Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Swapan Kumar Sardar & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 18 November, 2019
Author: Rajasekhar Mantha
Bench: Rajasekhar Mantha
Form No. J(1)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
Present :
The Hon'ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha
W.P. No. 20936 (W) of 2014
Swapan Kumar Sardar & Ors.
-Versus-
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the petitioners: Mr. Sardar Amjad Ali, Sr. Advocate,
Ms. Sucharita Roy.
For the KMDA: Mr. Partha Sarathi Bose,
Mr. Satyajit Talukdar.
For the State: Mr. Tapan Kumar Mukherjee, ld.A.G.P.
Mr. Somnath Naskar.
Heard on: November 18, 2019.
Judgment on: November 18, 2019.
Rajasekhar Mantha, J.:
The principal challenge in the instant writ petition by the employees of the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (in short KMDA) is to an order dated 22nd January, 2014 passed by the KMDA pursuant to a direction of this Court in W.P. No. 842 of 2011 (Swapan Kumar Sardar & Ors. - Vs. - The State of West Bengal & Ors.).
The fact leading to the claims of the writ petitioners is that they were originally granted a Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), for the purpose of improving the administration and service benefits to the direct employees of the State Government and State controlled bodies. The said Career Advancement Scheme was allowed in or about the year 1995 on the recommendation of the concerned Pay Commission not only to the employees of the State Government but also to employees of the statutory bodies under it.
Subsequently, when the 4th Pay Commission was implemented in or about the year 2002 an improved benefit of a Modified Career Advancement Scheme (MCAS) was allowed exclusively to the State Government employees.
It is submitted by the Counsel for the State that although the Pay Commission was requested to consider the case of employees of statutory bodies under the control of the State Government, the same was declined.
Before proceeding further with this order, it is necessary to explain the difference between the original CAS and subsequently introduced MCAS. The benefit under the original CAS was in the form of an automatic increment and/or climbing on to the next pay scale available to those employees, who were stagnating in their existing pay scale could not otherwise progress in their careers in two intervals i.e. after the completion of ten years of service (first advancement/jump to the next higher pay scale) and after completion of 20 years (second advancement).
Pursuant to the recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission, the same benefit of career advancement (hereinafter called the Modified Career Advancement Scheme) was given to the employees at three stages, i.e., after eight years (first movement), after sixteen years (second advancement) and after twenty one years (third advancement) of completion of their services. This was in replacement of the original Career Advancement Scheme.
It will not be out of place to mention that both the CAS and MCAS were allowed based on the similar Schemes allowed to the Central Government employees.
The arguments of the employees of KMDA are as follows:
(a) There is discrimination on the part of the State in allowing the benefits of the MCAS to the State Government employees while denying the same to the employees of statutory bodies under the State;
(b) A large number of other statutory bodies like Howrah Municipal Corporation, Shanti Niketan and Sriniketan Development Authority, Haldia Development Authority and West Bengal Pollution Control Board etc., have been allowed such benefits. These two of such organizations are similarly situated as the KMDA and therefore there is a class between the class and or class legislation created by the State.
(c) There is apparent contradictions and mindless fallacy in the impugned order where the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of West Bengal and the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West Bengal on one hand said that they could not grant the MCAS to the KMDA employees in view of the bar under the 4th Pay Commission but in the same breath contended that if the funds of the KMDA permitted such benefits, the same could be availed by the employees of KMDA.
