Delhi District Court
Amarjit Singh Bakshi vs State on 16 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHEETAL CHAUDHARY PRADHAN
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-02 : SOUTH EAST DISTRICT
SAKET COURT : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No.62/2026
PS- EOW
U/Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C.
In the matter of :-
1. Amarjit Singh Bakshi
S/o Sh. Satwant Singh Bakshi
R/o 9 Green Avenue Vasant Kunj,
New Delhi 110070
2. Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi
S/o Sh. Satwant Singh Bakshi
R/o 42, Amrita Shergill Marg, Rabindra Nagar,
New Delhi 110003
3. Sanjit Bakshi
S/o Sh. Kawaljit Singh Bakshi
R/o 42, Amrita Shergill Marg, Rabindra Nagar,
New Delhi 110003
....
Revisionists
Versus
1. State (NCT of Delhi)
2. Wharton Engineers And Developers Pvt. Ltd.
Having its registered office at
C-15, Qutab Institutional Area,
New Delhi 110016
Through its Directors
.......Respondents
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.1 of 49
Date of Institution : 02.02.2026
Date of Arguments : 11.04.2026
Date of Order : 16.04.2026
Decision : Revision stands allowed.
Order of Ld. Trial Court
stands set aside.
ORDER
1. Revisionist namely Amarjit Singh Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi and Sanjit Bakshi have filed present revision petition, thereby challenging impugned order dated 13.01.2026, passed by Ld. Trial Court in Complaint Case No.4357/2025, vide which, Ld. Trial Court allowed the application of the respondent for seeking registration of FIR U/s 175(3) BNS/ Section 156 (3) CrPC and the FIR came to be registered at PS EOW on 15.01.2026.
2. In my subsequent paragraphs, parties will be referred with the same nomenclature with which they were referred before Ld. Trial Court, in order to avoid confusion.
COMPLAINT FILED BY COMPLAINANT
3. Trial Court record reveal that complainant M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. had filed an application u/sec. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. against all the respondents, praying for registration of FIR, before Ld. Trial Court on 16.09.2025. The Ld. Trial Court called for ATR. On 08.10.2025 IO filed ATR and further sought time to file ATR and the same was subsequently filed on 25.10.2025 and 23.12.2025.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.2 of 49 ACTION TAKEN REPORT FILED BY IO DATED 08.10.2025 Most respectfully, it is submitted that the present complaint has been filed through Sh. M. B. Mathur, AR of M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. The gist of allegations levelled in the complaint are as under- Complainant company M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd is the owner of land admeasuring 70 Kanals and 18 Marias equivalent to 8 8625 Acres, falling in the revenue estate of Village Dhunela. Tehsil Sohna, District Gurgaon, Haryana During the year 2016, Mr. Amarjit Singh Bakshi, Mr. Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi and Mr. Sanjit Bakshi had approached Mr. Ajay Kumar Gupta/ complainant company with a proposal that this land be provided to M/s St. Patricks Realty Pvt. Ltd. to be made part of the Township being developed by Bakshi Group. In lieu of such land given by complainant company, alleged company shall give developed residential plotted area of 1200 square yorda for cach acre of the said Land (total land 8.8625 Acres), in total admeasuring 10 035 square yards of developed lands.
From January, 2016 to December 2016, various meetings with alleged persons Mr. Amarjit Bakshi, Mr. Kanwaljit Bakshi and Mr. Sanjit Bakshi were held wherein it was dishonestly and willfully represented that Bakshi Group be entrusted and handed over the said land for developing a township, they assured that the title and ownership of CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.3 of 49 the land shall remain with the complainant An assurance was also given by the alleged persons to the complainant Sh. Ajay Kumar Gupta that they shall develop the township and firat demarcate the developed residential plotted area of 10,635 sqfts, to the account of complainant share within the said land area and handover the said developed residential plotted area to the complainant before they proceed proceed to to sell to the balance areas to third party.
