Bombay High Court
Neo Capricorn Plaza Private Limited vs Inter Continenatal Hotels Group (Asia ... on 29 January, 2021
Author: G.S. Patel
Bench: G.S. Patel
20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
Atul
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMM ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 9427 OF 2020
Neo Capricon Plaza Pvt Ltd ...Petitioner
Versus
Intercontinental Hotels Group (Asia Pacific) Pvt ...Respondent
Ltd Mr Navroz Seervai, Senior Advocate, i/b Amey R Deshpande, for the Petitioner.
Mr Janak Dwarkadas, Senior Advocate, with Ameya Gokhale, Ila Kapoor, Vaibhav Singh, Ananya Aggarwal, Gourav Mohanty, & Surabhi Lal, i/b Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., for the Respondent.
CORAM: G.S. PATEL, J
DATED: 29th January 2021
PC:-
Atul G. 1. This is a Petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Kulkarni Digitally signed by Conciliation Act 1996. Between the parties there is a Hotel Atul G. Kulkarni Date: 2021.02.01 Management Agreement ("HMA") dated 26th May 2016. A copy of 10:37:25 +0530 this is at Exhibit 'A' from page 26.
2. While I will need to return to some of the provisions of this contract a little later, for the immediate purpose of setting out the arbitration provision, clause 18 is relevant. Clause 18.1 says that the Page 1 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX governing law is Indian law. Clause 18.2 provides for a dispute resolution mechanism. The dispute is to be resolved in accordance with SIAC Rules. The Arbitral Tribunal is to comprise three Arbitrators, one by each party and the third by the two nominee Arbitrators. The place of arbitration is to be SIAC in Mumbai. The clause also says that these provisions do not prevent either side from seeking injunctive relief in Courts of competent jurisdiction in India.
3. The property in question is a hotel known as Crowne Plaza City Centre at Bund Garden Road, Pune. The Petitioner ("Neo Capricorn") owns this hotel. The 1st Respondent is the Intercontinental Hotels Group (Asia Pacific) Pvt Ltd, a foreign entity ("ICH Group"). It is an international hotel management company. Respondent No. 2 is the Intercontinental Hotels Group (India) Pvt Ltd ("ICH India"), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Respondent No. 1. In the rest of this order, I use "Intercontinental" to refer to both Respondents, where this is convenient and appropriate.
4. The Crowne Plaza in Pune was earlier under the management of the Marriott Group of Hotels. In 2016, Neo Capricorn and Intercontinental were in discussions about the latter taking over the management of the Bund Garden hotel. Neo Capricorn decided to replace Marriott Group with the Intercontinental as the manager. This led to the HMA of 26th May 2016. The agreement defines the 2nd Respondent, ICH India, as the manager. The owner is Neo Capricorn. The ICH Group is said to be the licensor, evidently meaning that ICH India is its licensee for the purposes of this HMA.
Page 2 of 1929th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
5. The agreement has very many provisions, not all of which are relevant for our purposes today. Indeed the entire dispute in this Section 9 Petition relates to only one aspect, namely, the closure by the Respondents of the online booking system and the imposition of what is known as a Closed To Arrival ("CTA"). This is effectively an embargo on online bookings/reservations systems, meaning that any attempt to make a booking online returns a message that online bookings are unavailable, and the hotel is closed for online bookings. It does not seem to matter whether an attempted online booking is made directly on the dedicated website or through one or more of the third-party online travel services such as makemytrip.com, Trivago, Expedia, Booking.com, etc. All of them return the same result.