KMDA similar to the Haldia Development Authority and the Shanti Niketan and Sriniketan Development Authority are constituted and function under the provisions of the "West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979". Section 19 of the said Act stipulates that the following persons shall comprise of the governing body of the KMDA -
"19. Composition of the 1[Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority (1) The 1[Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority shall consist of the following members:--
(a) the Chief Minister of the State of West Bengal or any person nominated by him shall be the Chairman, and a Minister of the State of West Bengal to be nominated by the Chief Minister shall be the Vice-Chairman:
Provided that when there is no Council of Ministers functioning in the State of West Bengal, the State Government shall nominate such persons, as it may think fit, to be the two members and the Chairman and Vice- Chairman respectively of the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority;
(b) the Chief Executive Officer of the 1[Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority, ex officio;
(c) not more than three officers of the rank of Secretary to the State Government to be nominated by the State Government; and 2
(d) not more than five persons to be nominated by the State Government of whom--
(i) two shall be Councillors or Aldermen of the 1[Kolkata] Municipal Corporation;
(ii) one shall be a Councillor or Alderman of the Howrah Municipal Corporation;
(iii) two shall be Commissioners of any municipality within the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Area:
Provided that when an order of supersession of the 1 [Kolkata] Municipal Corporation or the Howrah Municipal Corporation or the municipality, as the case may be, has been made and is in force, it shall be competent for the State Government to nominate, in place of the Councillors or Aldermen or Commissioners, as the case may be, such persons as have experience in or knowledge of administration of local self-government to be members of the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority:
Provided further that on the revocation of the order of supersession as aforesaid, the members nominated under the first proviso shall, notwithstanding that the term of office of such members has not expired, cease to hold office and the vacancies shall be filled up in accordance with the provisions of clause (d).
(2) The Vice-Chairman shall discharge such functions and exercise such powers as may be delegated to him by the Chairman and shall, during the absence of the Chairman, perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Chairman.
(3) The members referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall hold office for a term of three years from the date of their nomination by the State Government and shall receive such allowances for attending the meetings of the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority or any committee thereof, as may be prescribed: 3 [Provided that every such member, on ceasing to be a Councillor or Alderman of the 1 [Kolkata] Municipal Corporation or the Howrah Municipal Corporation or Commissioner of a municipality within the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Area, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding that the term of office of such member has not expired, cease to hold office and the vacancy shall be filled up in accordance with the provisions of clause (d) of sub-section (1).] (4) No act or proceeding of the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority shall be deemed to be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy in, or defect, initial or subsequent, in the constitution of that Authority"
The finance, accounts and audit of the KMDA are required to be governed by Sections 107 to 114 of the aforesaid Act of 1979. Section 107, 108 & 109 stipulates as follows:
"107. (1) Every Planning Authority or Development Authority (other than the [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority) shall have and maintain its own fund to which shall be credited-
(a) all moneys received by the said Authority from the State Government by way of grants, loans, advances or otherwise;
(b) all development charges or other charges or fees received by the said Authority under this Act or rules or regulations made thereunder : and
(c) all moneys received by the said Authority from any other source.
(2) Every such Authority may keep in current account in any branch of the State Bank of India or any other Bank approved by the State Government in this behalf, such portion of its fund as may be prescribed and any money in excess of the said sum shall be invested in such manner as may be approved by the State Government.
108. Fund of the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority (1) There shall be a fund for the 1[Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority to which shall be credited--
(a) such moneys as may be paid to it by the State Government under the Taxes on Entry of Goods into 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Area Act, 1972;
(b) all moneys borrowed by it;
(c) such other moneys as may be received by it from the State Government or from any other authority or source.
(2) The 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority shall maintain a sinking fund for the repayment of money borrowed by it, and shall every year deposit into the said fund such moneys as may be paid to it by the State Government under the Taxes on Entry of Goods into 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Area Act, 1972.
(3) The money paid into the sinking fund shall be invested in such manner and in such securities as may be prescribed.
(4) The sinking fund or any part thereof shall be applied in, or towards, the discharge of the loan or part thereof for which such fund was created, and until such loan or part thereof is wholly discharged, the money standing to the credit of the fund shall be applied for no other purpose.
109 - Grants and advances by State Government The State Government may make such grants, advances and loans to any Planning Authority or Development Authority (including the 1 [Kolkata] Metropolitan Development Authority) as it may deem necessary for the performance of the functions under this Act and all such grants, loans and advances made shall be on such terms and conditions as the State Government may determine."
