Karnataka High Court
Smt.Gulab Taj @ Gulab Jan vs The Managing Director on 1 August, 2018
Author: Krishna S Dixit
Bench: Krishna S.Dixit
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF AUGUST, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
M.F.A. NO. 2105/2016 (MV)
C/W
M.F.A.NOS. 2106/2016, 103/2016, 101/2016 (MV)
IN M.F.A NO. 2105/2016:
BETWEEN:
1. SMT.GULAB TAJ @ GULAB JAN
W/O LATE BABA JAN,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
2. SRI NAWAZ
S/O LATE BABA JAN,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
3. KUMARI AYESHA
D/O ALTE BABA JAN
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
4. KUMARI GORIMA
D/O LATE BABA JAN
AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS,
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
JANGAMAKOTE VILLAGE,
SIDLAGATTA TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT - 562 105.
... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. N GOPALKRISHNA, ADVOCATE)
2
AND:
THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
K S R T C.,
K H ROAD, SHANTHI NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560027
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. D VIJAY KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 15.09.2015 PASSED IN
MVC NO.918/13 ON THE FILE OF THE 2ND ADDITIONAL
SMALL CAUSES JUDGE & 28TH ACMM, BENGALURU,
PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION FOR
COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF
COMPENSATION.
IN M.F.A NO. 2106/2016:
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. MUNIRATHNAMMA
W/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
2. MANJU MALA
D/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
3. SHIVANANDA
S/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
4. KUM ANITHA
D/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS,
3
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
JANGAMAKOTE VILLAGE,
SIDLAGATTA TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT
... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. GOPALKRISHNA N, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
KSRTC
K H ROAD, SHANTHI NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560027
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. D VIJAYKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 15.09.2015 PASSED IN
MVC NO.917/2013 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL
SMALL CAUSES JUDGE, & XXVIII ACMM, MACT,
BENGALURU, PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION
FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF
COMPENSATION.
IN M.F.A. NO. 103/2016:
BETWEEN:
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD
TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
CENTRAL OFFICE,
K.H. ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR,
BENGALURU-560 027.
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
... APPELLANT
(BY SRI. D VIJAYAKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
4
AND:
1. SMT GULAB TAJ @ GULAB JAN,
W/O LATE BABA JAN
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
2. SRI. NAWAZ
S/O LATE BABA JAN
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS
3. KUM. AYESHA
D/O LATE BABA JAN,
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS
4. KUM. GORIMA
D/O LATE BABA JAN,
AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS,
ALL ARE RESIDING AT.
JANGAMAKOTE VILALGE,
SIDLAGATTA TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DIST-562102
5. SRI. M. MUNIRAJAPPA
S/O SRI. MUNISWAMAPPA,
MAJOR,
R/AT NO.224, 4TH BLOCK,
JANGAMAKOTE VILALGE & POST,
SHIDLAGHATTA,
CHIKKABALLAPURA DIST-562102.
6. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
BRANCH OFFICE HINDUPURA,
T.T. COMPLEX,
M.P. ROAD, INDUPURA,
ANDHRA PRADESH-515 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. N GOPAL KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO 4
SRI. K SURESH, ADVOCATE FOR R6
R5 IS SERVED)
5
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 15.09.2015 PASSED IN
MVC NO.918/13 ON THE FILE OF THE 2ND ADDITIONAL
SMALL CAUSES JUDGE & 28TH ACMM, BENGALURU,
AWARDING THE COMPENSATION OF RS.8,92,000/- WITH
INTEREST AT 6% P.A. FROM THE DATE OF DEPOSIT TILL
THE DATE OF DEPOSIT.
IN M.F.A. NO. 101/2016:
BETWEEN:
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD
TRANSPORT CORPORATION
CENTRAL OFFICE, K.H.ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 027.
