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[Cites 28, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Rahul Jain vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 26 July, 2025

     IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR KHARTA,
      ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC)-02, CENTRAL
           DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI


Crl. Appeal No. 322/2018

In the matter of:-

Rahul Jain,
S/o Late Sh. Mahesh Chand Jain,
R/o B-2/50, First Floor,
Ashok Vihar, Delhi-110052.

                                                 ...Appellant

                              VERSUS


Central Bureau of Investigation,
(through its Director),
CBI Headquarters,
5-B, CGO Complex,
Lodhi Road, New Delhi.

                                                ....Respondent.


 Date of Institution of appeal     31.08.2018
 Date of Arguments                 23.07.2025 & previous dates
 Judgment reserved on              23.07.2025
 Date of Judgment                  26.07.2025

                             JUDGMENT

1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by appellant/convict Rahul Jain under Sec. 374/382 Cr.PC against the judgment of conviction dated 25.07.2018 (herein referred as Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 1 of 39 'impugned judgment') and order on sentence dated 04.08.2018 (herein referred as 'impugned sentence order') in case bearing RC No. 6(S)/8/DLI, passed by Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Central District, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'Ld. Trial Court'), whereby appellant Rahul Jain was convicted for the offences punishable under Sec. 420 IPC as well as 120B/420 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. Appellant/convict was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under Sec. 120B IPC read with Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

2. The brief facts leading to the present Criminal Appeal are that on 02.07.1988, a company in the name and style of M/s H. Choudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'accused company') was registered with the Registrar of Companies which was incorporated by H.S. Choudhary and his wife Smt. Sakuntala. As per record, appellant/convict Rahul Jain, Sh. O. P. Goyal and Sh. Rishi Goyal became directors of the accused company on 31.10.1988 and co-convict Ravi Kant became its director on 02.11.1988. As per the record, that the accused company appointed a number of agents for booking/selling of plots to interested persons in Pink City-I colony/township sought Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 2 of 39 to be developed by the accused company. As per the case of the prosecution, the appointments of the agents were made by H. S. Chaudhary with a promise of payment of commission @ 5% of booking amount. The agents were supplied with application forms and brochures by the accused company and advertisements in the leading newspapers were also got published between 07.04.1989 to 20.04.1989 stating that Pink City-I, Noida Kasana Road was approved and freehold residential colony. Thereafter, a large number of interested buyers made booking of plots and deposited more that Rs. 5,00,00,000/- with the accused company. As per the case of prosecution, the land in question was not an approved colony and the accused company did not own any land in its name prior to 17.04.1989 as sale deeds of various pockets of lands were executed by farmers in favour of the aforesaid accused company on 17.04.1989. As per the case of prosecution, vide said sale deeds of lands, company acquired lands in villages of Tugalpor, Namoli and Rohilapur within Bulandshehar District, Uttar Pradesh, which was found to be agricultural land according to Section 143 of UP Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 and could not have been used for residential purposes except with prior permission of the government but the accused company sold the plots to the buyers for residential purpose without obtaining such permission from the government and hence Pink City-I Colony/township was not an approved colony. As per the case of prosecution, the prospective buyers were misled by the representation made by the accused company to the public at large through the newspaper advertisements and Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 3 of 39 brochures supplied by the company as Pink City-I, Colony/Township was not approved and freehold residential colony.

3. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, case bearing RC No. 6/S/89 was registered by the CBI, Delhi and after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused company, its Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, appellant Rahul Jain (Director), Ravi Kant (Director) and Harish Bajaj (Chief Executive Officer of Citizen Advertising & Marketing). Thereafter on 08.03.1999, charges under Sec. 120B & Sec. 420 IPC were framed against accused persons namely H. S. Chaudhary, appellant Rahul Jain, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its case, prosecution had examined 45 prosecution witnesses. Accused Harish Bajaj expired during the trial and proceedings against him were abated. On completion of trial, accused persons i.e. M/s H. Choudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., H. S. Chaudhary, appellant/convict Rahul Jain and co-convict Ravi Kant were convicted for the offences punishable under Sec. 420 IPC as well as under Sec. 120B/420 IPC, by Ld. Trial Court, vide judgment dated 25.07.2018 and appellant Rahul Jain was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. Appellant Rahul Jain was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 4 of 39 year and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the offence punishable under Sec. 120B IPC read with Sec. 420 IPC and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, by Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 04.08.2018.

4. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence, appellant has preferred the present appeal. Arguments were heard at length on behalf of appellant/convict as well as on behalf of Ld. Senior PP for CBI.