The sources of fund of KMDA are set out in Section 108. In addition thereto, Section 109 of the Act of 1979 stipulates that the State Government may make such grants and advances and loans to any planning authority or development authority including the KMDA as it may deem necessary for the performance of the functions under the Act. It is further stipulated that all such grants, loans and advances made, shall be on such terms and conditions as the State Government may determined.
To address the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioners that there is discrimination between the facilities granted to the direct employees of the State Government and those employees of statutory bodies, it is now well settled that the same do not stand on the similar footing. Employees of statutory bodies are governed not only by the act under which they are constituted but also have independent bye-laws, Rules and Regulations not only governing their functions but also the terms and conditions of the service of their employees.
The first argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, has to be answered in negative.
The second argument raised is that the employees of the some development authorities similarly situated like KMDA is also governed under the aforesaid Act of 1979 yet have been granted such benefits and the employees of KMDA have been denied the benefits of MCAS.
The impugned order addresses this issue by first contending that such authorities and other organizations like Haldia Development Authority, West Bengal Pollution Control Board and Howrah Improvement Trust and West Bengal Housing Board have granted the benefits of MCAS since they have funds of their own in this regard and the KMDA does not.
Article 14 permits reasonable classification but does not permit class legislation. The equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. It does not attainment or circumstances in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons often requires separate treatment. From the very nature of society there should be different laws in different places and the legitimate controls the policy and enacts laws in the best interest of the safety and security of the state. In fact identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. So a reasonable classification is only not permitted but is necessary if society is to progress.
Thus what Article 14 forbids is class-legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. The classification however must not be "arbitrary ,artificial or evasive" but must be based on some real and substantial bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. But where equals and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply. Class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted that between whom and the persons not so favored no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the following cases.
In the case of D.S. Nakara v. Union Of India reported in 1983 AIR 130, 1983 SCR (2) 165, the Supreme Court contended as follows:
"The Government issued an office memorandum announcing a liberalized pension scheme for retired government servants but made it applicable to those who had retired after 31 March 1979. The Supreme Court held that the fixing of the cut off date to be discriminatory as violating Article 14. The division of pensioners into two classes on the basis of the date of retirement was not based on any rational principle because a difference of two days in the matter of retirement could have a traumatic effect on the pensioner. Such a classification held to be arbitrary and unprincipled as there was no acceptable or persuasive reason in its favour. The said classification had no rational nexus with the object sought to achieve."
In the case of Madhu Limaye v. Supdt. Tihar Jail Delhi, reported in 1975 AIR 1505, 1975 SCR (3) 582, the Supreme Court contended as follows:
"There were Indian and Europian Prisoners. Both were treated differently. Europian gets better diet. Court held that difference between Indian and Europian prisoners in the matter of treatment and diet violates right to equality under Article 14 of Indian prisoners. They all are prisoners they must treat equally."
It was also contended that no prior permission of the State Government was taken before extending such benefit in view of the denial of MCAS to non State Government employees under the 4th Pay Commission.
While the argument has made in the impugned order by two responsible Principal Secretaries of State Government, who are the Senior IAS Officers, appears to be ex facie contradictory and self-defeating, Counsel for the State would rely upon the fact that merely because an error is committed in the case of certain bodies, this similar erroneous benefit cannot be derived by the employees of the KMDA.
This Court refers to the doctrine of negative equality evolved in the following cases.
In the case of Union of India v. International Trading Co., reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 at page 444, Para 13, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of permission granted to the thirty two vessels. As highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as the thirty two vessels are concerned, but it cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality."
(emphasis added) In the case of M/S Vedanta Aluminium Limited vs Union of India (RVWPET No.218 of 2011) at Paragraph 17, the Orissa High Court held as follows:
"17. Even assuming for the sake of argument that any benefit was extended to a similarly situated Company, namely, Jindal Power Limited under the Office Memorandum dated 16.11.2010, the petitioner has no legal right to claim similar benefit for the reason that there is no concept of negative equality.