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
... APPELLANT
(BY SRI. D VIJAYA KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.SMT MUNIRATHNAMMA
W/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
2.MANJU MALA
D/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS,
3.SRI SHIVANANDA
S/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS,
4.KUM. ANITHA
D/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS,
ALL ARE R/AT
JANGAMAKOTE VILLAGE,
6
SIDLAGATTA TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT - 562 102.
5.SRI M MUNIRAJAPPA
S/O SRI MUNISWAMAPPA,
MAJOR,
R/AT NO. 224, 4TH BLOCK,
JANGAMAKOTE VILLAGE & POST,
SHIDLAGHATTA,
CHIKKABALLAPURA DIST - 562 102.
6.ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
BRANCH OFFICE HINDUPURA,
T.T.COMPLEX,
M.P.ROAD, INDUPURA,
ANDHRA PRADESH - 515 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. N GOPAL KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO4
SRI. K SURESH, ADOVATE FOR R6
R5 IS SERVED)
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 15.09.2015 PASSED IN
MVC NO.917/2013 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL
SMALL CAUSES JUDGE AND XXVIII ACMM, BENGALURU,
AWARDING COMPENSATION OF RS.7,68,000/- WITH
INTEREST @ 6% P.A FROM THE DATE OF PETITION TILL
THE DATE OF DEPOSIT.
THESE APPEALS COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS
DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:-
7
JUDGMENT
The two appeals in M.F.A.No.101/2016 and M.F.A.No.103/2016 by the K.S.R.T.C., the owner of the offending vehicle and two more appeals in M.F.A. No.2105/2016 and M.F.A.No.2106/2016 by the claimants challenge the judgment and award dated 15.09.2015 made by the M.A.C.T. Bengaluru (SCCH-13) allowing the claim petitions in M.V.C.No.917/2013 and M.V.C. No.918/2013, whereby a compensation in sums of Rs.7,68,000/- and Rs.8,92,000/- respectively has been awarded with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. thereon.
2. The challenge by K.S.R.T.C. is on the ground that the award is much on the higher side and that the ground of contributory negligence has not been addressed by the M.A.C.T. The challenge by the claimants is on the ground of inadequacy of compensation.
3. The brief facts stated are that:
a) On 07.01.2013 at about 8.00 p.m., one Shaik Babu was riding a brand new TVS Star City motorcycle 8 with three pillion riders; the said motorcycle did not have the registration number pasted on the number plate; the motorcycle was moving towards Vijayapura H.Cross Main Road; at that time the offending K.S.R.T.C. bus bearing Registration No.KA-07-F-1253 driven rashly and negligently and with high speed came on a wrong side of the road and dashed head-on to the motorcycle, resulting into death of two pillion riders and grievous injuries to the other two. The claim petitions filed by the L.Rs. of the two deceased persons in M.V.C. No.917/2013 and M.V.C. No.918/2013 were stoutly opposed by the insurer and the K.S.R.T.C. by filing the Written Statement.
b) To prove their claim, two widows of the deceased victims were examined as PW-1 and PW-2 and one Sri Ramesh an eye witness was examined as PW-3. In the evidence of the claimants, 14 documents came to be marked, which interalia comprise of police papers, medical records, ration cards and election I.D. cards.
c) To prove its resistance, the appellant K.S.R.T.C. had examined the driver of the offending vehicle by name 9 Venkatramanappa as RW-1. In his evidence, 7 photographs and an authorization letter came to be marked collectively as Ex.R-1 and Ex.R-2. The respondent insurer of the motorcycle in question, which too had filed the Written Statement got examined one Mrs. Lynette Suares as RW-2 and in her evidence the copy of the letter issued to the owner of the bike in question and unserved R.P.A.D. cover came to be marked as Ex.R-3 and R-4.
d) The M.A.C.T. having adverted to the pleadings of the parties and having considered the evidentiary material on record, has entered the judgment and award that are in challenge both by the owner of the offending K.S.R.T.C. bus and by the claimants, albeit on different grounds.
