National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Jalandhar Improvement Trust & Anr. vs Sanjay Gupta on 1 July, 2015
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL NO. 1216 OF 2014 (Against the Order dated 30/07/2014 in Complaint No. 82/2013 of the State Commission Chandigarh) 1. JALANDHAR IMPROVEMENT TRUST & ANR. THROUGH ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HAVING OFFICE AT JALANDHAR IMPROVEMENT TRUST BUILDING, JALANDHAR PUNJAB 2. CHAIRMAN, JALANDHAR, IPROVEMENT TRUST, JALANDHAR ...........Appellant(s) Versus 1. SANJAY GUPTA S/O. SHRI HAKUMAT RAI GUPTA, H NO. 112, STREET-4, PUNIA COLONY, SANGRUR PUNJAB ...........Respondent(s)
BEFORE: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER HON'BLE MR. SURESH CHANDRA, MEMBER For the Appellant : Mr. Neeraj Jain, Senior Advocate with Mr. P.N. Puri, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Karan Dewan, Advocate Dated : 01 Jul 2015 ORDER Consumer Complaints (No.81 and 82 of 2013) filed by Respondents/Complainants namely, Munish Dev Sharma and Sanjay Gupta, respectively were allowed by Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh ( for short, 'State Commission') vide separate orders dated 30.7.2014.
2. Being aggrieved, Appellants/Opposite Parties, have filed First Appeals (No.1215 and 1216 of 2014).
3. As facts in these complaints are similar and common question of law is involved, these appeals are being disposed of a common order.
4. In the year 2011, appellants framed a development scheme over an area of 94.97 acres of land for allotment of residential plots in Surya Enclave Extension, Jalandhar for which booking commenced w.e.f. 8.8.2011. Appellants invited applications from the general public. Respondents also applied for residential plots measuring 200 sq. yard each, the tentative price of which was ₹17,000/- per sq. yard. Vide allotment letters dated 26.12.2011 and 23.12.2011, respondents were allotted Plots No. 379-D and 305-D, respectively. As per terms and conditions of the allotment letter, entire payment, that is, ₹30,69,450/- each, was to be made within 30 days of the date of issuance of allotment letter or in the instalments alongwith interest, as indicated in the allotment letter. Further, as per terms and conditions of the allotment letter, agreement to sell was to be executed within 30 days of the date of issuance of the allotment letter. Thereafter, possession of plots was to be handed over.
5. It is alleged by respondents, that they had paid sum of ₹28,22,950/- each, till 24.6.2014. As per terms of the allotment letter, development facilities had to be completed within 2½ years and possession of plots by the allottee can be taken from the appellant after execution of the agreement for sale. On 18.1.2012, the agreement as envisaged in the allotment letter was executed. After execution of the agreement, appellants were under obligation to immediately deliver possession of the plots to the respondents. But appellants have not performed their part of the agreement. Since, appellants have failed to deliver the possession of the plots in question, despite respondents having paid substantial amount till date therefore, respondents are unable to take further steps for getting the plan sanctioned and start the construction, within the stipulated period of three years.
6. It is further stated, that respondents personally visited the sites in July, 2013. They noticed, that there is no sign of any development at the site nor there is any demarcation of the plots till date. Thereafter, respondents visited the office of the appellant and came to know, that there is some dispute between the owners and the appellant, which has not been sorted out till date. Thus, by not ensuring that there was no encumbrance on the land acquired by the appellants for the scheme in question, before proceeding to collect money from the consumers for allotment of residential plots to them, the appellants have exhibited gross negligence and deficiency in performance on their part. In this manner, respondents have suffered huge loss, as amount deposited by them with appellants got struck. The appellants are neither returning the said amount alongwith interest nor they are developing the site in question. Hence, respondents sent demand notice to the appellants on 4.7.2013, calling upon them to refund the amount deposited with them alongwith interest. But, there was no response. Accordinlgy, respondents filed consumer complaints seeking following reliefs;
"(i) Opposite Parties be directed to refund the amount of Rs.28,22,950/- deposited by the complainant with them alongwith penal interest @ 16% per annum, with quarterly compounded, since as per terms and conditions of allotment letter, Annexure P-2, Opposite Parties were entitled to recover interest from the complainant at the aforesaid rate, in case there was delay by the complainant in depositing the instalment beyond six months.
ii) Opposite Parties be directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainant for harassment mental agony and for the depreciation in the amount deposited by the complainant with them on account of inflation, and the rise in the prices of the immovable properties during the last 2-3 years.
iii) Opposite Parties be directed to pay Rs.5,000/- towards litigation expenses for the instant proceedings."
7. The State Commission issued notice to the appellants, who put in their appearance through their counsel. However, no written reply was filed by them, though adjournments were granted. The appellants burdened with cost also. Even, then appellants did not file any written reply nor paid the cost. Later on, none appeared on their behalf before the State Commission.
8. The State Commission, after taking into consideration evidence produced on behalf of the respondents and documents, allowed the complaints and directed appellants as under;
"ï) To refund Rs.28,22,950/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint till the date of payment;
ii) to pay Rs.2,00,000/- as compensation; and iii) to pay Rs.5,000/- as litigation costs."
9. Being aggrieved, appellants have filed these appeals. Alongwith it, applications seeking condonation of delay of 25 days have also been filed. However, as per office note there is delay of 33 days.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record as well as written submissions filed on behalf of respondents.
11. On condonation of delay, it has been submitted by learned counsel for appellants, that after receipt of the copy of impugned order, the same was examined by Appellant- Trust at various levels. In that process, delay of 25 days has occurred. The delay in filing these appeals is neither intentional nor wilful but bonafide. Therefore, delay should be condoned in view of the settled law since no prejudice will be caused to the other side. In support, learned counsel has relied upon following judgements;
"(i) State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and Ors.,
(1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 132 and
(ii) Improvement Trust Ludhiana Vs. Ujjagar Singh
and others,
2010 (6) Supreme Court Cases 786"
12. On the other hand, respondents in reply to application for condonation of delay, have stated that approach of appellants is very casual. No just reason is made out for condoning the delay. It is well settled, that each day delay has to be explained. In the present case, no explanation in this regard has been given. The conduct of appellants is not bonafide. Appellants with malafide intention, floated the scheme despite stay order passed by the High Court. In support, learned counsel for respondents has relied upon decisions of this Commission as well as decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority -IV (2006) CPJ 63 (SC).
13. Though, delay of about one month ought to be condoned but here the conduct of appellants is such which disentitle them to have any indulgence in this regard. Only ground on which condonation of delay has been sought is, that delay is not intentional but it was due to the office procedure, as file had to dealt with at different levels.
14. In this regard, we would like to quote the following observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563, which are binding on this Commission;
"24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;
"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."
The Court further observed;
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.
32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs".
15. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) held, that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if the appeals and revisions which are highly belated are entertained. Relevant observations are as under;
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras".
16. In the present case, the conduct of appellants from day one, is of wilful defiance. Initially, appellants had put in appearance before the State Commission through their Advocate. Later on, for reasons best known to the appellants, they have chosen not to contest the consumer complaints. In spite of various opportunities granted to the appellants, they did not file any written statement. No explanation is forthcoming, as to why appellants did not contest the complaints and have chosen to remain absent. Appellant-Trust must be having its own legal advisors. But even then, it had chosen not to contest.
17. In view of such conduct of the appellants we can only draw the conclusion, that they had no plausible defence in this case. Now, the appellants cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong.
18. Even after getting adverse order from the State Commission, Appellant-Trust remained negligent and lethargic. They took their own time to challenge the impugned order.
19. Be that as it may, appellants have nowhere stated in the appeal as to how they got knowledge of the impugned order passed by the State Commission. Hence, we do not find any ground whatsoever for condonding the delay. Decisions of Chandra Mani and Ors. (Supra) and Improvement Trust Ludhiana (Supra) relied upon by learned counsel for appellants are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case.
20. On merits, it is the submission of learned counsel for appellants, that possession of plots could not be handed over to the respondents, due to the stay order passed by Punjab and Haryana High Court. Thus, non-handing over of possession of the plots to the respondents, is neither deliberate nor intentional. However, in (F.A. No.1216 of 2014) respondent was offered possession of the plot in March, 2014. Respondent-Sanjay Gupta concealed this fact in his complaint. Therefore, this respondent has not approached the State Commission with clean hands. As such, his complaint is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone.
21. It is further submitted by learned senior counsel, that again in year 2015, appellants offered possession of alternative plots to the respondents, but they refused the offer. Thus, there is no deficiency on the part of the appellants. In support, learned counsel has relied upon following judgements;
(i) Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate Bank
(2007) 6 Supreme Court Cases 711 and
(ii) Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Balbir Singh,
(2004) 5 Supreme Court Cases 65"
22. On the other hand it is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, that when scheme in question was floated, the appellants were well-aware, that land in question is under litigation. In spite of this fact, appellants floated the scheme and collected money from the respondents. Even till date, there is no sign of development at the site and there is no demarcation of the plots. The land in question is still being used for agricultural purposes. The offer of alternative plot has been made by the appellants with ulterior motives, to mislead this Commission and also to avoid their liability to pay the amount in terms of the impugned order. Since, plots in question have not been developed till date, so no infirmity can be found in the impugned order, directing refund of the amount deposited by the respondents.
23. The State Commission in its impugned order observed;
"7. All the allegations, as made in the complaint, were duly proved by the complainant by means of his affidavits Ex.CA and Ex.CB. Those allegations are further corroborated by the documents proved on the record. So far as the allegation that the opposite parties invited applications through State Bank of Patiala for the allotment of the plots in the Scheme in dispute is concerned, the same stands proved from the brochure Ex.C-1, which was issued by them. The allotment letter dated 26.12.2011 was proved as Ex.C-2 and it becomes clear from that letter that the complainant was allotted plot No.379-D of 200 square yards on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The plot was allotted at the rate of Rs.17,000/- per square yard and the Schedule for the payment of the instalments was also mentioned therein. It is the specific case of the complainant that he paid the instalments as per the Schedule and supported that fact by means of his affidavit and the receipts Ex.C-3 to Ex.C-7. No doubt, all the instalments have not been paid but major portion of the price (Rs.28,22,950/-) has already been paid. Regarding the non-payment of the other instalments, the complainant had written letter dated 25.7.2013 Ex.C-9 to the opposite parties, in which he asked for the exact position and the delay in delivery of the possession and about the non-development of the Scheme as per the commitment.
8. As per clause 5 of the allotment letter, the agreement was to be executed between the parties within 30 days of the date of allotment for which the complainant was to attend the office of opposite party No.2 along with a stamp paper of Rs.500/-, two witnesses and duly computerized photograph. As per the allegation made in the complaint, in pursuance of that condition of the allotment letter, he attended the office of opposite party No.2 on 18.1.2012 where the agreement was executed and that opposite party had promised to send the copy of that agreement to him. The complainant deposed about all those facts in his affidavit and also deposed therein that the copy of the agreement has not been supplied to him so far. His deposition is further corroborated by the letter Ex.C-8, which was received in the office of the opposite parties on 4.7.2013. He specifically demanded the agreement, vide that letter. The possession was to be delivered to him immediately after the execution of that letter but the same was not delivered to him.
9. The evidence produced by the complainant also establishes that writ petitions are pending before the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court regarding the land which forms part of the Scheme, in which status-quo regarding possession has been ordered to be maintained. That evidence consists of the orders dated 8.3.2011 and 26.9.2012 Ex.C-12 and Ex.C-13, respectively, which have been passed in the said writ petitions. That appears to be the reason for the opposite parties in not delivering the possession to the complainant.
10. From the evidence produced by the complainant, it stands proved that the opposite parties failed to fulfil their part under the agreement, though the complainant fulfilled his part by making the payment of the price of the plot by instalments. This clearly amounts to deficiency in service on the part of the opposite parties. The complainant has successfully proved on the record that he suffered loss and injury on account of the non-delivery of the possession of the plot to him as there is inflation in the value of the money and rise in the prices of the construction material from the last two/three years. In all these circumstances, he is not only entitled to the refund of the amount paid by him towards the price of the plot along with interest but he is also entitled to the compensation for the deficiency in service on the part of the opposite parties."
24. As appellants did not file any written statement before the State Commission, therefore appellants have no defence on merits.
25. After going through the entire record, we are really shocked and surprised at the conduct of the Appellant-Trust. As per appellant's own case, in the year 2011 it framed a 'Development Scheme' for allotment of residential plots in Surya Enclave Extension at Jalandhar. Accordingly, it invited applications from the general public. After taking substantial amount of money from the respondents, the appellants issued allotment letters to them, allotting specific plots. However, appellants failed to handover possession of the plots to the respondents for more than 3 years. The legal defence of appellants is, that acquisition of land for the aforesaid scheme was challenged by various land owners by way of various writ petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court and there was stay. As such, appellants were not in a position to handover the possession of the plots. In this regard, appellants have placed on record, copy of order dated 8.3.2011, passed by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.3559 of 2011. Relevant portion of it states;
"It is specific contention of counsel for the petitioners that before issuance of a notification under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Trust Act, 1922, no Scheme was prepared by the Improvement Trust, which is a pre-requisite to initiate the process of acquisition.
Notice of motion for 22.3.2011.
Dasti also.
Status quo regarding possession shall be maintained, however, this would not mean that the petitioners can raise any further construction over the property in dispute.
08.03.2011"
26. Thus, it is manifestly clear from the above order that as on 8.3.2011, there was "Status quo regarding possession". However, the appellants despite having full knowledge of the above order of the High Court, issued allotment letters on 26.12.2011 and 23.12.2011, in respect of plots in question. Therefore, above facts clearly goes on to show, that at the time of issuance of the allotment letters in respect of plots in question, it was well within the knowledge of the Appellant-Trust, that there was an impediment in allotment of the plots in question. In spite thereof, Appellant-Trust had gone ahead and allotted plots in question to the respondents, which it could not have done so. In this manner, appellants have played fraud with the general public and thus collected huge amount of money.
27. The aforesaid act of the appellants, clearly falls within the meaning of "Unfair Trade Practice" as defined under Section 2(1)(r) of the Act, relevant portion of which states;
"(r) "unfair trade practice" means a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provision of any service, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of the following practices, namely:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
28. Appellants having full knowledge that the scheme in question could not see the light of the day, still promoted the scheme to befool the public. Thus, appellants have adopted "unfair method" as well as "deceptive practice" in promoting the sale of the plots in question. This act of appellants, is squarely covered within the meaning of "Unfair Trade Practice".
29. Furthermore, appellants after having taken substantial amount from the respondents in the year 2011, are still enjoying their hard earned money for last many years. Now, when appellants are not in a position to allot the plots in a habitable condition to the respondents, then why they are still withholding respondents' money. There is no reasonable and plausible explanation, in this regard from the side of the appellants. We deplore such "unfair trade practices" being adopted by the Appellant-Trust, which is a Public Body.
30. It would also be pertinent to observe, that appellants have not given any firm date of handing over the possession of plots in question, to the respondents which also is a "Deceptive Practice". The appellants should have given firm date of handing over of possession, at the time of taking booking amount. By not indicating the true picture with regard to their scheme to the respondents, appellants induced them to part with their hard earned money, which also amounts to "unfair trade practice".
31. Thus, appellants by not delivering the physical possession of fully developed plots to the respondents, till date even after having received more than 90% of the price thereof, are not only deficient in rendering service but are also guilty of indulging into "unfair trade practice".
32. Appellants in the present case, "wants to have the cake and eat it too", as admittedly they have received about 90% of the sale price of the plots. The appellants are thus enjoying possession of the plots as well as substantial amount of consideration paid by the respondents. On the other hand, respondents after having paid substantial amount of the sale consideration, are still empty handed.
33. Decisions of Bangalore Development Authority (supra) and Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra) as relied by appellants in support of its case are not applicable to the facts of the present cases.
34. Such type of unscrupulous act on the part of Appellant-Trust should be dealt with heavy hands, who after grabbing the money from the purchasers, enjoy and utilize their money but do not hand over the plots on one pretext or the other. Appellants want the respondents to run from one fora to other, so that appellants can go on enjoying the respondents' money without any hindrance.
35. It is well settled, that no leniency should be shown to such type of litigants who in order to cover up their own fault and negligence, goes on filing meritless appeal in consumer foras. Equity demands that such unscrupulous litigants whose only aim and object is to deprive the opposite party of the fruits of the decree, must be dealt with heavy hands. Unscrupulous developer like Appellant-Trust, who after taking almost entire cost of the plots, do not perform their part of obligation, should not be spared. A strong message is required to be sent to such type of Public Bodies, that this Commission is not helpless in such type of matters.
36. It is a well-known fact, that Courts across the country are saddled with large number of cases. Public Sector Undertakings indulgences further burden them. Time and again, courts have been expressing their displeasure at the Government/Public Sector Undertakings compulsive litigation habit but a solution to this alarming trend is a distant dream. The judiciary is now imposing costs upon Government/Public Sector Undertaking not only when it pursue cases which can be avoided but also when it forces the public to do so.
37. Public Bodies spent more money on contesting cases than the amount they might have to pay to the claimants. In addition thereto, precious time, effort and other resources go down the drain in vain. Public Bodies are possibly an apt example of being penny wise, pound-foolish. Rise in frivolous litigation is also due to the fact that Public Sector Undertakings though having large number of legal personnel under their employment, do not examine the cases properly and force poor litigants to approach the Court.
38. The Apex Court in Bikaner Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Mohal Lal 2010 CTJ 121 (Supreme Court) (CP) has made significant observations which have material bearing, namely, "4. It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by Governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to the corrected.
5. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf.
5.1 In Dilbagh Rai Jarry V. Union of India, 1973 (3) SCC 554, where this Court extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier decision of the Kerala High Court.):
"The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for the State's interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak. Government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations, which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay-out on litigation costs and execution time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957."
5.2 In Madras Port Trust vs. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.R.s (1979) 4 SCC, 176, held:
"2. It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable."
5.3 In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh & Ors.v.Union Territory of Chandigarh through LAC, Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737.
"3. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen."
6. Unwarranted litigation by Governments and statutory authorities basically stem from the two general baseless assumptions by their officers. They are:
(i) All claims against the Government/statutory authorities should be viewed as illegal and should be resisted and fought up to the highest Court of the land.
(ii) If taking a decision on an issued could be avoided, then it is prudent not to decide the issue and let the aggrieved party approach the Court and secure a decision.
The reluctance to take decisions, or tendency to challenge all orders against them, is not the policy of the Governments or statutory authorities, but is attributable to some officers who are responsible for taking decisions and/or officers-in-charge of litigation. Their reluctance arises from an instinctive tendency to protect themselves against any future accusations of wrong decision making, or worse, of improper motives for any decision-making. Unless their insecurity and fear is addressed, officers will continue to pass on the responsibility of decision making to Courts and Tribunals. The Central Government is now attempting to deal with this issue by formulating realistic and practical norms for defending cases filed against the Government and for filing appeals and revisions against adverse decisions, thereby, eliminating unnecessary litigation. But, it is not sufficient if the Central Government alone undertakes such an exercise. The State Governments and the statutory authorities, who have more litigations than the Central Government, should also make genuine efforts to eliminate unnecessary litigation. Vexatious and unnecessary litigation have been clogging the wheels of justice, for too long making it difficult for courts and Tribunals to provide easy and speedy access to justice to bonafide and needy litigants.
7. In this case, what is granted by the State Commission is the minimum relief in the facts and circumstances, that is to direct allotment of an alternative plot with a nominal compensation of Rs.5,000/- . But instead of remedying the wrong, by complying with the decision of the Consumer Fora, the Improvement Trust is trying to brazen out its illegal act by contending that the allottee should have protested when it illegally laid the road in his plot. It has persisted with its unreasonable and unjust stand by indulging in unnecessary litigation by approaching the National Commission and then this Court. The Trust should sensitize its officers to serve the public rather than justify their dictatorial acts. It should avoid such an unnecessary litigation."
39. Now question arise for consideration is, as to what should be the quantum of damages which should be imposed upon the appellants for dragging the respondents upto the highest fora under the Act, when appellants had no case at all. It is not that every order passed by the judicial fora is to be challenged by the litigants, even if the same are based on sound reasonings.
40. In Ravinder Kaur Vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 2004 SC 904, the Apex Court observed;
"Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtor to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forum only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law's delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system."
41. Further, Apex Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. Vs. Nirmala Devi and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos.4912-4913 of 2011 decided on July 4, 2011) has observed ;
"45. We are clearly of the view that unless we ensure that wrong -doers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigations. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that court's otherwise scarce and valuable time is consumed or more appropriately wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases".
The court further held;
50. Learned Amicus articulated common man's general impression about litigation in following words;
"Make any false averment, conceal any fact, raise any plea, produce any false document, deny any genuine document, it will successfully stall the litigation, and in any case, delay the matter endlessly. The other party will be coerced into a settlement which will be profitable for me and the probability of the court ordering prosecution for perjury is less than that of meeting with an accident while crossing the road."
Lastly, the Court observed;
54. While imposing the costs we have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and be realistic what the defendants or the respondents had to actually incur in contesting the litigation before different courts. We have to also broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses which have to be incurred towards drafting and filing of the counter affidavit, miscellaneous charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc.
55. The other factor which should not be forgotten while imposing costs is for how long the defendants or respondents were compelled to contest and defend the litigation in various courts. The appellant in the instant case have harassed the respondents to the hilt for four decades in a totally frivolous and dishonest litigation in various courts the appellants have also wasted judicial time of the various courts for the last 40 years.
56. On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned impugned order/ judgment. These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/-. We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation".
42. Accordingly, we find no infirmity or ambiguity in the impugned order. Thus, present appeals are nothing but gross abuse of process of law and same are required to be dismissed with punitive damages. Therefore, present appeals stand dismissed with punitive damages of ₹5,00,000/-(Rupees Five lakhs only) in all. Out of this amount, sum of ₹1,25,000/-(Rupees One lac Twenty Five Thousand only) shall be paid, to each of the respondents.
43. Appellants are directed to deposit a sum of ₹2,50,000/-(Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) by way of demand draft in the name of 'Consumer Legal Aid Account' of this Commission within eight weeks from today and balance amount of ₹2,50,000/-(Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) be deposited in equal share in the name of the respondents, by way of demand draft with this Commission.
44. Meanwhile, Appellant-Trust shall recover the punitive damages amount from the salaries of the delinquent officers, who have been pursuing this meritless and frivolous litigations, with the sole aim of wasting the public exchequer. The affidavit giving the details of the officers from whose salaries the amount has been recovered by the Chairman of the Appellant-Trust be also filed, within eight weeks.
45. Punitive damages awarded in favour of the respondents shall be paid to them only after expiry of period of appeal or revision preferred, if any.
46. In case, appellants fail to deposit the aforesaid amount within the prescribed period, then they shall also be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a. till realization.
47. Pending applications stand disposed of.
48. List for compliance on 4th September, 2015.
......................J V.B. GUPTA PRESIDING MEMBER ...................... SURESH CHANDRA MEMBER