Bombay High Court
Amir Jamal Khan Pathan And Another Etc. vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 15 September, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1995(3)BOMCR335, 1995CRILJ1957
JUDGMENT V.H. Bhairavia, J.
1. These three appeals out of the judgment and order dated 30th April 1991 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, in Sessions Case No. 122 of 1989, whereby the appellants-accused have been convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302, read with Section 149, I.P.C., and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer further R.I. for 3 months.
2. Two separate appeals have been filed against the order of conviction and sentence viz., Criminal Appeal No. 366 of 1991 filed by original accused Nos. 1 and 5 and Criminal Appeal No. 390 filed by original accused Nos. 2 to 4. The State has also preferred an appeal for enhancement of the sentence, being Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1991, Thus, all these three appeals have been heard together.
3. The respective appeals filed by the convicted accused challenge the order of their conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302, read with Section 149, I.P.C., sentencing them to undergo R.I. for life on the accusation that the appellants-accused and 2 more accused who have been tried along with the present appellants-accused but have been acquitted by the same order of the learned Judge, have committed murder of five innocent persons by pouring petrol in their room after closing and locking the door from outside, so that the victims could not come out of the room and setting the said room on fire. Therefore, it would be necessary to narrate the prosecution story in brief.
4. According to the prosecution, there is a railway building bearing No. 1003 adjoining to building No. 1004 situated in Waldhuni area at Kalyan. One Eknath Brahmane (P.W. 4), being a railway employee, was allotted room No. 7 situated on the ground floor of building No. 1003. It reveals that the said room was being used as a study room by the two sons of the said Eknath viz., Manohar and Sanjay. It further reveals that as this accommodation was inadequate for the family of Eknath, he was staying in another accommodation in Bhiwandiwala Chawl situated in the same Waldhuni area. It is alleged that prior to 2 1/2 months, one of the sons of Eknath viz., Manohar Brahmane, and one Rajesh were involved in one criminal case for attempting to commit murder of one Mohd. Baksh Jamalkhan Pathan (the brother of the appellant-accused No. 1) and, therefore, they were charge-sheeted for having committed offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 307, I.P.C., and thus they were under-trial prisoners. However, it reveals that Manohar and Rajesh were released on bail by the Court 8 days prior to the incident in question. It is further alleged that because of this involvement of Manohar and Rajesh, the appellant-accused No. 1 had a grudge against them. It is alleged that in he night between 20th October 1988 and 21st October 1988 the sons of Eknath viz., Sanjay and Manohar, were sleeping in room No. 7 along with their friends viz., Rajesh, Harshad Patel and Romi Antoni. These boys were sleeping in that room on that fateful night. It is further alleged that at about 3.45 a.m. on that night, those boys woke up on hearing noise of the window and saw something cold falling on their beds. It is alleged that accused Nos. 1 to 5 were seen by these boys outside the room near the window while the said accused were pouring petrol into the room through the window. The accused persons thereafter set that room on fire by throwing ignated match stick into the room. It is also alleged that the said room was locked by the accused persons from outside with a view that no one could come out.
