Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kailash Chand Gupta And Anr. vs Rukam Singh Yadav And Ors. on 14 May, 1998
Equivalent citations: AIR1998MP310, AIR 1998 MADHYA PRADESH 310, (1999) 1 MPLJ 283, (1999) 2 CIVLJ 764, (1998) 2 JAB LJ 208, (1998) 4 CURCC 559
ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the defendant/applicants as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent.
2. Perused the record.
3. The defendant/applicants feel aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court directing the applicants to handover the possession of the room in question to the plaintiff restoring the status quo ante prevailing prior to the grant of interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff.
4. During the pendency of the suit filed by the plaintiff, the trial Court on an application seeking an ad interim injunction filed by the plaintiff, issued an ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the premises in dispute directing the parties to maintain status quo till the final disposal of the suit.
5. A perusal of the aforesaid order indicates that the trial Court had prima facie come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was continuing to be ' in possesion of the accommodation in dispute of which room in question formed a part.
6. On 11-4-1997, the plaintiff moved an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) asserting that the defendants had forcibly dispossessed him from the room in question and obtained the possession thereof in clear defiance of the interim injunction granted in his favour by the Court which continued to be operative. The plaintiff prayed that he be put back in possession over the room in question and a suitable direction be issued in this regard against the defendants Nos. 3 and 4.
7. The trial Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, vide its impuged order came to the conclusion that the interim order injunction granted by the trial Court had been violated by the defendants in flagrant disregard of the same, the defendants had dispossessed him from the room in question in an entirely illegal manner.
8. The trial Court also came to the conclusion that it was fit case where exercising the inherent jurisdiction, the status quo ante prevailing prior to the issuance of the interim injunction which had been duly served be restored back.
9. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the impugned direction had been issued as indicated hereinabove requiring the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 to put back the plaintiff in possession over the room in question within a month.
10. The learned counsel for the defendant/ applicants has strenuously urged that the impugned order is manifestly illegal as the relief of recovery of possession could not be granted without first getting the plaint amended claiming such a relief especially when the plaintiff had never sought for any relief regarding recovery of possession and had asked for a mere injunction simpliciter.
11. It has further been urged that granting of such a relief as prayed for by the plaintiff would amount to changing the nature of the suit and converting it into a suit for recovery of possession without the plaint being amended which could not be permitted.
12. The learned counsel for the respondent has however urged that in the present case, it has been established on record that the defendants had violated the interm injunction granted by the , trial Court and disturbed the status quo prevailing at the time of grant of the interim injunction. In the circumstances, it is urged that the trial Court had ample jurisdiction to restore back status quo ante directing the defendants to put back the plaintiff in possession over the room in question from which he had been illegally dispossessed.
13. The learned counsel for the defendant/ applicants has placed reliance in support of his submission on the decision in the case of Municipal Council, Mandleshwar v. Ramesh Mangilal Fagna, reported in 1984 MPLJ 633.
14. In the aforesaid case, the plaintiff had field a suit for permanent injunction on 22-2-1984, and had applied for a temporary injunction also. The shop which was a subject matter of the suit was not removed till the filing of the suit but removed later on. The plaintiff had got the plaint amended and also moved an application for interim mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to restore the Gumati to its original position. This application had been allowed by the trial Court coming to the conclusion that the status quo ante, as obtaining on the date and time of the institution of the suit should be restored. This Court had dismissed the revision upholding the order of the trial Court observing that the defendant could not be permitted to destroy the subject matter of the suit during the pendency of the lis and then advance an argument that no relief can be granted in absence of the subject matter or the suit itself.
15. The learned counsel for the applicants has tried to urge that since in the aforesaid case i.e., Ramesh Mangilal Fagna (supra), mandatory injunction had been granted requiring the restoration of the status quo ante after getting the plaint amended, in the present case also the plaintiff should have got the plaint amended and only thereafter the question of granting any relief to him in regard to the restoration of the status quo ante could arise.
16. I have considered the above submission.
17. From a perusal of the aforesaid decision in the case of Ramesh Mangilal Fagna (supra), it is apparent that it was not a case where the status quo which was required to be maintained had been disturbed by violating any injunction granted by the trial Court. The subject matter of the suit had been destroyed before any interim relief could be granted by the trial Court. In such a situation, it became necessary to get the plaint amended.
18. The question in the aforesaid case was as to whether in such a situation, a mandatory injunction requiring the restoration of status quo ante could be granted or not.
19. In the present case, no such situation is there. Herein an ad interim injunction had already been issued by the trial Court securing the possession of the plaintiff over the subject matter of the suit. The finding is that the defendants violated the injunction and disturbed the status quo in flagrant disregard of the order of temporary injunction.
20. In such a situation referred to hereinabove, the ratio of the decision in the case of Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, rendered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and reported in AIR 1986 Cal 220, is squarely attracted.
21. It was observed in the aforesaid decision that the Court had ample jurisdiction and perfectly justified in passing an order of mandatory injunction under Section 151 of the Code, for the restoration of possession to the aggrieved party in case such a party had been dispossessed in disobedience of an order of injunction. It was observed that the Court can in exercise of its inherent power pass such order for ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the aggrieved party.
22. Similar views have been expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Hari Nandan v.S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All 48 and this Court also in its decision in the case of Munnilal v. Jagdish Prasad, Civil Revision No. 792 of 1977 (G); decided on 15-12-1979 by a learned single Judge and reported in 1980 MPWN SN. No. 196 at page No. 195.
23. 1 am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view.
24. Considering the facts and circumstances brought on record, no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference by this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction envisaged under Section 115 of the Code.
25. The revision is accordingly dismissed in limine.