5. Ld. Counsel for appellant/convict argued that the judgment and the sentence order passed by the Ld. Trial Court are perverse, illegal, bad in law and against the facts proved by the prosecution. He also argued that none of the prosecution witnesses has deposed that the appellant/convict had played any active role in the commission of offence and it has been specifically mentioned by the Ld. Trial Court in Para No. 90 of the judgment that there was no apparent material in evidence of the prosecution witnesses to show that appellant/convict was Incharge of or responsible to accused no. 1 company for conduct of its day to day affairs. He also argued that no charge was framed against the company i.e. M/s H. Choudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and hence the appellant/convict Rahul Jain who was one of the director of the company could not have been convicted as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. He also argued that no charge was framed against the appellant/convict as a director of the company but he has been convicted as a director of company which is not permissible in Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 5 of 39 law. He also argued that the officials of company cannot be held vicariously liable unless there are specific allegations and averments against them with respect to their individual role and accused cannot be convicted only on the ground that he was the director of a company. He also argued that prosecution has failed to prove the criminal conspiracy among the accused persons and the company. He also argued that the testimonies of PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor are suffering from material contradictions and the said witnesses cannot be relied upon and the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate their testimonies. He also argued that the appellant/convict was only a paid employee of the company and was getting a fixed salary. He also argued that the appellant/convict was not the beneficiary of the amount collected by the accused company as no such funds were ever transferred to his account from the account of company in which the amount was collected from plot buyers. He also argued that alleged misleading advertisements were given by the company or by its Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary in leading newspapers and the appellant/convict was not involved in any such decision making process of the company and prosecution has not produced any evidence in this regard. He has relied on judgments titled as 'Aneeta Hada Vs. M/s Godfather Travels & Tour Pvt. Ltd., 2012 Crl. L.J. 2525'; 'Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane, 2015 (2) JCC 1277' ; 'Ravindranatha Bajpe Vs. Manglore Special Economic Zone Ltd. & Ors, (2022) 15 SCC 430'; 'Varkey Joseph Vs. State of Kerela, AIR 1993 SC 1892' & 'Shyam Sundar Pramanik Vs. Moni Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 6 of 39 Mohan Sadhukhan & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 977'. He argued that impugned judgment dated 25.07.2018 and impugned order on sentence dated 04.08.2018 passed by the Ld. Trial Court should be set-aside and the present appeal should be allowed.

6. Per contra, Ld. Senior PP for CBI argued that the appellant has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the Ld. Trial Court. To substantiate his point, he argued that name of the company has been mentioned in the order of charge dated 08.03.1999 and non-mentioning of the name of company in the charge and non- signing of the same by the representative of company does not make any difference. He also argued that under Sec. 305 Cr.PC, it was the duty of the company to appoint its representative to defend the company who has not been appointed by the company and this fact shall not affect the conviction of appellant. He also argued that vide judgment dated 25.07.2018, the company has been convicted and hence the appellant cannot take the plea that his conviction was bad in law. He also argued that the appellant was the director of the company and he along with the company and other directors entered into a criminal conspiracy to cheat the public at large and this fact has been duly proved by the prosecution through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. He also argued that the colony/township was not approved by the Uttar Pradesh Government and the buyers were misled by the company and its associates. He also argued that PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor have specifically deposed against the appellant/convict. He also Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 7 of 39 argued that the prosecution witnesses are of sterling quality and their testimonies have been relied by the Ld. Trial Court. He also argued that prosecution had proved its case against the appellant/convict beyond reasonable doubt before the Ld. Trial Court and hence the present appeal should be dismissed and the conviction and sentence order passed by the Ld. Trial Court should be upheld.

7. I have thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced, judgments relied upon, perused the material available on record including the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, scrutinized the judgment dated 25.07.2018 and sentence order dated 04.08.2018 passed by the Ld. Trial Court and gone through the relevant provisions of law.

8. The main contention of appellant/convict is that though the company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. was charge-sheeted by CBI but it was not tried as an accused during the trial and since his conviction was dependent upon the trial/conviction of the company, he has been wrongly convicted by the Ld. Trial Court. Since as per established principle of law a director of a company cannot be prosecuted unless the company is arraigned as an accused, it is necessary to examine whether the company was really tried as an accused or not in the present case.

