Karnataka High Court
Satisha vs State Of Karnataka on 11 November, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB
CRL.A No.1276/2018
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1276/2018 (C)
BETWEEN:
SATISHA
S/O. LATE JAVAREGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT MADUVINAKODI VILLAGE
BOOKANAKERE HOBLI
K.R. PET TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT-571 426 ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI HARISH KUMAR H.C., ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY K.R. PET RURAL POLICE STATION
REP.BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
BENGALURU-560 001 ...RESPONDENT
Digitally
signed by K S (BY SMT.RASHMI JADHAV, ADDITIONAL SPP)
RENUKAMBA THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF
Location: CR.P.C, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
High Court of CONVICTION DATED 12.06.2018 AND SENTENCE DATED 14.06.2018
Karnataka PASSED BY THE III ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
MANDYA (SITTING AT SRIRANGAPATTANA) IN S.C.NO.5014/2017,
CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF IPC.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER
HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB
CRL.A No.1276/2018
HC-KAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL) Challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the accused in S.C.No.5014/2017 on the file of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya (Sitting at Srirangapattana) has preferred this appeal.
2. By the impugned judgment and order, the Trial Court has convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to pay the fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
3. The appellant was the sole accused in S.C.No.5014/2017. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to henceforth as per their ranks before the Trial Court.
4. The charge against the accused was that he was addicted to alcohol and was quarrelling with his wife/Renuka whenever she asked money. On 19.03.2016 at 3:00 p.m., in his house, he picked up quarrel with the victim and agitated by that, when she poured kerosene on herself saying that she will commit suicide, the accused lit fire and caused burn injuries. -3-
NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR She died on 24.03.2016 at 2:00 p.m. in K.R. Hospital, Mysuru, due to burn injuries. Based on alleged dying declaration/Ex.P23 said to be recorded by PW.17/Chandregowda, Head Constable of K.R. Pet Rural Police Station, PW.15/Punith, Assistant Sub- Inspector of Police of K.R. Pet Rural Police Station registered first information report/Ex.P24 initially for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. On receiving the death intimation, the case was converted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. On investigation, the charge sheet was filed.
5. The Trial Court, on hearing the parties, framed the charge against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. As the accused denied the charge, trial was conducted. In support of the case of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 17 were examined, Exs.P1 to P25 and MOs.1 and 2 were marked. The accused, after his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., did not lead any defence evidence.
6. The Trial Court on hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment and order, convicted the accused solely based on the dying declaration/Ex.P23 and the evidence of the official witnesses. The accused has challenged the said -4- NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR judgment and order of conviction and sentence in the above appeal.
7. Heard both side.
Submissions of Sri Harish Kumar H.C., learned Counsel for the appellant:
8(i) There are no eyewitnesses to the incident. The case was solely based on circumstantial evidence. The motive for the commission of the offence was alcohol addiction of the accused and he quarrelling with his wife/victim whenever she asked money for the family's maintenance. But the dying declaration/Ex.P23 does not whisper anything about the alleged addiction of the accused. Further, PWs.8, 9 and 12/father, daughter and younger brother of the victim respectively, did not support the prosecution version, both regarding motive as well as the overt acts of the accused.
(ii) The prosecution's own records show that the accused also had suffered burn injuries in the same incident and he had tried to put off the fire. When the victim was admitted into the hospital, history of accidental burns was given. The dying declaration was recorded after three days of the alleged incident. For those three days, the victim was under -5-
NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR treatment. Evidence of PW.16/Dr. Lokesh itself shows that at the time of recording of the dying declaration, he was not present. The Trial Court committed grave error in relying on such dying declaration which was shrouded with suspicion.
(iii) The Trial Court has wrongly applied the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paniben v. State of Gujarat1 to the facts of the present case. The Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record judiciously and apply the correct principles of law. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside.
9. In support of his submissions, he relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra2.
Submissions of Smt. Rashmi Jadhav, learned Additional SPP for the respondent-State:
10. The death has taken place in the house of the accused. Death was unnatural one. If the injuries were accidental injuries, the accused should have taken the victim to the hospital and reported the matter to the police but has not explained why he has not done so. That goes to show that he 1 (1992) 2 SCC 474 2 (2002) 6 SCC 710 -6- NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR was the author of the injuries. Only upon setting the victim on fire, he has tried to put off the fire, that will not exonerate him of his liability for conviction under Section 302 of IPC. Evidence on record shows that the accused had assured witnesses of the responsibility of bringing up his two daughters. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in holding that PWs.8, 9 and 12 were won over. The dying declaration was rightly found acceptable by the Trial Court. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court does not warrant interference of this Court.
