Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Ko & In India vs Commissioner Of Customs And Excise, ... on 30 October, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(6)ALD496, 2002(1)ALT79, 2002(145)ELT38(AP)
JUDGMENT S.R. Nayak, J.
1. In both the writ petitions, the validity and legality of the seizure of certain goods intended to be exported to Libya is assailed. Hence both the writ petitions were clubbed and heard together and they are being disposed of by this common order.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of the writ petitions, as stated by the petitioner in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, be noticed briefly as under: One B.J. Jawahar is the Proprietor of the petitioner-proprietary concern and he has executed a General Power of Attorney on 20.7.2000 in favour of Mr. D.L.V.R. Murthy, son of late D.R.K. Prasad, who is presently said to be serving in the petitioner-proprietary concern as Senior Manager (Projects). These writ petitions are filed on behalf of the Proprietary concern represented by Mr. D.L.V.R. Murthy. The petitioner is engaged in import and export of the goods and is a merchant exporter. The petitioner's import and export code number is 099003387. The petitioner procures export orders from various countries including Libya. The petitioner negotiated with Aziz and Company, Libya for export of electroplating plant for Cadmium, Zinc, Nickel, Hardchrome and Aluminium anodisation (turn key) and etc. After negotiating with the foreign buyer, the importer had placed order dated 25.2.2001 for purchase of above plant for a GIF value of US $ 50,000. As per the agreement with the foreign buyer, the goods are to be shipped to Libya in the month of June 2001 and the foreign buyer had agreed to make 100% payment in advance. The petitioner after receiving the purchase order, procured the goods locally and goods were carted to Inland Container Depot (ICD), Sanathnagar, Hyderabad for the purpose of export. The goods are sought to be exported under shipping bill for export of duty-free goods. Therefore, the petitioner filed free shipping bill as required under Section 50 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, the Act) in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Inland Container Depot, Sanathnagar, Hyderabad, the 2nd respondent herein. As per the procedure envisaged under Section 51 of the Act, the petitioner filed shipping Bill No.003500 dated 22.6.2001 before the 2"d respondent along with necessary documents for the purpose of passing of the shipping bill. The Superintendent of Customs, who is incharge of passing of free shipping bills, had examined the documents and after satisfying himself that the goods are exportable under relevant export policy passed the shipping bill on 23.6.2001. The Agent of the petitioner presented the shipping bill along with the goods on 25.6.2001 for examination and giving let export order to the concerned officer for the purpose of stuffing the goods into the container for export. According to the petitioner, before the goods could be examined by the officer, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence working under the Deputy Director of DRI, the 1st respondent herein, came to the ICD, Sanathnagar and wanted to examine the goods. For the purpose of examination of the goods by the DRI, the petitioner was also called to be present. The petitioner was present at the ICD on the afternoon of 25.6.2001. The Superintendent of Custom along with DRI officers opened all the packages for the purpose of examination and the officers carried out 100% examination of the goods and the goods were found to be as per the declaration given on the shipping bill, invoice and packing list. During examination nothing objectionable was found nor the goods contained any prohibited articles. After completion of the examination, the goods were repacked and are in the custody of the custodian i.e., CONCOR. When the matters stood thus, the petitioner was called to the office of the 1st respondent on 26.6.2001 for the purpose of explaining the nature of the goods. The petitioner claims that he explained about the nature of the goods to the officer of the 1st respondent and submitted technical catalogue of the goods as sought for. The clearing agent of the petitioner approached the 2nd respondent for allowing export of the goods as the same are to be supplied urgently to the importer since 100% payment was received for the goods. The 2nd respondent did not give any answer. Therefore, the petitioner made a representation on 28.6.2001 to the 2nd respondent requesting to allow clearance of the goods. However, no reply was received from the 2nd respondent. This led to the petitioner making one more representation dated 30.6.2001 to the 2nd respondent bringing to his notice the delay in clearing the consignment for export and he sought to know the reasons as to why goods were being held up. The 2nd respondent by his letter C.No. 3500/22-6-2001 dated 30.6.2001 but signed on 2.7.2001 informed the petitioner that the 1st respondent had directed him to detain the consignment of the petitioner, but he refused to disclose the reasons as to why the consignment was detained. There afterwards, the petitioner approached the 1st respondent and gave a representation dated 3.7.2001 seeking reasons for detention of the goods. No response came from the 1st respondent. The petitioner after 3.7.2001 almost everyday went to the offices of the respondents 1 and 2 asking them to give clearance for export of the goods and to give reasons for detaining the consignment and since no reasons were given by respondents 1 and 2, except stating that they are looking into the matter and goods will be cleared shortly. In those circumstances, the petitioner personally met the Commissioner of Customs on 20.7.2001 and submitted a representation to him and the Commissioner promised to look into the matter. However, the consignment was not cleared. That led to the petitioner to file W.P. No. 15472 of 2001 before this Court on 27.7.2001 questioning the action of the respondents in detaining the goods without any reasons. The relief sought in the writ petition reads--
