State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd Through Its ... vs Banoth Sali Bai W/O. Late B.Shankar on 16 February, 2026
1
BEFORE THE TELANGANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION : HYDERABAD.
AE NO.03 OF 2025 AGAINST ORDERS IN
EA.NO.20 OF 2025 IN IA.NO.2021 IN CC.NO.44 OF 2025,
DISTRICT CONSUMER COMMISSION- MEDAK AT
SANGAREDDY
Between
The Manager, Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd.,
SR Nagar, Hyderabad - 500038.
......Appellant/Respondent No.2
And
1.Banoth Sali Bai, W/o.Late Banoth Shankar, Aged about 54 years, Occ: Housewife, R/o.H.No.2-4/1, Devula Thanda, Yellupet tekmal (M), Medak District.
......Respondent No.1/Petitioner
2. The Manager MGB, Motor and Auto Agencies Pvt.Ltd., 2-26/2, Hyder Nagar, Opp: Vasanth Nagar Gate, Medchal-Malkajgiri - 500072.
3. The Manager, Care Health Insurance Limited, C-Block, on 2nd Floor, BRIJ TARNAG COMMERCIAL COMPLEX, M.No.631191/1 to 631196/2C, Beside Greenland, Guest House, Begumpet, Hyderabad - 500016.
4. The General Manager, Care Health Insurance Limited, Regd. office: Vipul Tech Square, Tower C, 3rd floor, Golf Course Road, Sector-43, Gurugram - 122009.
......Respondents No.2 to 4/Respondents No.1,3 & 4 Counsel for the Appellant/Respondent No.2: M/s.LAD Legal Services LLP Counsel for the Respondent No.1/Petitioner: M/s.M.S.Khan Counsel for the Respondents 3&4/Respondents 3&4: Notice served QUORAM:
HON'BLE SMT.JUSTICE DR.G.RADHA RANI ......PRESIDENT & HON'BLE SMT.MEENA RAMANATHAN ......MEMBER (NON-JUDICIAL) MONDAY THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND TWENTY SIX ****** 2 Order: (Per Smt.Dr.G.Radha Rani, Hon'ble President)
1. This appeal in execution is filed by the Respondent No.2 aggrieved by the orders of the District Commission, Medak at Sangareddy dated 22.08.2025 in EA.No.20/2025 in IA.No.21/2025 in CC.No.44/2025.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred as arrayed in the complaint.
3. The facts of the case in brief are that:
The Respondent No.1/Complainant filed CC.No.44/2025 on the file of the District Commission, Medak at Sangareddy, stating that her deceased husband namely Banoth Shankar was an agriculturist and approached Opposite Party No.1 for purchase of JCB vehicle and represented that the cost of vehicle was Rs.31,54,459/-. For providing loan he was introduced to Opposite Party No.2 therein who is the Appellant in the present appeal to make finance arrangements to the deceased husband of the Complainant. It was further averred by the Complainant that the Appellant herein sanctioned loan amount of Rs.28,55,000/- to her husband and that her husband made a down payment of Rs.2,20,798/- and purchased the JCB vehicle on 28.09.2024. To cover risk of payment of finance, a group policy of Health Insurance was given by Opposite Parties No.3 and 4 therein. The Complainant was the nominee of the insurance. The certificate of insurance was valid from 07.10.2024 to 06.10.2029. As per the policy, if the insured died during the subsistence of the policy, the liability of payment of rest of the instalments of the JCB would be upon Opposite Parties No.3 and 4 i.e., the Insurer and there would not be any need to pay further instalments by the nominee of the deceased and his family members and the JCB vehicle become free to the nominee. It was further stated by the Complainant that her husband passed away due to heart attack on 09.10.2024. Since the policy was in force, she approached Opposite Party No.1 who in turn referred her to contact Opposite Party No.2 and when she contacted Opposite Party No.2, she was again asked to approach 3 Opposite Parties No.3 & 4 since they were the insurance providers and when she approached the Opposite Party No.3 and explained the cause of death and requested them to settle the matter and to close the account of her deceased husband and to release the sum assured amount of Rs.28,55,000/-, instead of settling the matter, Opposite Party No.3 rejected the claim on the ground that the insured died within two days from the date of issuing policy. As such the Complainant filed a complaint against Opposite Parties No.1 to 4.
