Madras High Court
L. Jegannath And J. Thulasidaran vs The Land Acquisition Officer And ... on 3 April, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(2)CTC809, (2006)3MLJ196
Author: K. Mohan Ram
Bench: D. Murugesan, K. Mohan Ram
ORDER K. Mohan Ram, J.
Page 1267
1. The above Review Applications have been filed to review the order dated 05.03.2003 passed in CMP Nos. 648 and 759 of 2003 in A.S.Nos.132 and 133 of 2001 respectively.
2. The brief facts of the case, as pleaded by the Review Applicants are as follows:
(i) One Mr. M.Kullamma Naicker owned 445 acres in Balasamudhram Village, Palani Taluk. On 23.12.1959 he sold the lands to M/s. Narendra Diary Farm Private Limited, the fifth Respondent herein for a total consideration of Rs. 1,75,000/-. But only a sum of Rs. 10,000/- alone was paid and the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,65,000/- was withheld as unpaid sale consideration. On 30.03.1960, the fifth respondent herein, re-conveyed 31.79 acres out of 445 acres for Rs. 16,000/- and the said sum of Rs. 16,000/- was adjusted out of the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 1,65,000/-. The remaining amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- was the unpaid sale consideration. According to the Review Applicants, after the death of Kullamma Naicker, the Review Applicants, as his legal heirs, continued in possession and the fifth respondent company passed a resolution to that effect on 27.07.1969.
Page 1268
(ii) On 29.04.1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu initiated Land Acquisition Proceedings for the construction of a dam over a river and issued notice under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act to the Review Applicants, which according to the Review Applicants was issued, as the applicants were persons interested in possession. According to the Review Applicants, the Tamil Nadu Government took possession from them on 01.03.1972 and between 1972 and 1988, they sent several representations seeking compensation.
(iii) It is their further case that the Government allowed the acquisition proceedings to lapse. Thereafter in 1990 the Government of Tamil Nadu initiated fresh land acquisition proceedings but no notice was given to the Review Applicants. But notice was given only to the fifth respondent company and awards were passed in Award Nos. 8 and 9 on 10.02.1993. On a reference sought for by the contesting respondents herein, the same was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Sub-Court, Palani in LAOP Nos. 6 and 7 of 1996 and in the year 2001 the Court enhanced the compensation. The Government of Tamil Nadu filed A.S.Nos.132 and 133 of 2001 against the judgment and Decree passed in LAOP Nos. 6 and 7 of 1996 and the appeals are pending before this Court.
(iv) The Review Applicants filed CMP Nos. 648 and 759 of 2003 to implead them as parties in the said appeals on the basis that they are persons interested as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. By a common order dated 05.03.2003 the Division Bench dismissed CMP Nos. 648 and 759 of 2003. The above Review Applications are filed to review the above said order dated 05.03.2003. While dismissing the impleading petitions the Division Bench in Paragraphs 9 and 10 has observed as follows:-
9. When possession was taken from the petitioners and the dam was constructed thereafter, the petitioners' possessory right is lost. The claim of the petitioners is that they were in possession of the land under acquisition only in lieu of the interest on the unpaid sale consideration. When the petitioners had only a lien over the unpaid sale consideration, they can proceed against the property only in respect of such claim alone. In the case of compulsory acquisition by invoking the powers of the eminent domain, the land vests with the Government or the requisitioning body, free of all encumbrances. In such circumstance, definitely the petitioner cannot have any right over the land. To exercise their right to recover the unpaid sale consideration, they need not be impleaded as party/respondents in these appeal, as they have no say in the quantum of compensation which is the subject matter of the appeals. The petitioners can recover the unpaid sale consideration by initiating the proceedings against the respondents. As the petitioners have no right or title in respect of the property under acquisition, as stated already, they have no say in respect of the quantum of compensation. When that be so, the Government cannot be forced to face the proceeding by impleading the petitioners as party/respondents.
Page 1269
10. Even assuming the petitioners have got any right in the compensation, the appeals are arising out of a reference under Section 18 of the said Act and as such the petitioners cannot be impleaded in this proceeding. It is obvious that there must be a claim of the petitioners under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The reference under Section 18 cannot be converted into one of the reference under Section 30 of the said Act to decide the inter se dispute between the conflicting claims or to determine the share. There should be a separate proceeding in respect of the same and on this ground also the petitioners cannot be impleaded in these appeals.
3. Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Division Bench having factually found that possession was taken by the Government from the Review Applicants, ought not to have dismissed the impleading petitions. The order suffers from the following errors:-
i) That the error in the order is apparent when the Division Bench observed that the petitioners were nowhere in the picture after they gave possession to the Government.
ii) The finding that the petitioners lost their possessory right is also an error apparent in law.
iii) The finding that the petitioners are having only the lien over the sale consideration is a further error apparent in law. Section 55(4)(b) of Transfer of Property Act creates a charge over the property for the unpaid purchase money. Therefore the petitioners are in a position of a mortgagee/charge-holder and they have interest over the property. Further, the fact that the property was put in possession of the petitioners in lieu of interest is not in dispute. Therefore, the Court was in error in holding that the petitioner had only a lien over the unpaid sale consideration, as the question of lien over unpaid sale consideration does not arise. According to the Learned Senior counsel the consideration itself is payable to the petitioners, and therefore, there is no question of having a lien over their own money.
iv) The finding that the petitioners cannot have any right over the land and that they need not be impleaded to exercise their right to recover the unpaid sale consideration is an error apparent in law. The petitioners have proceeded on the basis that as persons having a charge over the property they are persons interested and therefore entitled to claim compensation as persons interested. The petitioners are not claiming any right over the land acquired by the Government, but are entitled to claim compensation as persons interested and therefore entitled to notice.
v) The finding that the petitioners cannot be impleaded in the proceedings arising out of a reference under Section 18 is an error in law. The question of Section 30 will arise only after determining compensation under Section 18. In the present case, there is no dispute that possession was taken from the petitioners in 1972 and there is no dispute that the petitioners have the charge over the property at the time when the possession was taken by the Government.
Page 1270
4. Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, Learned Senior Counsel referred to Sections 55(4)(b) and 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and relied upon (M.A.Khan v. P.J. Surana). The following passages from the judgment was relied upon, viz., A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. When the seller and buyer are both willing to perform their respective parts of the contract but the specific performance of the contract has become impossible by the unexpected interference by the State in acquiring the property, the buyer will be entitled to recover from the seller any purchase money properly paid together with interest and also earnest with interest and to that extent he would have had under Section 55(6)(b) of T.P.Act a charge on the land. However, as the land is no more available to the parties as the State has acquired it and by deciding its compensation has converted the property into a sum certain, the buyer would be entitled to claim from the compensation amount, which represents the converted form of property, his purchase money and earnest together with interest. It is in this sense that the buyer whose contract is frustrated has a claim or share in the compensation which becomes payable to the owner of the property by reason of the acquisition thereof.
Section 3(b) does not require that a person for being interested must have an interest in the compensation which has become payable on account of the acquisition of the land. Under the definition of Section 3(b) such buyer would be undoubtedly a person interested as he can claim the amount advanced by him together with interest from the land and in the absence of the land from the money which represents the converted value of that land.
Relying upon the above said decision, the Learned Senior counsel submitted that the same principle applies to a case covered by Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act also.
The Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao) and more specifically to paragraphs 41 and 42, which reads as follows:
41. Clause(b) extracted above provides that where the ownership of the property is transferred to the buyer before payment of the whole of the sale price, the vendor is entitled to a charge on that property for the amount of the sale price as also for interest thereon from the date of delivery of possession.
42. This clause obviously applies to a situation where the ownership in the property has passed to the buyer before the whole of the purchase money was paid to the seller or the vendor. What is Page 1271 contained in this clause is based on the English doctrine of equitable lien as propounded by Baron Rolfe in Goode v. Burton. This clause confers statutory recognition on the English doctrine of equitable lien. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Webb v. Macpherson the statutory charge under this paragraph is inflexible. The charge does not entitle the seller to retain possession of the property as against the buyer but it positively gives him a right to enforce the charge by suit. (See: Venkataperumal Naidu v. M. Rathnasabhapathi Chettiar; Shobhalal Shyamlal Kurmi v. Sidhelal Halkelal Bania and Basalingaya Revanshiddappa v. Chinnava Karibasappa.
The Learned Senior Counsel also referred to (Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen) for the proposition that the mortgagees were within the definition of the phrase "person interested" under Section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. He also referred to (Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas), wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
The definition of 'Person interested' is an inclusive definition. It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded.
The Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon (Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd., v. F.V. Coutinho), wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
The definition of a 'person interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. Thus the definition of 'person interested' in Section 18 must be construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. This view accords with the principles of enquiry, justice and good conscience.
The Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon (Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (LA)), wherein the Apex Court after considering the scope of Sections 3(b), 18, 26, 50(2) and 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1984, held that 'Person interested' comprehends the local authority or company for whose benefit the land is acquired, it being a proper party, if not necessary party, under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and therefore it has right to participate in reference proceedings under Section 18 or prefer appeal under Section 54 or file writ petition before High Court under Article 226.