The alleged company/persons persuaded the complainant to repose trust on them and assured that they will act in fiduciary capacity and agent to protect interests al complainant and its shareholders. On account of the past dealings with alleged persons and Bakshi group, the complainant was induced sand deceived into believing the false assurances of the alleged individuals and hence entered into Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016 with St. Patricks Realty Pvt. Ltd. with regard to the aforesaid land. The terms of the said Collaboration Agreement are:
a Upon entrusted of the land by the complainant company, the alleged company, St. Patricks was to procure all permissions from concerned authorities at their own cost and expense b. And after its development in the given time, St. Patrieks was to first demarcate the said share of Wharton of such developed residential plots on the site plan c. St. Patricks would only be entitled to deliver possession of the plots fallen to its share and to further CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.4 of 49 enter into Sale Deeds in respect thereof with third parties, hot, but only after delivery of actual possession of the entire share of the Complainant company.
d. St. Patricks has no right to deal with the same or enter into any transaction of any nature whatsoever with any third party in respect of share of the complainant. The complainant company was to deal with the said residential plot admeasuring 10.635 sq yds. e. Alleged company St. Patricks had no right to deal with transfer, alienate or create any third-party rights in the shore and allocation of complainant company f. Alleged company, St. Patricks is not even entitled to deal with any portion of the said Land or the plots developed thereupon, (even falling to the share of St. Patricks) till such time St. Patricks develops the residential plots and hands over/ delivers the actual possession of the entire allocation to the Complainant Further, in pursuance of the terms of the aforesaid Collaboration Agreement , complainant company executed General Power of Attorney (GPA) dated 16.12.2016 and Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated 16.12.2016 in favour of S Patricks appointing M/s St. Patricks Realty Private Limited Due to the failure of the alleged persons to handover the share of complainant or return the said land, complainant cancelled the General Power of Attorney dated 16.12.2016 (GPA) and Special Power of Attorney dated 16.12.2016 (SPA) vide Legal Notice dated 01.08.2023 and was also constrained to file Cont Suit No.96/2023.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.5 of 49 After filing of suit and upon filing of the written statement and pleadings in the said Civil Suit that the Complainant was shocked to learn that the alleged persons in conspiracy with each other sold the developed residential plots on the said land to various parties including the share of the Complainant The alleged persons had breached the trust and confidence reposed on them and illegally sold various parcels of said land and misappropriated the proceeds there from without authority and permission of the Complainant But the alleged persons executed agreements and deeds in favour of third parties, fully knowing that they had no authority or right to do so, and thereby causing wrongful loss to the Complainant and wrongful gain to the Accused and Bakshi Group of more than Rs 250 Crores.
It has also been alleged that the alleged persons have duped several other companies/persons by adopting same modus operandi The alleged persons are also guilty of cheating numerous innocent homebuyers and third parties, who have purchased portion of the said Land owned by the Complainant: They dishonestly, fraudulently induced third parties to enter into bookings and sale deeds by false misrepresentation that they were authorized in terms of the Collaboration Agreement to sell The alleged have cheated the public and third parties out of their hard earned money which the victims would have saved throughout their lifetime in order to buy their homes.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.6 of 49 The amounts so received from sale of land parcels belonging to the share of the complainant were given by the alleged company to their related parties/ associated enterprises, Bakshi Group including St. Ambrose Buildcon Private Limited, Task Infotech Private Limited, F.I Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd., Sweta Estates Limited, St. Dominic Estates Private Limited etc. During enquiry, both parties have filed numerous documents as well as copy of proceedings filed by both parties before various forum. The scrutiny of these documents as well as versions both parties is being carried out. The complaint will be finalized shortly. Moreover, the undersigned is ready and willing to abide by the directions passed by this Hon'ble Court."
