Allahabad High Court
Meena Kumari vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 21 January, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIR 2019 (NOC) 341 (ALL), 2019 (2) ALJ 754, (2019) 133 ALL LR 815, (2019) 134 ALL LR 507, (2019) 144 REVDEC 151, (2019) 144 REVDEC 279, (2019) 2 ALL WC 1359, AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 459
Author: Vivek Kumar Birla
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 30 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1497 of 2019 Petitioner :- Meena Kumari Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Vishal Tandon Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Shrinath Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.P. Singh, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents.
2. Present petition has been filed for quashing the impugned order dated 31.12.2018 passed by the respondent no. 2-District Magistrate, Kaushambi.
3. By the impugned order in exercising powers under Section 95(1)g of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner have been ceased and a final inquiry has been directed.
4. Shorn of details, necessary relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner was given a show cause notice dated 16.10.2018, wherein charges were mentioned. In the preliminary inquiry conducted before issuance of show cause notice dated 16.10.2018 the charges were found to be prima facie proved allegedly mainly on the basis that the petitioner has failed to supply muster roll and other records as demanded. In response to the show cause notice reply was submitted by the petitioner on 12.11.2018 annexing therewith muster roll and all other documents and on that the District Magistrate directed scrutiny of the reply and documents submitted by the petitioner for the purpose of recording a prima facie satisfaction for exercising powers under Section 95(1)g of the Act. A fresh report dated 24.12.2018 was submitted by the inquiry committee and on the basis of this report a prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the District Magistrate and the order impugned herein was passed.
5. Challenging the same, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that after fresh inquiry new facts have been taken into account and new findings have been recorded and therefore, a fresh show cause notice should have been given to the petitioner. He submits that the fresh findings are in regard to the construction of a boundary wall, rebore of handpumps and construction of toilets.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there are two stages in this case when the principles of natural justice are bound to be followed; one stage of passing the orders for the purpose of ceasing financial and administrative powers of the elected Gram Pradhan after preliminary inquiry, and subsequent stage is final inquiry. He further submits that in the present case the impugned order is in violation of principles of natural justice. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the second inquiry committee has conducted after spot inspection.
7. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments in the cases of Shamim vs. State of U.P. and others 2018(6) ADJ 1 (F.B.), Rama Shanker Barnwal vs. State of U.P. and others 2000 (1) AWC 168, Ramashankar Chauhan vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ C No. 38979 of 2016), Hari Ram Gupta vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ C No. 61251 of 2017), Paras Jain vs. State of U.P. and others 2015 LawSuit (All) 3561, Vivekanand Yadav vs. State of U.P. and another 2010(10) ADJ 1, Nagar Panchayat Safipur vs. State of U.P. and others 2014(10) ADJ 608, Amichand vs. State of U.P. and others 2009 (7) ADJ 214 and Masiuddin Naimuddin vs. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad and another AIR 1966 All 265.
8. Placing reliance on the abovenoted judgments crux of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that since fresh findings have come, therefore, a fresh show cause notice should have been given to the petitioner.
9. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel submits that it is only prima facie satisfaction that has to be recorded at this stage and that no fresh charge has been included.
