Kerala High Court
Sherry Joseph vs Thomas Jose @ Tomy on 30 January, 2025
MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022
1
2025:KER:7389
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY 2025 / 10TH MAGHA, 1946
MACA NO. 574 OF 2010
OPMV NO.331 OF 2002 OF MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL, THALASSERY
APPELLANT/PETITIONER
SHERRY JOSEPH
AGED 31 YEARS
S/O.JOSEPH, C/O.DWARAKA TOURIST HOME, PAYYANNUR,
KANNUR, DISTRICT.
SRI.M.V.AMARESAN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS
1 THOMAS JOSE @ TOMY
S/O.JOSE KALLOORKAD, P.O.KALLOORKAD, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT.
2 THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
TALIPARAMBA.
3 K.PAVITHRAN, SO.NARAYANAN, NATIONAL METAL WORKS,
NEAR S.B.I., KANHANGAD.
BY ADV A.R.GEORGE - SC
THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 10.1.2025, ALONG WITH CO.136/2022, THE COURT ON
30.1.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022
2
2025:KER:7389
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY 2025 / 10TH MAGHA, 1946
CO NO. 136 OF 2022
MACA NO.574 OF 2010 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ARISING
OUT OF THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 07.09.2009 IN OPMV NO.331
OF 2002 OF MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL , THALASSERY
CROSS APPELLANT/2ND RESPONDENT IN MACA
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. THALIPARAMBA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY, THE
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., REGIONAL OFFICE
ERNAKULAM, METRO PALACE, KOCHI-18, PIN - 682018
BY ADV A.R.GEORGE - SC
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT & RESPONDENTS 1 & 3 IN MACA
1 SHERY JOSEPH, S/O. JOSEPH, C/O. DWARAKA TOURIST
HOME, PAYYANNUR, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670307
2 THOMAS JOSE @ TOMY, S/O. JOSE, KALLOORKKAD PO.,
KALLOORKAD, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 686668
3 K PAVITHRAN, S/O. NARAYANAN, NATIONAL METAL
WORKS, NEAR S.B.I. KANHANGAD, PIN - 671315
BY ADV.M.V.AMARESAN - R1
ADV ARUNKUMAR A - R3
THIS CROSS OBJECTION/CROSS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 10.1.2025, ALONG WITH MACA.574/2010, THE COURT ON
30.1.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022
3
2025:KER:7389
JUDGMENT
Dated : 30th January, 2025 The petitioner in OP(MV).331/2002 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thalassery is the appellant. He filed the above OP under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation for the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 25.12.2000. According to the petitioner, while he was travelling in a scooter bearing registration No.KL-14-3761 as pillion rider, the 1st respondent who was the rider of the motor cycle driven the same in a rash and negligent manner and the motor cycle capsized and he sustained grievous injuries. The 2nd respondent is the insurer and 3rd respondent is the owner of the above motor cycle. In the OP he claimed a compensation of Rs.4,00,000/-.
2. The 2nd respondent filed a written statement admitting the insurance coverage and disputing the negligence on the part of the 1st respondent. A further contention was taken by the 2nd respondent that since the petitioner was a pillion rider, the 2nd respondent is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner.
3. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimony of PW1 and Exts.A1 to A6 and X1. After evaluating the evidence on record, the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.1,87,700/- payable jointly and MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 4 2025:KER:7389 severally by respondents 1 to 3. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the petitioner preferred this appeal. At the same time, the 2 nd respondent filed a cross objection contending that the offending vehicle had only 'Act only policy' and as such, they are not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner. Now the points that arise for consideration are the following :
(i) Whether the Cross Objection is maintainable ?
(ii) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable ?
(iii) Whether the 2nd respondent has any liability to indemnify the claim of the petitioner?
4. Heard Sri.M.V.Amaresan, the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant and Sri.A.R.George, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent.
5. Point No.1 - At the very outset the learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that the Cross objection filed by the 2 nd respondent is not maintainable, as it does not in any way relate to the issue involved in the appeal. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner preferred the appeal for enhancement of compensation while the Cross MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 5 2025:KER:7389 Objection was filed claiming that there was no valid insurance policy to cover a pillion rider. In support of the above argument, he has relied upon certain precedents.