"...it is prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ declaring the action of the respondents in retaining the goods covered by shipping bill No. 003500 dated 22.6.2001 as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction and violative of petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and set aside the letter C.No. 3500/22.6.2001 dated 30.6.2001 issued by the 2nd respondent with all consequential benefits and to pass such other order, orders or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
3. The said writ petition was admitted on 9.8.2001 and it was adjourned from time to time at the behest of the Department to file counter. When the matters stood thus, on 17.8.2001, the petitioner received a call from the office of the 1st respondent and he was asked to come to ICD on 20.8.2001 at 11.00 am. Accordingly, the petitioner on 2.8.2001 went to the ICD and the officer of the 1st respondent was present. At that time the officer told the petitioner that they wanted to draw samples of chemicals from the consignment. The petitioner stated that since he was only a merchant exporter he does not know the procedure for drawing samples without diminishing the commercial value of the goods and also to ensure that the export-worthy packing is not damaged. In spite of this plea of the petitioner, the officer of the 1st respondent intimated the petitioner threatening that he could be prosecuted. Under those circumstances, the petitioner left the ICD and after he left, the 1st respondent called the CHA Mr. Srinivasa Murthy and threatened him with dire consequences unless he follows their threats. When Mr. C.T. Sudhakar, the Assistant Manager of the petitioner went to the ICD to deliver a letter at 3.00 p.m., the officers of the 1st respondent caught hold of him and he was not allowed to leave ICD despite many requests made by him and he was detained at ICD by the officers of the 1st respondent till 8.30 p.m. in the night and he was forced to sign on some papers. He was not allowed to telephone/contract his office or his superiors. He was also not allowed to read papers and he has no idea as to what do the papers contain. The DRI officers threatened/abused and used unparliamentary/ derogatory language against Mr. C.T. Sudhakar and the petitioner's concern. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner received the seizure panchanama dated 20.8.2001 by speed post on 23.8.2001. On receipt of the said panchanama, the petitioner came to know about the seizure of the goods. The petitioner so alleging has filed W.P. No. 18461 of 2001 assailing the validity and legality of the seizure effected vide panchanama dated 20.8.2001. The prayer in the writ petition reads--
".....it is prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or order (1) declaring the seizure effected vide panchanama dated 20.8.2001 as illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction, void abinitio and violative of petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,19(1)(g), 21 and 800A of the Constitution.
(2) To direct the respondents to allow the exports of goods covered by shipping bill No. 3500 dated 22.6.2001 with immediate effect;
(3) To allow the writ petition with all consequential benefits and to pass such other order, orders or directions as this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
4. Opposing the writ petitions, the respondents have filed counter affidavits. In the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No. 15472 of 2001, it is stated that specific intelligence was received by the Deputy Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Hyderabad, the third respondent in the writ petition, to the effect that M/s Anu Technological Services, D-47, Phase I, Industrial Development Area, Jeedimetla, Hyderabad were exporting goods to Libya in contravention of EXIM policy. On the basis of that information, enquiries were conducted and the outcome of those enquiries revealed that S.J. Jawahar, the Proprietor of the petitioner-concern was also effecting exports to Libya. It was further gathered that one consignment of the petitioner-concern entered for exportation to M/s Aziz & Co., Libya was lying at the ICD, Sanathnagar, Hyderabad. It is stated in the counter affidavit that on verification of the export documents, it was noticed that the consignment covered under shipping bill No. 003500 dated 22.6.2001 has been described as electroplating plant for Cadmium, Zinc, Nickel, Hardchrome, and Aluminium anodisation (turn key) containing various equipment and parts including laboratory reagents, salts, catalysts and compositions with a declared FOB value of Rs. 21,90,740/-, some of the items in the consignment are prohibited/restricted in terms of Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification and Appendix 37 of the EXIM Policy 1997-2002. The list of such items and their restrictions under the EXIM policy are set out in the counter affidavit. They are--
(a) Titanium heaters and titanium baskets restricted under Sr.No. 3A010 of SCOMET (Export of special chemicals, organisms, materials, equipment and technologies (articles made of titanium, uranium alloys) -Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(b) Nickel Anode plates, Nickel Additive and Nickel Carbonate are restricted as per entry 3D001 of SCOMET (Nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight: alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight) - Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(c) Safety Accessories appear to be restricted in terms of entry 3D002 of SCOMET (equipment related to P3, P4 facilities such as protective suits and class III safety cabinets) -Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(d) Filtering units with pump and frame also appear to be restricted as per the entry 3D001 of SCOMET (pumps made from nickel or alloy etc) -Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(e) Catalysts - export of prepared catalysts to Libya is prohibited under Appendix 37 of the EXIM policy.