A party cannot claim that if something wrong has been done in any case, similar direction should be given for doing the wrong again. No illegality should be allowed to perpetuate under the shelter of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality, and no one can be permitted to take benefit of negative equality."
(emphasis added) It is now well settled that the negative equality is not permitted under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The doctrine of negative equality has already explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited cases is that no body can claim benefit from a wrongful gain made by similarly situated persons.
While this Court may have sympathy for the writ petitioners in this regard, the conduct of the State Government in failing to monitor the activities and functions of those other statutory bodies cannot be but deprecated. It is expected that remedial measures shall be taken by the State in respect of the Statutory bodies. This Court is not free from doubt that they are more favorite statutory body/employees in the State than the employees of the KMDA The only argument advanced on behalf of the State that needs to be dealt with by this Court is in terms of Section 139 of the aforesaid 1972 Act. Section 139 of the aforesaid Act of 1979 stipulates as follows:
"Section 139 - Power to make regulations Any Planning Authority or Development Authority may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make regulations consistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder, to carry out the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to the generality of this power such regulations may provide for,--
(a) the time and place of holding and procedure to be followed in meetings of the Planning Authority, Development Authority and Advisory Committee, and the number of members necessary to form a quorum therein;
(b) the powers and duties of the officers and employees of the Planning Authority and Development Authority;
(c) the salaries, allowances and conditions of service of its officers and employees;
(d) the terms and conditions for the continuance of use of any land used otherwise than in conformity with a development plan; and
(e) any other matter which has to be or may be prescribed by rules."
Sub-Section (C) of Section 139 clearly indicates that the power to frame regulations for the purpose of governing the salaries, allowances and conditions of service of its officers and employees is vested in the KMDA but the same has to be made in consultation with the State Government.
Mr. Ali, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners, relies upon Section 29 by saying that when the State Government is already in majority in the governing body of KMDA the consent of the State Government is to an idle formality and that once the Board of KMDA passes a salary that is empowered to frame regulation governing the salaries and emoluments to its employee, and if the same including the MCAS such regulations and/or rules must have deemed approval of the State Government.
This Court seizes some force in such argument but is reminded of the well settled principle that there is no estoppel against the law. The aforesaid principle applies not only in the context of Section 139(6) read with Section 29 of the aforesaid 1972 Act but also in the context of the denial by the 4th Pay Commission Authorities of MCAS to the persons similarly placed like the petitioner, i.e., employees of the statutory bodies albeit under the control of the State Government.
The following Supreme Court ruling resonate the principle of "no estoppel against the law":
In the case of Dunlop India Ltd vs Union Of India And Ors, reported in 1977 AIR 597, 1976 SCR (2) 98, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"At one stage Mr. Sanghi pointed out that in certain Bills of Entry of Dunlop India Limited, their Agents, Messrs Mackinnon. Mackenzie & Co., Private Ltd., gave the I.T.C. item No. 87 with regard to the imported V.P. Latex. This according to Mr. Sanghi clearly shows how the appellants themselves have understood the matter. There is, however, no estoppel in law against a party in a taxation matter. In order to clear the goods for the customs, the appellants' Agents may have given the classification in accordance with the wishes of the authorities or they may even be under some misapprehension. But when law allows them the right to ask for refund on a proper appraisement and which they actually applied for, we do not attach any significance to this aspect of the matter pointed out by counsel. The question is of General importance and must be decided on its merits."