10. I have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record.
11. Before proceeding further it would be relevant to quote relevant extraction of Section 48(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which is quoted as under:-
"48. Removal of President. -
(1) [* * *] (2) Where the State Government has, at any time, reason to believe that, -
(a) there has been a failure on the part of the President in performing his duties; or
(b) die President has -
(i) incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sections 12-D and 43-AA; or
(ii) within the meaning of Section 82 knowingly acquired or continued to have, directly or indirectly or by a partner, any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature, in any contract or employment with by or on behalf of the [Municipality]; or
(iii) knowingly acted as a President or as a member in a matter other than a matter referred to in clauses (a) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 32, in which he has, directly or indirectly or by a partner, any share or interest whether pecuniary or of any other nature, or in which he was professionally interested on behalf of a client, principal or other person; or
(iv) being a legal practitioner acted or appeared in any suit or other proceeding on behalf of any person against the [Municipality] or against the State Government in respect of nazul land entrusted to the management of the [Municipality] or against the State Government in respect of nazul land entrusted to the management of the [Municipality], or acted or appeared for or on behalf of any person against whom a criminal proceeding has been instituted by or on behalf of the [Municipality]; or
(v) abandoned his ordinary place of residence in the municipal area concerned; or [(vii) during the current or the last preceding term of the](vi) been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or [Municipality], acting as President or [* * *], or as Chairman of a Committee, or as member or in any other capacity whatsoever, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, so flagrantly abused his position, or so wilfully contravened any of the provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law, or caused such loss of damage to fund or property of the [Municipality] as to render him unfit to continue to be President; or
(viii) been guilty of any other misconduct whether committed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 whether as President or as [* * *], exercising the powers of President, or as [* * *], or as member; or [(ix) caused loss or damage to any property of the municipality; or
(x) misappropriated or misused of Municipal found; or
(xi) acted against the interest of the municipality; or
(xii) contravened the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder; or
(xiii) created an obstacle in a meeting of the municipality in such manner that it becomes impossible for the municipality to conduct its business in the meeting or instigated someone to do so; or
(xiv) wilfully contravened any order or direction of the State Government given under this Act; or
(xv) misbehaved without any lawful justification with the officers or employees of the municipality; or (xvi) disposed of any property belonging to the municipality at a price less than its market value; or (xvii) encroached, or assisted or instigated any other person to encroach upon the land, building or any other immovable property of the municipality;] it may call upon him to show cause within the time to be specified in the notice why he should not be removed from office.
[Provided that where the State Government has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds of this sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show-cause notice and proceedings under this sub-section he shall, from the date of issuance of the show-cause notice containing charges, cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show-cause notice issued to him under this sub-section and finalization of the proceedings under sub-section (2-A) and the said powers, functions and duties of the President during the period of such ceasing, shall be exercised, performed and discharged by the District Magistrate or an officer nominated by him not below the rank of Deputy Collector]. [* * *] [* * *] [(2B) An order passed by the State Government under sub-section (2-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.] (3) [* * *] [(4) A President removed under sub-section (2-A) shall also cease to be a member of the] [Municipality] and in case of removal on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clause (vi), (vii) or (viii) of clause (b) of subsection (2) shall not be eligible for re-election as President or member for a period of five years from the date of his removal."
12. Provisions of Section 95(1)g of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 are also quoted as under:-
"95. Inspection - (1) The State Government may -
(a) cause to be inspected an immovable property owned used or occupied by a Gram Panchayat, or a joint committee 1[or a Nyaya Panchayat] or any work in progress under the direction of such [Gram Panchayat] or Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat].
(b) by an order in writing call for and inspect a book or document in the possession or under the control of a Gram Panchayat or a Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat.
(c) by an order in writing require a Gram Panchayat or a Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat to furnish such statements, reports or copies of documents relating to the proceedings or duties of the Gram Panchayat or such committee or a Nyaya Panchayat as it thinks fit;
(d) record in writing for the consideration of a Gram Panchayat or Joint Committee any observation which it thinks proper in regard to the proceedings or duties of such Gram Panchayat or Joint Committee.
(e) institute any enquiry in respect of any matter relating to a Gram Sabha, Gram Panchayat or Nyaya Panchayat; and
(f) 3[* * *] dissolve any Gram Panchayat, Joint Committee, Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or Nyaya Panchayat if in the opinion of the State Government such Gram Panchayat, Joint Committee [Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti] or Nyaya Panchayat has abused its position or has continuously failed to perform the duties imposed upon it by or under this Act or its continuance is not considered desirable in public interest;
Explanation. - [* * *] [(g) remove a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or member of a Gram Panchayat] or a Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he -
i- absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings.
ii- refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude.
iii- has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by this Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or iii-a has taken the benefit of reservation under sub-section (2) of Section 11-A or sub-section (5) or Section 12, as the case may be, on the basis of a false declaration subscribed by him stating that he is a member of Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the backward classes, as the case may be.] iv- being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics, or v- suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5-A;
[Provided that where, in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Pradhan or Up-Pradhan shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a Committee consisting of three members of Gram Panchayat appointed by the State Government.] [(gg) [* * *];
[(h) [* * *];
[Provided that -
i- No action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) 5[* * *] except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed;] ii- 1[* * *] (2) A person under sub-clause (iii) and (iv) of clause (g) of sub-section (1) of this section shall not be entitled to be re-elected or re-appointed to any office under this Act for a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may order in any case.
(3) No order made by the State Government under this section shall be called in question in any Court.