5. In the counter affidavit filed in W.P.NO. 18461 of 2001, it is stated that the consignment lying at the Inland Container Depot, Hyderabad, belonging to the petitioner was seized under the panchanama dated 20.8.2001, on a reasonable belief that it contains some items which are prohibited or restricted for export as they are covered under 'SCOMET' i.e., Export of Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies as notified under the notification No. 5 (Re- 2000) 1997-2002 dated 31.3.2001 and hence they appear to be liable for confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962 read with Import Export Policy 1997-2002. It is further stated that samples of some chemicals were taken for examination and it is learnt that some of the chemicals are hazardous and requires technical person's help to draw the samples. The list of such items and their restrictions which appear to be covered under the notification are set out in the counter-affidavit and they are--
(a) Titanium heaters and titanium baskets appear to be restricted under Sr. No. 3A010 of SCOMET-Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(b) Nickel Anode plates, Nickel Additive and Nickel Carbonate appear to be restricted as per entry 3D001 of SCOMET (Nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight: alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight) - Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(c) Safety Accessories appear to be restricted in terms of entry 3D002 of SCOMET (equipment related to P3, P4 facilities such as protective suits and class III safety cabinets) -Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
(f) Filtering units with pump and frame also appear to be restricted as per the entry 3D001 of SCOMET (pumps made from nickel or alloy etc) -Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification.
6. Sri G. Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner with his usual persuation and tenacity would first contend that the necessary conditions precedent to invoke the power of seizure under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act do not exist when the goods were seized. Elaborating this contention, the learned Counsel would maintain that there existed no reason to believe that the goods sought to be exported to Libya by the petitioner are liable to confiscation under the Act. The learned Counsel would maintain that to wriggle out from a wrongful act committed by them and impugned in WP No. 15472 of 2001 and to give a colour of legality, they created grounds to seize the goods under a Panchanama on 20-8.2001. The learned counsel would condemn the impugned action of the respondents as the one tainted with legal mala fide. Further, the learned counsel would contend that the officer who has seized the goods should have filed counter affidavit and not others. The learned Counsel would next contend, even assuming that there existed reasonable ground to invoke the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act, that satisfaction is confined to only certain items as set out in the counter affidavit filed in W.P. No. 18461 of 2001 and that satisfaction itself would not be a justification to seize and detain the other goods. The learned counsel would point out that the goods sought to be exported to Libya consist of as many as 114 items and each of those goods is separately packed, valued and shown in the invoice and, therefore, there could not be any justification for the respondents not to clear the consignment for export except certain goods mentioned in the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No. 18461 of 2001. Lastly, the learned counsel would conclude that there is inordinate delay in conducting and concluding the enquiry.
7. On the other hand, Sri C.V. Ramulu, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Central Government would point out that the sole Proprietor of the petitioner-Proprietary concern Mr. B J. Jawahar, is not available in India for examination and is still in Libya; that the intelligence report received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relates to the security and defence of the country; that several items sought to be exported to Libya are prohibited goods and even other good are also accessory goods in production of defence materials. The learned Senior Standing Counsel would maintain that there was reasonable reason for invoking the power of seizure under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act. The learned Standing Counsel would point out that no mala fides are attributed to the officers of the 1st respondent and, therefore, the impugned action cannot be condemned as the one tainted by either legal mala fide or factual mala fide. The learned Senior Standing Counsel would also highlight the scope of judicial review in a matter like this. Meeting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that all items of goods sought to be exported to Libya cannot be seized, the learned Senior Standing Counsel would draw our attention to the provisions of Section 119 of the Act and would maintain that not only the goods which are liable to confiscation under the Act, but also any goods used for concealing such goods are also liable to be seized and confiscated. The learned counsel would maintain that under Sub-section (2) of Section 110 of the Act, the respondent-authorities have six (6) months time to complete the enquiry and pass appropriate order in confiscation proceedings and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is inordinate delay on the part of the department in conducting and completing the enquiry, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Senior Standing Counsel would rely on the Judgment in J.K.Bardolia Mills v. M.L. Khunger, Dy. Collector, , The Asst. Collector of Customs and Superintendent, Preventive Service Customs, Calcutta and Ors. v. Charan Das Malhotra, , Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and another, and Suresh Kumar Agarwal v. Collector of Customs, Madras, 1998 (103) ELT 18 (AP) in support of has submission.