6. In the decision in Manoj Kumar v. Subramanian, 2009 ICO 2629, in paragraph 15 and 16, a Division Bench of this Court held that :
"The basic feature emerging from the two sets of decisions is that cross appeal is maintainable only if the rights of the cross objector are directly concerned or connected in the appeal already preferred and is pending consideration. To put it more clear, when the Insurer files the appeal in the capacity as the indemnifier of the owner, for getting absolved from the liability to indemnify the owner or to have the liability limited to the specified extent as stipulated in the policy, it does not give rise to a cause of action for the claimant to seek for enhancement of the award amount by way of Cross Objection. On the other hand, as made clear by the Division Bench of this Court in 2004 (2) KLT 679, when the appeal is filed by the Insurer disputing the quantum of compensation, Cross-objection filed by the claimant seeking for further enhancement of the quantum is very much maintainable. This is obviously for the reason that the right of appeal conferred on the Insurer under the statute is only on the specified grounds as provided under Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which does not take in the quantum or negligence. As such, when an appeal is preferred by the Insurer under the statutory grounds of defence mentioned under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, no cross appeal will lie at the instance of claimant for enhancement. If the insurer has filed the appeal on all grounds by virtue of having obtained permission to have wider defence under Section 170 of the MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 6 2025:KER:7389 Motor Vehicles Act or on the basis of the 'Reservation Clause' mentioned in the Policy enabling to contest the matter on behalf of the Insured as well, 'Cross-objection' is very much liable to be entertained.
In the instant case, as mentioned hereinbefore, the appeal has been preferred not by the Insurer; but by the claimant, for enhancement. Since the owner of the vehicle has been primarily held liable to satisfy the compensation, Cross-objection is very much maintainable against the claimant/appellant in MACA 744/2003, so as to have the quantum of compensation reduced, if supported by valid grounds. But since none of the grounds raised in the "Cross Objection' does refer to any such case seeking to reduce the quantum of compensation awarded. There is no challenge against the quantum already fixed by the Tribunal and as such, there is no legally sustainable cases as against the rights and liberties of the appellant in MACA 744/2003".
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Padmavathi, 1983 KHC 6, a Division Bench of this Court relied upon the observations made by a Bench of five Judges of Madras High Court in Devendra Ayyar v. Muthu Chettiar, AIR 1938 Mad.329. Thereafter the Division Bench proceeded to hold that :
"7. In support of the contention that an appeal against one of the corespondents is maintainable, reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Madras High Court in Devendra Ayyar v. Muthu Chettiar (AIR 1938 Mad. 329) wherein Abdul Rahman J, had held as follows: -
"The provisions contained in O.41, R.22 are quite general in my MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 7 2025:KER:7389 opinion and entitle respondent to take any cross objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal. It has been already held in a Full Bench ruling of this court in 38 Mad. 705 and followed in 41 Mad. 904 and AIR 1923 Lah. 39 that a respondent could urge cross objections against a corespondent in any and every case."
However, the view expressed in this decision could not be considered to lay down the correct position in law in view of the decision in Venkateswarlu v. Ratnamma (AIR 1950 Mad. 379) handed down by a Bench of Five Judges. Speaking for the Full Bench, Raja Mannar C. J said:
"The legislature by describing the objection which could be taken by the respondent as a cross objection' must have deliberately adopted the view of the other High Courts. One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent. The cross objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant."
After having quoted the above passage, the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 1516) stated:
"We think, with respect, that these observations put the matter clearly and correctly. That the legislature also wanted to give effect to the views held by the different High Courts that in exceptional cases as mentioned above an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a corespondent is indicated by the substitution of the word 'appellant' in the third paragraph by the words 'the party who may be affected by such objection.' This view in regard to the limited scope and application of O.41, R 22 CPC., has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar (1982 (1) SCC 232) wherein in MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 8 2025:KER:7389 Para.7 of the judgment, at page 235 of the report, Misra J , who spoke for the Bench, has stated as follows:-
"The first part of this Rule authorises the respondent to support the decree not only on the grounds decided in his favour but also on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below. The first part thus authorises the respondent only to support the decree. It does not authorise him to challenge the decree. If he wants to challenge the decree, be has to take recourse to the second part, that is, he has to file a cross objection if he has not already filed an appeal against the decree. Admittedly, the State of Bihar had neither filed any appeal nor cross objection. Obviously, therefore, on the strength of the first part of sub-r.(1) of R.22 of O.41 the State of Bihar could only support the decree not only on the grounds decided in its favour but also on the grounds decided against it. The Commissioner, however, has set aside the finding in favour of the appellants on the strength of O.41, R.22(1). Ia our opinion this he could not do."