6. That this is the principle issue is evident from prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the Section 9 Petition:
"(a) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the arbitration proceedings that will commence between the parties, this Hon'ble Court by its order be pleased to direct the Respondents to revoke the suspension of the reservation system and/or to change the status of the Hotel from "Closed to Arrival" to "Open";
(b) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the arbitration proceedings that will commence between the parties, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to by its order and injunction restrain the Respondents from continuing with the suspension of the reservation system and/or showing the status of the Respondents from Close to Arrival'
(c) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the arbitration proceedings that will commence between the parties, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the Page 3 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX Respondents to disclose on oath and provide copies of the account's statements in relation to the said Hotel for the period from April 2020 to December 2020 as also all balance sheets, ledgers, statements of assets and liabilities, income and expenditure for the period commencing from January 2020 to till date;"
7. The contract does provide that Intercontinental (India) is to receive a license fee, a defined percentage of the adjusted gross revenue. The Respondents were to manage the day-to-day operations of the Crowne Plaza at Bund Garden Road. The owner that has certain funding obligations.
8. This is clear from a very quick look at the agreement itself. Clause 1.1 tells us that the purpose of the agreement is to define the terms and conditions under which ICH India, on Neo Capricorn's behalf, would manage the hotel. That Neo Capricorn is the owner is not in doubt. As an owner, it has certain obligations including spending on renovations and so on. The running of the hotel requires that a reservation system, a property management system, a sales and a catering system be put in place. These are defined in Schedule 5 and Neo Capricorn is to obtain a license and have these systems installed. Obviously, what the Respondents bring to this agreement is the value of their brand and its 'brand equity'.
9. Clause 4 of the agreement requires the establishment of a bank account and says that all revenue from hotel operations are to be deposited in a special corporate bank account called the Owner's Corporate Bank Account. The next clause says that all expenses in relation to the hotel are to be paid from a dedicated expense bank Page 4 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX account which is to be operated by Neo Capricorn known as the Expense Bank Account. Clause 4.2(b) then tells us that the corporate account must at all time guarantee continuous availability of funds into the expense bank account in line with historic expense trends or expense budget estimates. This, Mr Dwarkadas for the Respondents is at some pains to point out, is specifically expressed to be a fundamental and material obligation of Neo Capricorn. Its further obligation is to ensure that the expense bank account has an unconditional revolving overdraft credit of Rs. 1.5 crores. This overdraft is to be established before the contractually defined commencement date. There are the usual provisions for record keeping and so on.
10. Clause 15.4 deals with suspension of system. The system itself is defined in the contract and I will take this to include, as I believe it indeed must, the online booking system. Indeed, in clause 3.8 there is a specific provision that the manager, i.e. the Respondents must procure access to the reservation system. Now clause 15.4 is part of the general clause 15 that deals with termination. Clause 15.1 speaks of bankruptcy and insolvency, with which we are not concerned. Clause 15.2 deals with a material breach and how it is to be cured, if capable of being cured. Then clause 15.4 deals with a 'suspension of the system'. This must necessarily include a suspension of the reservation system. For completeness, I will reproduce clauses 15.2 and 15.4:
"15.2 Material breach If either party commits a material breach of this Agreement, the other party may terminate this Agreement at the Page 5 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX expiration of thirty (30) days after giving written notice to the party which committed the breach PROVIDED the breach has not been remedied or the defaulting party has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the non-defaulting party within such thirty (30) day period that it has taken appropriate steps to cure the default and is working diligently to complete such cure within a period satisfactory to the non- defaulting party, acting reasonably.
However, if the default is not capable of being cured, the non-defaulting party may serve a notice on the defaulting party providing details of the alleged default and specifying an amount of compensation, to be paid to the non-defaulting party within sixty (60) days after the non-defaulting party's serving the notice on the defaulting party, for which the non- defaulting party is willing to settle the default. If such sicty (60) day period expires without the non-defaulting party receiving the compensation required in its notice or adequate compensation to the reasonable satisfaction of the non-
defaulting party, then at any time within six (6) months of the date of expiration of such sixty (60) day period, (or within one (1) month if such sixty (60) days preiod expires at a time less than six (6) months prior to the Expected Completion Date as provided in Item 6 of the Details), the non-defaulting party has the right to terminate this Agreement by notice to the defaulting party.