(4) Where any 2[* * *], Gram Panchayat, Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti is 3[dissolved] the State Government may appoint such person or persons to exercise and perform the powers and duties thereof as it may deem fit."
13. In the case of Shamim (supra) following questions were for consideration of Hon'ble Full Bench:-
"(i) As to whether the District Magistrate at the point of time when he proceeds to cease the administrative and financial authority of the Pradhan, he acts as a Tribunal or acts as an administrative authority.
(ii) The view as expressed in the case of Smt. Sonia (supra) that under the scheme of things provided for under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, the District Magistrate exercising delegated authority of State Government acts as Tribunal is a correct view or District Magistrate exercises administrative authority, while exercising authority under Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947."
14. The same were answered by Hon'ble Full Bench as under:-
"We accordingly proceed to answer the reference in the following terms:
(A). The District Magistrate exercising delegated authority of the State Government, is a Tribunal exercising quasi judicial power by a quasi judicial authority under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act while proceeding to cease the administrative and financial authority of the Pradhan pending final enquiry.
(B). Re-Question (i):The decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Sonia vs. State of U.P. (supra) lays down the correct position of law."
15. In view of the aforesaid, therefore, there is no quarrel with the law that the District Magistrate acts as Tribunal exercising quasi judicial power by quasi judicial authority.
16. It may, however, be noticed that Section 2 proviso to Section 95(1)g of the Act itself provides for reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed.
17. The questions before Hon'ble 5 Judges Full Bench in Paras Jain (supra) are quoted as under:-
"(a) Whether the Full Bench judgment in the case of Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Vs. State of U.P. (supra) lays down the correct law;
(b) Whether in view of the language of the proviso to Section 48(2) of the U P Municipalities Act, there can be any proceedings for removal of the President without his financial and administrative powers ceasing, under the proviso;
(c) Whether cessation of financial and administrative powers of the President follows automatically with the issuance of a show cause notice under Section 48 (2) calling upon him to show cause as to why he may not be removed;
(d) Whether any separate order for cessation of financial and administrative powers of the President is required to be made while issuing a notice under the proviso to Section 48(2) or such cessation follows automatically; and
(e) Whether in view of the specific language of Section 48(2), the question of opportunity of hearing before cessation of the financial and administrative powers of the President stands excluded."
18. After interpreting Section 48 (2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act thereto, the questions were answered by Hon'ble Full Bench as under:-
"We accordingly proceed to answer the reference in the following terms:
(I) Re Question (a): The decision of the Full Bench in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Vs State of U P (supra) lays down the correct position in law.
(II) Re Questions (b) & (c): The cessation of financial and administrative powers of the President does not necessarily follow merely upon the issuance of a notice to show cause under the substantive part of Section 48(2). The financial and administrative powers of the President shall stand ceased if the State Government has reason to believe that (i) the allegations do not appear to be groundless; and (ii) the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds of sub-section (2) resulting in the issuance of the notice to show cause and proceedings thereunder. The President of the municipality will, in that event, cease to exercise, perform and discharge financial and administrative powers, functions and duties from the date of the issuance of the notice to show cause containing the charges. For a cessation of financial and administrative powers to take effect, the requirements of the proviso to Section 48(2) must be fulfilled. Hence, proceedings for removal of a President of a municipality under Section 48(2) may take place in a given situation though the financial and administrative powers have not ceased under the terms of the proviso.
(III) Re Question (d): There is no requirement under the statute that a separate order has to be passed under the proviso to Section 48(2) when the financial and administrative powers of the President of a municipality cease. Such a consequence would come into being upon the requirements specified in the proviso to Section 48(2) being fulfilled.
(IV) Re Question (e): An opportunity of being heard, consistent with the principles of natural justice, before there is a cessation of the financial and administrative powers of the President does not stand excluded by the provisions of Section 48(2). As a matter of textual interpretation, the requirement of complying with the principles of natural justice is an integral element of the proviso to Section 48(2). The requirements of natural justice would warrant the grant of an opportunity to the elected head of a municipality to respond to the notice issued by the State indicating the basis for the formation of a reason to believe that the charges do not appear to be groundless and that the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 48. The period of notice can be suitably molded to deal with the exigencies of the situation."