As early as in 1960 a Division Bench of this Court in Abubacker v. Abdulrahiman Beary (1960 KLT 348) had taken the view that memorandum of cross objections which is directed solely against corespondents, not the appellants, is not maintainable under O.41, R.22. The law is well settled that as a general rule a respondent can file a cross objection only against an appellant; and it is only in exceptional cases where the decree proceeds on a common ground or the interest of the appellant is intermixed with that of the respondent that a respondent could be allowed to urge a cross objection against a corespondent."
8. In New India Assurance Co.Ltd v. Kunhiraman Nambiar, 1994 KHC 196 another Division Bench of this Court held in paragraph Nos.8 to MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 9 2025:KER:7389 10 that :
"8. Memorandum of Cross objection has been filed by the claimants in each of these cases, claiming enhanced compensation. Prima facie the cross objections are not maintainable having regard to the decision of this court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi, 1991 (1) KLT 832, where Bhat and Guttal, JJ. held that the position of the insurer being only that of an indemnifier, a memorandum of cross objection for enhancement of compensation will not lie in an appeal filed by the insurer.
9. But, counsel for the claimants, Sri.Therattil contends, relying on the decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan in Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi, 1986 ACJ 316 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi, 1988 ACJ 962, that cross objections could be entertained and the compensation enhanced in exercise of the powers vested in this court under R.33 of O.41 of the C.P.C. even though the appeal is by the insurer only. We find it unable to agree with this submission. The liability of the appellant insurer is only to indemnify the insured, by paying to the claimant the amount of the decree obtained by him (but not exceeding the sum assured), as if he were the judgment debtor. (Vide S.96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939). The liability is only to pay such sum as is adjudged payable by the insured, the owner of the vehicle. Admittedly the owner of the vehicle has not joined the appeal. An objection under O.41 R.22 should, as a general rule, primarily be against the appellant. It is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in the objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and the others, that it can be directed also against the other respondents MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 10 2025:KER:7389 (Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma, AIR 1950 Mad. 379 (FB) where the matter is discussed in elaborate detail and which was approved in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516). The relief of enhancement of the compensation is directed against the corespondent owner of the vehicle. The appellant insurer does not become liable for any further amount unless an enhanced award is passed against the owner of the vehicle, who is only a corespondent. The memorandum of cross objection is therefore not maintainable under R.22 of O.41 CPC.
10. Nor is it possible to grant enhancement under R.33 of O.41. The object of R.33 is to avoid contrary and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. The rule does not ordinarily confer a right to reopen decrees which have become final. The object of the rule is to adjust the rights of parties according to justice where it becomes necessary as a result of interference with the decree, in favour of the appellant (State of Kerala v. Padmavathi, 1983 KLT
17). The rule is not intended to provide a kind of separate appeal on disputes essentially between correspondents and not arising as a result of any decision in favour of the appellant in the appeal."
9. On the other hand, in the decision in Dheeraj Singh v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2023 KLT OnLine 1595 (SC), the scope of order XLI Rule 22 CPC was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 15, 16 and 17 as follows :-
"15. In cases where the opposing party files a first appeal against part or whole of the original decree, and the respondent in the said first appeal, due to part or whole of the decree being in their favour, abstains from filing an appeal at the first instance, in such cases, to ensure that the respondent is also given a fair chance to be heard, he is MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 11 2025:KER:7389 given the right to file his cross objections within the appeal already so instituted by the other party, against not only the contentions raised by the other party, but also against part or whole of the decree passed by the court of first instance.
16. In a similar circumstance, where the other party in the first instance has preferred an appeal, apart from the remedy of cross objections, the respondent can also file a cross appeal within the limitation period so prescribed, which in essence is a separate appeal in itself, challenging part or whole of the original decree, independent of the appeal filed by the other party. The respondent also has the right to fully support the original decree passed by the lower court in full.
17. In the present case at hand, the appellants herein, in the court of first appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of the appellants herein that his cross objection was not considered by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. At this stage, it must be noted that while cross objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filed within an already existing appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular appeal, and therefore, must be considered in full by the court adjudicating upon the same."