15.4 Suspension of System In addition to any other rights and entitlements of Manager under this Agreement, where Owner has been given notice by Manager pursuant to clause 15.2 that it is in material breach of its obligations under this Agreement and such material breach continues to subsist thirty (30) days after the date of Manager's notice, then Manager may also have the option to suspend without further notice to Owner the Page 6 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX Hotel's access to the Reservation System and any other of the services of the System until such time as Owner's breach has been rectified. Owner shall continue paying the System Fund Contributions in accordance with this Agreement during such suspension period. Suspension of the System pursuant to this clause 15.4 shall not impede any of the other rights of Manager under and arising out of this Agreement."
11. What seems to have happened is this. The pandemic of March- April 2020 resulted in a nation-wide lock down. Even at that time, there was a move that many hotels should be adapted to serve as the quarantine centres to supplement municipal and local authority facilities. Neo Capricorn suggested that a CTA be imposed. This was done. The hotel was not conducting business in terms of the guidelines. A copy of Neo Capricorn's email of 10th April 2020 is at Exhibit 'B' to the Petition.
12. Around 1st June 2020, the State Government allowed a partial reopening of restaurants. The case of the Petitioners is that Intercontinental lifted the CTA on 1st June 2020 only to shut it down five days later on 6th June 2020. This second CTA imposition was not at Neo Capricorn's request at all.
13. Around August 2020, hotels were allowed to resume normal operations. The Petitioner asked for a resumption of the online reservation system. Intercontinental declined and now claimed that the Petitioner was 'in material breach'; and that until the Petitioner not only cured those alleged defaults but also complied with some internal self-audit and self-certification process, the CTA would not and could not be lifted.
Page 7 of 1929th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
14. There are all kinds of other allegations made in the Petition with which I am not concerned. The short question that presents itself is this. Is there or is there not a contractual provision for imposing the CTA? If so, how is that CTA to be regulated? What are the terms and conditions under which it can be operated? When is it to be lifted, and by whom?
15. In answer to my questions, Mr Dwarkadas could only point me to clause 15.4. He did also refer to some correspondence, including Intercontinental's Advocates' letter of 18th November 2020 (Petition page 149) to say that the Petitioner is in default at two levels. First, it has not paid some outstanding claims of the Intercontinental Group; second, it has failed to maintain funds in the expense bank account and the minimum balance required.
16. This does not answer my question at all. The question was specific. It was as to what contractual provision permitted the CTA to begin with; and since the Intercontinental insisted on this process of self-audit and self-certification, where in the contract might I find those provisions. There is indeed no such provision for the latter part and none is shown to me. There is admittedly in this Advocate's correspondence a demand by the Intercontinental for payment of an amount of over Rs. 8.3 crores as licensing fee. Then there is a demand at an earlier point that the Intercontinental has suffered a cash loss of Rs. 50 crores. But what emerges from this is that the imposition of the CTA ostensibly under clause 15.4 is being operated entirely -- or at least substantially -- outside any contractual regulations or controlling mechanism. When does it start? How long is it to last? What are the terms on which it could be re-imposed? If this is to be a Page 8 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX unilateral right given to the Intercontinental under the agreement in question, then the agreement must say so. It is not something that can be assumed and there is no implicit assumption possible that clause 15.4 allows the Respondents to impose a CTA whenever it likes, for whatever duration it likes and on such terms as it likes.
17. Mr Dwarkadas submits that there is no denial of indebtedness because paragraph 8 of the Affidavit in Reply remains without a traverse. Deservedly so, because paragraph 8 of the Reply says nothing at all that is specific and is couched in only generalities, about general amounts allegedly due and regular emails being sent as follow up. The Rejoinder in fact is a lot more specific than the Reply. In paragraph 5 of the Rejoinder, Neo Capricorn points out that it has in fact transferred Rs 13 crores into the contractually mandated accounts. It is to this in the Rejoinder that there is simply no answer. Indeed, there can be none because the fact of the transfer is hardly something that can be controverted. It is a matter of banking records and is easily established.