11. On hearing both side and on examination of the materials on record, the point that arises for consideration of this Court is "whether the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is sustainable"?
Analysis
12. Some of the admitted facts of the case are as follows:
(i) That victim Renuka and the accused were married 14 years prior to 19.03.2016. At the time of incident, the couple had two children namely, PW.9/Kavya aged 12 years and another daughter by name Kavana aged 9 years, PWs.8 -7- NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR and 12 are father and younger brother of the victim Renuka respectively.
(ii) On 19.03.2016 at about 03.00 p.m., Renuka suffered burn injuries in her house. The accused also had suffered burn injuries. Both of them were taken to Hospital on the same day with the history of accidental injuries. Victim succumbed to the burn injuries on 24.03.2016 at 02.00 p.m. while undergoing treatment.
13. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows:
(i) That the accused was addicted to alcohol and he was not taking care of his family. He used to squander the family's income from the yield of coconut crop. On 19.03.2016 at 3.00 p.m. quarrel ensued between him and victim Renuka regarding money. Agitated by that, Renuka poured kerosene on herself saying that it is better for her to die. The accused saying that she should die, set her ablaze with match stick.
Then he tried to put off the fire. Therefore, he also suffered injuries. Then both of them were shifted to Hospital.
(ii) When victim was being treated in the K.R.Hospital, Mysore on receiving Medico Legal intimation, PW.15/Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police deputed PW.17 to record the statement -8- NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR of the victim. Accordingly, PW.17 visited K.R.Hospital. On PW.16 the doctor certifying about her fitness to give the statement, he recorded her statement as per Ex.P23 in the presence of PW.16. Then PW.17 returned to the police station and tendered the said statement before PW.15.
(iii) Based on Ex.P23, PW.15 registered first information report as per Ex.P24. Then he visited the spot, conducted the spot mahazar as per Ex.P2 and seized the incriminating materials during such mahazar. He recorded the statements of the witnesses. After the death of victim, PW.13 received the death intimation sent by PW.1/Medical Officer of K.R.Hospital. Based on that, he sent requisition to the Court to incorporate Section 302 of IPC in the case and handed over further investigation to PW.14.
(iv) PW.14 deputed his staff to apprehend the accused. Accordingly, they apprehended the accused and produced him before PW.14. He recorded the voluntary statement of the accused as per Ex.P17. Then he recorded the statements of the witnesses, got conducted inquest mahazar and post mortem examination. After completing the investigation, he filed the charge sheet.
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14. The case of the prosecution was based on the following set of evidence:
(i) Motive i.e. accused quarreling with his wife regarding money;
(ii) The dying declaration of the victim as per Ex.P23;
(iii) Death was homicidal one.
Reg. Motive:
15. According to the prosecution, the accused was addicted to alcohol. Therefore he was squandering his income for his addiction without giving anything to the family. Therefore there used to be quarrels between the accused and the victim and during such quarrel, he set her ablaze. Whereas, the defence of the accused is that the victim had suffered injuries due to stove burst and when he tried to rescue her, he also suffered burn injuries.
16. To prove the motive circumstance, the prosecution relied on the evidence of PWs.8, 9 and 12/father, daughter and younger brother of the victim respectively. But none of them supported the prosecution version. They deposed that the accused and deceased were living cordially. They also deposed that the victim suffered burn injuries due to stove burst and the
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR accused also had suffered burn injuries. Trial Court in a single stroke says that they have deposed falsely to save the accused. It is to be noted that the accused and the victim were married 14 years prior to the incident. They had two daughters. Nothing was placed on record to show that prior to the incident there were any quarrels between them or any panchayats were held for reconciliation. Except the aforesaid witnesses, no other neighbours of the victim and the accused or any other independent witnesses were examined to prove the motive alleged.
17. It is no doubt true that PW.12 in his cross- examination by the Public Prosecutor stated that they are not financially well off to take care of the children of the accused and the deceased and the accused has assured to take care of his daughters. But that itself is not sufficient to hold that they are trying to save the accused. Basically all those witnesses have denied the addiction of the accused to alcohol and his waywardness. If at all PWs.8, 9 and 12 were interested witnesses or had any reason to turn hostile, the prosecution could have examined some independent witnesses regarding
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR motive which is not done and there is no explanation for that. Therefore, motive circumstance was not proved. Reg. Dying Declaration:
18. As already noted, the circumstance of motive was not proved. Trial Court has convicted the accused solely based on the dying declaration/Ex.P23 and the evidence of PW.16/the doctor who said to have certified about the fitness of the victim at the time of recording the dying declaration and PW.17 who said to have recorded Ex.P23/dying declaration.
