Bombay High Court
Dr. Satyasaheel Nandlal Naik vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 9 November, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ1463, 1996(2)MHLJ633
JUDGMENT
1. This is a writ petition filed by the petitioner to quash the chargesheet filed by the police in Criminal case No. 276 of 1987 on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. 8, Pune. Heard both the sides.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this writ petition are as follows :-
The petitioner is a registered medical practitioner at Pune. It appears on 7-8-1987 at about 12.30 p.m. one patient by name Ravindra Salunke came to hospital with some injuries. The patient was treated. The patient gave history of skidding of motor vehicle and sustained some injuries. The patient was admitted to the hospital. On the next day viz. 8-8-1987 the patient was discharged on his request. It transpired that the patient was admitted to Ruby Nursing Hall, Pune where he succumbed to the injuries and died on 8-8-1987. In the first instance, the police registered a case for accidental death and then they came to know that a vehicle had been involved in the accident. Then the police registered a case for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of I.P.C. against the driver of the vehicle who had unfortunately died. Subsequently, the police made some enquiries and filed a chargesheet against the present petitioner, viz. the doctor alleging that he did not inform the police about the accident which he had come to know through the patient and thereby he has committed an offence punishable under Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code. After receiving the process in the criminal case, the petitioner has approached this Court for quashing the chargesheet and further proceedings in the criminal case.
3. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Mr. Nalwade, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State.
4. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that even admitting all the allegations made in the chargesheet and the statements of the chargesheet and the statements of the witnesses, there is no material to show that the petitioner was under legal obligation to inform about the accident to the police. Even otherwise there is no material to show that there is any intentional lapse on the part of the petitioner doctor to attract Section 176 of the I.P.C.
4A. I have perused the statements of three witnesses in the chargesheet filed against the petitioner. The three statements are of (i) Mr. R. M. Sayyed, Police Inspector of Swargate Police Station, (ii) Mr. R. P. Yadav, Inspector, Vishrambaug Police Station, Pune, and (iii) Bhimrao Kambli, Police Constable, Vishrambaug Police Station, Pune. Their only statement is that the doctor had not intimated the police even though he had come to know of the accident. There is not even a whisper in these statements that there was any intentional omission on the part of the doctor to inform the police about the accident.
5. Section 176 I.P.C. clearly provides that whoever is legally bound to give any notice or information to any public servant intentionally omits to give such notice or information, then he is liable for punishment which may extend to one month or fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. The two ingredients of the offences are (1) intentional omission to give information to a public servant and (2) that the accused was legally bound to give such information to a public servant. As far as the first point is concerned, the statements of the witnesses do not disclose that the doctor intentionally omitted to inform the police. When the important ingredient of the offence is not alleged by the witnesses, there is no question of improving on the same during the course of the trial. If that important ingredient is wanting, then there is no necessity to prosecute the accused for the offence. On the other hand, the statement of the Constable clearly shows that he talked to the doctor on phone when he gave the information about admitting the patient in the hospital. If there was any intention on the part of the doctor to suppress the facts, he would not have given any information to the Constable and he would have even denied having admitted the patient in the hospital. On the other hand, the doctor informed the constable that the patient along with his friend visited the hospital and had sustained injuries in accident. Hence in any view, the materials on record do not indicate one of the most important ingredient viz. intentional omission to give information to the police about the accident. This ground itself is sufficient to quash the proceedings. It will be travesty of Justice if on this scanty material the accused should be asked to face the trial.
6. Then we come to the second point mentioned above whether really the doctor was legally obliged to give information to the police when he treats a patient who has met with an accident.
The only one provision which casts a duty on public to give information to the public about commission of offence is Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides that every person who is aware of the commission of the offence mentioned in that section is obliged to give information to the nearest Magistrate or Police Officer. Certain offences are mentioned in that Section, but it does not refer to Section 279, 337, 338 or 304A I.P.C. with which we are concerned. There is no statutory obligation on a citizen to inform police about other offences which are mentioned in Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be that there is a moral duty on every citizen to inform the Magistrate of police, if they come to know of any offence. But we are concerned about punishing a person for not informing the police. Penal provisions must be construed strictly. If there is no statutory or legal liability for a citizen to inform the police regarding a particular offence, then the prosecution under Section 176 of the I.P.C. cannot stand.
7.Under the Motor Vehicles Act there is a statutory provision in Section 134 which clearly casts a duty on the driver of a vehicle to inform the police about an accident caused by him. If he does not do it, he will be committing an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no provision making it compulsory for public or a doctor to inform the police about a motor vehicle accident. What is more, Section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act has since been amended making it obligatory on a doctor to treat the patient who is involved in a vehicle accident in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Even then there is no provision in the amended section making it statutory obligation on the part of the doctor to inform the police about having treated such a patient.
8. Even otherwise, mere causing an accident is not an offence. If the accident was due to rash and negligent driving, then it becomes punishable under all or any of the offences, viz. under Ss. 279, 337, 338 or 304A I.P.C. Even if the doctor is informed that some accident has taken place, it is not an offence unless it was a rash and negligent driving. The prosecution papers do not show that the doctor had been told by the deceased or pillion rider that the accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving. A doctor is not required to make enquiries with the patient about the accident. The main duty of a doctor is to save the life of the patient. He is not bothered about legal implications of the accident. In the present case we find that the petitioner who is a medical practitioner of repute at Pune has done his duty in attending and treating a patient who was involved in an accident. He cannot be prosecuted for an offence under Section 176 I.P.C. in the admitted facts and circumstances as made out in the prosecution papers. The prosecution of the petitioner is wholly misconceived. The learned Magistrate has not at all applied his mind and has mechanically issued the process since the charge-sheet was filed. It will be sheer waste of public time and money if the petitioner is tried and subsequently honourably acquitted. It will be abuse of process of the Court if the prosecution is allowed to continue. Hence this is a fit case where this Court should interfere and quash the prosecution.
9. In the result, the petition is allowed. The charge-sheet, filed by the police and the subsequent proceedings in Criminal Case No. 276 of 1987 are hereby quashed.
10. Petition allowed.