18. But what is particularly telling is what happened in Court after the hearing began.
19. Yesterday Mr Seervai handed up some printouts of emails. I did not permit this because Mr Dwarkadas was at the hearing online and did not have advantage of these. They had not been sent in advance to his Attorneys. I required these emails to be put on Affidavit. Neo Capricorn has done this by a very short Affidavit of Page 9 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX one Deepak Raheja and what that Affidavit says in paragraphs 2 and 3 simply needs to be reproduced without annexures:
"2. Then I further states to my shock and surprise, bookings for period from April 2021 were available. I further sates that immediately thereafter I requested my son Aditya Raheja to try and book the same online through IHG website and he accordingly requested to his acquaints to try the bookings post April through IHG Site. I further state that accordingly his acquaints namely Mr Ravi Rudramurthy and Mr Rudresh Nagaraj tried the same and was successfully able to do the booking for the month of May 2021 and they both done the booking for 22nd to 23rd may 2021 and Mr Sikander Elahi made booking for 4th and 5th June 2021 from the said site of IHG, and they all have sent me the booking details.
3. I further state that to verify the same again, I asked Mr Pradhan Ganpathy who is Senior manager of the Hospitality Division of Petitioner to make an online reservation and he has accordingly made booking in the name of Mrs Vijaya Menon who is his wife and he successfully booked from 12th April to 13th April and one more Mr Manjunath Muniappa who booked for period of 10th to 11th April 2021 and they both have forwarded the same to me on my Email which "[email protected]". Hereto annexed and marked as Annexure "A1 to A5" are the booking details forwarded to me by all those persons."
20. The long and short of this is that Neo Capricorn has found that for no reason anyone can tell, the presently ongoing CTA block is operative only until early-April and that from about 10th April 2021, online bookings are regularly available. Who has decided this and why, when, and in what manner is unclear.
Page 10 of 1929th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
21. Mr Dwarkadas's Attorneys have filed a response Affidavit of one Sudeep Jain. This is supposedly in response to the Additional Affidavit of the Petitioners. Regrettably, this Affidavit does not leave much to be desired. It leaves everything to be desired. Paragraphs 3 to 6 at pages 415 to 416 read thus:
"3. I further state that the Petitioner has filed an affidavit dated 28 January 2021 enclosing certain copies of booking details made online for Crowne Plaza Pune City Centre ("Hotel") for 10-11 April 2021, 12-13 April 2021, 22-23 May 2021 and 4-5 June 2021. In the affidavit, the Petitioner has alleged that ' the blocking of online reservation under guise by the Respondents from 6th June 2020 till end of March 2021 is illegal and nothing but a arm twisting technics adopted by the Respondents to harm the Petitioner'. I completely and vehemently deny this allegation made by the Petitioner.
4. I state that if any hotel managed by the Respondents is required to be put on CTA, it is done so for a specific time period, which means that the System records the date from when the hotel has been put on CTA and also a date till when it will remain on CTA. I further state that the CTA status of the hotel is reviewed periodically and if the conditions to change the status to 'Open', i.e. self-audit, self-certification etc., have not been met the CTA status period is further extended.
5. I state that while the hotel is on CTA, online bookings will not be available for that particular time period, however guests can make bookings for the period after the CTA status expires. Therefore, if the hotel is on CTA till 30 January 2021, then guests will be able to make bookings for February 2021 and thereafter.Page 11 of 19
29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
6. In the present case, the Hotel was put on CTA on 10 April 2020, on the request of the Petitioner. I further state that this status was initially until May 2020. However, since the Hotel has continued to fail to meet the minimum requirements necessary to change the status to 'Open', the CTA status of the Hotel has been extended multiple times and is currently valid up till 31 March 2021. I state that at the next periodical review, this date will be extended if the Hotel has not by then met the minimum requirements."
22. Now, of this, the less said the better. It is abundantly clear now, that at any given time, the CTA is only what Intercontinental wants to make of it. Even a lockdown declared by a Government has a defined and publicly known end date. This CTA-lockdown does not. Intercontinental can impose it whenever it likes, without citing to 15.4, without any contractually stipulated notice (a matter to which I will soon turn), without specifying an end date, and during the continuance of which it can continuously raise additional unspecified demands not to be found in the contract at all, including self-audit, self-certification etc.