5. It reveals from the record that one Mikman viz., Kanhayalal, a resident of Shivaji Nagar, Kalyan, who was supplying to the customers in Waldhuni area and the railway quarters, happened to go to the railway building for supplying milk on that morning at 4 a.m. on 21st October 1988. On reaching near room No. 7, he suspected fire in the said room. He immediately rushed to the room of Rajesh Rajmani and Manohar Bramhane and conveyed this information to the respective parents. On receiving this information, Santoshi (P.W. 3), the sister of Manohar Bramhane and the mother of Rajesh immediately rushed to the room and Eknath followed them. On reaching near the said room, they noticed the room locked from outside and also noticed fire in the said room. It is alleged that Eknath removed the bolt and the lock and entered into the said room. He saw Rajesh and Manohar in the bathroom with burn injuries. Eknath took out these two boys from the room. He also found three bodies of Sanjay Harshad Patel and Romi Antony lying on the floor in burned and dead conditions. It also reveals that this incident was reported by Eknath to the police on telephone and thereafter Manohar and Rajesh were taken to hospital. On receiving the telephonic message, police party reached to the spot and started making enquiries about the incident. As the two injured Manohar and Rajesh were admitted in the hospital and as their condition was deteriorating, the police officer thought it fit to get their dying declarations recorded. Therefore, he tried to find out the Special Executive Magistrate who was authorised to record the dying declarations but could not succeed to get Special Executive Magistrate. Therefore, one Dr. Prem Narayan Talarejn who was doctor by profession and was designated as a Special Executive Magistrate, was called to the Hospital to record the dying declaration of the two injured persons. Dr. Prem Narayan (P.W. 15) recorded the dying declarations of the two persons (Exhibits 59 and 60). It also reveals from the record that a complaint of Rajesh was also came to be recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector Shripat Malache (P.W. 20) disclosing the offence committed by the accused persons punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34, I.P.C., and this complaint (Exh. 69) was registered with the Mahatma Phule Police Station as Crime No. 389 of 1988 on 21st October 1988 at 7.45 a.m. It also reveals that the fire-brigade was also informed and fire-brigade also rushed to the spot and the fire was extinguished. Spot panchanama and inquest panchanama of the dead bodies lying in the room were also drawn. Post mortem of the dead bodies of the deceased persons were performed. Statements of witnesses were recorded. It further reveals that as the condition of Manohar and Rajesh was serious, they were transferred to K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay, Manohar died on 26th October 1988 and Rajesh died on 27th October 1988. It is alleged thereafter the accused persons were arrested and were charge-sheeted and were committed to the Sessions Court to stand their trial. After framing the charges against the accused persons, they were prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C., is to be noted here that on investigation, the Investigation Officer found that accused Nos. 6 and 7 were also involved in the commission of the offence and, therefore, they were also arrested and charge-sheeted for the same offence and the charge was altered from Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C., to Section 302 read with Section 149, I.P.C. After recording the evidence, the learned Judge held accused Nos. 1 to 5 guilty for committing the murder of five persons by pouring petrol into the room and setting the said room on fire and convicted them and sentenced to suffer R.I. for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer R.I. for 3 months. Accused Nos. 6 and 7 have been acquitted for the offences with which they were charged. Hence these appeals by the respective appellants against the order of their conviction and sentence.
6. Heard Mr. S. G. Samant, learned counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 390 of 1991, Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 366 of 1991, and Mr. D. A. Nalawade, A.P.P., for the respondents in the above appeals and for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1991.
7. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants accused that the order of conviction is based on no evidence against the appellants-accused and, therefore, the appellants-accused are entitled for acquittal. The learned counsel Mr. Samant has emphatically submitted that the conviction of the appellants-accused came to be recorded by the learned trial Judge relying on the two dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60). He has submitted that there is no direct evidence connecting the appellants-accused with the crime. He further submitted that there is no perfect chain of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused persons with the crime. The learned counsel has firstly challenged the validity of the two dying declartions (Exhibits 59 and 60). It is submitted that said alleged two dying declarations were not recorded by the competent authority. He pointed out from the evidence of Dr. Prem Narayan and (P.W. 16) that though he is a Special Executive Magistrate, he was not an authorised Magistrate for recording dying declarations and, therefore, these two dying declarations deserve to be discarded. Mr. Samant has vehemently submitted that the two dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) to be treated as statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. According to him, a statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code made before a Magistrate who is empowered to record the statement, is admissible. The learned counsel has submitted that as those statements are not recorded by the Magistrate who is empowered to record the same, they have to be excluded from the evidence, and conviction cannot be based on such invalid statements. In support of his argument, the learned counsel has relied on a ruling in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, . In our opinion, this is a very absurd argument advanced by the learned counsel. Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under :-
164(1) : "Any Metropllitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate may, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any confession or statement made to him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or under any other law for the time being in force, or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry or trial."