19. It is settled principle of law that to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to establish the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. More particularly when the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances should be so complete that it should lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. If there is any break in the chain of circumstances, then the benefit of such break in the chain should go to the accused.
20. So far as the dying declaration is concerned, the trial Court relied on the judgment in Paniben's case referred to supra. In para 18 of the said judgment, which is extracted by
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR the trial Court itself, while considering whether corroboration to the dying declaration is required or not, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summed up the principles governing the dying declaration as follows:
"18. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P; (1976) 3 SCC 104)
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav; (1985) 1 SCC 552, Ramawati Devi v.
State of Bihar; (1983) 1 SCC 211).
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor; (1976) 3 SCC 618).
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P; (1974) 4 SCC
264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P; 1981 SCC (Cri) 645)
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu; AIR 1981 SC 617)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar; AIR 1979 SC 1505)
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P; AIR 1988 SC 912)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan; (1989) 3 SCC 390) (Emphasis supplied)
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21. Reading of the above judgment goes to show that though there is no rule that the dying declaration should have some corroboration, but to rely on such dying declaration, the Court has to scrutinize the same carefully. Further in para 18(iv) of the above judgment, it is clearly stated that where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Reading of the above judgment makes it further clear that the prosecution has the burden to prove that victim was in fit mental condition to make the dying declaration. This Court has to examine the evidence adduced in this case in the light of the above said principles.
22. The evidence in proof of dying declaration/Ex.P23 is that of PW.17/Head Constable of K.R.Pet Police Station who was allegedly deputed by PW.15/Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and PW.16/the doctor in whose presence the same is said to be recorded and who has certified the fitness of the victim.
23. PW.17 says that he visited burns ward of the K.R.Hospital on 21.03.2016 at 09.15 p.m. and PW.16 was the doctor on duty treating the patients. PW.17 further says that he enquired PW.16 about the fitness of the victim to give
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR statement and on PW.16 certifying the same, he recorded her statement Ex.P23.
24. PW.16 says that on 21.03.2016, PW.17 gave requisition at 9.15 p.m. to him and accordingly he examined the victim and endorsed on Ex.P25/requisition that the victim is in fit state to give statement. In the chief examination, he deposed that the victim's statement/Ex.P23 was recorded in his presence between 09.15 p.m. and 09.45 p.m. Ex.P23 shows that the same is recorded on 21.03.2016 between 09.15 p.m. and 09.45 p.m. Whereas, PW.16 in his cross-examination states that on that day he was in charge of the surgery department and he worked in burns ward only between 04.00 p.m. and 09.00 p.m. He admits that he had not treated the victim. He also admits that when victim gave statement, she was in ICU. He does not state that he was in charge of ICU ward also. He says there were three to four patients in the said ICU, but he cannot say their names. Whereas, PW.17 says that he came to the hospital itself at 09.15 p.m. If PW.16 was on duty only upto 09.00 p.m., then how he would be available to record the statement between 09.15 p.m. and 09.45 p.m. was not explained.
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25. PW.17 in his cross-examination says that he reached the burns ward at 09.15 p.m. and on enquiry, doctor took 5 to 10 minutes to make endorsement on Ex.P25/requisition. Then PW.16 certified the condition of the victim and he recorded the statement. He also states that he cannot say how many persons were there in the victim's ward in the hospital. He states that he went on putting the questions to the victim, she gave the answers and he recorded the same. Ex.P23 is not in the question and answer form.