23. The CTA is thus something of a work in progress. Like a giraffe, it is difficult to describe, but one knows it when one sees it. That is all that can be said about this CTA. Where something as severe as a CTA is sought to be deployed in the context of a commercial contract, it must be backed by clear and unambiguous contractual provisions. It cannot be something of this hazy, impressionistic quality, where only one party invokes it, entirely extra-contractually. My repeated questions as to the terms and the Page 12 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX contractual provisions -- the consensus ad idem -- about this CTA have gone unanswered.
24. But what Intercontinental entirely misses is that the contractual provision in clause 15.4 is not some standalone blanket authority. It is tied hands and foot to a preceding clause 15.2, and clause 15.2, dealing with a material breach, requires notice to be given cure an alleged default. Obviously, this means that before a system suspension can be effected -- and everyone agrees that the CTA is a system suspension -- there must be a curative notice in accordance with the contract. If the breach is, as Mr Dwarkadas now contends, material or incurable, then distinct consequences follow under the second part of clause 15.2. In no situation can there be a direct system suspension without a notice. Anticipating the response to this: this is a prima facie view, although I do not see why it should be because the contract must be plainly read to mean what it says.
25. If the Respondents are, therefore, unable to show any contractual basis to their imposition or continuance of the CTA, then an inevitable result must follow. The first CTA was, as it were, on request. Every subsequent CTA has been one-sided, unilateral and without contractual foundation.
26. Then there is this one telling circumstance, to which there is simply no cogent answer. For, oddly enough, Intercontinental has no problem at all allowing walk-in guests to take up as many rooms in the hotel as required. Mr Dwarkadas's submission on instructions that the online system is necessary so that the hotel can make the Page 13 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX necessary arrangements for air-conditioning, house-keeping etc does not stand commend itself. If there is no limit on the number of an unannounced walk-in guests who can be accommodated, obviously the entire hotel is kept running and in working condition. The purpose of the online system is not to enable or disable facilities, or to extend them as required, but is a courtesy to visitors to make the booking experience simpler. In the days before the internet and online facilities being available, bookings were made only by walk-in or by contacting the hotel and making the necessary request. The logical fallacy is this: if the hotel has, say, 80 rooms, and there are 80 walk- ins on any given date, even according to Intercontinental, all 80 can and will be accommodated and given rooms. But if there are only 40 walk-ins, the remaining 40 rooms cannot be serviced by online reservations because this would, according to Intercontinental, impose an additional burden on running the hotel. This is simply untenable. It does not stand to reason.
27. In this context paragraph 9 of the Affidavit in Reply at page 168 makes for the most interesting reading. This is what it says:
9. In March 2020, there was a lockdown announced in India, due to the wide spread of COVID-19 . Dueto this lockdown, several hotels, managed by the Respondents, requested them to initiate a 'Closed to Arrival' ("CTA") status on the IHG System to avoid being converted into quarantine centres during the outbreak. By this status no bookings could be made at these Hotels online, either through the IHG Reservation System or through third party websites such as Makemytrip, Booking.com etc. Once the CTA status was initiated, in order to change the status back to 'Open', all hotels would have to undergo a self-audit Page 14 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX and self-certification process, where they are required to certify, inter alia, whether "working capital based on cash flow forecast are in place" and "all outstanding IHG payables and payment plan is in place and approved by the Head of Operations and Finance". These are basic conditions, which the Hotel would have to fulfil so that it can re-open and be able to function smoothly and efficiently as a hotel managed under the Brand. It is important to note that a change of status to CTA is completely different from suspension of the System, where the Hotel cannot accept any reservations at all either on the IHG System or on third party websites. Moreover, the Hotel will not be found on any online searches. On the contrary when the status is changed to CTA, it will still be able to accept walk-in guests and banquets are still allowed to function.
(Emphasis added)
28. This raises more questions than it answers. Let us take the emphasized portions one by one.
(a) The claim that lifting the CTA requires that "all hotels would have to undergo a self-audit and self-certification process" is traceable to no portion or provision of the HMA. None can be shown to me, and I have asked repeatedly. Therefore, this condition is entirely outside the HMA, the contract in question.
