reads as follows:-
Para No. Information Sought Reply
3. There is no
i) Is any Financial Advisor
financial advisor
attached with the post of
provided to
Executive Engineer/ED-
Executive
5/DDA?
Engineer/ ED-
ii) Was any Financial
5/DDA
Advisor attached with the
post of Executive
Engineer/ED-5/DDA
13. The learned counsel for the applicant, based on the above information, states that in as much as the respondents have admitted 7 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 that there is no post of Financial Advisor attached to the post of Executive Engineer (ED-5/DDA), then how could the applicant be said to be performing the duties of the Financial Advisor as alleged in the charge-memo served to him?
14. The learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant by stating that the applicant failed to record his objection in the register of omission/objections for awarding the work without A/E and E/S and had facilitated the taking up of the work even without permission to take up the work by the Administrative Authority in anticipation of Administrative Approval (A/A) and Expenditure Sanction (E/S).He also states that no efforts were made by the applicant for the revision of budget slip and even has not objected or remarked being a Financial Advisor that he should not pass the payment before the item was sanctioned. The responsibility of payment of bill and compilation of accounts were transferred to EE to CAU and his contention to switch over blame to CAU is not agreeable. The applicant did not make any effort for regularizing the expenditure beyond the Revised Budgetary Estimate (RBE).
15. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the judgments relied upon by the applicant are not applicable in the present case because the facts and circumstances mentioned in the above mentioned cases are entirely different from the present case. 8 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015
16. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the applicant was served with the charge sheet after the detailed investigation on facts and after obtaining the CVC's advice.
17. The learned counsel also submits that the Revisionary Authority, i.e. Hon'ble Lt. Governor had given a personal hearing to the applicant and thereafter seeing the facts, the Revisionary Authority upheld the penalty imposed by the Appellate and Disciplinary Authorities and rejected the Revision Petition of the applicant by passing a detailed as well as reasoned speaking order.
18. The learned counsel for the respondent by referring to the assertions made in the counter reply states that it is a settled proposition of law, as held in a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the strict law of evidence are not applicable to departmental inquiries. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Tribunal, while exercising powers of judicial review, cannot undertake appreciation or re- appreciation of evidence as if sitting in appeal. The scope of judicial review is confined to examining whether the delinquent officer was afforded fair treatment, whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and whether the decision-making process suffers from perversity, arbitrariness, or mala fides.
19. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in D.K. Gupta vs. M.C.D. in W.P.(C) No. 3623/2008, wherein the writ petition was dismissed after observing that re-appreciation of evidence does not fall within the ambit of judicial review. Further reliance is 9 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310, wherein it was categorically held that a Court, in exercise of judicial review, cannot re- appraise the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer, nor can it substitute its own findings for those recorded in the inquiry proceedings.
20. In Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra JT (1999) (1) SC 61, the Supreme Court held that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. If an appeal is filed, the Appellate Authority also has full power to re-appreciate evidence and reach its own conclusions. The Court noted that the High Court had erred by interfering with factual findings beyond its jurisdiction. This judgment reaffirmed that fact-finding lies only with departmental authorities, while courts may step in only where there is illegality, procedural violation, or perversity of findings.
21. It is contended that the applicant cannot abdicate or shift his duty and responsibilities onto others. The burden of the work assigned to him cannot be passed on. The departmental inquiry has been held strictly in accordance with the prescribed rules, and mere failure to comply with any technical rule, such as Rule 9(21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings. It is further submitted that unless prejudice is shown by the delinquent officer, no interference is warranted, as held in Sunil Kumar Banerjee vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., (1980) 3 SCC 304.
22. The respondents argue that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have passed reasoned and speaking orders after 10 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 due consideration of the charge sheet, inquiry proceedings, inquiry report, defence statement, and appeal.
23. It is submitted that the Appellate Authority is not required to record detailed reasons when it concurs with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. This principle has been settled in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1996) 1 SLJ SC 145. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, as well as orders passed by the Disciplinary, Appellate, and Revisional Authorities, are detailed, analytical, and reasoned, leaving no scope for judicial interference.
24. The applicant has failed to establish any prejudice caused to him in the inquiry proceedings. Reliance is placed upon the judgments in the following cases:
o State of U.P. vs. Harvinder Kumar, (2004) 13 SCC 117;
o Union of India vs. Alok Kumar & Ors., 2010 (3) SCSLJ 1;
o Serve UP Gramin Bank vs. Manoj Kumar Sinha, SCC (L&S) 2010, p.
861;
o Narender Nath Bhalla vs. State of U.P., SCC (L&S) 2010, p. 766;
o SBI vs. Bidyut K. Mitra, (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 323.
25. The respondents submit that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to judicial review, and it cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities. The Tribunal can interfere only if the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to law. Reliance is placed on State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh 11 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 Greasy, JT 1996 (5) SC 403, and Union of India vs. Alok Kumar & Ors., 2010 (3) SCSLJ 1.
26. It is argued that the Tribunal cannot reassess the correctness of charges or evidence, as these fall within the exclusive domain of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. The Supreme Court has held in Union of India & Ors. vs. Upender Singh, (1994) 2 SCC 77, and reaffirmed in State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Sangram Keshari Mishra & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 380, that the truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter solely for the disciplinary authority.