(emphasis added) In the case of Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs Sampuran Singh, reported in 1347, JT 1999 (2) SC 598, (1999) 122 PLR 295, 1999 (2) SCALE 415, (1999) 3 SCC 494, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"13. The High Court as well as the lower appellate court also relied upon the fact that the Trust had made similar preferential allotments as local displaced person in favour of other persons. Therefore, the courts below came to the conclusion that even the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to such allotment. In our opinion, before coming to this conclusion the courts below should have first decided the question whether the allotment in favour of those persons was within the scope of the Rules applicable. If it was not within the scope of the Rules then even those allotments in favour of other persons will not create a right in the respondents to claim equality with them; may be, if the allotments were made wrongly in favour of those persons, the same may become liable for cancellation, if permissible in law, but that will not create an enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar wrongful allotments in their favour. In our opinion, even this ground relied upon by the High Court as well as the lower appellate court is unsustainable. The courts below next relied upon the fact that in regard to some of the respondents, the Trust itself at a point of time made allotments and accepted initial deposits towards the consideration of the plot which was subsequently cancelled. Based on those facts, the courts below held that the Trust having once allotted the plots and having collected part of the consideration, it could not have cancelled the allotments, probably basing the respondents' case on the principle of promissory estoppel. Here the courts below have failed to notice the legal principle that there is no estoppel against law. The allotment of plots by the Trust is controlled by the statutory Rules. Any allotment contrary to those Rules will be against the law. Since the allotments made in favour of some of the respondents was based on wrong application of the reservation made for "local displaced person" those allotments were contrary to law. Hence, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to protect such illegal allotments. In the said view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the judgments and decrees impugned in these appeals."
(emphasis added) In the case of Bennett Coleman & Co. (P) Ltd vs Punya Priya Das Gupta, reported in 1970 AIR 426, 1970 SCR (1) 181, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The respondent thereafter applied to the Delhi Administration and the latter, as aforesaid, referred his claim to the Labour Court for adjudication. In his statement of claim before the Labour Court, the respondent claimed that the monthly wages payable to him were Rs. 700 basic, Rs. 497 as dearness allowance, Rs. 200 conveyance allowance and Rs. 50 being the estimated value of the benefit of a free telephone and newspapers, aggregating Rs. 1,447 per month. He claimed gratuity computable on the basis of Rs. 1,447 as being his monthly wages, Rs. 1,447 as compensation for the month's leave, in all, Rs. 6,000.34 P. He did not deduct from the said claim the said amount of Rs. 2,810.47 P. as he had not encashed the cheque given to him against the receipt dated November 21, 1963. The company in its written statement denied the claim relying on the said receipt and further denied that the car allowance and the monetary value for the free telephone and newspapers could be included in the wages payable to the respondent either as due to him or for calculating gratuity. Before the Labour Court the company did not dispute the value of the benefit of the free telephone and newspapers estimated by the respondent, but it raised the question whether the said value and the car allowance formed part of the respondent's wages and whether the amount of gratuity payable to him could be ascertained on the footing of their being part of his wages. The Labour Court held that there was no evidence that the car allowance was not payable to the respondent while he was on leave as was the case in respect of another working journalist, C. V. Vishwanath, whose claim also the Labour Court was trying along with that of the respondent. The Labour Court found this difference a significant one and held that the car allowance had to be taken as part of the wages. The Labour Court also held that the car allowance and the free telephone and newspapers were an allowance and an amenity respectively falling under the definition L 12 Sup CI/69-13 of s. 2 (rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, both forming the component parts of monthly wages payable to the respondent,. As regards the leave, the respondent was undoubtedly entitled to 30 days leave. But the company's plea was, firstly, that its rules did not permit compensation for such leave and secondly, that it was set off against the period of notice which the respondent was required to give. No rules, however, were produced to show that they contained any provision disallowing such compensation. As regards the notice period of one month, the Labour Court held that as the resignation dated October 8, 1963 was accepted with effect from October 21, 1963 there was compliance of 13 days only and therefore the management was not liable to pay for the balance of 17 days leave. The Labour Court rejected the company's plea that the receipt given by the respondent in full settlement of all his claims estopped him from making these claims on the ground that as these items were claimable under the Act there could be no estoppel against law. In the result, the Labour Court held that the respondent was entitled to claim car allowance at Rs. 200 per month, Rs. 50 per month for telephone and news- papers and compensation for 13 days leave, that the first two were parts of his wages, that his monthly remuneration was, therefore, Rs. 1,447 and gratuity equivalent to 51 months wages would have to be calculated on the basis of Rs. 1,447 being his wages per month and directed the company to pay on the aforesaid calculations Rs. 2,002 over and above Rs. 2,810.47 P. for which the company had issued the said cheque."