26. To examine whether the victim was in a fit condition to give statement, the prosecution's own record Ex.P22/case sheet has to be looked into. Ex.P22 shows that the victim was admitted into the hospital on 19.03.2016 at 06:06:34 p.m. Ex.P22 shows that the victim had suffered 70- 75% superficial and deep burns and inhalational injuries. She was brought with history of kerosene stove burst on 19.03.2016 in Maduvinakodi Village, K.R.Pete around 03.00 p.m. It is not even the case of the prosecution that the accused himself took the victim to the hospital and gave false history. Ex.P22/case sheet shows that PW.12 Suresh/the brother of the victim has signed the consent form. Page 29 of case sheet
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR shows that the victim had suffered superficial and deep burns involving face, neck, anterior and posterior part of chest, abdomen and thighs. It is to be noted that though she was admitted into the hospital on 19.03.2016 by her brother, none of her relatives filed any complaint alleging that the accused is the author of the burns. In page 31 of Ex.P22, it is recorded that the brother of the victim was explained about the condition of the patient and the injuries including serious burns and complications associated with that. Her statement was purportedly recorded on third day of her admission. The noting dated 21.03.2016 in Ex.P22 shows that the victim's general condition was average. Till then she was being administered with drugs. It is to be noted that the victim died at 02.00 p.m. within three days thereafter. Nothing was elicited in the evidence of PW.16 that there was any entry in Ex.P22 to show that he had treated her.
27. It is also to be noted that though the victim died after 2 days of recording of Ex.P23, the Investigating Officer did not make any effort to get her statement recorded through the Taluka Executive Magistrate. None of the doctors who treated the victim were examined. Ex.P16/photographs
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR produced by the prosecution itself show that the victim had suffered extensive burns on her lips, face and body. On the requisition/Ex.P25, doctor/PW.16 is purported to have made endorsement at 09.15 p.m. about the fitness of the victim. As already stated as per his own admission he was on duty till 09.00 p.m. Similarly the purported certification of PW.16 on Ex.P23 is taken after the alleged statement by adjusting the space available at the bottom of the said document. That shows a clear interpolation.
28. PW.17 says that after recording the statement he tendered the same before PW.15/Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. But PW.15 says that PW.17 tendered the said document before him on 22.03.2016 at 00.05 hours. Based on that he registered first information report/Ex.P24. Ex.P24 though purportedly registered on 22.03.2016 at 00.05 hours, same is delivered to the Court on 23.03.2016 at 10.50 a.m., i.e. more than 40 hours after registration of the same. This delay was not explained by any of the prosecution witnesses.
29. Next circumstance which creates doubt about accused being the culprit is the prosecution's own document Ex.P12/wound certificate of the accused. Ex.P12 shows that the
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR accused was also taken to Government Hospital, K.R.Pet by one Nagesh, with history of burns on 19.03.2016 at 03.45 p.m. in his house. He had also suffered burn injuries on his face, upper chest, abdomen and upper limbs. The said document was issued on the requisition of the Investigating Officer by the Duty Medical Officer, Government Hospital, K.R.Pet. In all fairness, the Investigating Officer/prosecutor should have examined the said doctor to show how and why the accused suffered injuries. That document probabilized the defence of the accused that the victim suffered accidental burns and when he went to her rescue, he also suffered injuries. If at all the accused had any intention to commit murder of the victim, after setting fire he would not have gone to her rescue and he would not have suffered such extensive injuries. Under such circumstances, the burden was heavy on the prosecution to prove by acceptable evidence, that victim had given statement/Ex.P23 and that was recorded by PW.17.
30. The aforesaid evaluation of evidence goes to show that victim being in fit state of mental condition to give statement on 21.03.2016, PW.16 being present in the hospital treating her and PW.17 visiting the hospital and recording the
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR statement in the presence of PW.16 becomes doubtful. If at all she had given such statement, for re-affirmation of the same, the Investigation Officer ought to have got her statement recorded through Taluka Executive Magistrate, an independent Officer. Thus Ex.P23 did not satisfy the conditions enumerated in para 18 (iv) and (v) of the judgment in Paniben's case referred to supra.
31. It is unfortunate that the trial Court has not evaluated the other evidence on record at all. It has only gone by Ex.P23 and jumped into its own conclusion imputing motive to PWs.8, 9 and 12 that they intended to save the accused. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is solely on account of failure of the trial Court to evaluate the evidence judiciously, contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jayamma v. State of Karnataka3 wherein it is held that when dying declaration is not found reliable, there should be corroborating evidence. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence are unsustainable. Hence the following:
ORDER Appeal is allowed.
3 (2021) 6 SCC 213
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NC: 2025:KHC:45752-DB CRL.A No.1276/2018 HC-KAR The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellant/accused is hereby set aside.
Appellant/accused is acquitted of the charge for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
The order of the trial Court with regard to disposal of the properties is maintained.
Accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, if his detention is not required in any other case.
Communicate copy of this order to the trial Court and concerned prison forthwith.
Sd/-
(K.S.MUDAGAL) JUDGE Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE KVK,KSR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 25