27. Similar view, regarding the correctness of the charges after relying upon the judgment of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Upender Singh, reported in 1994 (2) SCC Page-77, has been taken in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. Vs. Sangram Keshari Mishra & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC (L&S)
380.
28. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Ors. Vs. M/s Gopi Nath and Ors. (1992 Supp (2) SCC 312). The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus:
"Judicial Review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter, which it is authorized by law to decide, a conclusion, which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial Review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment 12 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."
"7. Now, if a Court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is understandable how can that be done by the Tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of articles of charges and the statement of imputations but mainly on the basis of the material produced by the respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate."
29. In case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas, reported in AIR 1993 SC Page 444, Hon'ble Supreme Court viewed that the power and authority of the Tribunal of judicial review is corresponding to such power of Hon'ble High Court, thus the constraint and norms which Hon'ble High Court observes while exercising the writ jurisdiction should equally apply to Ld. Tribunal also. The Ld. Tribunal is not an appellate authority.
30. The decision of the Apex Court in Bank of India Vs. Jagjit Singh Mehta, reported in (AIR 1992 SC Page 519), does not support the view that the Tribunal can interfere as if it is an Appellate Authority so long as the impugned order is intra virus and bonafide. Although the observations in S.L. Abbhas's case were made in the case concerning of a transfer, the view of the Supreme Court that the Tribunal is subject to the same constraint and norm which High Court observes appear to apply to service matters and particularly disciplinary matters before the Tribunal.
13Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015
31. The Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Naga Maleswara Rao, reported in (AIR 1998 SC 111), has reiterated its earlier views that the Administrative Tribunal cannot examine the enquiry proceedings as if it was hearing an appeal in the criminal case, and if it does so, it has committed an error of law and also exceeded its jurisdiction.
32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the plethora of cases viz Calcutta Port Shramik Union of India vs. Calcutta River Transport Association and Ors. 1988 (Supp.) SCC 768, Indian Overseas Bank vs. IOBM Canteen Workers Union and Another AIR 2000 SC 1580 etc., has consistently opined that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot act as an appellate authority over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. The scope of the judicial review is limited to correcting the errors of law or procedural errors leading to injustice and violation of the principles of natural justice.
33. The Tribunal could not interfere in the penalty awarded by the competent authority. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shri Parma Nand vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in (1989(2) SCC 177) and the Court held that the Tribunal could exercise only such powers which the civil courts or the High Courts could have exercised by way of judicial review, whether the Ld. Tribunal is justified in setting aside the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Supreme Court in that case further observed as under:
"The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate 14 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rule made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an inquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has not power to substitute it own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter of the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.
We may, however, carve out one exception to this proposal. There may be cases where the penalty is imposed under Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Where the person without inquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal court, the Tribunal may examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial justice. The Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration or by itself substitute one of the penalties provided under Clause (a)."
34. The decision of the Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Jagjit Singh Mehta, AIR 1992 Supreme Court page 519, does not support the view that the Tribunal can interfere as if it is an Appellate Authority so long as the impugned orders is intra vires and bona fide. Although the observations in S.L. Abbas's case were made in the case concerning of a 15 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 transfer, the view of the Supreme Court that the Tribunal is subject to the same constraint and norm which High Court observes appear to apply to service matters and particularly disciplinary matters before the Tribunal.
35. In K.L. Anand vs. CSIR, 1992 (20) ATC 46, the Principal Bench has stated the law as being:
"As regard to the validity of the departmental inquiry it is now well- settled law that the Court or Tribunal cannot act as an Appellate Authority to scrutinize whether the evidence before the Inquiry Officer was sufficient and adequate to sustain the findings."
36. The Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Naga Maleswara Rao, AIR 1998 SC 111, as reiterated its earlier views that the Administrative Tribunal cannot examine the enquiry proceedings as if it was hearing an appeal in the criminal case, and if it does so, it has committed an error of law and also exceeded its jurisdiction.
37. When the question whether the Tribunal could interfere with the penalty awarded by the competent authority on the ground that it is excessive or disproportionate to the misconduct proved, was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Parma Nanda Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 1989 (2) Supreme Court Cases 1771 and the Court held that the Tribunal could exercise only such powers which the civil courts or the High Courts could have exercised by way of judicial review, whether the Ld Tribunal is justified in setting aside the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Supreme Court in that case further observed as under:
16
Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 "The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rule made under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an inquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.
XXX XXX XXX We may, however, crave out one exception to this proposal. There may be cases where the penalty is imposed under Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Where the person without inquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal court, the Tribunal may examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial justice. The Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration or by itself substitute one of the penalties provided under Clause (a)."
38. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 : (1995 AIR SCW 4374), this Court opined (at p. 4379 of AIR SCW): 17
Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 "The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re- appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal."
Further it was held that :
"A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or, to shorten the litigation, it may itself in exceptional and rare cases impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
(Emphasis supplied)
39. Again in Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian (1995) 1 SCC 216: (1994 AIR SCW 4833), the Hon'ble Apex Court opined that (p. 4834):
"It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant materials which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which materials reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different findings than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the reaching a findings different than that of the inquiring authority."