Page 1272 The Learned Senior Counsel by relying upon A.I.R. 1926 Madras 307 (Siva Pratapa v. A.E.L. Mission) submitted that, even an attaching creditor will be a 'person interested' under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 75 (Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands) A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1650 (Lily Thomas v. Union of India) and (Parison Devi v. Sumita Devi), in support of his submissions relating to the scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C.
In A.I.R.2006 S.C.75, in Paragraph 15 and 16, it has been held as follows:
15. We are unable to countenance the argument advanced by Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents. A careful perusal of the impugned judgment does not deal with decide many important issues as could be seen from the grounds of review and as raised in the grounds of special leave petition/appeal. The High Court, in our opinion, is not justified in ignoring the materials on record which on proper consideration may justify the claim of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has also explained to this Court as to why the appellant could not place before the Division Bench some of these documents which were not in possession of the appellant at the time of hearing of the case. The High Court, in our opinion, is not correct in overlooking the documents relied on by the appellant and the respondents. In our opinion, review jurisdiction is available in the present case since the impugned judgment is a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-consideration of relevant documents. The appellant, in our opinion, has got a strong case in their favour and if the claim of the appellant in this appeal is not countenanced, the appellant will suffer immeasurable loss and injury. Law is well-settled that the power of judicial review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent mis-carriage of justice.
16. The power, in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Courts should not hesitate to review its own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of the justice so demands in appropriate cases. The grievance of the appellant is that though several vital issues were raised and documents placed, the High Court has not considered the same in its review jurisdiction. In our opinion, the High Court's order in the revision petition is not correct which really necessitates our interference.
In A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1650, in Paragraph 52, it is observed as follows:
52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It Page 1273 cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise.
In Paragraph 55, it is observed as follows:
That the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.
In , Paragraph 9 of the judgment reads as follows:
Under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise.
In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows:-
There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the later only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction.
5. Countering the above said submissions made by Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Review Applicants, Mr. R.Thiagarajan Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that the contesting respondents have not admitted, as contended by the Learned Senior counsel for the Review Applicants, that the Review Applicants were in possession of the lands acquired and possession was taken from them. He further submitted that as admitted by the Review Applicants in their affidavit that in lieu of payment of 4% interest on the Secured loan as shown in the balance sheet, the petitioners were permitted to receive the lease amount from third parties who were cultivating the subject lands on lease. He further submitted that as per Clause XI of the Family Settlement dated 05.02.1969, the Review Applicants were permitted to collect the lease amount from third party cultivators/lessees in lieu of interest payable on the above loan amount and he also referred to the operative portion of Clause XI of the Family Settlement. The Learned Senior Counsel further referred to the letters written by the Review Applicants on 16.05.1979 to the Land Acquisition Tahsildar, Palani and submitted that the applicants Page 1274 had only claimed that they are entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,67,742.71 with interest thereon from the year 1972 from out of the compensation amount payable. The Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the same letter, the Review Applicants had requested the Tahsildar to withhold and order the payment of the sum of Rs. 1,67,742.71 with interest from 1972 up to the date due to the applicants, as per the Family Settlement, as the petitioners are persons interested in the properties acquired by the Government.
6. According to the Learned Senior counsel, the unpaid sale consideration claimed by the Review Applicants was converted into interest bearing liability divested from the ownership of the property. The reliance placed on Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had been categorically negatived by the order under review. Hence, the said contention raised once over again in Review Applications which is nothing but an appeal in disguise. The Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that none of the decisions referred to by the Review Applications before us were brought to the notice of the Division Bench. In respect of the submissions made by the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, with reference to Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.Thiagarajan submitted that Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act does not enable persons, like the Review Applicants, who have monetary claims against these contesting respondents, to recover the amount by apportionment of compensation paid for the lands acquired by the Government.
7. With respect to the decisions and relied upon by Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.Thiagarajan submitted that these judgments and authorities are for the proposition that the beneficiary of the Land Acquisition Proceedings is a person interested in the determination of compensation in respect of the lands acquired, as the ultimate financial incidents is on the beneficiary. Therefore, according to him, these judgments do not apply to the case of the Review Applicants, who are neither the beneficiaries nor the requisitioning authority in respect of the lands acquired. In respect of the submissions made by the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan that the appellants in the appeals have not objected to the impleading of the Review Applicants, the Learned Senior counsel Mr. R.Thiagarajan submitted that these respondents who are the contesting respondents and who are entitled to compensation are entitled to oppose the impleading petition filed by the Review Applicants. He further submitted that it is settled law that, to be impleaded, the Review Applicants must prove that they are necessary or proper parties to the proceedings and establish such locus standi and does not depend on the objection or otherwise of some of the respondents, who are not contesting respondents.