19. Apart from conclusion drawn as noted above in Paras Jain (supra) in paragraphs 37 and 39 it has further been observed:-
"37. ........ A finding of prima facie guilt must, in our view, be consistent with a prior fulfillment of the norms of natural justice, consistent with the stage of enquiry. ......."
"39. ........ The minimum requirement of the principle is that the President of a municipality should be made aware of the grounds on which the action against him is proposed in the formulation of the charges which are issued to him, as mandated by the proviso. ......"
20. The questions before Hon'ble Full Bench in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) are quoted as under:-
"14. The counsel for the parties have formulated the following questions from the referring orders that are referred to us:
(i) Whether the pradhan is required to be associated in the preliminary enquiry under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the UP Panchayat Raj Act?
(ii) In case, the preliminary enquiry is adverse to the pradhan then, whether an opportunity is necessary before passing an order ceasing financial and administrative powers of the pradhan?
(iii) If the District Magistrate has sufficient material to undertake a formal enquiry then, is he still required to hold a preliminary enquiry?
(iv) Whether the following observations in Chunmun v. District Magistrate, Sonbhadra reported in 1998 (3) AWC 1892 (paragraph 8 ) (the Chunmun case) are correct:"
21. Relevant paragraphs and the conclusion drawn by Hon'ble Full Bench in the Vivekanand Yadav (supra) are quoted as under:-
"65. The Municipalities Act contemplates cessation of power on notices being issued, fulfilling the conditions under proviso to section 42(2) of the Municipalities Act. Apart from other conditions, one of the conditions is that the State Government should have reason to believe that the allegation against the president are not groundless and he is prima facie guilty of the charges. In Hafiz case, we have held that the belief of the State Government or satisfaction has to based on the material. The basic question involved there was:
Should the President be involved while collecting the material;
Is the president entitled to any opportunity before ceasing his financial and administrative powers.
66. The aforesaid questions are also involved in these cases as well. It is for this reason that these questions, in connection of pradhan of a gram panchayat, were also considered in the Hafiz case. It is held there that:
'It is not necessary to involve a head of a local body in the process of collecting material or in the preliminary inquiry. However, it is necessary to ask and consider his explanation, or point of view or version regarding charges before issuing notice under the relevant provisos under the different enactments'. {see 6th and 7th POINT: PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION SHOULD BE SEEN (paragraph 132)}.
67. In these cases, there was an additional argument for opportunity being given namely applicability of proviso to section 95(1) to the proviso to section 95(1)(g). However, we have negated it, while deciding the first point.
68. In view of our decision and reasons detailed in the Hafiz case, a pradhan is neither entitled to be associated in the preliminary enquiry nor is he entitled to get the copy of the preliminary enquiry report--his only right is to have his explanation or point of view or version to the charges considered before the order for ceasing his financial and administrative power is passed.
69. In the cases, cited before us from the petitioners' side (see below)4, it was held that association of the head of the local body in the preliminary inquiry was necessary. With due respect, we do not agree with them.
107. Our conclusions are as follows:
(a) The DM may ask the preliminary enquiry to be conducted by any officer defined under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules on a complaint or a report under rule 3 or any other material or information. He has suo motu powers as well to order a preliminary enquiry;
(b) A pradhan has no right to object that complaint or report is not in accordance with rule 3 of the Enquiry Rules;
(c) A pradhan is neither entitled to be associated in the preliminary enquiry nor is entitled to the copy of the preliminary report. However, before an order ceasing the financial and administrative power is passed, his explanation or point of view or the version to the charges should be obtained and considered;
(d) In the first and the third WPs, the impugned orders have been passed on the basis of preliminary report after obtaining and considering the explanation of the pradhan. The impugned orders in these WPs cannot be faulted on this ground;
(e) In our opinion the word 'otherwise' in rule 5 includes and the DM can rely upon the following reports only to cease financial and administrative power and direct the final enquiry:
A report of a person who is also defined as an enquiry officer under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules--irrespective of whether he was directed by the DM to conduct the preliminary inquiry or not;
A preliminary enquiry report conducted by the DM himself.
(f) In the third writ petition, the report was submitted by the DPRO, who is defined as an enquiry officer under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules. The impugned order cannot be faulted on the ground that the DPRO was not asked by the DM to conduct the preliminary enquiry;"
22. In the case of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur (supra) (DB) is also related to Section 48 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and are now covered by decision of 5 Judges Full Bench in Paras Jain (supra). The other cases are related to the cancellation of fair price shop license or armed license, where the final orders have been passed.