9. The trial of any criminal case commences with the framing of charges. The basic purpose of framing charge against the accused is to tell him precisely of the accusation against him Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 8 of 39 which the prosecution intends to prove against him so that he may properly defend himself during the trial. In any criminal trial, charge is the foundation of the case of the prosecution. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in judgment titled as 'Dal Chand @ Dalia Vs. State, cited as (1982) DLT 127' was pleased to set- aside the conviction on the ground of defect in charge. No person can be convicted under any section of law until and unless charges have been framed against him. For deciding the contention of appellant/convict, it is necessary to go through the charges framed against the appellant/convict. The charge framed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 08.03.1999 reads as under:-

CHARGE I, R. K. Gauba, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi do hereby charge you H. S. Chaudhary, Rahul Jain, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj as follows:-
Firstly that all of you during the year 1989 in Delhi and other places agreed among yourselves to do the illegal act to with cheating with dishonest intention by inducing general public through adverstisements made in the leading news papers projecting a freehold and approved residential colony and the same acts were done in pursuance of said agreement and thereby all of you thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 120B of Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court.
Secondly, that all of you during the abovesaid period and at the same places cheated the prospective buyers of the plots by dishonestly inducing them to deliver to you amounts over Rs. Five Crores on the pretext of booking of the plots in Pink City-I, Noida, Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 9 of 39 falsely projecting the same as residential colony freehold, approved/sanctioned by the government of U.P. and which was the money/property of the said prospective buyers and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC and within the cognizance of this court.
I hereby direct you to trial for the said charges.
C.M.M. Charge has been read over and explained to the accused persons who are questioned as under:-
       Q.          Do you plead guilty?
       A.          I H. S. Chaudhary plead not guilty.
       A.          I Rahul Jain plead not guilty.
       A.          I Ravi Kant plead not guilty.
       A.          I Harish Bajaj plead not guilty.

       RO & AC
                                                    C.M.M/8.3.99

10. On the careful perusal of charges framed on 08.03.1999, it is revealed that charges had been framed against H. S. Chaudhary, Rahul Jain (appellant/convict), Ravi Kant & Harish Bajaj only and no charge was framed against the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. It is pertinent to mention that the name of the company has been mentioned in the order on charge dated 08.03.1999 but the name of the company was not mentioned in the charges actually framed nor it has been signed by any representative on behalf of the company.

It is also pertinent to mention that the charges dated 08.03.1999, Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 10 of 39 nowhere metions that the appellant/accused was the director of the company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or that he entered into any criminal conspiracy with the accused company and it only mentioned that appellant/accused entered into criminal conspiracy with accused persons namely H. S. Chaudhary, Ravi Kant and Harish Bajaj. However, appellant/accused has been convicted in capacity of director of the accused company and in the judgment dated 25.07.2018, the Ld. Trial Court has recorded the finding that accused/appellant along with other accused persons and the company entered into a criminal conpiracy which is contrary to the charges framed on 08.03.1999. From the language of charges framed against the appellant/accused, it may be inferred that the abovesaid accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy with each other in their private capacity and they did not enter into criminal conspiracy with the company in capacity of its directors. Thus, it has come on record that no charges were framed against accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. Since no charge was framed against accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., it could not have been tried as an accused.

11. As per the contents of FIR i.e. RC No. 6/89/SPL/DLI dated 31.08.1989 and charge-sheet filed on behalf of CBI, the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. was principal accused which entered into criminal conspiracy with H. S. Chaudhary, Smt. Shakuntala Chaudhary, Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Om Prakash to cheat the public at large.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 11 of 39 The Ld. Trial Court while deciding the contention of not framing the charge against the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., observed that accused no. 2 i.e. H. S. Chaudhary was Managing Director of accused no. 1 company at relevant time and summons were served upon accused no. 2 upon which he had appeared before the court and therefore, once accused no. 2 H. S. Chaudhary had been served with a summon, such service on the principal officer of the company can be said to be a valid service on accused no. 1 company as well. The observation of Ld. Trial Court does not seem to be correct as a company incorporated under The Companies Act,1956 is a separate legal entity from its directors including the Managing Director and it was mandatory to serve summons independently upon the company and the Ld. Trial Court must have ensured the appearance of its representative in pursuance of summoning order.