4. Along with the complaint, the Complainant filed IA.No.21/2025 under Order-39 Rule-1 & 2 of CPC, R/w. Section 151 of CPC to grant Ad-interim injunction restraining the Respondents/Opposite Parties from seizing the JCB machine from the custody of the Complainant till the disposal of the main complaint. The District Commission had passed an exparte Ad-
interim injunction as prayed for by the Complainant and directed the Complainant to comply with the provisions of Order-39 Rule 3(a) of CPC.
5. In the meanwhile, the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 seized the JCB vehicle from the house of the Complainant in her absence in the month of June,2025. The Complainant filed EA.20/2025 in IA.21/2025 stating that the JCB was seized without issuing any prior notice to her by the Respondent/Opposite Party No.2. Immediately after seizure of the JCB, she went to Medak where the JCB was kept and shown interim order passed by the District Commission against the Respondent/Opposite Party No.2. Instead of handing over the JCB vehicle, the officials of the Respondent No.2 torn the copy of the interim order and threatened her. Immediately she approached the concerned police, but the Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2 managed the police, as such filed the Execution Application under Section-72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 seeking the relief to handover the JCB and to arrest Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2 for violating the interim order of the District Commission as it amounts to 4 contempt. The District Commission issued an arrest warrant against the Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2.
6. The Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2 entered his appearance before the District Commission on 11.06.2025 and filed an undertaking memo before the District Commission stating that there was no wilful disobedience of the orders. The orders in IA.No.21/2025 were not served upon them and the vehicle was seized unaware of the said order and since the District Commission orally directed them to return the vehicle, requested the Commission to give a written direction to return so that it would be in compliance to their institution's policies and audit procedures. Without prejudice, if the order/direction is passed, they would return the vehicle while reserving the right to challenge the matter in appeal, if required.
7. On such memo dated 22.08.2025 filed by the counsel representing the Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2, the District Commission passed the impugned order closing the execution petition directing the Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.2 to return the seized vehicle to the Petitioner/Complainant as per orders passed on 21.03.2025.
8. Aggrieved by the said order, the Respondent No.2 preferred this appeal. Notices were issued to Respondents No. 1 to 4, M/s.M.S.Khan, Advocate filed vakalat for Respondent No.1. Notice sent to Respondent No.2 was returned unserved with an endorsement "addressee left". Notices were served on Respondents No.3 & 4 but they were called absent. The counsel for Appellant reported that Respondent No.2 was not necessary party to this petition.
9. Heard the learned counsel M/s.LAD Legal Services LLP for the Appellant and M/s.M.S.Khan, advocate for Respondent No.1.
10. The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the District Commission passed the impugned order in contravention 5 of the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in as much as Section-72 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 was a penal provision and provides for punishment. However, the District Commission passed an order for return of the vehicle which was civil in nature in contravention with the statutory provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. As such the impugned order was unsustainable. He further contended that the District Commission failed to consider that the Complainant did not comply the requirements under the provisions of CPC under Order-39 Rule- 3(a) of CPC. The District Commission entertained the execution application without observing whether the Complainant had followed due procedure or not. The District Commission ought to have seen that the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 filed a memo intimating the court in the main C.C. that their office was re- located. Having considered the same and directing the Complainant to furnish the complaint copy to Opposite Party No.2, the District Commission ought to have directed the Complainant to amend the complaint and the I.A., and should have decided the I.A. on merits, however went on to entertain the execution application and violated the procedure. The District Commission failed to see that the Appellant had filed counter in I.A., as such ought to have decided the I.A. on merits without entertaining the execution application. Admittedly, the deceased died after the issuance of policy and no single EMI was paid by the deceased. Subsequently, neither the Insurance Company settled the claim nor the Complainant paid the unpaid EMIs. As such the Appellants would have right to take possession of the vehicle and their action could not be termed as deficiency of service and no restraint order could have been passed, without there being any prima facie case against the Appellant. The District Commission ought to have directed the Complainant to file a fresh I.A. seeking return of vehicle if there exists any circumstances for directing so, but went on to pass an order in violation of the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, . The very prayer in EA.No.20/2025 was not in accordance with Section-72 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019. As such, granting the relief prayed in a defective petition was unjustifiable and would deserve to be set aside. He further 6 contended that the District Commission failed to see that no material was placed before it by the Complainant to prove that a restraint order passed by the District Commission was communicated to the Appellant before the date of seizing the vehicle on 24.05.2025. Without ascertaining the same, the District Commission entertained the EA and passed the impugned order in haste and prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned order dated 22.08.2025 in EA.20/2025 and to direct the District Commission to proceed with the main C.C. in accordance with law.