23. There is no quarrel with the law and as also held by Five Judges of this Court in the case of Paras Jain (supra) that if the principles of natural justice are not included in the provision still they have to be followed otherwise the same may be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
24. Now coming to the facts of the case, on perusal of record, I find that there is no difference in the charges that were mentioned in the show cause notice dated 16.10.2018 to which the petitioner has submitted his reply and the charge on which subsequent findings have been recorded by the Inquiry Committee. It is only on those charges the District Magistrate in all his fairness found it appropriate to have further inquiry in view of the reply before exercising his powers under Section 95(1)g of the Act in respect of ceasing of financial and administrative powers of the petitioner. It is only thereafter a prima facie satisfaction has been recorded. On perusal of record I find that detailed findings of the inquiry committee after considering the muster roll and other documents filed by the petitioner while replying the show cause notice have been considered and on that basis the findings have been recorded by the inquiry committee while submitting its report and thereafter on that basis prima facie satisfaction has been recorded by the District Magistrate applying his own mind.
25. Some of the judgments that have been relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner are in relation to the proceedings initiated before passing the final order or removal from the post.
26. In Full Bench decision in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) this Court clearly lays down that only right of a Gram Pradhan is to have his explanation or point of view or version to the charges considered before the order for ceasing his financial and administrative power is passed. In the present case the charges were same and the reply of the petitioner submitted alongwith record to the show cause notice was considered and in all his fairness the District Magistrate directed further preliminary inquiry and thereafter, on the same charges he has recorded prima facie satisfaction before passing the order of ceasing the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner.
27. Some of the judgments which were specifically placed before this Court are also related to the proceedings of final orders of cancellation of fair price shop, wherein it was held that if a charge is levelled but the final order is passed on fresh charge, the petitioner is entitled for a fresh show cause notice.
28. Admittedly, the petitioner was given a show cause notice to which he submitted his reply and it on due consideration of his reply the District Magistrate directed further preliminary inquiry. Thus, not only the principles of natural justice stood satisfied but infact, due attention was paid by the District Magistrate to the reply submitted by the petitioner. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the final inquiry is yet to be concluded. It is only preliminary inquiry to which the petitioner has no right to participate or even to have a preliminary inquiry reoprt as per the settled law. It is not final in nature insofar as adverse findings against the petitioner is concerned.
29. Thus, it is clear that as per Paras Jain (supra) requirement of fulfillment of norms of natural justice has to be consistent with the stage of inquiry. Undisputedly, in the present case it is the stage of preliminary inquiry and the final inquiry and the result thereof is yet to come and undisputedly, in the present case the petitioner was made aware of which action proposed to him as in the present case paying attention to the reply submitted by the petitioner further inquiry was got directed by the District Magistrate and prima facie satisfaction was drawn.
30. Paras Jain (FB) (supra) was a case of removal of President of municipality as per the proviso to Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act. In the present case, the provision of Section 95(1)(g) of the Act is different where the show cause notice does not automatically entails ceasing of financial and administrative powers of the petitioner. The final inquiry is yet to take place to which the petitioner is entitled to file his defence. Thus, Paras Jain (supra) is of no help to the petitioner and is clearly distinguishable.
31. In the present case, I find that the principles of natural justice were duly followed at the first stage also, as after preliminary inquiry show cause notice was duly given to the petitioner to which he has submitted his reply and thereafter, after considering the reply and other documents submitted by the petitioner, for the purpose of recording prima facie satisfaction for passing orders of ceasing of financial and administrative powers of the petitioner further inquiry was directed. The petitioner was admittedly granted opportunity of hearing at the first stage and his reply was duly considered, therefore, I do not find any substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that at the first stage the principles of natural justice were not followed. It is the settled law that this principle of natural justice is not straight jacket formula. Suffice to refer to one judgment in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indina Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia and others (2005) 7 SCC 764 in this regard. The contention, therefore, is baseless and is hereby rejected.
32. In such view of the matter, the ratio of law as placed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly distinguishable and for the discretion made hereinabove I do not find any good ground to interfere in the order impugned herein.
33. For the discussions made hereinabove, present petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Order Date :- 21.1.2019 Lalit Shukla