(Emphasis supplied) 18 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015
40. This Court cannot enter into the merits of the charges framed against the petitioner. The scope of this writ petition goes only so far as an examination in the process of the inquiry and decision making can go. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others (1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 749, the Supreme Court categorically laid down that the scope of judicial review relate only to the decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence to substitute its finding. This opinion has been repeatedly followed by the Supreme Court. The cases in which the judgment of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) has been reiterated is that of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Others (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 583 and Principal Secretary, Govt. of A.P. and Another v. M. Adinarayana (2004) 12 Supreme Court Cases 579."
41. In Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Ghlabhia M. Lad reported in 2010 (3) AISLJ SC 28 after considering the judgments of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; UCO Bank v. P.C. Kakkar 2003 SCC (L&S) 468; Union of India v. S.S. Ahluwalia 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 627; State of Meghalaya v. Macken Singh 2008 (2) SCC (L&S) 431; DGRPF v. Sai Balu 2003 SCC (L&S) 464; it was held as follows:
"The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal it cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, and/or on appeal the Appellate Authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the Court/Tribunal."19
Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015
42. In the case of Union of India & Anr.. v. J. Jason Joseph (Civil Appeal No. 1863/2011) 2011 (2) SCSLJ 165 has held:
"Where the Charges were proved, the High Court cannot interfere in penalty."
"The High Court was not justified in granting the relief of Seniority and 25% back wages. When High Court has upheld that the findings that the respondent was guilty of charges 1, 6 & 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court."
43. In the context of what has been stated above, and in particular that, there are no issues that has been raised in the OA as regards procedural infirmity in inquiry or violation of principle of natural justice or denial of opportunity to defend; the legal position on the role of tribunal or courts in quasi judicial proceeding is a matter of Res Judicata, the attempt on the part of the applicant to approach the Tribunal with unclean hands is only to indulge in wasting the precious time of the tribunal. For the reasons above the OA should be dismissed with costs to the respondent.
44. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar and another declared the law:
"Judicial Review / Validity / Scope -- High Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of Constitution does not act as Appellate Authority. Where findings of competent authority are based on some evidence, High Court does not re-appreciate evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. Re-appreciation of evidence of High Court to arrive at a conclusion that Respondent 1 was not guilty of any 20 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 misconduct, held was beyond jurisdiction of High Court. Dismissal of Respondent No. 1 restored."
45. Hence the present O.A may be liable to be dismissed on this short point.
46. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, carefully perused the pleadings available on record.
47. At the outset, we are conscious of the limitations of the Tribunal in a judicial review. We are aware that we cannot reappraise the facts and evidences which have already been considered by the respondents. The Tribunal can interfere only when the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidences or contrary to law. We are guided in our working by the catena of judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, in paragraphs 19 to 44.
48. The learned counsel for the applicant among other grounds has chiefly relied on two grounds: (i) the issue involved herein is identical to that of OA No. 962/2012 relating to the same respondents, which has been allowed by this Tribunal on 15.02.2017. (ii) The information that he has obtained under the RTI Act to the effect that there is no post of financial advisor attached to EE/ED-5.
49. However, on careful perusal of the OA, it is seen that although the respondent is the same DDA and the applicant is an AAO as herein and the two charges therein in that OA are chiefly that the applicant therein 21 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 had recommended works in excess of the original sanctioned budget slips for which there are circulars available in the DDA and also that the applicant therein had deviated quantities in the RA Bill prior to the approval of such deviation by competent authority.
50. However, in the present case herein, there are five charges and the primary charge is one of processing and recommending award of work without administrative approval and expenditure sanction. Only the second charge in the present case herein is same as that of the charges 1 and 2 found in the OA No. 962/2012. The OA No.962/2012 relied upon by the applicant would come to his rescue as far as charge no.2 herein is concerned as this also involves release of payment in excess of the sanctioned budgets.
51. Regarding the second ground taken by the applicant, we cannot ignore the information obtained from the respondents under RTI Act and submitted by the applicant that there is no post of 'Financial Advisor' provided to the Executive Engineer, ED 5/DDA. In all the five Articles of charge, quoted in para 1 above, the applicant is being charged as a 'Financial Advisor' and is accused of dereliction of duty attached to that post. When the respondents themselves have given information under RTI Act that there is no post of 'Financial Advisor' attached to Executive Engineer ED 5/DDA then the foundation of the charges collapses. If the foundation crumbles then there is nothing much left of the edifice and on 22 Item No.34- (C-2) O.A. No. 3043/2015 that one ground itself, the present O.A. deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Impugned Memo (Annexure A/1) and subsequent inquiry proceedings /findings of inquiry officer (Annexure A/2) are quashed and set aside;
(ii) The orders of Disciplinary Authority (Annexure A/3), Appellate Authority (Annexure A/4 and Revisionary Authority (Annexure A/5) are also set aside and quashed;
and
(iii) The aforesaid directions shall be complied with as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six weeks of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
52. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
53. Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(B.Anand) (R.N. Singh) Member (A) Member (J) /anjali/