Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Kadiyala Usha Rani vs The Diety Of Sri Seetharamananjeya ... on 1 September, 2025
APHC010354012019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
MONDAY,THE FIRST DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
I.A No.1 of 2025
In/and
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 473 OF 2019
Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC, against the orders and decree
dt.03.09.2019 passed in I.A.No.180/2018 in O.S.No. 89/2018 on the file of the
IX Additional District Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District.
Between:
Kadiyala Usha Rani, W/o N.Bhaskar Babu, Aged about 38 yrs, Occ.
Housewife, R/o D.No.2-184, Motor Street, Chowdepalle, Chittoor District.
...Appellant/Respondent No.3/Defendant No.3
AND
1. The Diety of Sri Seetharamananjeya Bhajana Mandiram Devalayam,
Palamaner, Rep. by Next friend and Devotee Of the Deity, S.A.
Tejaswi, D/o Ashok Kumar, Aged about 22 yrs, R/o D.No.11-589
Radha Bunglow, Old Pet, Palamaner.
... Respondent/Petitioner/Plaintiff
2. Sri Seetharama Bhajana Mandiram Palamaner Trust, by its
President/Trustee, R/o D.No.11-593, Radha Bunglow, Oldpet,
Palamaner, Chittoor District.
. s
3. P S Nouzia, W/o Shaik Noor Ahammad, Aged about 34yrs, Occ.
Housewife, R/o D.No.28-1394/1, New Balaji Colony, Chittoor, Chittoor
District.
...Respondents/Defendants No.1 & 2
lA NO: 1 OF 2019
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend operation of the order and decree Dt;03.09.2019 passed in
03.09.2019 passed in I.A.No. 180/2018 in O.S.No. 89/2018 on the file of the
IX Additional District Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District.
lA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant leave/permission to the petitioner to complete the construction of the
house in the site that the petitioner has purchased vide a sale deed dt.
27-7-2018 situate in sy.no.767/6 measuring 40x60, house under construction
upto lintel level and with a borewell also having current service connection
within the following boundaries as follows:- East; house sites of masthan and
vasumurthi and others West; 20 feet road. North : 30 feet road. South: the
plot of defendant no.2.
Counsel for the Appellant: Sri S S Bhatt
Counsel for Respondent No.1 : Sri M Venkata Ramana Reddy
Counsel for Respondent No.2 : Sri L J Veera Reddy
Counsel for Respondent No.3 :Sri Kopparthi Sumathi
The Court made the following:
*!
APHC010354012019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3506]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 473/2019
Between:
1.KADIYALA USHA RANIN, W/0 N.BHASKAR ^ABU, AGED
ABOUT 38YRS, OCC. HOUSEWIFE, R/0 D.NO.2-184, MOTOR
STREET, CHOWDEPALLE, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT
AND
1.THE DIETY OF SRI SEETHARAMANANJEYA BHAJANA
MANDIRAM DEVALAYAM, , PALAMANER, REP. BY NEXT
FRIEND AND DEVOTEE OF THE DEITY, S.A. TEJASWI, D/0
ASHOK KUMAR, AGED ABOUT 22YRS, R/0 D.N011-589,
RADHABUNGLOW, OLD PET, PALAMANER.
2. SRI SEETHARAMA BHAJANA MNADIRAM PALAMANER
TRUST, BY ITS PRESIDENT/TRUSTEE, R/0 D.NO.11-593,
RADHA BUNGLOW, OLDPET, PALAMANER, CHITTOOR
DISTRICT.
3.P S NOUZIA, W/0 SHAIK NOOR AHAMMAD, AGED ABOUT
34YRS, OCC. HOUSEWIFE, R/O D.NO.28-1394/1, NEW BALAJI
COLONY, CHITTOOR, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC is filed against the orders
and decretal orders dt.03.09.2019 passed in I.A.No. 180/2018 in
O.S.No. 89/2018 on the file of the IX Additional District Judge, Chittoor,
Chittoor District and pass
2
CGR, J.
CI\/IANo.473 of 2019
lA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances
stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may
be pleased to grant leave/permission to the petitioner to complete the
construction of the house in the site that the petitioner has purchased
vide a sale deed dt. 27-7-2018 situate in sy.no.767/6 measuring 40x60,
house under construction upto lintel level and with a borewell also
having current service connection within the following boundaries as
follows:- East; house sites of masthan and vasumurthi and others West:
20 feet road. North : 30 feet road South; the plot of defendant no.2. and
pass
Counsel for the Appellant;
1.SSBHATT
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.LJVEERA REDDY
2.KOPPARTHI SUMATHI
3.M VENKATA RAMANA REDDY
The Court made the following:
CGR, J.