12. The Ld. Trial Court has also observed that it was the responsibility of the company to have appeared in the court or otherwise to face consequences for non-appearance. The observation of the Ld. Trial Court does not seem to be correct as per the established principles of law of criminal jurisprudence. A person cannot be tried or convicted until and unless he has been given an opportunity to defend himself. The Ld. Trial Court has also discussed Sec. 305 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and has observed that it was the prerogative of company itself as to who it wants to appoint its authorized representative and if at Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 12 of 39 all such representative is to be appointed or not and the court can neither compel nor direct a company to appoint any such representative or to appoint any particular person as its representative. In any criminal trial, if any of the accused is not represented by any counsel, it is the duty of the court and the Public Prosecutor that such accused is provided legal aid so that such accused may defend himself. Not providing the opportunity of defence to any accused is against the principle of natural justice. No such efforts were made during the trial of present case. Sec. 305 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as under:-

Section 305 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
305. Procedure when corporation or registered society is an accused:-
1. In this section, "corporation" means an incorporated company or other body corporate, and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860).
2. Where a corporation is the accused person or one of the accused persons in an inquiry or trial, it may appoint a representative for the purpose of the inquiry or trial and such appointment need not be under the seal of the corporation.
3. Where a representative of a corporation appears, any requirement of this Code that anything shall be done in the presence of the accused or shall be read or stated or explained to the accused, shall be construed as a requirement that that thing shall be done in the presence of the representative or read or stated or explained to the representative, and any requirement that the accused shall Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 13 of 39 be examined shall be construed as a requirement that the representative shall be examined.
4. Where a representative of a corporation does not appear, any such requirement as is referred to in sub-section (3) shall not apply.
5. Where a statement in writing purporting to be signed by the managing director of the corporation or by any person (by whatever name called) having, or being one of the persons having the management of the affairs of the corporation to the effect that the person named in the statement has been appointed as the representative of the corporation for the purposes of this section, is filed, the Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that such person has been so appointed.
6. If a question arises as to whether any person, appearing as the representative of a corporation in an inquiry or trial before a Court is or is not such representative, the question shall be determined by the Court.

13. As per Sec. 305(2) Cr.PC, where a corporation is an accused person or one of the accused persons in an inquiry or trial, it may appoint a representative for the purpose of inquiry or trial or such appointment need not to be under the seal of corporation. Under Sec. 305 (3) Cr.PC, where a representative of a corporation appears, any requirement of this Code that anything shall be done in the presence of the accused or shall be read or stated or explained to the accused, shall be construed as a requirement that that thing shall be done in the presence of the representative or read or stated or explained to the representative, and any requirement that the accused shall be examined shall be construed as a requirement that the representative shall be Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 14 of 39 examined. Under Sec. 305(6) Cr.PC, if a question arises as to whether any person appearing as the representative of a corporation in an inquiry or trial before a court is or is not such representative, the question shall be determined by the court.

14. On the perusal of complete record of the case, it is revealed that the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. never appointed any representative to defend the accused company. There is no order from the court in which any of the director who were facing the trial including accused H. S. Chaudhary, who was Managing Director of the company was ever appointed as representative of the company or that any of the director or the Managing Director voluntarily came forward to represent the company in the trial. In the absence of any document of representation filed on behalf of accused company and in absence of any order of court or the written consent by Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, it cannot be presumed that the company was being represented by accused H. S. Chaudhary. No charges were framed against the accused company nor the document of charge was signed on behalf of company by anyone. On the perusal of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, it is revealed that 44 prosecution witnesses i.e. from PW-1 to PW-44 have not been cross-examined on behalf of the company or its representative nor any opportunity was granted to the accused company for such cross-examination as the heading 'cross by accused M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd.' is missing in the cross-examination of PW-1 to PW-44. It is pertinent to mention Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 15 of 39 that PW-45 IO/Inspector Harikesh has been cross-examined on behalf of accused company. This court has carefully examined the orders of the Ld. Trial Court of the dates on which PW-45 IO/Inspector Harikesh was examined as PW but there is nothing in the said orders stating that the company had appointed its representative for cross-examination of PW-45 or the court its own had appointed such representative. PW-45/IO Inspector Harikesh has been cross-examined by Sh. Rajeev Kumar (Advocate) on behalf of accused H. S. Chaudhary and M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. However, on the perusal of Vakalatnama of Sh. Rajeev Kumar (Advocate), it is revealed that he was given the authority by accused H. S. Chaudhary to represent himself only and not the company.