4. The learned panel counsel for K.S.R.T.C. Sri Vijay Kumar firstly contends that the impugned judgment and award are flawsome inasmuch as the ground of contributory negligence that was established in the course of the evidence has not been duly adverted to by the M.A.C.T. He also submits that the award of compensation 10 in both these cases is on the higher side and transcends the limits of entitlement. In particular, he points out, the amount of compensation under the conventional heads is in far excess of what has been permitted by the Apex Court in the case of "National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi and others" reported in AIR 2017 SC 5157.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimants Shri Gopal Krishna and the learned counsel for 6th respondent- insurer Shri K.Suresh, vehemently oppose the contention advanced on behalf of K.S.R.T.C. Further the counsel for the claimants submits that the awards are on the lower side and therefore appropriate enhancement has to be made, regard being had to the entire evidentiary material on record.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for K.S.R.T.C., the owner of the offending vehicle, the learned counsel for the claimants and also the learned counsel appearing for 6th respondent-insurer of the bike in question. I have perused 11 the original records from the L.C.R. and I have also glanced the appeal papers, as well.
7. The contention of the panel counsel for K.S.R.T.C. that the bike in question was brand new, it had no registration number printed on the number plate; four persons including the rider were on the bike on the eventful morning as against the permitted seating capacity of two; the rider rashly and negligently drove the said bike with heavy load constituted by the persons ie., 3 pillion riders; the rider was trying to overtake a school van which too was going in the very same direction, and when negotiating to overtake, the bike itself had dashed to the K.S.R.T.C. bus; the version of RW-1, the driver of the offending bus coupled with the photographs, establish these facts which constitute contributory negligence attributable to the rider of the motorbike in question and that the same has been overlooked by the M.A.C.T. resulting into award of higher compensation. In other words, had the M.A.C.T. adverted to the plea of contributory negligence which was built up in the course of 12 the evidence and which stood substantiated by virtue of the totality of the circumstances, the award would have been much on the lower side and thus there is a legal lacuna warranting indulgence of this Court in its appellate jurisdiction, inasmuch as it is a first appeal and therefore the first appellate Court is both Court of law and facts.
8. The contra version of the claimants and the insurer of the bike in question is that there is no plea whatsoever taken up in the Written Statement, the version now sought to be urged is not founded on the evidentiary material on record; merely because the bike in question had 4 persons on it, that per se does not constitute contributory negligence in any manner and even the version of RW-1, namely, the driver of the offending bus also does not support the version now put forth by the K.S.R.T.C. before this Court. In support of his contention that regardless of the number of persons on the bike, the issue of contributory negligence has to be addressed on the basis of independent evidence and that there cannot be a presumption of contributory negligence, merely because 13 the rider of the bike had overloaded the bike with more persons than permitted by law.
9. Learned counsel Shri Vijay Kumar, in support of his contention banks upon the judgment of this Court in the case of SHIVANNA & OTHERS vs. K.S.R.T.C. & OTHERS (M.F.A.No.10770/2010 and other connected matters disposed of on 27.08.2013). The relevant portion OF paragraph 7 of the judgment reads as under:
7. Learned Advocate for the claimants relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., and others reported in 1998 ACJ 342 submits that the two pillion riders though were travelling on the ill-fated motor cycle with the rider of the motor cycle, they did not have control over the motor cycle; since they are not at all at fault, the finding relating to the contributory negligence may not be applicable to the pillion riders, inasmuch as, they have not contributed anything to the accident in question. Said submission cannot be accepted. In the matter on hand, the rider of the two wheeler did not have driving licence. Nothing is produced by the claimants to 14 show that the rider of the two wheeler had got driving licence. Nothing is also placed by the claimants to show as to under what circumstances, the two pillion riders boarded the two wheeler. Moreover, the aforecited judgment of Union of India Vs. United India Insurance Co., Ltd., and others may not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as, in the said matter, the Apex Court had held that the passengers of the vehicle cannot be saddled with the finding relating to contributory negligence on part of the driver of the two wheeler. In the said matter, the vehicle involved was four wheeler and the passengers had either lost their lives or had suffered injuries. It was not a case of two wheeler and in that context, the Apex Court had held that the passenger cannot be treated as back-seater, but in the matter on hand, contributory negligence to an extent of 50% is on the rider of the two wheeler also. The pillion riders cannot be treated as passengers. They can be treated as back-seat drivers. The KSRTC cannot be liable to pay more than 50% of the compensation, inasmuch as, the driver of KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident to an extent of 50% only. Remaining 50% of the compensation shall be paid by the driver and owner of the two wheeler involved in the 15 accident. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocates for the claimants and consequently, the finding relating to contributory negligence should be applicable to the case of pillion riders also while quantifying the compensation."