CMA No.473 of 2019
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
l A.No.j of 2025
in/and
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.473 of 2019
COMMON JUDGMENT:
Appellant herein - 3'^'^ defendant in the Suit preferred present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC assailing order, dated 03.09.2019, the fiie of the iX passed in I.A.No.180 of 2018 in O.S.No,89 of 2018 on Additionai District Judge, Chittoor, granting temporary injunction in favour of T*' respondent/plaintiff restraining the appeiiant and other co- defendants from interfering in any way with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, pending the Suit.
as they
2. For the sake of convenience, parties herein are referred to were arrayed in the Suit before the trial Court.
3. Brief facts of the case are as follows;
(a) Appellant herein is defendant in the Suit. 1"' respondent-
the file of the IX Additional plaintiff initially filed O.S.No.89 of 2018 on District Judge, Chittoor, for declaration of right and title to suit schedule property and also to declare that sale deeds, even dated 27.07.2018, executed by 1"' defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3 to be null and void and not binding on plaintiff and for consequential relief of CGR, J.
CMANo.473 of 2019permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. Suit was instituted by Ms.S.A. Tejaswi D/o.Ashok Kumar, as next friend of Deity viz., Sri Seetharamanjeya Bhajana Mandiram Devalayam, Palamaner (hereinafter called as "Devalayam").
Alongwith the Suit, plaintiff also preferred I.A.No.180 of 2018 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents/defendants, their men in any way interfering with the plaintiff's/petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. As per the schedule, the subject property is an extent of Ac.0.20.20 cents out of Ac.3.29 cents in Survey No.767/6 of Palamaneru Revenue Village. As per facts narrated in the plaint and also I.A., late R. Jayarama Chetty was a devotee of Sri Seetha, Rama, Lakshmana and Anjaneya, during his life time, he constructed Devalayam at Cross Road, Old Pet, Palamaner. In order to maintain the same, an extent of Ac.3.29 cents in Survey No.767/6 was dedicated.
which was evident from the registered partition deed, dated 09.12.1964, particularly, described as "J-Schedule" therein. The rest of properties were partitioned amongst his three sons, as per desire and wish of their father, who by then already died way back on 30.03.1957. Even wife of late R. Jayarama Chetty also died on 05.03.1993. One of the sons of late R.Jayarama Chetty viz., Radhakrishnan sold the land that was set j'- • CGR, CIVIANo.473 of 2019 apart to Devalayam under registered sale deed, dated 10.02.1974 in favour of R.K.Venkatachalapathi without any authority or consent of family members and delivered possession of the property. The same was challenged by J.S.Ganesh Kumar, who was grandson of late R.Jayarama Chetty and son of Sreeramulu as next friend representing Devalayam in O.S.No.30 of 1989 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court at Chittoor, to which even all other sons and grandchildren of late R.Jayarama Chetty were arrayed as defendants. The same was contested only by the purchaser and eventually, by judgment and decree, dated 03.08.1996, Suit was decreed in favour of Devalayam and the subject property was ordered to be delivered back. Assailing the same, purchaser preferred A.S. No.2164 of 1996 before this Court and ultimately, pending adjudication of the Appeal, parties have compromised the dispute in terms of Memorandum of Compromise, dated 01.11.2004 and accordingly, appeal came to be disfiosed. As part of compromise, out of Ac.3.29 cents, an extent of Ac.0.20.20 cents which is subject matter of present Suit, was kept apart and the remaining was allowed to be parted with the purchaser on receiving settlement amount of about Rs.1.00 Lakh which was to be spent for the maintenance and development of Devalayam. While things stood thus.
1®' defendant, who is son of late Radhakrishnan and grandson of late R.Jayarama Chetty created bogus Trust under the name and style "Sri CGR, CMANo.473 of 2019 % Seetharama Bhajana Mandiram, Palamaner" vide Registration No.14/2018, dated 19.05.2018, which is similar to that of Devalayam and later passed a resolution, dated 25.07.2018, authorising 1®' defendant to alienate the properties held by the said Trust and eventually, 1®* defendant in his capacity as President of the said Trust sold away suit schedule property through two registered sale deeds.
even dated 27.07.2018, bearing Document Nos.3908/2018 and 3909/2018, for consideration of Rs.14,38,000/- and Rs.8,63,000/- in favour of defendants 2 and 3 respectively and as per recitals of the said documents even possession was also delivered to the purchasers on the same day. It is also stated that even before aforesaid sale deeds came to be executed, 1®^ defendant also managed to mutate name of newly formed Trust as owner of suit schedule property in revenue records. Therefore, Ms.S.A. Tejaswi D/o.J.S.Ashok Kumar, who is the son of late J.S. Sreeramulu Chetty, as next friend, filed present Suit and also I.A. for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment over suit schedule property.
(b) 1®* respondent filed counter inter alia stating that Devalayam was being managed by him after demise of his father, who was earlier looking after the affairs and have spent huge amounts for installation of idols about five years ago and has been conducting Ustavams every CGR, J.