15. In the present case, no opportunity was granted to accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. to cross- examine 44 prosecution witnesses and only one witness was examined on behalf of accused company and that too without any authorization from the company or its representative. The right of cross-examination is a fundamental right deeply rooted in the principles of natural justice to ensure fair trial to the accused. Article 21 of The Constitution of India guarantees the right to life and personal liberty and the right of fair trial is covered under Article 21 of The Constitution of India. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in judgment titled as 'Natasha Singh Vs. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741' has held that the denial of right of cross-examine to the accused is a serious violation of the principle of natural justice Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 16 of 39 and the right to a fair trial. It is pertinent to mention that the statement of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. was not recorded under Sec. 313 Cr.PC through its representative and the company was convicted by not following the mandatory procedure of trial laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, this court is of considered opinion that no representative was ever appointed on behalf of the accused company to defend the company as per mandate of Sec. 305 Cr.PC, no charges were framed against accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., out of 45 prosecution witnesses, 44 witnesses were not cross-examined on behalf of accused company, statement of company/its representative was not recorded under Sec. 313 Cr.PC and hence it cannot be said that the company was arrayed as an accused in the present case. Filing of charge-sheet against the accused company was not sufficient and arraigning of the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd was necessary during the trial and hence the impugned judgment dated 25.07.2018 and impugned sentence order dated 04.08.2018 qua appellant/convict are bad in law.

16. On the basis of foregoing discussions, it has come on record that accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd was not arraigned as an accused during the trial of co- accused persons. Now the question before this court is whether co-accused/convict/appellant who was director of the company can be convicted without arraigning the company as an accused.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 17 of 39 Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as Hon'ble High Court of Delhi have laid down the principles regarding the liability of directors when the company is not an accused. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in judgment titled as Aneeta Hada Vs. M/s Godfather Travels & Tour Pvt. Ltd., 2012 Crl. L.J. 2525' while deciding the vicarious liability of a director of a company has observed as under:-

"39. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has been stated by us earlier, the vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the Act stands satisfied. There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature, a strict construction of the provision would be necessitous and, in a way, the warrant."

41. It will be seemly to quote a passage from Maxwell's The Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) : -

"The strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four ways: in the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence; in interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence; in requiring the fulfilment to the letter of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 18 of 39 statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction."

42. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to highlight that there has to be strict observance of the provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be imposed affecting the rights of persons whether juristic entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company........Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company" appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 19 of 39 cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted.

43. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (supra) which is a three-Judge Bench decision.

17. Similarly Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in judgment titled as 'Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane, 2015 (2) JCC 1277' reiterated the law laid down in 'Aneeta Hada (supra) and observed as under:-

"In the case at hand as the complainant's initial statement would reflect, the allegations are against the company, but the company has not been made arrayed as a party. Therefore, the allegations have to be restricted to the Managing Director. As we have noted Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 20 of 39 earlier, allegations are vague and in fact, principally the allegations are against the company. There is no specific allegation against the Managing Director. When a company has not been arrayed as a party, no proceeding can be initiated against it even where vicarious liability is fastened on certain statutes. It has been so held by a three-Judge Bench in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited in the context of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881."

18. In the present case, appellant/convict has been convicted under Sec. 420/120B of Indian Penal Code. As per the cardinal principle of interpretation of statue, the provisions of criminal law are to be interpreted strictly. The court should not broaden the scope of criminal statues beyond their clear and unambiguous language, especially when doing so may result in finding of guilt. The principle of strict construction ensure that no one is punished for the actions not clearly defined by the criminal law. In the present case, Ld. Trial Court had presumed that charges were framed against the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and the accused company faced the trial. The presumption taken by the Ld. Trial Court is against the facts and the principles of strict construction. Applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Suprme Court of India in 'Aneeta Hada (supra)' and Sharad Kumar Sanghi (supra)', the arraigning of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. during the trial was mandatory for securing the conviction of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 21 of 39 accused/appellant. The appellant/convict could have been prosecuted only when the company was prosecuted. In the present case, the accused company was charge-sheeted but was not prosecuted. The conviction of company without arraigning it during the trial cannot be considered legally right and hence the conviction of accused/appellant is also bad in law.

19. To secure the conviction of an accused, the prosecution must prove that the accused actively participated in the commission of offence. A person cannot be convicted only on the ground that he was the director of the company. There were other directors of the company namely Smt. Shakuntala Chaudhary, Om Prakash Goyal and Rishi Kumar who were not charge- sheeted by the Investigating Agency on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence against them. In the present case, the main contention of the prosecution is that the public at large was cheated through the misleading advertisements by the accused company and its directors. Thus, the active role played the appellant/convict in the present case is to be seen in light of evidence adduced by the prosecution and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in this regard.