(b) If the self-audit and self-certification are "basic conditions" the hotel must fulfil, then the contract must say so. These conditions cannot be unilaterally imposed.
They cannot be invented when one party thinks fit. These cannot be constantly shape-shifting provisions, the goalposts constantly moving. Nor can they be used Page 15 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX to satisfy the demand of one side, even a financial demand. Any such demand requires adjudication, and the demand itself cannot be enforced by what is, to all intents and purposes, a throttling provision entirely in the hands of one party. Any such provision must be rooted in contract, showing the agreement of both sides to it, and it must have clearly-defined boundaries and contours.
(c) The last portion, distinguishing the CTA from a contractually-contemplated System Suspension, really puts the matter beyond the pale. As I noted, when I asked Mr Dwarkadas to show me a contractual provision for a CTA, he pointed me to Clause 15.4, the provision for a System Suspension. But his clients' own affidavit says that a CTA is not a System Suspension and therefore does not come under Clause 15.4 at all. In short, there is no contractual provision for the CTA at all, and there is a fatal logical inconsistency between the assertion on affidavit, the actual deployment of the CTA and the justification in arguments.
(d) The last argument, that the Suspension is a wholesale, as it were, 'lockdown', with the hotel being entirely off- grid and a CTA, which permits only walk-ins and banquets, does not stand to reason, as I have noted in the previous paragraph. The word 'banquet' also suggests an advance intimation and booking. In other words, a 'walk-in' can make an advance booking for a banquet. Nobody can possibly rustle up a 'banquet' without Page 16 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX advance notice, at least not without doing very considerable violence to the language, to say nothing of the food. That in turn suggests that a walk-in is not limited to make an immediate booking, but may also make an advance booking. The only segment to which this is denied is the online visitor. The reason to do this is in fact provided in paragraph 9 itself. It is to ensure that bookings are kept as low as possible, to minimize the earned revenue, and this is to continue until Intercontinental's unilateral demands are satisfied.
29. There are thus wide -- and apparently irreconcilable -- inconsistencies in the Respondents' justifications for their CTA actions.
30. In a Section 9 Petition, this is more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The other tests of balance of convenience and irretrievable prejudice more or less answers itself.
31. Returning to the prayer, I cannot of course find reason to grant the order in terms of prayer clause (c). Prayer clause (b) is one that will need to be pressed before the Arbitral Tribunal. In the meantime, however, there will need to be an interim order in terms of prayer clause (a). The Respondents will lift the CTA forthwith.
32. I am informed that it is the Respondents that have invoked arbitration. So much the better. They will undoubtedly nominate their Arbitrator and the Petitioners will do likewise. If there is any Page 17 of 19 29th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX default in this, liberty to the parties to file an appropriate Application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.
33. It only needs to be clarified that it is open to the Petitioners to seek the relief in terms of prayer clauses (b) and (c) in arbitration notwithstanding the present order, just as it is open to the Respondents to make out a case in arbitration for both interim and final relief.
34. This order will continue until the disposal of a Section 17 application by the arbitral tribunal that is yet to be constituted. Either side may seek relief in a proceeding under Section 17 including without limitation for a continuation or confirmation of this order, or for it being modified or even vacated.
35. What remains is to chant the usual mantra: all contentions are left open in arbitration. All views expressed are prima facie only for the purposes of this Section 9 petition.
36. The Section 9 Petition is disposed of in these terms.
37. Notwithstanding this disposal, if parties are able to settle their disputes and arrive at any compromise or settlement -- which I encourage them to do -- and should that settlement or compromise require an order of this Court, liberty to either side to circulate the matter for a listing for that purpose.
Page 18 of 1929th January 2021 20-CARBPL9427-2020.DOCX
38. The costs of this Petition may be recovered in arbitration along with interest as permissible in law.
39. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary of this Court. All concerned will act on production of a digitally signed copy of this order.
(G. S. PATEL, J) Page 19 of 19 29th January 2021