Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 08.04.2026 vs State Of Hp & Others on 18 May, 2026
2026:HHC:17935
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 734 of 2025
Reserved on: 08.04.2026
.
Date of Decision: 18.5.2026.
Sanjeev Verma .... Petitioner
Versus
State of HP & others .... Respondents
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
rt
For the Petitioner : Mr Dipankar, Advocate, vice
Mr Jagjeet Singh Bagga,
Advocate.
For Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 184 of 2020, dated 06.07.2020, registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 324, 326, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act based on a compromise effected between the parties.
1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 22026:HHC:17935
2. It has been asserted that the parties have settled the matter with the intervention of the respectable members of society. The informant does not want to proceed further with the .
matter after the compromise. Hence, the present petition.
3. I have heard Mr Dipankar, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned of Additional Advocate General for Respondent nos. 1 and 2/State.
4. Mr Dipankar, learned vice counsel representing the rt petitioner, submitted that the parties have settled the matter and there is no impediment in quashing the F.I.R. based on the compromise effected between the parties. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:
Manpreet Singh vs. State of Punjab & others 2025 PHHC-054473; and Sanjay Thakur vs. State of H.P. & Ors. Cr.MMO No.329 of 2024 decided on 21.06.2024.
5. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2, submitted that F.I.R. has been registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, which is a heinous offence; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 32026:HHC:17935
6. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
.
7. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under of section 482 based on the compromise is different from the jurisdiction of compounding under section 320 of CrPC. It was observed:
rt "57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320. The court is guided solely and squarely thereby. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence, criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power. However, the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of the indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 4 2026:HHC:17935 opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have .
harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public rt servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.
59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:17935 Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does .
not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences of indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under Section 482. rt The two powers are distinct and different, although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override an express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333:
1993 Cri LJ 1049], the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076:
AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:17935 and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC .
364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120- B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with of 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against society when a prima facie case has been made out rt against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:17935 Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion .
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding, FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accordance with of the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where rt the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide a basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:17935 category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression .
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the rt above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
8. The F.I.R. (Annexure P-1) reads that the informant and his son Raman were present in their home on 06.07.2020, when some persons entered the house and started beating Raman. They were armed with a Kirpan and a country-made pistol. They inflicted injuries on Raman with a Kirpan. The informant shouted, and the people reached the spot. The assailants ran away from the spot. The police registered the F.I.R and investigated the matter. The police found after the investigation that one sword was used during the incident. The sword was recovered at the instance of the petitioner, Sanjeev Verma. The victim, Raman Kumar, had sustained injuries, which ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:17935 could have been caused by means of a sword/Kirpan. Hence, the police filed the charge sheet before the Court.
.
9. The allegations in the F.I.R clearly show that a sword was used. A sword is a weapon that requires a licence to for its possession. The petition does not mention that the petitioner possessed a licence for carrying the sword. Therefore, prima of facie, an offence punishable under section 25 of the Arms Act is made out against the petitioners.
10. rt It was held in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 that the offences punishable under the Arms Act fall within the definition of serious offences and cannot be quashed based on the compromise. It was observed:
"15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 10
2026:HHC:17935 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on .
society.
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes rt against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 112026:HHC:17935 Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466:
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances .
stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a of settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was rtabsconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc." (Emphasis supplied)
11. Therefore, it is apparent that the offences punishable under the Arms Act are against society, which cannot be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties.
12. In Manpreet Singh (supra), The Court had noted the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Narayan (supra) and the observations that offences punishable under Section 307 of IPC and Arms acts etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences which are to be treated as crime against the society and cannot be quashed in exercise of the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. on the ground that parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the judgment ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:17935 failed to notice their significance and quashed the F.I.R registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 341, read with Section 34 of the IPC and 25 of the .
Arms Act. Since the judgment runs contrary to the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Narayan (supra), it is difficult to rely upon the judgment of Manpreet of (supra).
13. Sanjay Thakur (supra) deals with the offences rt punishable under section 279, 337 and 304(A) of the IPC, and is not relevant to the present case.
14. No other point was urged.
15. Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties.
16. Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.
17. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla ) Judge 18th May, 2026 (ravinder) ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:32:39 :::CIS