20. PW-7 Sh. K. L. Kalra, Retd. Bank Manager, proved the documents pertaining to the current account of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. exhibited as Ex. PW-7/A, extracts of board meeting and copy of memorandum of accused company as Ex. PW-7/A-1 to Ex. PW-7/A-6, letter, Ex. PW-7/B and pay-slips, Ex. PW-7/B-1 to Ex. PW-7/B-9. As per Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 22 of 39 document, Ex. PW-7/A-5 i.e. minutes of board meeting dated 01.11.1988 of accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd., the authority to operate the account of company was given only to Managing Director H. S. Chaudhary, Rishi Kumar (director) & Om Prakash (director). Thus, the appellant/convict was not having any authority to deal with the financial matters of accused company and he had not issued any cheque for the payment of misleading advertisements and he had not received any payments from the plot buyers on behalf of the company.

21. The prosecution is not clear as to on which date, time and place the decision regarding the misleading advertisements was taken and by whom the said decision was taken. The prosecution has not placed any document of minutes of the board meetings of the directors showing the presence of appellant/convict in the said meeting, showing his signatures in which the agenda and draft of misleading advertisements was passed. Even during the the examination of prosecution witnesses, prosecution has not brought on record as to who had passed the agenda and draft of misleading advertisements. Prosecution has examined three witnesses i.e. PW-2, PW-4 & PW-14 relating to the misleading advertisements. PW-2 Sh. Vinod Goyal who was proprietor of Ikon Advertising Services, deposed that an order was placed for display of hoarding by Harish Bajaj (co-accused since expired) of Citizen Advertising & Marketing to promote Pink City-I township. He has proved letter in this regard as Ex. PW-2/A and the record showing the hoardings, Ex. PW-2/B-1 to Ex.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 23 of 39 PW-2/B-10. He has not deposed that he had received the said order from the accused company or its directors including the appellant/convict. Similarly, PW-4 Sh. H. K. Bhatia has also deposed that he had printed leaflets for Pink City-I on order placed by Citizen Advertising. PW-14 Sh. K. S. Rawat, who was working as Senior Clerk at Advertising Department, National Herald Newspaper also deposed that the said advertisement was given by the Citizen Advertising & Marketing. The prosecution has not proved as to on what basis the Citizen Advertising & Marketing was giving the misleading advertisement in the leading newspapers on behalf of accused company. No official from Citizen Advertising & Marketing has been examined as PW to prove the documents through which the said firm had received the order through which prosecution could have proved as to who was actively involved in draft and publication of misleading advertisements in the leading newspapers through Citizen Advertising & Marketing. Moreover, none of the prosecution witness has deposed that appellant/convict was having any role in the decision qua the draft and publication of misleading advertisements. Without any direct evidence, it cannot be presumed that appellant/convict was actively involved in the said decision making process or in preparing the draft of misleading advertisement and its publication.

22. As per the case of prosecution, the accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. had appointed booking agents for booking plots for prospective buyers. As per order of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 24 of 39 charge dated 08.03.1999 also the appointment of booking agents were made by accused no. 2 i.e. H. S. Chaudhary with a promise of payment of commission @ 5% on the booking amount. Prosecution has examined several booking agents i.e. PW-1 Sh. Nanak A. Bhatia, PW-6 Sh. Rishi Gupta, PW-9 Sh. S. K. Bajaj, PW-16 Sh. Mohan Arora, PW-17 Sh. Mahinder Gupta, PW-25 Sh. S. K. Dua, PW-26 Sh. S. P. Kapoor, PW-39 Sh. Sudhir Kumar and PW-44 Sh. Suresh Talwar. All the abovesaid prosecution witnesses (booking agents) deposed that they were booking agents for M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and they had been promised a commission of 5% on the booking amount of the plots and they were given brouchers pamphlets by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or H. S. Chaudhary (since expired). All the abovesaid PWs have either deposed that they were approached by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. or by co-accused H. S. Chaudhary, (since expired), who was Managing Director of accused company. None of the abovesaid prosecution witnesses (booking agents) have deposed that they were ever approached by the appellant/convict. Thus, prosecution has also failed to prove the active role of appellant/convict with respect to appointment of booking agents and distribution of pamphlets/ brouchers to them in which misleading information regarding the proposed township was printed.

23. Appellant/convict has taken the defence that he was only the employee of company and was working as a director on a monthly salary and he had not contributed any share capital in Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 25 of 39 the company and he was not entitled to any profit from the company. The prosecution has not alleged that the appellant/accused was beneficiary of the alleged cheated amount collected by accused company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd.

24. While deciding the scope of liability of a director on basis of his active role in the management and affairs of company, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in 'Ravindranatha Bajpe Vs. Manglore Special Economic Zone Ltd. & Ors, (2022) 15 SCC 430' has observed as under:-

8. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra), it is observed by this Court in paragraphs 42 to 44 as under:
"(iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person
42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy.