11. The learned counsel for the Respondent/Complainant on the other hand contended that the Appellant seized the vehicle after passing of the order in IA.No.21/2025 on 21.03.2025. In the absence of the Complainant when she and her family members were out of station from the village, taking advantage of the same, the Appellant came to the house of the Complainant at Devula Thanda, Yellupet Tekmal Mandal of Medak District and without her knowledge and without issuing any prior notice to the Complainant, took the JCB machine bearing No.TG08 TR 8149. Immediately the Complainant went to Medak and had shown interim order passed against the Appellant. But the officials of the Appellant high-handedly behaved and torn the copy of the interim order and threatened the Complainant. Immediately the Complainant approached the police, but the police were managed by the Appellant by using influence. So far, the Appellant had not handed over the JCB vehicle. Order-39 Rule-3 proviso-b of CPC, only speaks about delivering the copies or sending them to the Opposite Parties. The Complainant had sent the notices to the address of the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 which was mentioned in the R.C. All the Opposite Parties colluded with each other and not settling the matter. They were not paying the insurance amount and on the other hand seized the vehicle. The impugned order was passed by the District Commission only on the undertaking given by the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2. Even though counter was filed by the Appellant in IA.No.21/2025, due to the seizure of vehicle, the said I.A. would become infructuous.
7The Appellant need to return the vehicle to the Complainant as per the undertaking given by them before the District Commission, basing on which only the execution application was closed and prayed to dismiss the appeal.
12. Now the points for consideration are:-
(i) Whether the impugned order passed by the District Commission is sustainable or the same needs to be modified or rectified in any manner?
(ii) To what result? 13. Point No.1:-
On a perusal of the record, the husband of the Complainant by name Banoth Shankar purchasing a JCB vehicle by availing loan facility from the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 under a Group Insurance Policy on 07.10.2024 with Opposite Parties No.3 & 4 is not in dispute. The husband of the Complainant died within two days of purchase of the vehicle on 09.10.2024 is also not in dispute. The Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 financing an amount of Rs.28,55,000/- is also not in dispute. As the Opposite Parties No.3 & 4 failed to settle the claim, the Complainant approached the District Commission and filed CC.No.44/2025 for insurance benefits and along with the complaint filed IA.No.21/2025 to restrain the Respondents/Opposite Parties from seizing the JCB machine from her custody till the disposal of the complaint. An exparte Ad-interim injunction was granted on 21.03.2025 and the District Commission directed the Petitioner/Complainant to comply with the provisions of Order-39 Rule-3(a) of CPC. The court usually grants an exparte temporary injunction when it appears to it that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. The obligation of the Petitioner/Complainant is to deliver or send the notices to the Opposite Party immediately after the injunction is granted along with the copy of the application, plaint and affidavit and any documents relied upon by it.