(emphasis added) In the case of C. Beepathumma And Ors. vs V.S. Kadambolithaya And Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 241, 1964 5 SCR 836, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"18. Mr. S. T. Desai learned counsel for the appellants admits that the mortgagors had not lost their right to the properties comprised in Ex. P-2 and that Ex. P-2 incorporated Ex. P-1. Exs. P-63 and P- 63(a) were filed to establish the connection which, in view of the admission, it is not necessary to set forth here. He also admits that he cannot make out case under Art. 134 of the Indian Limitation Act. He contends that the doctrine of election is but a species of estoppel and there can be no estoppel against law especially against the Limitation Act, because of s. 3 of that Act. He relies upon a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Sitarama Chetty and Anr. v. Krishnaswami Chetty [(1915) I.L.R. Mad., 38,
374.] where White C.J. quoting a passage from Mr. Mitra's book on the Law of Limitation, observes that an agreement by a person against whom a cause of action has arisen, that he would not take advantage of the statute, cannot affect its operation on the original cause of action, unless such agreement amounts to an acknowledgment of liability which the statute recognises as an exception to the rule. Mr. Desai also relies upon Govardhan Das v. Dau Dayal [(1932) I.L.R. 54 All. 573.] for the proposition that no one can contract himself out of the statute of limitation, nor can estoppel be pleaded against a statutory bar of limitation. Some other cases cited by him are not in point and need not be mentioned. On the basis of these cases, Mr. Desai contends that unless Exs. P-2 and P-2(a) can be pleaded as an acknowledgment limitation cannot be saved in respect of Kunhi Pakki's share and the suit itself must be dismissed under s. 3 of the Limitation Act. He contends that the equitable doctrine of election does not apply to the present case, because the documents on which reliance is placed refer not to the 1/4th share of Kunhi Pakki but to the 3/16th share of Cheriamma which Kunhi Pakki subsequently obtained. He states that the latter conclusion is inescapable if Exs. P-59, P-60 and P-61 are read together. He submits that in these documents Kunhi Pakki no doubt connected the 3/16th share with Exs. P-2 and P-2(a) but treated his own 1/4th share separately."
In the case of State Of Rajasthan And Anr vs Surendra Mohnot And Ors (Civil Appeal Nos. 5860-5861 of 2014) reported in (2014) 14 SCC 77 at Paragraph 17 the Supreme Court held as follows:
"17. It is well settled in law that there can be no estoppel against law. Consent given in a court that a controversy is covered by a judgment which has no applicability whatsoever and pertains to a different field, cannot estopp the party from raising the point that the same was erroneously cited."
(emphasis added) In the case of Rajendra Jha vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in 1984 AIR 1696, 1985 SCR (1) 544, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"In order to get over these difficulties, it is urged by the appellant that there can be no estoppel against law and therefore, it is open to him to argue even at this stage that the Labour Court ought not to have passed the particular order. In support of this contention reliance is placed by the appellant on two judgments of this Court.
In Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapapa Subbanna, it was held by the majority that pure questions of law, not dependent on the determination of any questions of fact, should be allowed to be raised for the first time even at later stages of a litigation."
(emphasis added) It is, however, made clear that in the event the petitioners or the KMDA Authorities duly represented by the State Government, approach the next available Pay Commission for granting of MCAS benefits to employees of statutory corporation and other authorities similarly situated like the petitioners, the MCAS Authorities will do so in accordance with law and bearing in mind the principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
In view of the aforesaid, this Court is unable to grant any benefit to the petitioners and hence the writ petition does not succeed and is disposed of without any order.
There will be, however, no order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.
(Rajasekhar Mantha, J.)