CIVlANo.473of 2019 0 year. Further that in order to develop the Devalayam as funds were required, a Trust came to be registered on19.05.2018, as per Trusts Act with him and other members to be Trustees for the development of Mandirams and thereafter, after passing resolution, it was decided to 1 sell part of Trust property to meet the expenditure for development and renovation of existing structures. Accordingly, sale deeds, even dated 27.07.2018, were executed in favour of respondents 2 and 3 and subject property was delivered to them, the sale consideration received was in turn to be spent for development of the Devalayam and to reconstruct rooms and two upper portions in existing premises. It is also stated that neither the petitioner nor her father have ever spent or contributed any amounts for conducting annual Ustavams or development of Devalayam.
(c) Respondents 2 and 3, who are purchasers, filed counter stating that subject properties were purchased on payment of proper sale consideration and that they are bond fide purchasers and have been put in possession upon registration of sale deeds. Further, 3 respondent also stated that after execution of sale deed, she has obtained building permission from Palamaner Municipality, secured housing loan from Canara Bank, Palamaner and raised constructions upto lintel level and that Suit was instituted only to settle personal disputes amongst family members of late Jayarama Chetty in relation to CGR, J.
CMA No,473 of 2019 management of the Devalayam. It is also stated that O.S.No. 18 of 2010 was filed by 1®' defendant for permanent injunction claiming himself to be Managing Trustee against other family members, which was decreed in his favour. Therefore, being bona fide purchasers, they should not be made to suffer in the process.
(d) Both petitioner and respondents 1 and 3 exhibited their respective documents, which were marked as Exs.AI to A6, Exs.R.1 to R.5 and Exs.R.6 to R.10, respectively.
(e) The trial Court, after considering the pleadings and also the exhibits marked, and having considered respective pleas raised, ultimately, allowed the I.A. granting temporary injunction The trial Court has mainly proceeded on the basis that the registered partition deed, dated 09.12.1964, clearly earmarked the shares falling to three I children of late Jayarama Chetty besides an extent of Ac.3.29 cents in Survey No.767/6 for maintenance of Devalayam, part of remaining extent of which now being subject matter of the Suit clearly establish that it belonged to the Deity and creation of new Trust and thereafter, passing of resolution allowing 1®' respondent to alienate the same. therefore, needed to be examined while consideration of main Suit, however, as now Suit property is alienated to respondents 2 and 3 allowing them to proceed with permanent constructions would lead to CGR, J.
CMA No.473 of 2019multiple proceedings and causing greater inconvenience to the petitioner, therefore, granted temporary injunction for preserving the property till disposal of the Suit. Assailing the same, the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/S^^ defendant.
4. Heard Sri S.S. Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri M. Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for 1®* respondent, None appeared for respondents 2 and 3 despite service of notice.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prayer made in the interim application was' one relating to grant of temporary injunction from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff/petitioner over suit schedule property, therefore, it IS pre requisite for petitioner, prime facie, establish the possession and enjoyment, whereas, even as per the pleadings made in the I.A., there has been a clear admission that upon execution of sale deeds by defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3, they began to raise constructions inspite of the protest made, therefore, on the face of the pleadings itself, the injunction ought not to have been granted. Unless, prime facie, possession is established, question of granting injunction in favour of petitioner does not arise. Further, the trial Court miserably failed to address aforesaid issue and rather proceeded or> the basis that the subject property belonged to and vests with deity, therefore, to 10 CGR, J.
CMANo.473 of 2019preserve the same, the respondents were injuncted from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by not proceeding with the further constructions, which in a way was an interim injunction restraining the defendants from dealing with the nature of property, but not one as prayed for in the I.A. Learned counsel also submitted that i.A.No.1 of 2025 has been filed seeking leave/permission of this Court to third respondent to complete the balance construction of the building over part of the suit schedule property as constructions were almost at the verge of completion without claiming for any equities and prayed to consider the same as well. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgment of erstwhile High Court of A.P. in Gandam Sujatha v. Kathirisetti Venkata Narasaiah^ to buttress that there cannot be any preventive injunction of interfering with possession if the defendant is found to be in possession. With respect to prayer made in I.A.No.1 of 2025, learned counsel has tried to take aid of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in Anwar Elahi v. Vinod Misra^ to buttress the point that as already substantive amounts have been spent and 90% construction is complete, permission be granted for completing the balance construction in order to safeguard ' 1995 (I) ALT 670 = AIR 1995 A.P. 154
- 1995 (60) DLT 752 = 1995 (4) AD (Del)576 1995 (35) DRJ 341 CGR, CMANo.473 of 2019 the already constructed building, which, however, will be subject to outcome in the Suit.
6. Opposing aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the 1®' respondent/plaintiff tried to support the impugned order passed by the trial Court by contending that the possession claimed by appellant/1®' respondent is unlawful and inasmuch as no saleable rights accrued in her favour, as per law, the right and possession continues to be with the deity, is, therefore, entitled for injunction restraining the defendants/ respondents in any manner interfering with the suit schedule property.