10. In Urmila Devi v. National Insurance Co.Ltd., 2020 (1) KLT OnLine 1074 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs 22 to 26 as follows :-
"22. A perusal of Section 173 of the M.V. Act would reveal that the said provision does not restrict the right to file an appeal as is restricted under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It provides, that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereof, may prefer an appeal to the High MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 12 2025:KER:7389 Court. The restriction imposed under sub-section (2) of Section 173 is with regard to non-filing of appeal against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. Needless to mention that this is subject to the provisions about limitation.
23. As already discussed herein above, the learned single judge of the High Court himself has observed that in view of Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992, there cannot be any issue with regard to the tenability of the cross-objection. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992 would show, that save as provided in sub- rules (1) and (2), the provisions of Order XLI and Order XXI in First Schedule to the CPC shall apply mutatis mutandis to appeals preferred to the High Court under Section 173 of the M.V. Act.
24. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI rule 22 of the CPC would reveal, that there is no restriction on the right to appeal of any of the parties. It is clear, that any party aggrieved by any part of the Award would be entitled to prefer an appeal. It is also clear, that any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, apart from supporting the finding in his favour, is also entitled to take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal.
25. When in an appeal the appellant could have raised any of the grounds against which he is aggrieved, we fail to understand, as to how a respondent can be denied to file cross-objection in an appeal filed by the other side challenging that part of the Award with which he was aggrieved. We find, that the said distinction as sought to be drawn by the High Court is not in tune with conjoint reading of the provisions MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 13 2025:KER:7389 of Section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI rule 22 of the CPC.
26. As a matter of fact, it could be seen from the prayer clause in the appeal preferred by the respondents herein (Insurance Company) before the High Court that the entire award was challenged by the respondents - Insurance Company. Not only that, but the appellants herein (the claimants) were also impleaded as party respondents to the said appeal. In such circumstances, the High Court has erred in declining to consider the cross objection of the appellants herein (the claimants) on merits.
11. In the decision in New India Assurance Co.Ltd, and Others v. K.K.Sunil and Others, MANU/KE/2151/2021 relying upon the decision in Urmila Devi (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the decision in Manoj Kumar (supra) is no more good law. In the above decision, the accident occurred in a collision between a motor cycle and a bus. The petitioners were the pillion riders in the motor cycle. The owner of the motor cycle contended that the motor cycle was stolen and that it was driven by the thief. The Tribunal found that the negligence was on the part of the rider of the motor cycle and hence negligence could not be attributed on the driver of the bus and directed the insurer of the motor cycle to pay compensation to the petitioners. Aggrieved by the above order, the insurer preferred the appeal challenging their liability. At the same time, the petitioner filed Cross-objection challenging the question of negligence and MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 14 2025:KER:7389 for enhancement of compensation. The learned Single Judge held that even though the insurer has preferred the appeal only challenging its liability, there is no legal impediment in the cross objectors challenging the finding of negligence and seeking for enhancement of compensation.
12. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Urmila Devi (supra) held that any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, apart from supporting the finding in his favour, is also entitled to take any cross objection to the decree which he could have filed by way of appeal, I am constrained to hold that the Cross-objection filed by the insurer in this case is maintainable.
13. In this case, from the additional written statement filed by the 2nd respondent before the Tribunal it can be seen that, along with the said written statement, the copy of the policy was also produced. However, the said policy is not seen marked in evidence and not seen acted upon. During the pendency of this appeal, the 2nd respondent along with I.A.2/2019 produced the carbon copy of the insurance policy as Annexure-B1. Since the 2nd respondent has produced the very same policy before the Tribunal and the same was not acted upon by the Tribunal, the carbon copy of the policy produced as Annexure-B1 is liable to be accepted in evidence and it is MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 15 2025:KER:7389 marked as Ext.B1, for reference.
14. On a perusal of Ext.B1, it can be seen that it is valid for the period from 6.2.2000 to 5.2.2001 and that it is only an 'act only policy', in respect of the motor cycle bearing registration No.KL-14-3761. The accident occurred when the motorcycle capsized while the petitioner was riding pillion on it. In the above circumstance, the 2 nd respondent has no liability to indemnify the 1st respondent and as such, the 2nd respondent is entitled to get an order to pay and recover the compensation from the 3rd respondent/owner.
15. The petitioner was aged 24 at the time of accident. He would claim that he was employed abroad in a bar earning a sum of Rs.4,500/- per month. The Tribunal fixed his income at Rs.3,000/-. Though the petitioner has claimed an income of Rs.4,500/-, nothing was produced before the Tribunal, to show his actual income. Therefore, his monthly income as fixed by the tribunal, at Rs.3000/- is liable to be accepted.