However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 26 of 39

43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision.

44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 27 of 39 Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company."

8.3 As held by this Court in the case of India Infoline Limited (supra), in the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction about a prima facie case against the accused who are Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the Directors of the Company and the role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them.

Looking to the averments and the allegations in the complaint, there are no specific allegations and/or averments with respect to role played by them in their capacity as Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Director, Deputy General Manager and Planner & Executor. Merely because they are Chairman, Managing Director/Executive Director and/or Deputy General Manager and/or Planner/Supervisor of A1 & A6, without any specific role attributed and the role played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences committed Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 28 of 39 by A1 & A6.

25. The Ld. Trial Court in para no. 90 of the impugned judgment has specifically recorded the finding that there was not apparent material in the evidence of prosecution witnesses to show that they were in-charge of or responsible to accused no. 1 company (M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd.) for the conduct of its day to day affairs and there was no clear evidence that these accused had signed any material document on behalf of the company. Thus, the Ld. Trial Court was also of the view that the appellant/convict was not actively involved in the conduct of day to day affairs of the company.

26. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and the finding recorded by the Ld. Trial Court, this court is of considered opinion that the appellant/convict was not actively involved in the conduct of day to day affairs of the company and he had not signed any document through which the public at large was cheated by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. Applying the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in 'Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra)', this court is of considered opinion that without proving the active role played by the appellant/convict with criminal intent and in absence of specific provision of vicarious liability in IPC, he could not have been convicted only on the ground that he was the director of the company at the relevant time.

27. The Ld. Trial Court has discussed the role of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 29 of 39 appellant/accused in para no. 90 of the impugned judgment. The Ld. Trial Court observed that there was no clear evidence that these witnesses (accused, the word witnesses seems to be a clerical mistake) had signed any material document on behalf of company but still the court cannot ignore the fact that PW-40 has specifically identified these accused persons as well though during cross-examination by Ld. APP for CBI. The Ld. Trial Court also observed that even PW-20 deposed about involvement of appellant/convict, though, he could identify him. Thus, with respect to the active role of appellant/convict, the Ld. Trial Court while convicting the appellant/convict has relied upon the testimonies of PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor. The testimonies of these witnesses need to be appreciated as per the established principles of criminal jurisprudence and nothing can be presumed.

28. To prove the prosecution case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses must be reliable. It is not the quantity but the quality of the testimony of the witness that helps a court in arriving at a conclusion in any case. The test in this regard is that the evidence adduced by the parties must have a ring of truth. In a criminal trial, the prosecution has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and it is possible only when the testimony of prosecution witnesses is cogent, trustworthy and credible. To secure a conviction of accused, the testimony of the prosecution witness must be of sterling quality.

29. In case titled as Rai Sandeep @ Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 30 of 39 Delhi) cited as (2012) 8 SCC 21, it is held that :

"22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the Cross examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstances should given room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 31 of 39 corelation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of very other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only, if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness' whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 32 of 39 the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged."

30. In case of Ramdas Vs. State of Maharashtra cited as (2007) SCC 170, it is held that :

"23. It is no doubt true that the conviction in a case of rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, but that can be done in a case where the court is convinced about the truthfulness of the prosecutrix and there exist no circumstances with cast of shadow of doubt over her veracity. It the evidence of the prosecutrix is of such quality that may be sufficient to sustain an order of conviction solely on the basis of her testimony. In the instant case we do not fine her evidence to be of such quality."

31. Thus, from the above said judgments, it is clear that the version of the witness should be natural one and it must corroborate the prosecution case. Such version must match with the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. It should be of such a quality that there should not be any shadow of doubt upon it.

32. PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh deposed that in April, 1989 he had seen advertisement regarding booking of plots in the name of Pink City Colony at Noida which was sponsored by H. S. Chaudhary Estate. He further deposed that he visited the office Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 33 of 39 of H. S. Chaudhary Estate situted at Ashok Vihar where he met with Mr. Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant. He further deposed that he cannot identify Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant). In his cross-examination by the Ld. Senior PP for CBI, PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh deposed that he did not remember that Sh. Rahul Jain and Sh. Ravi Kant abovenamed had told him in the office that Pink City-I was an approved colony by UP government. He also deposed that he did not remember that Ravi Kant had also given the broucher or that he had stated before CBI Inspector that Ravi Kant had given him the broucher. He also deposed that he did not remember that he had told the CBI and got recorded in his statement that Ravi Kant and Rahul Jain were director of the company. Thus, PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh had turned hostile qua the role as well as on the identity of appellant/convict and in these circumstances, he had failed to bring any incriminating evidence on record against appellant/convict. This court is of considered opinion that PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh was not a witness of sterling quality and his testimony cannot be relied upon to secure the conviction of appellant/convict.