In support of said submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of A.P., in K.Ankaiah v. T.T.Dl Further, he opposed the prayer made in I.A.No.1 of 2025 and contended that as there is injunction granted restraining respondents/defe ndants from interfering with the suit schedule property, she should not be permitted to complete the balance work and by allowing so, the very purpose of filing Suit would be defeated and in alternative, he submitted that as the Suit is of the year 2018, the same may be directed to be concluded in certain time frame.
2002 (4) ALD 223 = 2002 (6) ALT 170 12 CGR, J.
CMA No.473 of 2019%
7. Perused the record and considered the rival submissions of both the learned counsel.
8. Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v.
Harish Ambalal Choksi"^, while dealing with the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Order 43 CPC, has after reviewing the previous precedents on issue, observed as follows:
"20. The law in relation to the scope of an appeal against grant or non-grant of interim injunction was laid down by this Court m Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] Antox brought an action of passing off against Wander with respect to the mark Cal-De-Ce. The trial court declined Antox's plea for an interim injunction, however, on appeal the High Court reversed the findings of the trial Judge. This Court, upon due consideration of the matter, took notice of two egregious errors said to have been committed by the High Court:
(a) First, as regards the scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order; and
(b) Secondly, the weakness in ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the trade mark on which the passing off action is founded.
21. With regard to (a), this Court held thus: (Wander case [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727]. , SCC p. 733, para 14) , "74. ... In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely, or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. ... The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below. .. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the ■'(2024) II SCC 351 13 CGR, J.
CMANo.473 of 2019 appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion."
27. In Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. [Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 see 672 : (2016) 2 See (eiv) 190] , this eourt held that the appellate court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. In other words, the Court took the view that to interfere against an order granting or declining to grant a temporary injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated in the finding of the trial court.
31. The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well-settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of the . appellate court under Order 43CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours laid down in Wander case [Wander Ltd. V. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727]."
9. Further, explaining the expression "perverse", which would be the touchstone for interfering with the orders of temporary injunction, held as follows:
"Meaning of the expression "perverse"
34. Any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. \n Moffetts. Gough [Moffettw. Gough, (1878) 1 LR Ir 331], the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfreys. Godfrey [Godfrey v. Godfrey, 106 NW 814 : 127 Wis 47 (1906)] , the Court defined "perverse" as "turned the wrong way"; not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
35. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
(a) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.14
CGR, J.
CMANo,473 of 2019 Pervprse -- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable,
(b) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English -- International Edn.
Perverse -- Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable,
(c) The New Oxford Dictionary of English -- 1998 Edn. Perverse -- Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the Judge on a point of law.
(d) New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse -- Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant,
(e) Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. Perverse -- A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
36. the wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion pn the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. (See Damodar Laly. Sohan Devi [Damodar Lai v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 3 SCC 78 ; (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 36] .)".
10. Keeping aforesaid parameters as enunciated in various judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in view and being conscious of the limited and restricted interference in exercising appellate jurisdiction, the facts of the present case are tested as under:
11. The undisputed facts of present case are that the suit schedule property originally belonged to R.Jayarama Chetty. During his lifetime, he has constructed Devalayam at Palamaneru from out of his own m:
15CGR, J.CMANo.473 of 2019
<5^ funds. He expired on 30.03.1957 leaving behind wife and three children.
There was a registered partition on 09.12.1964 amongst the children and wife, by which, all the properties of late Jayarama Chetty came to be partitioned. As per his desire and wish, an extent of Ac.3.29 cents in Survey No.767/6 of Palamaneru was set apart for maintenance of Devalayam. All the family members have agreed for such arrangement.
Nonetheless one of the son viz., Radhakrishnan, father of 1®' defendant herein, alienated aforesaid land through registered sale deed, dated 10.02.1974. The same ended in dispute, initially, O.S.No.30 of 1989 was decreed annulling the same and later, in appeal before this Court in A.S.No.2164 of 1996, in pursuance to compromise entered between the parties, as per terms of memorandum of compromise, dated 01.11.2004, leaving apart an extent of Ac.0.20.20 cents the remaining extent was made over to the purchaser on receiving settlement amount of Rs.1.00 Lakh, which was to be used for maintenance of Devalayam.
The deity was being maintained and every year Ustavams were conducted. It is the case of the plaintiff/petitioner that though aforesaid Ac.0.20.20 cents belonged to Devalayam, the same now being alienated by 1®' respondent claiming to be Managing Trustee through registered sale deeds, which are subject matter of the present Suit. Suit is instituted by Ms.S.A.Tejaswi D/o.Ashok Kumar. It is alleged in the Suit that 1®* respondent formed a bogus Trust in the year 2018 and later 16 CGR, j CMANo.473 of 2019 passed resolution authorising to sell aforesaid properties and the sale proceeds are misused. Therefore, along with Suit, she also filed present I.A. seeking for temporary injunction restraining the respondents/ defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property in any manner.