It is clear from the plain reading of this section that a confession or statement made before the competent Magistrate should be proved by oral evidence of that Magistrate before whom the confession or statement is made by the maker of the statement and if that is proved by the said Magistrate, that statement is admissible in evidence.
8. So far as the ratio laid down in the authority cited by the learned counsel is concerned, we have no quarrel on this point. But we cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the two dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) are to be treated and read as statements under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and as these statements are not recorded by the competent Magistrate, they are to be discarded. According to him, if Exhibits 59 and 60 are excluded from the record, no evidence remains against the appellants-accused. The second contention of the learned counsel is that the dying declarations are doubtful for the simple reason that though the injured Manohar and Rajesh had been taken to the police station, they did not disclose the names of the assailants. It has also been submitted that the injured did not disclose the names of the assailants immediately even before Eknath and Santosh who had reached the spot first in time. Further, it has been submitted that deceased Manohar and Rajesh did not disclose the names of the appellants to Dr. Gaikwad immediately after they were admitted in the hospital. The deceased only mentioned to the police.
"Some persons have burnt us."
It has been further submitted that the dying declaration (Exhibits 59 and 60) came to be recorded after 1 1/2 hours after deceased Manohar and Rajesh were admitted in the hospital and the dying declarations were recorded at 7.10 a.m. and 7.20 a.m. respectively, and till then the deceased did not disclose the names of the appellants to any one. Admittedly, Eknath and the police officer were there all the time. This creates doubts about credibility and truthfulness of the dying declarations disclosing the names of the appellants-accused and there was every opportunity to tutor the deceased and therefore, the contents of the dying declaration cannot be relied upon.
9. Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned counsel for the appellants-accused Nos. 1 and 5, after adopting the above arguments, submitted that the evidence of the rickshaw driver Vilas Shankar Shinde (P.W. 10) is a created evidence with a view to corroborate the dying declarations of the deceased. It has been submitted that though this witness was plying rickshaw in the night and he was to maintain a log book, no entry was found about plying of the rickshaw on the night of the incident. It has also been argued that the incident took place on the morning of 21st October 1988 and the statement of this witness was recorded on 27th October 1988 i.e., after 7 days. Therefore, his evidence cannot be used as a corroborative piece of evidence and it does not provide any chain leading to the circumstances connecting the appellants-accused with the crime in question. The second contention of Mr. Mundargi is that the discovery of key is not proved by the prosecution. It has been submitted that only the memorandum of panchanama and the discovery panchanama (Exhibit 79) has been produced in the Court but the panchas were not examined by the prosecution in support of that panchanama. The learned counsel has also pointed out from the said panchanama the confessional statement made by the appellant-accused No. 1 which reads thus :
"On 21-10-1988 at 3.45 hours I and my companions together poured the petrol in the room of Railway Quarter at Waldhuni and set it on fire by lighting a match stick and Sanjay Brahmane and others were killed by burning them in fire. At that time I locked the room from outside and the key of the lock is kept by me in a room in the chawl of Venubai Jadhav at Sindhigate in which room my brother Mohamadbux Jamalkhan Pathan was living. The key has been kept hidden by me on the rafter of roof under roof tiles."
Admittedly, no panch witness has been examined in support of this panchanama as one of the panchas was reported to be dead and the second panch was not tracable. The investigating officer, however, has deposed in his evidence that the panchanama was drawn in his presence and the panchas had signed over it and he has also countersigned on this panchanama (Exh. 79). He has also proved the contents of the panchanama in his oral evidence. The learned counsel has vehemently submitted that the key is alleged to have been discovered at the instance of accused No. 1, the prosecution has failed to prove that the discovered key was the same key which was applied to the lock and found to be fitted with it. No witness has been examined on that point. The evidence of the P.S.I. is not sufficient to prove this. Therefore, there is no substantial evidence connecting accused Nos. 1 and 5 with the crime.