16. Another contention is with regard to the percentage of disability of the petitioner. As per Ext. X1, the disability assessed by the medical board is 50%. However, the Tribunal has scaled down the same to 25%. As per Ext. A2 wound certificate, the petitioner sustained abrasion MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 16 2025:KER:7389 over the left knee, abrasion over the right elbow, left palm and lateral side of right eye brow etc. Ext.A3 C.T. Scan report states that :
"Serial axial sections of the head were studied before and after injection of I.V.Contrast. 5Mm sections were taken in the posterior fossa and 10mm in the supratentorial region. There is evidence of midline shift. III defined hyperdense area surrounded by hypodense area seen in the right parietal area. Fissures, sulci and lateral ventricle on the right side are compressed. In the post contrast study there is no abnormal enhancement in this lesion. Sulci and margins of the fissures show abnormal enhancement. Rest of the cerebral parenchyma shows normal attenuation. Cerebellum, midrain show normal attenuation. Cisterna magna is prominent. Effacement of the basal cisters seen. Visible paranasal sinuses are clear. Calvarium normal."
17. It was on the basis of the above injuries, the medical board assessed his permanent physical disability at 50%. The law is settled that if the Tribunal is not satisfied with the disability certificate produced by the petitioner, the remedy is to refer him to a higher Authority. Having not done so, the Tribunal was not justified in scaling down the percentage of disability. I do find any grounds to disbelieve the disability assessed as per Ext. X1 and as such the permanent physical disability of the petitioner is fixed as 50%.
18. Since the petitioner was aged 24 on the date of accident, 40% of the income is to be added towards 'future prospects' and the multiplier to MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 17 2025:KER:7389 be applied is 18. Therefore, the loss of disability will come to Rs.4,53,600/-.
19. Towards loss of earning the tribunal has awarded only Rs.9,000 @ Rs.3000/- for 3 months. Considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the petitioner and the percentage of disability suffered by him, I hold that the notional income for a period of 6 months can be awarded towards loss of earning, which will come to Rs.18,000/- (3000x6).
20. Towards 'pain and suffering', the Tribunal awarded Rs.5,000/-. Considering the fact that the petitioner was treated as inpatient for a total period of 21 days, the nature of injuries sustained by him and the percentage of disability suffered by him, I hold that the compensation awarded towards pain and suffering is on the lesser side, and hence, it is enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-.
21. Towards 'loss of amenities' no compensation was awarded by the Tribunal. Considering the nature of injuries sustained by the petitioner, and percentage of disability suffered by him, Rs.30,000/- is awarded for 'loss of amenities'. Towards 'extra nourishment' the tribunal has awarded Rs.6,000/-, which is on the lesser side and hence it is enhanced to Rs. 15,000/-.
MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/202218
2025:KER:7389
22. No change is required, in the amounts awarded on other heads, as the compensation awarded on those heads appears to be just and reasonable.
23. Therefore, the petitioner/appellant is entitled to get a total compensation of Rs.5,81,300/- as modified and recalculated above and given in the table below, for easy reference.
Sl. No. Head of claim Amount awarded by the The amount
Tribunal(Rs) given in appeal
(Rs.)
1 Disability income 1,53,000 4,53,600
2 Medical expenses 11100 11100
3 Pain and sufferings 5000 50000
4 Bystanders expenses 2100 2100
5 Extra nourishment and review 6000 15000
treatment
6 Taxi expenses 1500 1500
7 Loss of earning for 9000 18000
8 Loss of amenities Nil 30000
Total 1,87,700 5,81,300
Amount enhanced 3,93,600
24. In the result, this Appeal is allowed in part, and the 2nd respondent is directed to deposit a total compensation of Rs.5,81,300/- (Rupees five lakhs eighty one thousand three hundred Only), less the amount already deposited, if any, along with interest as ordered by the Tribunal, from the date of the petition till realization, with proportionate costs, within a period MACA 574/2010 & CO 136/2022 19 2025:KER:7389 of two months from today (interest for the enhanced amount is limited to 8%).
25. On depositing the aforesaid amount, the Tribunal shall disburse the entire amount to the petitioner, excluding court fee payable, if any, without delay, as per rules.
On depositing the aforesaid amount, the 2nd respondent is allowed to recover the said amount from the 3rd respondent/owner, as per law.
Sd/-
C.Pratheep Kumar, Judge Mrcs/17.1.