10. Learned counsel Shri Gopal Krishna banks upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA vs. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS reported in (1997) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES 683 at paragraph 10 which reads as under:
"10. There is a well-known principle in the law of torts, called the doctrine of identification or `imputation'. It is to the effect that the defendant can plead the contributory negligence of the plaintiff or of an employee of the plaintiff where the employee is acting in the course of employment. But, it has been also held in Mills vs. Armstrong [1988] 13 A.C. 1 (HL) (also called The Bernina case) that principle is not applicable to a passenger in a vehicle in the sense that the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in which the passenger is travelling, cannot be imputed to passenger.
(Halsbury's laws of England 4th Ed., 1984 Vol. 34, page 74) (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Torts (23rd Ed. 1997 p.511) (Ramaswamy Iyer, Law of Torts, 7th Ed., p. 447). The Barnina case in which the principle was laid in 1888 related to passengers in a steamship. In that 16 case a member of the crew and a passenger in the ship Bushire were drowned on account of its collision with another ship Bernina. It was held that even if the navigators of the ship Bushire were negligent, the navigators' negligence could not be imputed to the deceased who were travelling in that ship. This principle has been applied, in latter cases, no passengers travelling in a motor-vehicle whose driver is found guilty of contributory negligence. In other words, the principle of contributory negligence is confined to the actual negligence of the plaintiff or of his agents. There is no rule that the driver of an omnibus or a coach of a cab or the engine driver of a train, or the captain of a ship on the one hand and the passengers on the other hand are to be `identified' so as to fasten the latter with any liability for the former's contributory negligence. There cannot be a fiction of the passenger sharing a `right of control' of the operation of the vehicle nor is there a fiction that the driver is an agent of the passenger. A passenger is not treated as a backseat driver. (Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., (984 p.521 522). It is therefore clear that even if the driver of the passenger vehicle was negligent, the Railways, if its negligence was otherwise proved - could not plead contributory negligence on the part of the passengers of the vehicle. What is clear is that qua the passengers of the bus who were innocent, - the driver and owner of the bus and, if proved, the railways - can all be joint tort- feasors".
Similarly in the case of SUDHIR KUMAR RANA vs. SURINDER SINGH AND OTHERS (2008) 12 SCC 436, the Apex Court at paragraph 9 has observed as under: 17
"9. If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence. The same, by itself, in our opinion, may not lead to finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has been held by the courts below that it was the driver of the mini truck who was driving rashly and negligently. It is one thing to say that the appellant was not possessing any licence but no finding of fact has been arrived at that he was driving the two- wheeler rashly and negligently. If he was not driving rashly and negligently which contributed to the accident, we fail to see as to how, only because he was not having a licence, he would be held to be guilty of contributory negligence".