8. The Learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the judgment and he also relied upon the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court of India reported in 2005 (6) S.C.C. 651 (Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Limited) and A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1909 (Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab).
Page 1275
9. It is interesting to note that both the Learned Senior Counsel relied upon and the relevant part of the said decision has already been extracted above.
The Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following observations contained in Paragraph 10 of the decision reported in 2005 (6) S.C.C. 651.
In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the courts records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto.
The Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following observations contained in Paragraph 8 of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1909.
It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.
10. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon by both the Learned Senior Counsel, we would like to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court of India reported in 2006 (1) S.C.C. 275 (State of Orissa v. MD. Illiyas). Paragraph 12 of the judgment reads as follows:
12. ...Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a Page 1276 precedent (See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. the words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be rad as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem the Earl of Halsbury, L.C. observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
In the light of the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the above referred decisions, we have to consider as to how far the decisions relied upon by both the Learned Senior Counsel applies to the case on hand.
In A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 75, the Honourable Supreme Court of India in Paragraph 11 of the judgment has referred to the following arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant:
It was argued that the High Court has committed an error of fact by over-looking the documents relied on by the appellant particularly the documents showing bias on the part of the respondents/members of the Screening Committee and the discrimination and harassment to which the appellant has been subjected since 27-3-2000 and the incorrect submission made by their respondents in their affidavits which bear direct relation to the case of the appellant and as such non-adjudication on the grounds of mala fide/fraud falls within the scope of Order 47, CPC.
In that factual background only the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows:
In our opinion, review jurisdiction is available in the present case since the impugned judgment is a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-consideration of relevant documents.
11. But in the case on hand it is not the case of the Review Applicants that documents placed before the Division Bench by them was not considered by the Division Bench. In our considered view, the facts of the case in A.I.R. 2006 S.C.75 and the facts of the case on hand are totally different. Therefore in our considered view the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. As far as the decision reported in A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1650 is concerned, it is rather in favour of the contesting respondents than the Review Applicants. In this decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that Review is also not an appeal in disguise and Review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. It has been further held that the power of Review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view and mere possibilities of two views on the subject is not a ground for Review. In Paragraph 57 of the said judgment, it has been observed and held as follows:
It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not Page 1277 within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal's case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment.
12. If we consider the case on hand, in the light of the above, we can see that in this case also it is not the case of the Review Applicants that they have discovered any new and important point which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the orders in the impleading petitions. In this case, all pleas raised before us were not in fact addressed before the Division Bench. As pointed out by the Honourable Supreme Court of India, error contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. In our considered view, no such error has been pointed out by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Review Applicants.
13. As far as the decision is concerned, it is held that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of Review under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". The Honourable Supreme Court of India has further held that a Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". The Honourable Supreme Court of India has however held in this decision that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the later only can be corrected by exercise of review jurisdiction. If the above said principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of India are applied to the case on hand, the submissions of Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, Learned Senior Counsel, cannot be accepted as it would amount to converting the review jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction. Even assuming the order of the Division Bench to be erroneous, it is not permissible for us to rehear the matter afresh and correct the decision. As the review petitions have a limited purpose, it cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". The five errors, which according to Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, Learned Senior Counsel are errors apparent on the face of the record, in our considered view, cannot be called or termed as errors apparent on the face of the record.
14. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record, justifying the Court to exercise the power of review under Order 47 Page 1278 Rule 1 of C.P.C. In our considered view, in exercise of jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. Unfortunately, all the factual and legal submissions have admittedly not been made before the Division Bench, whose order is sought to be reviewed. The above said decisions relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel were also not referred to, relied upon and arguments advanced on that basis before the Division Bench. The relevant part of the order sought to be reviewed, which has been extracted above, does not indicate or show that the above said submissions were made before the Division Bench. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that it is neither stated in the Review Applications nor submitted by Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan Learned Senior Counsel during the course of his elaborate arguments that the above said submissions were made but the same have been omitted to be considered by the Division Bench. But having failed to make the above said factual submissions and legal arguments before the Division Bench, it is not open to the Review Applicants to raise all those factual and legal submissions in the Review Applications. A review application has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be appeal in disguise.
15. In view of the above discussions as to the scope of Review, we are of the considered view that the elaborate arguments and series of case laws cited by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Review Applicants pertaining to "person interested" and "sellers lien in respect of unpaid sale consideration" etc., cannot be allowed to be raised within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. Accordingly the Review Applications failed and they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps are closed.