Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
K.N. Sharma vs State Of Rajasthan on 12 February, 1988
Equivalent citations: 1988(1)WLN232
JUDGMENT
G.M. Lodha, Actg. C.J.
1. We are glad that an Advocate of this Court K.N. Sharma, who not only according to his own assertion is committed to the concept of speedy dispensation of justice and providing legal assistance in numerous cases, but, further by way of this public interest writ petition has provided an exemplary illustration of his real anxiety for the real consumer of justice i.e. litigants, who are facing serious problems on account of nonavailability of jurisdiction to hear bail applications by Additional Sessions Jugde.
2. Shri Sharma in this writ petition has pointed out that on account of a judgment of this Court in Rajesh Chowdhary v. State 1987 WLN (UC) 57 : 1986 RLW 667, in which it has been held that Addl. Sessions Judge has got no power under Section 439, Cr. PC, 1973 for considering bail application, thousands of litigants who could have normally obtained decision on the prayer of bail at the place in which the Court of Additional Sessions Judge is located or situated, are now required to bear heavy expenses and further devote lot of time with cumbersome expensive procedure in engaging counsel at two places, one of Additional Sessions Judge's Court and other Sessions Judge's Court which are located at far distant-places in view of the geographical areas lying in Rajasthan, are facing serious difficulties in getting justice.
3. We have been taken through the entire judgment in Rajesh Chowdhary's case and further with the assistance of Shri Dhankhar, counsel for Shri K.N. Sharma and Mr. M.I. Khan, Additional Advocate General, we have perused and studied the various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Constitution of India. At present, we refer to Rajesh Chowdhary's case and others which were referred to us and cited before us.
4. The real crux of the controversy which has been high-lighted by this writ petition is that on account of the above judgment, the litigants by and large have been put to serious jeopardy not only in the matter of expenditure and inconvenience but also are deprived of their right as they are required to run from one place to other even though the Court of Additional Sessions Judge is located at the original place only.
5. While we are hearing the case in order to consider the correctness of the view taken in Rajesh Chowdhary's case, we find that in view of the legal position that has emerged during the course of arguments it would be better to avoid the exercise to decide the correctness and validity of the judgment in the present writ petition. Obviously, no reference has been made by any of the Hon'ble Judges for reconsidering the judgment in Rajesh Chowdhary's case. But without expressing any opinion, whether in this writ petition we can do so or not, we feel that in the view that we are now going to take, it is unnecessary and should be avoided. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the question whether the decision in Rajesh Chowdhary's case lays down a good law or correct law, is left open to be considered as and when and, if at all, a regular reference is made and in any case, if at all it becomes necessary to do so.
6. We find that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gokaraj Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh held that a person appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising jurisdiction in the Court of Sessions and his judgments and orders would be those of the Court of Sessions. These observations have been explained in Rajesh Chowdhary's case in one particular manner and we would refrain from making any comments whether it has been correctly explained or not as we are not deciding the correctness or propriety of that judgment in the present writ petition.
7. Mr. Khan, learned Additional Advocate General, rightly pointed out the main anxiety of this Court, so also of the petitioner and the State, the trilogy of all the three who are responsible for dispensation of justice, which should be cheap, speedy, substantial and real and to ensure that the litigants are not compelled to run from pillar to post and post to pillar for the v purpose of getting even minimum relief, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, for getting their right of liberty to be considered in the context and within the four corners of sees 438 & 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Precisely, as mentioned above, after the judgment in Rajesh Chowdhary's case, it will have to be admitted and it has been consistency realised by all concerned that thousands litigants who require their bail applications to be considered under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. PC, 1973 and who are living in an area where the Court of Additional Sessions Judge has got jurisdiction have started feeling helpless as the Additional Sessions Judge refuses to hear the bail application on account of the handicap created by Rajesh Chowdhary's case. The litigant who is an accused and is likely to be arrested in Dausa or Lalsot cannot approach the nearest court in Dausa, i. e, the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, but is compelled to incur expenditure and have the luxury which he cannot afford but under compulsion, comes to Jaipur for approaching the Sessions Judge, Jaipur District. Similar are the instances where an accused at Gangapur or Karauli is required to go to Sawai Madhopur. Such examples are almost known of other districts and the miserable plight of the accused, which can certainly be appreciated by all of us, is that they have to incur heavy expenditure and further the litigant has to come to distant places even it was a case where bail under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. PC could have been given or should have been given.
8. In this view of the matter, the object of Shri Sharma appears to be genuine and real and the solution which Mr. Khan has put forth and rightly so by exercising power under Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as under:
The Sessions Judge may also make provision for the disposal of any urgent application, in the event of his absence or inability to act, by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, or, if there be no Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and every such Judge or Magistrate, shall be deemed to have jurisdiction to deal with any such application.
9. Section 10 in turn enables Sessions Judge appointed under Section 9 for directing Additional Sessions Judge to dispose of the original applications on account of his inability to act and in that case, Additional Sessions Judge gets jurisdiction. Section 10 reads as under:
The Sessions Judge may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among such Assistant Sessions Judges.
10. The question sometimes arises and may be agitated is, whether 'liability' used in Sub-section (3) of Section 10 is to be considered in terms of physical inability. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had the occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in T.V. Sharma v. A. Nagakoteswararao and Ors. 1977 Cr. LJ 19, in which it has been held as under:
Inability to act is the same as incapable of acting. The words inability and incapacity are synonymous. In common parlance, while 'incapacity' or 'incapability' is generally used to connote physical incapacity or incapability, 'inability' is used as a term of wider amplitude, meaning not only physical disability or incapacity but any other kind of want of ability to do a particular act whatever may be the reason for the lack of ability. By reason of the expression "inability to act" in Section 10 of the Criminal PC, a Sessions Judge can assign urgent applications for disposal to an Additional Sessions Judge not only when he is physically incapable of acting but also when he is otherwise unable to act due to pressure of other work.
11. Reliance has been placed on State v. Mohinder Singh 1964 (2) Cr. L.J. 728 in the said judgment of T.V. Sharma (supra), para 5 of which may be referred for ready reference:
Admittedly, in the instant case, the Sessions Judge was not absent. The only question is whether the transfer is valid with reference to the words "inability to act" in the provision. Drawing the attention of the court to the observations in State v. Mohinder Singh AIR 1964 Punj 543 : 1964 (2) Cri. L.J 728), Sri Ram Sharma contends that "incapacity to act" means not only physical incapacity but also incapacity caused by other reasons like, pressure of work. He points out that the Legislature has deliberately avoided the words "incapable of acting" and purposefully used the words "incapacity to act" in the new Section 10 with a view to restrict the application of the provision to cases of physical inabilty or illness alone. In the case relied when the old Code, was in force, the Sessions Judge assigned an application for bail for disposal to the Additional Sessions Judge on the ground that he was busy in an Election Petition and that he had therefore no time to dispose of the application. It was contended before the High Court that the order of the Sessions Judge was illegal in so far as the expression "incapable of acting" included only physical incapacity due to illness or such other cause. The High Court over ruled the contention by holding that the Sessions Judges can assign urgent application for bail to the Additional Sessions Judge whenever there is congestion of work. The contention of Sri Sharma that by changing the words from "incapable of acting" to "inability in act", the Legislature wanted to narrow down the scope of the provision does not commend itself to me as correct, 'inability to act' is the s the as 'incapable of acting'. The word "inability' and 'incapacity' are synonymous. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "incapability' means, the quality or condition of being incapable; incapacity, inability, incompetence and inability means, "the condition of being unable; want of ability, physical, mental, or moral; lack of power, capacity or means." According to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 42, page 498, 'incapable' means, lacking or wanting in natural, ability, capacity, or qualifications" an 'inability' (page 493) means, "state of being unable, physically, mentally, or morally, incompetency; lack of ability, want of sufficient power, strength, resources, or capacity; lack of power capacity or means, want of ability, without ability, "It is also pointed out in the Corpus Juri Secundum that "the term (inability) has been held to be as broad us, or synonymous with, "incapacity and distinguished from "lessened capacity". In common parlance, while "incapacity" or incapability" is generally used to connote physical incapacity or incapability 'inability' is used as a term of wider amplitude, meaning not only physical disability or incapacity but any other kind of want of ability to do a particular act whatever may be the reason for the lack of ability. Though some of the High Courts interpreted the expression "incapable of acting" as meaning not only physical "inability" to act, but also incapacity or inability due to any other reason, the Legislature perhaps wanted to make the matter absolutely clear and uncontroversial by using the words 'inability to act' I am therefore clearly of the view that a Sessions Judge can assign urgent applications for disposal to an Additional Sesssons Judge not only when he is physically incapable of acting but also when he is otherwise unable to act due to pressure of other work.
12. We are of the opinion that proper reasons have been given in the above judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court. Reference has also been made to a judgment of the Supreme Court Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 1360, where in their Lordships of the Supreme Court released the accused either on bonds or without even bonds. We feel it our constitutional and legal duty to direct that all Additional Sessions Judges in Rajasthan will entertain and hear the bail applications under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. PC. Obviously, as the situation exists both geographically and statistically Sessions Judges are unable and there is inability to act in those cases where the Courts of Additional Sessions Judges are located or are functioning. The reasons, apart from heavy work-load, long distances and other factors can also be enumerated as making justice expensive and delayed by compelling them to go to the Sessions Judges where they can get it considered by Additional Sessions Judge. If the object is to bring justice to the doors of the litigants, it is not to be a laudable pleasant slogan, but it is to be turned into reality. Thus, it is our duty to interpret the law in such a harmonious manner so as to make this object achievable.
13. We therefore in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in addition to other provisions, direct that all Additional Sessions Judges in Rajasthan would entertain hear consider, adjudicate and decide bail application under Sections 438 and 439, Cr. PC arising out of the cases in their territorial areas/jurisdiction.
14. We also direct that in order to achieve this object collectively and to plug the loop holes of technical laws, if any the Registrar of the High Court would issue directions in this respect and the Sessions Judges in Rajasthan would further issue such directions under Section 10, Cr. PC so that there is no scope for any anomaly resulting in multiplicity of litigation.
15. Consequently, the writ petition is accepted and it is ordered that all Additional Sessions Judges in Rajasthan would hear bail applications under Sections 438 and 439 Cr. PC which emerge from the cases which are registered in their territorial jurisdiction. We are happy that Mr. Dhankhar, Mr. Khan, Mr. Chaturvedi and other members of the Bar have shown their anxiety for the cause of consumers of justice, who are not normally represented. This will help to achieve the goal of social justice as laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution of India to help poor, down-trodden, oppressed depressed and suppressed citizens of our country.