10. Having gone through the entire record and proceedings of the present case, we do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants-accused. It is true that the entire prosecution case proceeded on the two dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) and the learned Judge has also relied on these two dying declarations. The submission of the learned counsel Mr. Samant that as the alleged dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) were not recorded by the competent authority, they should be discarded, is not a sound proposition in law. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), , it has been observed thus (para 8) :-
".......... to sustain a conviction in such cases, the circumstantial evidence must be complete and must be incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. It is also true that the dying declaration which is not recorded by a Magistrate has to be scrutinised closely, but it is well settled that if the Court is satisfied on a close scrutiny of the dying declaration that it is truthful, it is open to the Court to convict the accused on its basis without any independent corroboration."
11. The learned Public Prosecutor has cited some authorities in support of his submissions, viz., (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; (4) AIR 1993 SC 1180 : (1993 Cri LJ 298); (5) 1994 SCC (Cri) 719 : (1994 Cri LJ 942); (6) .
12. The above cited authorities were also relied on in the judgment delivered in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, , wherein it has been observed thus (paras 16 and 17) :-
"It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties."
"In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that, that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities."
In the case of Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, , it has been observed thus (para 7) :-
"There is no requirement of law that dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate. What evidentiary value or weight has to be attached to such statement, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In a proper case, it may be permissible to convict a person only on the basis of a dying declaration in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case."
However, as per the legal position discussed above, the recent view of the Supreme Court is that in the case of more than one dying declarations and if one of them is recorded by the Executive Magistrate, weight should be given to that dying declaration in preference to others. It is not a rule that dying declaration must be recorded by the Executive Magistrate alone and that position is made very much clear by the Apex Court in the above referred cases. Therefore, in the instant case, the dying declarations recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate Dr. Prem Narayan (P.W. 16) who was an Executive Magistrate but who was not entrusted with the duty of recording dying declarations cannot be discarded. There is evidence of P.S.I. Malache (P.W. 20) that immediately after the deceased were admitted in the hospital, they tried to contact the Executive Magistrate who was empowered to record dying declarations but he was not available and, therefore, he contacted P.W. 16 Dr. Prem Narayan as the condition of the injured was deteriorating and under that circumstances thought it fit to get the dying declarations recorded immediately. Under these circumstances, this witness (P.W. 16) Dr. Prem Narayan was brought to the hospital and the dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) were recorded in the presence of Dr. Gaikwad (P.W. 15) who has endorsed on the dying declarations that the patient was in a fit condition to give statement. We find the endorsement on the dying declaration itself that the patient was conscious at the time of beginning of recording the dying declaration and at the time of ending of recording the dying declaration. It is in the form of question and answer. The learned counsel Mr. Samant made a point for his argument that it was not recorded by the Magistrate (P.W. 16) himself but it was written by the police constable in Marathi language. P.W. 16 has stated that he can understand and speak Marathi very well but he cannot write. Therefore, he took the help of the police constable as a writer. The police constable was taking down the questions put by P.W. 16 and the answers given by the deceased or the deponents. He has categorically stated that he was watching the writing of the police constable and verifying what was being written by him. The recording of the dying declarations has taken place in the presence of Dr. Gaikwad. All the precautions were taken before the dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60) were recorded. No relative of the patients was allowed to remain near the bed of the patients. The opinion of the doctor was also endorsed on the paper and this witness (P.W. 16) himself verified and satisfied with the physical and mental condition of the deceased. Thus, there is no reason to discard his evidence and the truthfulness of the dying declarations. It is an approved rule of the Apex Court that once the Court is satisfied that the testimony regarding the dying declaration recorded by any officer who may or may not be competent officer, inspires its confidence and does not leave any shadow of doubt, the Court can act upon and rely upon the dying declaration alone and need not require any corroboration. In the instant case; we do not see any discrepancy in the dying declarations (Exhibits 59 and 60). The doubts created by the learned counsel for the appellants-accused, are unsustainable and, therefore, they are rejected.