12. 1®' respondent filed counter, contending that the suit schedule property does belong to the Devalayam, in a way the Trust and that Trust has passed a resolution to alienate the properties in order to meet regular expenditure and also for renovation of existing rooms and construction of one another floor over existing structures. He also stated that petitioner nor her father ever contributed to the regular expenditure in performing Ustavams or for construction or renovation of the structures.
13. In the reply filed to I.A.No.1 of 2025, 1®' respondent herein has also pleaded that uncle of petitioner J.S. Ganesh Kumar, executed registered gift settlement deed, dated 12.08.2009, vide Document No.2273/2009, in favour of father of petitioner, by which an extent of 666.66 sq. yards out of Ac.0.20.20 cents in Survey No.767/6 has been conveyed and in turn said J.S. Ashok Kumar executed registered settlement deed, dated 29.08.2018 vide Document No.4293/2018 in favour of B.P. Chandramouli, meaning thereby, even her own farther CGR, J CMANo.473 of 2019 also indulged in alienation of part of suit schedule property, therefore, Therefore, it the very institution of Suit itself is for obvious reasons, appears that now there are two sets of transactions concerning suit schedule property, one executed by defendant in the capacity as Managing Trustee of the newly formed Trust and the second, that has » been executed by petitioner's uncle in favour of her father.
14. Aforesaid facts narrated go to show that suit schedule property clearly has been endowed with Devalayam. Neither even 1®' respondent claim any exclusive right to the said property. It is not known as to what is the source of title for uncle of petitioner to execute registered settlement deed in favour of her father and at any rate this Court is not now going into aforesaid aspect exfcept referring to the plea raised by the 3^^^ respondent that Suit has singled out them and with respect to a transaction which is in favour of petitioner's father was left out. 3 respondent in the counter has also taken stand that earlier to when there were disputes with respect to management of Devalayam, 1®* to declare respondent filed O.S.No.18 of 2010 for permanent injunction him as Managing Trustee of the Devalayam for the purpose of maintenance which came to be decreed. In the above background, the prayer made by the petitioner has to be considered 4P 18 CGR, J CMANo.473 of 2019
15. In order to appreciate the prayer made, it is necessary to refer to the pleadings of petitioner in I.A. Petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. has specifically pleaded that resppndent has executed sale deeds in favour of respondents 2 and 3, who in turn have began to trespass and started raising constructions in spite of the protest and further they are allowed to proceed with the construction work in the suit schedule property, hence, would cause hardship. Further, in the plaint, she has stated in para. 13 that as per recitals in the sale deeds, possession has already been delivered to respondents 2 and 3 on the same day and even before that respondent has managed the revenue authorities to mutate the name of newly formed Trust as owner of the suit schedule property in revenue records. In the light of these statements, it is the case of petitioner that the subject property is recorded in revenue records in the name of newly formed Trust and that upon execution of sale deeds, possession has been delivered to respondents 2 and 3 purchasers, and that they have started construction over the same.
16. On the other hand, 3'"^ respondent in the counter pleaded as follows;
"6) This Respondent has purchased a house site measuring 40X60 with in specific boundaries out of the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 27-07-
2018 for proper and valid consideration of Rs.8,63,000/-. The said property is details in this Counter. On the same date the 19 CGR, J.
CMANo.473 of 2019remaining sites were also sold by the president of trust toof two others. This Respondent was inducted into possession the Counter schedule property on t)ie date of its purchase. Since then this Respondent has been in exclusive and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. She has dug a bore well in the Counter schedule property and is constructing a house by obtaining approval from Palamaner Municipality. She has also availed housing loan from Canara Bank, Palamaner by depositing the original title deed with them. She hasunder also obtained electricity service connection to the building construction. The construction is raised up to lintel level. The photographs showing the said construction is filed here with.is Due to grant of interim injunction, the further construction stopped.
^7;
(7) The 1®* Respondent from out of the sale consideration derived from the sale of the suit schedule property is constructing shop rooms by the side of Sri Seetharamanjeya Bhajana Mandiram to the knowledge of Tejaswi. The said showing constructions are also up to roof level. The photographs the said constriction is filed here with.
8) This Respondent submits that the Petitioner has not prayed separate reliefs for cancellation of different documents by has not valuating the documents as per its value. The Petitionerfrom this prayed for further relief of recovery of possession Respondent and other purchasers as per proviso to Section 34 is liable to of Specific Relief Act. On that ground alone the suit of different be dismissed. The Petitioner is aware of existence sale deeds in favour of different persons in respect of the suit of the property. But the Petitioner has not prayed for cancelationis liable registered documents and on that ground also the suit to be dismissed.