8. The impugned seizure of the goods is effected under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act. It reads--
"110. Seizure of goods, documents and things (1) If the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under this Act, he may seize such goods:
Provided that where it is not practicable to seize any such goods, the proper officer may serve on the owner of the goods an order that he shall not remove, part with, or otherwise deal with the goods except with the previous permission of such officer."
9. The condition precedent to invoke the power of seizure under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 is that the appropriate officer should have reason to believe that goods sought to be seized are liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Act. The phrase "reason to believe" occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act fell for consideration in large number of cases. In Narayanappa and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, , the Supreme Court dealing with the power of Income Tax Officer in initiating proceedings under Section 34(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and interpreting the phrase "reason to believe" occurring in the section opined that formation of the belief is a condition precedent to exercise the power. At the same time, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe--
"....but the legal position is that if there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income Tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of underassessment, that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to issue the notice under Section 34. Whether these grounds are adequate or not is a matter for the Court to investigate. In other words, sufficiency of the grounds which induce the Income Tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue."
10. In Sheonath Singh v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, , the Supreme court observed thus--
"There can be no manner of doubt that the words, "reason to believe' 'suggest that the belief must be that of an honest 'and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the Income Tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. The Income Tax Officer would be acting without jurisdiction if the reason for his belief that the conditions are satisfied does not exist or is not material or relevant to the belief required by the section. The court can always examine this aspect though the declaration or sufficiency of the reasons for the belief cannot be investigated by the court."
In M.A. Rashid v. State of Kerala, , the Supreme Court held--
Where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when "they are satisfied" or when "it appears to them", or when "in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists; or when powers enable public authorities to take "such action as they think fit" in relation to a subject matter, the courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authority's opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated.
Where reasonable conduct is expected the criterion of reasonableness is not subjective, but objective. Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson said:
If there are reasonable grounds, the Judge has no further duty of deciding whether he would have formed the same belief any more than, if there is reasonable evidence to go to a jury, the Judge is concerned with whether he would have come to the same verdict. The onus of establishing unreasonableness, however, rests upon the person challenging the validity of the acts.
Administrative decisions in exercise of powers even if conferred in subjective terms are to be made in good faith on relevant consideration. The courts inquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself on the law or the facts in a material respect. The standard of reasonableness to which the administrative body is required to conform may range from the courts' own opinion of what is reasonable to the criterion of what a reasonable body might have decided. The courts will find out whether conditions precedent to the formation of the opinion have a factual basis."
11. In Rohtas Industries v. S.D.Agarwal and others, , an order under Section 237(b)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act for investigation of the affairs of the company was challenged on the ground that though the opinion of the Government is subjective, the existence of the circumstances is a condition precedent to the formation of the opinion. It was contended that the Court was not precluded from going behind the recitals of the existence of such circumstances in the order, but could determine whether the circumstances did in fact exist. The Supreme Court held that if the opinion of an administrative agency is the condition precedent to the exercise of the power, the relevant matter is the opinion of the agency and not the grounds on which the opinion is founded. If it is established that there were no materials at all upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion, the Court may infer that the authority passed the order without applying its mind. The opinion is displaced as a relevant opinion if it could not be formed by any sensible person on the material before him.
