Orissa High Court
Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, ... vs Ramesh Chandra Gouda And Anr. on 13 April, 1994
Equivalent citations: [1995(70)FLR468], (1994)IILLJ1127ORI
JUDGMENT L. Rath, J.
1. An award of the Labour Court in favour of the opposite party No. 1 directing the reinstatement with full back wages is the subject-matter of challenge. Though there is some difference between the petitioner and the opposite party No. 1 regarding his earlier spells of appointment, it is the common case of the parties that he continued in the O.R.T. Company as a casual watcher on daily wage basis from February 14, 1986 to January 14, 1987 whereafter he was no longer employed. The conciliation proceeding taken up by the Labour Officer having failed, the matter was ultimately referred to the Labour Court by the Government to decide whether the termination of services of the opposite party No. l with effect from January 15, 1987 was legal and/or justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled. The Labour Court considering the respective cases advanced by both the parties as also taking into consideration the documents placed and the oral evidence adduced, came to the conclusion of the opposite party No. 1 having been in continuous employment for more than 240 days with the petitioner and he being entitled to the protection as a workman under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which had not been followed. In coming to the conclusion, the Labour Court negatived the plea of the petitioner of the non- continuance of the opposite party No. 1's employment since January 15, 1987 to be not retrenchment being covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act.
2. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged the self-same question before us. It is his submission that since the opposite party No. 1 was a daily wager he had a contract of employment with the management from day to day and if the contract is not renewed after any day, it is a case of termination of service of the workman as a result of non-renewal of contract of employment and hence is not retrenchment as provided under Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act.
3. For appreciation of the argument advanced, Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act is necessary to be extracted:
"2. Definition - In this Act, unless there is, anything repugnant in the subject or context, xx xx xx (oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as apunishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-
xx xx xx (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or"
The provision is in two parts, the first dealing with the termination of service as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment, and the second dealing with the contract being terminated in accordance with the stipulation in it. In the present case we are concerned with the interpretation of the first part of the section. "Non-renewal of the contract of employment" would pre-suppose an existing contract of employment which is not renewed. It is of course true that even in respect of a daily wager a contract of employment may exist, such contract being from day to day. The position is different when such a contract is in reality a comouflage for a more sustaining nature of arrangement, but the mode of daily wager is adopted so as to avoid the rigors of the Act. To us it appears that Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 does not contemplate to cover a contract such as of a daily wager and is rather intended to be more general class of contracts where a regular contract of employment is entered into and the termination of the service comes about because of non-renewal of that contract. Such a meaning to be given to Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 is in consonance with the substantive provision of Clause (oo) which defines "retrenchment" as a termination by the employer of services of a workman for any reason whatsover. It is hence the general intention of the legislature that all types of termination of services are to be covered by "retrenchment" except the events excepted in Sub-clauses (a) to (c). It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigours interpretation and only govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in this case to treat any termination of services as retrenchment except what is strictly excepted. This view also gets added support from the definition of "workman" in Section 2(s) which does not make any distinction between a regular employee and a casual employee and means any person including an apprentice employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work. Since a daily wager is a workman, it could not have been the intention of the Parliament to exclude the benefits granted to him in one of the provisions, by another provision. In interpreting a statute, a harmonious and purposive construction is the corner-stone and in making such interpretation, the harmonious reading of Section 2(s) and Section 2(oo)(bb) leads us to hold the exception (bb) being intended only to cover persons who have regular contracts with the employer but it is not renewed and does not comprehend casual workers. In this view we receive complate support from a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in (1990-II-L.L.J.577) (R. Sreenivasa Rao v. Labour Court, Hyderabad and Anr.). Mr. Mohanty has also brought to our notice a decision of this Court reported in 72 (1991) C.L.T. 404 (Sri Chakradhar Tripathy v. State of Orissa and Ors.). That decision though relied upon by him yet expressly re-affirms the principles decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court though an observation has been made there of the law having been widely stated. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity in the award.
4. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 300/-.