14. An exparte injunction operates from the moment the said order is passed. Pendency of service of notice does not dilute the 8 binding nature of the order. It is also admitted by the Appellant that the vehicle was seized on 24.05.2025 during the currency of injunction, but however contended that he was not aware of the said order as he had not received the notice in the said order. The affidavit filed by the Complainant in EA.No.20/2025 in IA.No.21/2025 would disclose that she went to Medak where the JCB was kept, immediately after its seizure and have shown them the copy of the interim order passed by the Commission but the same was torn away by the officials of the Appellant. The execution application was filed because of wilful violation of injunction order.
15. The Appellant also filed a memo before the District Commission admitting the seizure of the vehicle and gave an undertaking stating that he would return the vehicle. On such undertaking only, the execution application was closed by the District Commission. Though the Appellant contended that the undertaking was given under the threat of arrest, it was binding in nature. A party cannot approbate and reprobate. On one hand the Appellant accepted the protection of the Forum by giving an undertaking and on the other hand, filed the appeal challenging its authority. The appeal was filed not to challenge the jurisdiction, but to legitimize an illegal seizure. The Appellant approached this Forum with unclean hands. Having violated the injunction order, compelled the execution proceedings, given an undertaking and now resiling from it. Such contempt disentitles the Appellant to any discretionary relief.
16. The Complainant was a widow whose husband died within two days of purchase of the JCB. The insurance claim was pending adjudication. The vehicle was a source of livelihood and an essential asset. The high-handed seizure during injunction would cause severe mental agony, harassment and financial distress to the Complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court in ICICI Bank Ltd., Vs. Prakash Kaur (2007) 2 SCC 711 and Citi Corp Maruthi Finance Ltd., Vs. S.Vijaylaxmi (2012) 1 SCC 1 held that "financiers cannot resort to force or unilateral seizure. Re-possession must be only through due process of law."
917. The Consumer Commissions have statutory power to enforce the interim orders U/s.71 & 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The impugned order merely restores status-quo ante and does not decide any substantive rights. Such enforcement cannot be interfered with in an appeal. Section-72 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 deals with penalty for non-compliance of orders passed by the Consumer Commissions. The same was invoked by the Complainant when the Appellant wilfully disobeyed the interim order passed by the Commission. As there is an injunction order existing restraining seizure of the vehicle and the Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 violated the said order and seized the vehicle, the return of the vehicle was necessary to enforce compliance of its order. Direction to return the vehicle is a permissible consequential order passed to enforce obedience, not to grant substantive relief. As such, granting such relief was maintainable U/s.72 of the Act. When violation of an interim order results in deprivation of possession, the Consumer Commission is empowered U/s.72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 to direct restoration of the subject matter as a necessary consequence of enforcing compliance. The contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that Section-72 only provides for penalty and a civil remedy like return of vehicle cannot be granted under it, is not maintainable as enforcement necessarily includes restoration of what was illegally taken. Penal consequences are only a means and not the only remedy. A plea for return of JCB under Section-72 is maintainable as it is filed to enforce compliance of an interim injunction, violation of which resulted in illegal seizure of the vehicle.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Palm Groves Co-operative Housing Society Limited Vs. Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates, (2025) INSC 1023 held that: "both interim and final orders passed by the Consumer Forum are enforceable like Civil Court decrees and must not remain mere paper decrees." The above judgment strongly supports the proposition that enforcement can include restoration and specific performance of a 10 Forum's order. As such, we do not find any error or illegality in the impugned order of the District Forum to set aside the same.
19. Point No.2:-
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs confirming the order of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Medak at Sangareddy in EA.No.20/2025 in IA.No.21/2025 in CC.No.44/2025 dated 22.08.2025 and direct the Appellant to comply with the undertaking given by them before the District Commission and to return the seized vehicle to the Respondent/Complainant.
The Appellant is directed to pay costs of Rs.20,000/- to the Respondent/Complainant within a period of one month for abuse of process of law.
Time for compliance is one month from the date of receipt of this order.
Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by her, corrected by me and pronounced by us in the open Court on this the 16th day of February, 2026.
Sd/- Sd/-
PRESIDENT MEMBER-NJ
Dt: 16.02.2026
UC*