11. In the case of ANJANAPPA & ANOTHER v.
RAHAVENDRA AND ANOTHER [M.F.A.No.10768/2010 (MV)], the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 20.06.2013 at paragraph 12 has stated as under:
" Therefore, merely breach of law or duty would not create a liability to pay damages. Such a breach of law or duty should result in injury. The contributory negligence does not depend upon any breach of duty. The breach of duty should result in injury and consequent losses. If there is a blame causing the accident on both sides, the losses lice where it falls. Therefore, in the instant case, merely because the deceased was riding the motorcycle with two persons on the vehicle though it amounts to contravention of Section 123 of the Act it does not amount to a negligent act on the 18 part of the deceased. The driver riding the vehicle if it is demonstrated lost control of the vehicle, he was not able to balance the vehicle or because of such contravention he dashed against the vehicle which resulted in the accident then the question is to what extent this breach of duty resulted in negligence is to be assessed by the court."
12. In the light of these rival contentions, I have considered the matter as to invocability of doctrine of contributory negligence on the basis of the evidentiary material on record. There is no dispute as to the involvement of the brand new motorbike which had not even the Registration Number printed on its number plate; there is also no dispute as to the rider of the motorbike taking 3 pillion riders with him on the early morning of the eventful day. Ordinarily, during the morning hours the school van ply on public roads; RW-1 has specifically stated that the bikers were trying to overtake a school bus and at that juncture, the accident in question has happened. The photographs collectively marked in the evidence in Ex.R-1 series specifically show both the bus and the motorbike as being on the left side of the road; 19 there is not even a whisper as to these photographs being manipulated or that the entire scene have been stage- managed. The fact that these photographs depict post- accident scenario is also borne in mind; as rightly contended by the panel counsel for the K.S.R.T.C. there is some amount of contributory negligence on the part of the rider of the motorbike and also 3 pillion riders who had volunteered to pillion the vehicle knowing fully well that it has seating capacity of only 2.
13. The Court has adverted to the often quoted plea that merely because there is violation of traffic rules by the motorbike, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the said violation per se amounts to contributory negligence. Keeping the totality of the circumstances, I am of the considered view that the accident happened in all probability with the contributory negligence of both the K.S.R.T.C. bus and motorbike in question in the ratio of 75:25.
20
14. The contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that if at all there is any contributory negligence, the same should be confined to the driver of the offending bike and the driver of the offending bus, since the pillion riders do not have any role would contribute negligence, is liable to be rejected because the motorbike in question had the seating capacity of 2, whereas 4 persons with eyes wide open had volunteered to ride the bike as if it was a big vehicle. Ordinarily, the numerical strength of the riders per se does not contribute negligence, but when too many riders ride the bike, then there is problem of maintaining the centre of gravity and thereby in all probability, the same would contribute to happening of the accident. The contention that there may be violation of traffic rule may not per se amount to contributory negligence is also taken care of, but the contention withers in thin air with 4 persons riding a motorbike whose seating capacity is 2. In these circumstances, the rulings which have been relied upon from the claimants side do not come to their aid. 21
15. The contention of the panel counsel for K.S.R.T.C. that higher amount is awarded by way of compensation under the conventional heads is to some extent substantiated inasmuch as ordinarily even going by the ratio in the case of Pranay Sethi, Rs.70,000/- in all is awarded as compensation under the conventional heads. However, the M.A.C.T. has awarded Rs.82,000/- and therefore the amount of compensation is scaled down to Rs.70,000/-.
16. The learned counsel for the respondent-insurer of the motorbike in question adopted the arguments of learned counsel for the claimants and submits that there is absolutely no case of contributory negligence at all and that the accident in question happened only because of negligence attributable to the offending K.S.R.T.C. bus. He points out the absence of sketch which respondent No.1 has spoken of and he also points out the absence of the rider of the motorbike being examined to prove contributory negligence. The aspect of contributory negligence has already been dealt with above, and the 22 same does not require more deliberation and therefore the contention that there is absolutely no contributory negligence that can be put on the threshold of the rider of the motorbike, is liable to be rejected.