33. PW-40 Smt. Kant Kapoor deposed that she had booked plot in Pink City-I, Noida which was being developed by M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. She further deposed that her brother-in-law (behnoi) had gone to the office of M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. for booking the aforementioned plot and he met Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant there Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 34 of 39 and on their asking booked the plot. She also deposed that M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. had shown the paper showing the aforesaid project approved by the government and on this belief the plot was booked and she had given cash to her brother-in-law who in turn made payment to M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. She specifically deposed that she personally had not gone to the office of M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and she failed to identify the accused persons. Thus, as per the examination-in- chief of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor, she did not meet the appellant/convict nor she had visited the office of M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. for booking the plot. The brother-in- law (behnoi) of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor was not examined as PW. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor had not produced any receipt allegedly signed by appellant/convict. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor was declared hostile and was cross-examined by Ld. Spl. APP for CBI in which she changed her stand and gave the answers to the questions put to her by Ld. Spl. APP for CBI in affirmative and deposed that she had personally visited to the office of M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. and she had met Rahul Jain (appellant/convict) and Ravi Kant. She also identified the appellant on the pointing out by the Ld. Spl. APP for CBI. The incident pertains to year 1989 and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor was examined on 01.11.2013 i.e. after about 24 years of the incident. PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor had taken two different contradictory stands in her examination-in-chief and cross- examination which cannot co-exist and this raises serious doubts on her veracity as well as the prosecution story. Identification of Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 35 of 39 appellant/convict on the pointing out by the Ld. Spl. APP for CBI that too after changing her stand, after lapse of 24 years without production of any document in this regard, does not inspire confidence. Thus, the testimony of PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor cannot be relied upon.

34. Applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rai Sandeep (supra) and Ramdas (Supra), this court is of the considered opinion that PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor are not witnesses of sterling quality as their versions are not natural and they have failed to withstood the test of cross examination. This court is of the considered opinion that the testimonies of PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor are not clear, cogent, credible, trustworthy and consistent and have not been corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses and documentary evidence on record and the circumstances.

35. It is established principle of law that if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be accepted. The benefit of doubt must always go to the accused as the prosecution has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

36. The Hon'ble Apex court in Rang Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2000 SC 1209 has held as follows:-

"The timetested rule in that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 36 of 39 establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits."

37. In yet another decision in State of U.P. Vs. Ram Veer Singh and Another reported in 2007(6) Supreme 164 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-

"The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two view are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 37 of 39 of the accused really committed any offence or not."

38. In the present case due to not arraigning the company i.e. M/s H. S. Chaudhary Estate Pvt. Ltd. as an accused during the trial, non-proving of active/specific role of appellant/convict with criminal intent, no specific provision of vicarious liability in IPC, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of star witnesses of prosecution i.e. PW-20 Sh. Charanjeet Singh and PW-40 Smt. Kanta Kapoor and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in 'Aneeta Hada (supra), Sharad Kumar Sanghi (supra) & 'Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra), serious doubts have been created on the prosecution story and the evidence led by the prosecution before the Ld. Trial Court and two views are possible in the present case and hence the benefit of the same must go to the appellant/convict.

39. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this court is of considered opinion that the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the substantive offence of 420 IPC as well as 120B/420 IPC cannot be sustained. Accordingly the present appeal is hereby allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction of appellant dated 25.07.2018 and the impugned sentence order dated 04.08.2018 are hereby set-aside. Appellant is hereby acquitted of the offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC as well as Sec. 120B/420 IPC.

Crl. Appeal. No. 322/2018, Rahul Jain Vs. CBI Page No. 38 of 39

40. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance. Trial Court Record be returned back to Ld. Trial Court alongwith copy of this judgment.

                                                            Digitally signed
                                                            by VIRENDER
                                                 VIRENDER KUMAR
Announced in the open court                      KUMAR
                                                 KHARTA
                                                          KHARTA
                                                          Date:

on 26th day of July, 2025
                                                          2025.07.26
                                                            13:16:06 +0530


                                           (Virender Kumar Kharta)
                                          ASJ/FTC-02(CENTRAL)
                             TIS HAZARI COURTS:DELHI:26.07.2025




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Rahul Jain Vs. CBI                                         Page No. 39 of 39