11) the land This Respondent submits that the purpose whichachieved is set apart for the benefit of Bhajana Mandiram was land, and long back by alienating the major extent of cultivable of a compromise is also entered into by the family members Jayaram Chetty. Now the Petitioner and her family members are there was estopped from claiming otherwise. In the year 2010 Rajendran tussle between senior paternal uncle of Tejaswi and with regard to management of their family Bhajana Mandiram viz Sri Seetharamanjeya Bhajana Mandiram. At that time Rajendran filed a Civil Suit in O.S.No.18 of 2010 for grant of permanent injunction claiming himself to be the managing suit was trustee against the senior paternal uncle. The said decreed in favour of Rajendran. The said fact was supp'ressed."
20CGR, J, CMANo.473 of 2019
17. On consideration of respective pleadings, it is very much clear that the petitioner clearly admitted that the suit schedule property has been in possession of 1®* respondent initially as per revenue records and later upon execution of sale deeds, same was delivered to respondents 2 and 3 and in turn in particular 3'"^ respondent has i commenced construction, which is underway, The stand of 3'^^ respondent and also the exhibits marked i.e., Exs.R6 to R.9, which are approved plan for construction of building, electricity bills, letter of sanction of loan by Canara Bank, photographs with C.D. relating to construction of building, go to show that possession has been assertively with the 3'"'^ respondent. Even the 1 respondent has marked Exs.R.1 to R.4 to show that from out of sale proceeds, certain activities were undertaken for demolition of dilapidated structures and construction of new shop rooms. Aforesaid pleadings and documents exhibited, prima facie, go to show that possession definitely was not with the plaintiff and rather was with the defendants. Only petitioner alone instituted present Suit and none of the other family members of late Jayarama Chetty are made parties as either co-plaintiffs or defendants. The Suit is filed for declaration of title and for permanent injunction by annulling the sale deeds executed in favour of respondents 2 and 3. The trial Court has rightly recorded that whether the newly formed Trust did y.,, 21 CGR, J.
CMANo.473of 2019 # have legal right to alienate suit schedule property will have to be gone into at the time of trial of the Suit, however, misdirected itself in granting injunction without first rendering any finding as to wheth'er the plaintiff i.e., Devalayam instituted through petitioner was in possession and enjoyment. When it has recorded finding that continuing further constructions will cause hardship, the same presupposes that the defendants were already in possession of the subject property, but not the plaintiff, which itself will disentitle the relief of granting interim injunction as prayed for.
18. It is trite law that for the purpose of claiming relief of interim injunction of restraining defendants from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment, one has to prima facie, establish the possession. There is no dispute with respect to title to the property as even 1®' respondent also claims that subject property belongs to Devealayam, which is being administered by newly formed Trust.
Therefore, as both plaintiff as well as 1®* defendant are not in dispute regarding the fact that deity be the rightful owner, it is only with regard to who controls or is in the helm of affairs of managing day to day activities, the said aspect would be determined in the main Suit.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred the judgment of erstwhile High Court of A.P. in Gandam Sujatha's case^ , which was a 22 CGR, J.
CMANo,473 of 2019 case wherein defendants therein were found in possession of suit property therein, however, injunction came to be granted by lower appellate Court which was called in question in revision before this Court, considering the finding of fact that the defendant was . in possession, it was held that question of granting preventive injunction having found that defendant was in possession, would not arise and in fact, this Court went ahead to hold that the plaintiff therein needed to amend the Suit seeking for possession. Reievant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
"But, the situation is quite reverse as the defendant's possession is proved and there is a concurrent finding of fact that the defendant had been in possession along with the other rnembers^lf that be the case, the hardship or mental agony to the plaintiff or other members of his family is of no consequence Preventive injunction cannot be granted as the perpetual injunction is granted preventing the defendant from doing a particular thing including that of interfering with the possession pre-supposing that the defendant is not in possession. Once the ^nding is that the defendant is in possession, the Court is debarred from granting injunction, which is rightly assailed here by the plaintiff and I have got no alternative to interfere with the order passed by the lower appellate Court and to set aside the same. I do so. It is up to the plaintiff to amend the suit seeking for possession and if such an application is filed, the Court below shall allow the same and dispose of the suit expeditiously by the end of this year. But, this revision petition is bound to be allowed and I hereby allow the same setting aside the order passed by the lower appellate Court in C.M A No 18/94 "
20. Even in the present case, the pleadings made by petitioner/ plaintiff show that the suit schedule property has been recorded in revenue records to be in the name of newly formed Trust in the name of 23 CGR, J.
CMA No.473 of 2019Devalayam followed by execution of sale deeds by 1®' respondent in favour of respondents 2 and 3 and delivery of possession thereon and subsequently, raising of constructions. The photographs marked by 3'"^ respondent indicate that constructions are substantially complete, meaning thereby clearly plaintiff is not in possession.
21. In view of the same, there cannot be a preventive injunction restraining the defendants/respondents in interfering with the which possession and enjoyment of the petitioner/plaintiff, even according to them is not with them.
22. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff tried to contend that the possession of defendants is unlawful without any saleable right, in support of the same, he tried to place reliance on the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of A.P. in K.Ankaiah's caseT
23. It is not pleaded case of the petitioner/plaintiff that the respondents possession is an unlawful possession, rather they pursued the matter so far on the basis that possession is still with plaintiff. Even otherwise, it is not the defendants, who instituted the Suit and claim for injunction rather it is converse, Therefore, the case cited above dealt with facts wherein injunction was sought for by plaintiff against defendants therein, which was refused on account of plaintiff's being 24 CGR, J, CMANo.473 of 2019 held to be in unlawful possession and that injunction cannot be granted against true owner on the basis of sole unlawful possession. Clearly, the said judgment has no application to facts of the present case. Therefore, this Court finds that the trial Court without delving upon aforesaid aspects has granted injunction which is clearly unsustainable. The trial Court has not rendered any finding with respect to plaintiff's, prima facie, possession, merely because the subject property belong to Devalayam, the injunction has been granted restraining the respondents from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment, In fact.
the reasoning given by the trial Court, if closely analysed, it appears that the trial Court proceeded as if it was considering an application of one in the nature of restraining respondents from altering physical features of the property, which is not the case on hand.
24. Learned counsel for the appellant while addressing I.A.No.1 of 2025, submitted that third respondent has made substantial construction over part of the suit schedule property, in support of the same, he has drawn attention of this Court to Ex.R.6 approved plan, Ex.R.8 letter of sanction by Canara Bank and Ex.R.9 photographs of the constructions made. A close look of aforesaid document and also photographs goes to show that the appellant has made substantive efforts in securing building permission, tying up loan with the Canara mm f»i¥ 25 CGR, J, CIVlANo.473 of 2019 0 Bank and made constructions, the photographs indicate that ground and first floor are raised, indicating that she spent substantive amounts not only for purchasing the property but also making further developments.
Further, under Exs.R.1 to R.6 filed by 1®* respondent, it is pleaded and stated that from out of sale proceeds realised, the same has been spent for demolition of dilapidated structures and construction of new shop rooms for the benefit of Devalayam.
25. Learned counsel for the 1®' respondent/plaintiff opposed the application, contending that permitting 3^^ respondent to proceed with construction and completing the same would tantamount to rendering the relief in the Suit infructuous and further, even otherwise, as 3'''^ respondent is in unlawful possession, she is not entitled to continue with further constructions.
26. As the petitioner/plaintiff has pleaded in both plaint and also in the counter filed to I.A.No.1 of 2025 that defendant got the name of newly formed Trust mutated in the revenue records before alienating the subject property in favour of 3*^^ respondent and that possession has accordingly been delivered to 3^^^ respondent and further 3'^'^ respondent already made constructions, the same by itself demonstrates that plaintiff is not in possession. Whether such possession is lawful or unlawful, remains to be adjudicated in main Suit, fact remains that 26 CGR, j CMANo.473 of 2019 possession is with 3^'^ respondent as of now. Further, it is not also in 'V:
dispute that the 3'^'^ respondent secured permissions before constructing and has made substantial progress in raising the constructions. The constructions were made around 2018 and 2019 and are lying unfinished since then. Therefore, it is not one in the interest of either of parties, to abandon unfinished structures rather to put it for optimum utilisation, however, subject to outcome in the Suit.
27. In the aforesaid context, it is apt to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ECE Industries Ltd.(2) v. S.P. Real Estate Developers (P) Ltd.®, dealing with a case of granting or otherwise of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2, while dealing with a case between the owners and developers and issues arising under development agreement, having noticed that the defendant/develop er therein has made certain constructions over suit schedule property while denying the relief of grant of injunction of changing the nature of the suit schedule property, held as follows:
"26. It is well settled that when construction has been made on a land, which is of considerable magnitude, and when the plaintiff shall not face any substantial injury, if no order of injunction is granted because of payment/deposit of the entire amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under the agreement, though belatedly, we are of the view that the Court will not, as a matter of course, pass an order of injunction against the other party restraining the other party from raising any construction on the suit property till the disposal of the suit.
(2009) 12 see 776 27 CGR, J.
CMANo.473 of 2019
27. If ultimately, the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff is decreed, he can be compensated in damages or the respondent-defendants may be directed to pull down the construction and deliver vacant possession to the appellant- plaintiff when no equity can be claimed for such construction by the respondent-defendants.
28. On the other hand, in our view, if at this stage, an order of injunction is granted against the respondent-defendants from proceeding with further construction in the suit property, it will undoubtedly destroy the constructions already made by the respondent-defendants and the respondent-defendants will suffer irreparable loss and injury for not allowing them to make construction on the suit property."
28. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that 3^'^ respondent being purchaser of subject property has already invested considerable amounts for construction of building and that out of the sale consideration, even first respondent has made certain developmental works to the benefit of the Devalayam and if present structure raised by 3'^'^ respondent is allowed to be unfinished, the same would not be in the interest of neither parties, as the appellant is already suffering and deprived from the benefit of using the same besides continuing it to be abandoned would cause immense damage on account of rains and being exposed to sun light without proper care. On other hand, as the petitioner/plaintiff is not going to loose anything financially, even otherwise in the event of succeeding in the Suit, either can be adequately compensated by way of damages or the property be delivered back, therefore, in order to safeguard interest of both sides, without causing much harm, the construction by 3"^^ respondent should ' \ 28 CGR, J.
CMAN0473 of 2019 be allowed to be completed and in the event petitioner/plaintiff succeeds in the Suit, the subject property has to be delivered without claiming any equities.
29. This Court is conscious of the fact that the permission that is being granted now to 3^^^ defendant to complete the construction is not emanating from any specific prayer before the trial Court. It is only for first time the 3'^'^ defendant has filed such application before this Court pending the appeal. The appellant had no occasion to move such application before the trial Court inasmuch as there was never any injunction sought for as such from changing or altering nature of the suit schedule property. As observed above, the application before trial Court was only for granting injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject property. The pleadings and also documents placed before trial Court, as also the findings recorded, demonstrate that 3'"' defendant is in possession of the part of the suit schedule property, therefore, the grant of injunction suffers from culpable error. As there is no injunction as such restraining appellant/defendant No.3 to complete the balance construction, it has to be now seen whether this Court can grant such relief exercising appellate jurisdiction. SPSS'*.' 29 CGR, J CMANo,473of2019
-J
30. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliarice on Section 107 CPC to contend sub-section (2) thereof postulates the appellate Court with powers co-extensive to that of Court of original jurisdiction.
Section 107 CPC came to be considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sunil Sikri v. Guru Harkrishan Public School® and held as follows:
"21. As far as Section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, it declares that subject to such conditions and limitations that may be prescribed, the appellate court has the power to determine a case finally. It is also blessed with the power to remand a case. It can also frame issues and refer the issues for trial. It is also authorised to take additional evidence or permit the evidence to be taken. Section 107(2) declares that the appellate court would have the same power and perform nearly the same duty as are conferred and imposed on the courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.
22. Reliance placed on Section 107CPC, if inspiration is sought to be drawn to the emphasis supplied to the words "may decide the case finally", to find that there is express power to decide on the question of emoluments as well, does not appeal to us. The purport of the provisions in Section 107 is to only declare that the appellate court has a wide range of options, which include the power to finally decide the case. This should be understood to only mean that there is also a power to remand the case or to grant other relief, which may not result in the final disposal of the case. This cannot be understood as meaning that the appellate court has the express power to grant the relief of back wages or to decide upon the question as to whether the period of absence should be treated as duty. This is the power coupled with a duty which is squarely vested with the Management."
31. Taking cue from aforesaid passage, since this Court is only 1 considering to grant limited relief of allowing completion of balance construction, which, however, is made subject to outcome in the Suit, as (2022) 16 see 85 CGR, j X CMANo.473 of 2019 the said relief would not tantamount to deciding the substantive issues in the Suit, nor disposes the Suit itself, this Court deems it fit to exercise the powers so conferred on it.
32. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that ends of justice will be met by allowing the 3'""' respondent to complete the construction over part of suit schedule property, as per the sanction plan issued by the local body and further is restrained from creating any third party interest over subject property so constructed including mortgaging or alienating and further she shall file an undertaking within two weeks of passing of this Judgment that the building will be constructed at her risk and costs and will deliver the same back to the plaintiff in the event Suit is decreed either alongwith structures or by removing the same without claiming for damages. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is disposed of.
33. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed setting the impugned order, dated 03.09.2019, passed in I.A.No.180 of 2018 in O.S.No.89 of 2018 on the file of the IX Additional District Judge, Chittoor.
No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.
Sd/- S.V.S.R.MURTHY JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER One fair copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice CHALLA GUNARANJAN (for His Lordship's kind perusal) To,
1. The IX Additional District Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District, (with I records if any)
2. One CC to Sri. S S Bhatt, Advocate [OPUC
3. One CC to Sri. L J Veera Reddy, Advocate [OPUC]
4. One CC to Sri. Kopparthi Sumathi, Advocate [OPUC]
5. One CC to Sri. M Venkata Ramana Reddy, Advocate [OPUC]
6. Nine(09) L.R copies
7. The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi
8. The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings at Amaravathi
9. The Section Officer, V.R Section, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi
10.Two CD Copies Stu vna HIGH COURT DATED:01/09/2025 j(^f_ANOgg^ 5( 18 SEP 2025 COMMON JUDGMENT urrentSectiooXW I.A No.1 of 2025 in/and CMA NO. 473 OF 2019 DISPOSING OF THE I.A NO.1 OF 2025 ALLOWING THE CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL