Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Uma Shankar on 1 December, 2022
Bench: Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, Ajai Tyagi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 44 Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 1960 of 1992 Appellant :- State of U.P. Respondent :- Uma Shankar Counsel for Appellant :- A.G.A. Counsel for Respondent :- Subhas Kumar Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.
Hon'ble Ajai Tyagi,J.
1. Heard learned A.G.A. for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.
2. This appeal under Section 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'), at the behest of the State, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.07.1992 passed by II Assistant Sessions Judge, Gyanpur, District-Varanasi in Sessions Trial No.24 of 1989 acquitting accused-respondent who was tried for commission of offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC').
3. Brief facts as culled out from the record on 25.11.1979 at about 06:35 p.m., the informant listened from outside quarter, that the accused-respondent Uma Shankar was abusing his wife in filthy language and was also threatening her. When his wife objected, the accused-respondent took out a knife from the almirah and stabbed her on her chest and stomach, as a result of which, she sustained injuries.
4. After the F.I.R. was lodged, investigation was moved into motion. Charge-sheet was laid against the accused in the Court of Judicial Magistrate. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions as the charges were triable by Court of Sessions. The prosecution examined certain witnesses and relied on leading documentary evidences which were sought to be proved by oral testimony of the witnesses. After the prosecution evidence was completed, the accused were put to question under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. where the accused stated that they were falsely implicated and no such incident had occurred.
5. In order to challenge the judgment of acquittal, learned A.G.A. for the state has submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has mistakenly disbelieved statements of the prosecution witnesses and without assigning any cogent reasons has disbelieved prosecution story. It is further submitted that the evidence on record and surrounding circumstances have not been properly appreciated by the Trial Court as far as acquittal of accused-respondents are concerned.
6. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is just and proper as no infirmity can be found in the finding given by the learned Sessions Judge. It is further submitted that this Court should go by the well settled principles concerning criminal appeal against acquittal and that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge is not so perverse as even in the dying declaration, nothing has been assigned against the present three acquitted respondents.
7. Before we embark on testimony and the judgment of the Court below, the contours for interfering in Criminal Appeals where accused has been held to be non guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 and 307 I.P.C, would require to be discussed.
8. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of an appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of "M.S. NARAYANA MENON @ MANI VS. STATE OF KERALA & ANR", (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39, the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below."
9. Further, in the case of "CHANDRAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA", reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415, the Apex Court laid down the following principles;
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
[1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
[2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
[3] Various expressions, such as,"substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
[4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
[5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court."
10. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable views/conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
11. In the case titled "STATE OF GOA Vs. SANJAY THAKRAN & ANR.", reported in (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in appeals against acquittal. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under:
"16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with."
12. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in cases titled "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS. RAM VEER SINGH & ORS.", 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in "GIRJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY L.R.s VS. STATE OF MP", 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled.
13. In the case of "LUNA RAM VS. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS.", reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under:
"10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition.
11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence."
14. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case titled "MOOKKIAH AND ANR. VS. STATE, REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, TAMIL NADU", reported in AIR 2013 SC 321, the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under:
"4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while hoosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573]"
15. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of "STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. HEMAREDDY", AIR 1981 SC 1417, wherein it is held as under:
"...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93:(AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."
16. The Apex Court in "SHIVASHARANAPPA & ORS. VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA", JT 2013 (7) SC 66 has held as under:
"That appellate Court is empowered to reappreciate the entire evidence, though, certain other principles are also to be adhered to and it has to be kept in mind that acquittal results into double presumption of innocence."
17. Further, in the case of "STATE OF PUNJAB VS. MADAN MOHAN LAL VERMA", (2013) 14 SCC 153, the Apex Court has held as under:
"The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. Mere receipt of the amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification. Hence, the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness. In a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convincing the accused person."
18. The Apex Court recently in Jayaswamy vs. State of Karnataka, (2018) 7 SCC 219, has laid down the powers of appellate court in re-appreciating the evidence in a case where the State has preferred an appeal against acquittal, which read as follows:
"10.It is by now well settled that the Appellate Court hearing the appeal filed against the judgment and order of acquittal will not overrule or otherwise disturb the Trial Court's acquittal if the Appellate Court does not find substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. If the Trial Court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; if the Trial Court's decision was based on erroneous view of law; if the Trial Court's judgment is likely to result in grave miscarriage of justice; if the entire approach of the Trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; if the Trial Court judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; and if the Trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of the ballistic expert etc. the same may be construed as substantial and compelling reasons and the first appellate court may interfere in the order of acquittl. However, if the view taken by the Trial Court while acquitting the accused is one of the possible views under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court generally will not interfere with the order of acquittal particularly in the absence of the aforementioned factors.
.........................It is relevant to note the observations of this Court in the case of Ramanand Yadav vs. Prabhu Nath Jha & Ors., (2003) 12 SCC 606, which reads thus:
"21.There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not."
19. The Apex Court recently in Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 14 SC 750, has held that the appellate court is reversing the trial court's order of acquittal, it should give proper weight and consideration to the presumption of innocence in favour of accused, and to the principle that such a presumption sands reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court and in Samsul Haque v. State of Assam, (2019) 18 SCC 161 held that judgment of acquittal, where two views are possible, should not be set aside, even if view formed by appellate court may be a more probable one, interference with acquittal can only be justified when it is based on a perverse view.
20. We have perused the depositions of prosecution witnesses, documentary evidence supporting ocular versions, arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge.
21. The fact that the prosecutrix went on her own volition with the accused and the medical evidence shows that she was not a minor when the alleged incidence took place. The provisions of Sections 366 and 376 I.P.C. read as follows:-
366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.-Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid.
376. Punishment for rape.--
(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.
(2) Whoever,--
(a) being a police officer commits rape--
(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or
(iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or
(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or
(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or children's institution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or
(e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
(f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or
(g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years. Explanation 1.--Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section. Explanation 2.--"Women's or children's institution" means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected woman or children or a widows' home or by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of woman or children. Explanation 3.--"Hospital" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation.]
22. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and appraisal of the evidence available on record and on the contours of the judgment of the Apex Court, we have no other option but to concur with the judgment of acquittal by the the learned Sessions Judge.
23. Hence, in view of the matter & on the contours of the judgment of the Apex Court, we concur with the learned Sessions Judge.
24. The appeal sans merits and is dismissed. The record and proceedings be sent back to the Court below.
25. We are thankful to learned A.G.A. for ably assisting the Court.
(Ajai Tyagi, J.) (Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.)
Order Date :- 1.12.2022
Jyotsana