17. The learned counsel for the claimants pressing his appeals for enhancement of the compensation submits that the impugned judgment and award are liable to be interfered with because firstly, the M.A.C.T. has taken a discount of 50% from the notional income of the deceased persons; secondly that the addition in terms of judgment of Pranay Sethi's Case have to be made to the income of the deceased; thirdly the M.A.C.T. has taken Rs.6,000/- as the monthly income of the deceased persons disregarding the abundant evidentiary material to establish at least Rs.8,000/- as income, if not more. The learned panel counsel for K.S.R.T.C. opposes any enhancement stating that the M.A.C.T. has exercised its discretion on sound principles and has arrived at the findings which are entitled to due deference by this Court.
23
18. The accident in question happened in the month of August 2013; the deceased persons are stated to be coolies; going by the then contemporary Consumer Index, the Wage Standards and the Notional Income Chart of the Lok Adalat, the amount of Rs.6,000/- appears to be on the lower side and therefore the same has been shot up to Rs.8,000/-. Thirdly, in both the claim petitions, the deceased were married persons having settled families and therefore the M.A.C.T. could not have discounted ½ of the income. Consequently, the discount is scaled down to 1/3rd.
19. Lastly, Shri Gopal Krishna, the counsel for the claimants justifiably submits that in M.F.A. No.2105/2016 arising from M.V.C. No.918/2013, the age of the deceased has been taken at 40 by the M.A.C.T. on the basis of Postmortem Report, the Election I.D. Card and other documents, and therefore the addition in terms of ratio of Pranay Sethi Case would be 30% to the notional income of the deceased, hence the notional monthly income comes to Rs.10,400/-. In M.F.A. No.2106/2016 arising from 24 M.V.C. No.917/2013, the age of the deceased is taken at 43 by the M.A.C.T., and therefore the addition would be 25% since the deceased was in the age group of 40-50, going by the Postmortem Report and the Election I.D. Card. Thus the notional monthly income comes to Rs.10,000/-.
20. In view of altered factors, the compensation has been re-worked in terms of the memo of calculation jointly filed by both the sides as under:
"Memo of calculation 1. M.F.A.No.2105/2016 c/w M.F.A.No.103/2015 Income determined at Rs.8,000/-p.m., adding 30% for future prospects ie., 2,400/- p.m., it comes to Rs.10,400/-p.m. (10400X2/3 X12X15 = 12,48,000 ) Loss of dependency = 12,48,000/-
Conventional heads = 70,000/-
--------------
Total = 13,18,000/-
---------------
2. In M.F.A.No.2106/2016
c/w M.F.A.No.101/2015
Income determined at Rs.8,000/-p.m., adding 25% for future prospects ie., 2,000/- p.m., it comes to Rs.10,000/-p.m. (10000X2/3 X12X14 = 11,20,000 ) 25 Loss of dependency = 11,20,000/-
Conventional heads = 70,000/-
--------------
Total = 11,90,000/-
---------------
21. Accordingly, the appeals by the K.S.R.T.C. and the appeals by the claimants are partly allowed; the impugned judgment and award have been modified enhancing the compensation from Rs.7,68,000/- to Rs.11,90,000/- in M.V.C. No.917/2013 AND from Rs. 8,92,000/- to Rs.13,18,000/- in M.V.C. No. 918/2013, both with 6% annual interest thereon, subject to the liability of K.S.R.T.C. being confined to 75% of the said award amounts in both the cases.
Since 25% of the liability is attributable to rash and negligent driving of the rider of the vehicle in question and the pillion riders too, there shall be no liability fastened on the 6th respondent-Insurer. Consequently the appeals against the owner of the motorbike in question and also the 6th respondent-insurer are dismissed.26
The amount in deposit in the Registry of this Court be transmitted to the M.A.C.T. along with the L.C.R. in both the cases to facilitate immediate disbursal of compensation.
Sd/-
JUDGE Snb/