13. So far as the circumstantial evidence brought on record particularly the evidence of the rickshaw driver Vilas Shankar Shinde (P.W. 10) is concerned, his evidence that his rickshaw was hired by accused No. 1 and accused No. 6, in that rickshaw they carried tins to the petrol pump and brought back the said tins filled with petrol and went to a particular place, cannot be discarded simply on the ground that he has come forward for giving statement after seven days. This witness has also categorically stated that he read in the newspaper about the incident and he remembered about the passengers who hired his rickshaw on the particular day of the incident and who had taken his rickshaw to the petrol pump and from where they had taken petrol and returned back to a particular place where they got down from the rickshaw. There is no reason for this witness to falsely involve these accused persons because there is no evidence showing any enmity between accused No. 1 and this witness. The reason for not coming to the police station immediately need not be explained and that will not discredit his evidence in view of the other circumstances. Until he read in the newspaper, he did not suspect anything happened on the night in question. Immediately after reading the news item, he has voluntarily gone to the police station and given his statement. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Mundargi is unsustainable.
14. Mr. Mundargi, learned counsel for the appellant-accused No. 1 has submitted that the discovery panchanama could not be held proved to the extent the key discovered at the instance of accused No. 1 was not the same key applied to the lock. There is substance in the submission of the learned counsel. In the absence of specific evidence in support of this panchanama, the said discovery panchanama cannot be held to be proved.
15. Mr. Nalawade, learned A.P.P., also fully assisted the Court by citing some relevant authorities on the point of accepting the dying declarations in question and the circumstantial evidence. The submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor are also covered by our above observations and the same need not be repeated here again.
16. In view of the above facts and circumstances and our observations, there is no substance in these appeals which deserve to be dismissed.
17. We are in full agreement with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. However, Mr. Nalawade, the learned A.P.P., has emphatically pressed the State appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1991, and submitted that the sentence of R.I. for life is not adequate punishment to the persons who brutally killed innocent persons by pouring petrol into the room by closing the door from outside and locking the same, thereby giving no chance to them to escape and save their lives and, therefore, they deserve no mercy looking to the manner in which the victims have been killed. The learned Prosecutor has cited a ruling in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab,. He thus submitted that the sentence may be enhanced and the maximum punishment should be awarded to the accused. In our opinion, the accused persons do not deserve any mercy and the sentence awarded by the learned Judge, in our opinion, looking to the seriousness of the offence and the motive behind committing the crime they deserve the maximum punishment. But looking to the facts and circumstances of the genesis of this crime, we are completely in dark about meeting of the five accused persons at a particular time, making up their mind to commit the crime and the motive for committing the said crime. It reveals from the record that no doubt there was a strong motive to take revenge against deceased Manohar and deceased Rajesh for their alleged involvement in the alleged commission of offence under S. 307, IPC on the accusation that they have attempted to murder Mohd. Baksh Jamalkhan Pathan, the brother of accused No. 1. In our view, accused Nos. 2 to 5 must have extended their support to accused No. 1 in taking revenge for the alleged assault on the brother of accused No. 1 by the two deceased persons. Therefore, though we are fully convinced that the accused persons are the culprits of the offence and the charge is held proved against them, we are not inclined to enhance the sentence. We feel that the sentence of R.I. for life imposed on the 5 accused persons would not bring back the lives of the five deceased persons but at the same time hanging these accused persons would also not serve the purpose of preventing the crime looking to the age group of the deceased group and comparing the same with that of the accused persons who are between 26 and 32, whereas the deceased were aged 20 and 22 years respectively. The ends of justice will be met if the accused persons are treated as per the guidelines issued by the Government of Maharashtra in its letter dated 11th May 1992 falling under the category 'Murder committed with premeditation and with exceptional violence or perversity.
18. With the above observations, we dismiss all the three appeals.
19. Appeals dismissed.