12. What emerges from the above noticed Judgments of the Apex Court is that the words 'reason to believe' occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act suggests that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person and formation of that belief should be grounded on good faith and it should not be a pretence or camouflage. Although the satisfaction to form the opinion is subjective in nature, that satisfaction should be based on objective consideration of all relevant materials and in forming the belief the officer should eschew all irrelevant considerations and materials. However, it is not permissible for the reviewing Court to go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of the materials on the basis of which the belief is formed by the officer. Therefore, the only question to be considered in the facts and circumstances of this case is whether in forming the opinion envisaged under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act, the Deputy Director, DRI, had before him some relevant materials to form the belief that the seized goods are liable to confiscation under the Act. As already pointed out that the sufficiency or adequacy of the materials on the basis of which he formed the opinion cannot be gone into while reviewing his action under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We have already set out the facts stated in the two counter affidavits above. On the basis of the intelligence report received by the DRI, Hyderabad, it is stated, on verification of the documents it was noticed that the consignment covered under shipping bill No. 003500 dated 22.6.2001 is described as electroplating plant for Cadmium, Zinc, Nickel, Hardchrome, and Aluminium anodisation (turn key) containing various equipment and parts including laboratory reagents, salts, catalysts and compositions with a declared FOB value of Rs. 21,90,240/-. It is also stated that some of the items in the consignment are prohibited/restricted in terms of Appendix 3 of ITC (HS) Classification and Appendix 37 of the EXIM policy 1997-2002. Whether all the goods or some of the goods sought to be exported are prohibited or restricted for export and whether they are covered under the SCOMET is yet to be finally determined and decided after conclusion of the enquiry and investigation under the Act. At the time of hearing, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for Government of India would tell us that samples from certain seized goods could not be drawn for examination, because they are hazardous and samples could be drawn only by expert technical persons and such experts from Defence Ministry, New Delhi are likely to visit Hyderabad within a week or two to take up that job. According to the DRT, the material collected by them including the samples would show that some of the goods sought to be exported to Libya are prohibited/restricted for export. Therefore, it cannot be said that in forming the belief that the seized goods are liable to confiscation under the Act, the Deputy Director; DRI, had no relevant materials before him. There existed relevant materials on the basis of which he formed the opinion to seize the goods by virtue of the power granted under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act and, therefore, it cannot be said that the belief formed by the Deputy Director, DRI, is based on extraneous considerations or irrelevant materials. However, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no justification for the respondents to seize and detain all the goods sought to be exported to Libya, particularly having regard to the fact that even according to the respondents only certain goods are prohibited/restricted for export and not all the goods and, therefore, there cannot be any legitimate objection for the respondents to permit export of those goods which are not prohibited/restricted for export. Countering this contention of the teamed counsel for the petitioner, what the learned Senior Standing Counsel for Government of India would contend is that even the other goods, sought to be exported to Libya, are intended to be used as subsidiary goods in the production of defence materials and, therefore, even the remaining goods cannot be permitted to be exported unless the enquiry, which is set in motion, is completed and the real nature of all the goods is ascertained conclusively. We find force in this contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for Government of India. If after necessary enquiry and investigation it is found that even those goods which are not prohibited/restricted for export are intended to be used as subsidiary goods in the manufacture or production, of prohibited goods, like defence materials, it cannot be said that the DRI authorities would be acting illegally and unjustly in not permitting such goods for export pending enquiry. Be that as it may, as often said and reiterated by the Constitutional Courts, while reviewing the administrative and statutory actions of the public authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot assume the role of an appellate Court or authority. Judicial Review is not against the decision as such, but only against the decision making. This Court cannot dissect each and every materials which has gone into the decision making, in the instant case, in forming the belief envisaged under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act, with a surgeon's scissors and with microscopic review of the facts and circumstances in order to placate the apprehended flaw or irregularity in the formation of the belief. That is exactly what the learned counsel for the petitioner attempted before us. This Court is not the fact finding authority in a matter like this. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties for a considerable time and perusing the entire records placed before us, we are satisfied that the belief formed by the Deputy Director, DRI, in seizing the goods is bonafide and is intended to subserve the statutory objectives for which the power is granted to him under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act. However, the DRI authorities cannot take their own sweet time to conduct and complete the enquiry. It is expected of them to conduct and complete the enquiry with diligence and promptitude. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for Government of India, drawing our attention to Sub-section (2) of Section 110 of the Act, would maintain that the Department has time to conduct and complete the enquiry within a period of six months from the date of seizure of the goods and that period is not yet expired in the instant case. The learned Senior Standing Counsel would submit that since the goods involved are hazardous in nature, samples from them could be drawn only by experts in the field and at a considerable cost and since the said course of action requires administrative sanction at a higher level, considerable time is required for completing the investigation in the enquiry. Although, we appreciate the circumstances stated by the learned Standing Counsel, nevertheless, we are of the considered opinion that ends of justice would be met by directing the respondent-authorities to conduct and complete the enquiry and pass appropriate orders within a timeframe, keeping in mind the competing claims of the petitioner and the public interest.
13. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we dispose of the writ petitions directing the respondents to conduct and complete the enquiry initiated in pursuance of the seizure of the goods and pass appropriate final orders within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.