4. In the second ATR report dated 25.10.2025, IO has stated that:-
Alleged company namely M/s St. Patricks Reality Pvt. Ltd stated that in view of an agreement in the year-2013, M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd. was a co-developer/partner in entire project of 127 acres approx land in Sector 29, 30, 32 and 33 Gurgaon. Sh. Ajay Gupta is promoter/director in M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt Ltd which has 1/3rd share in the entire project and he is also director/promoter of complainant company ie. M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd The alleged company has stated that the sale of plots falling in the scheduled property i.e. 8.8 Acres were done with the consent and knowledge of the complainant company. The alleged has further stated that complainant CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.7 of 49 company is sister concern of M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd which was a joint venture development partner of the alleged company in the same project.
It is claimed by the alleged company that complainant Sh. Ajay Gupta has been managing both the companies ie. M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd and he was well informed about the demarcation of plots, development status, marketing, and sale of the inventories in Wharton's land as well as qua the entire project.
M/s St. Patricks Reality Pvt Ltd had already paid Rs. 5.32 crores to M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd in the year of 2016 against the 8.8 Acres of land. It has been stated by the alleged company that Clauses 3.1 and 12.1.5 of the Collaboration Agreement explicitly provided that Wharton's alleged share of developed plots would be made available within the larger township project, not necessarily from the original Scheduled Property. Therefore, any sale within or outside the Scheduled Property cannot unauthorized be termed as The alleged company has also stated that due to some unforeseen reasons such as inter section of GAIL pipeline and provision of school and green area, the actual plotted area remained 2.11 acres in the scheduled property. Out of this, 25% of plotted area i.e. 2689 Sq. yards has already been secured and additional 7946 Sq yards of developed plotted area has been preserved within the adjusting township.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.8 of 49 The alleged company has further stated that on 23-03- 2022, Ms. Tanushree Gupta, common Director at M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd as well as at M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt Ltd, acknowledged the consolidated list of plots sold, including those attributed to Wharton's alleged share. This acknowledgment after several years of plot sale activity. shows actual knowledge and acceptance.
The alleged company has also contended that M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd, a company having common directors with Wharton, actively participated in the development of the Project and was a co-developer. Various demarcated plots allegedly falling in the share of M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd were booked before 30.06.2019 (ie., before exit of M/s Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd from partnership as a co developer of the Project) and the booking amounts were also received. A detailed account of such sales and share of TRADEX in three equal parts was offered to TRADEX on 18.10.2019. It is categorically reiterated that such account also includes share of booking proceeds from Whartons land.
Further, M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt Ltd company has filed a Civil Suit No. 96/2023 before the Commercial Court, Gurugram for specific performance and the permanent injunction over the same issue and the same is pending.
The alleged company M/s St Patricks Reality Pvt Ltd had already made a declaration in the Commercial Court, CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.9 of 49 Gurgaon that the amount of Rs. 46 crores are available against the sale of 33 plots in the scheduled property. Further, 10 plots in the scheduled property are already put on hold by the Commercial Court vide Interim order dated
05.12.2024 and interest of M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd has been secured, subject to outcome of the Court proceedings. M/s St. Patricks Reality Pvt Ltd shall be obliged to pay/handover compensation/inventories to M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. The NDOH in the Commercial Court, Gurugram is 25/09/2025.
Facts emerged during enquiry During enquiry, it has been found that the complainant company was entitled for an area of total 10,635 Sq. yds in the form of developed plots in lieu of their land admeasuring 8.8 Acres. The complainant claimed that as per terms and conditions of collaboration agreement, this developed plotted area of 10,635 Sq. yds was to be allotted within the scheduled property i.e. 8.8 Acres. On the other hand, the alleged company stated that this developed plotted area was to be allotted in the entire area of project and not in the scheduled property. However, as per clause 3.1 and 12.1.5 of the collaboration agreement, the complainant to get developed area of 10,635 Sq yds in the township project and not in the scheduled property i.e. 8.8 Acres.
The enquiry has revealed that the allegation of complainant that he was not aware about the demarcation and sale of plots in the scheduled property does not seems CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.10 of 49 to be correct as the alleged company vide email dated 18.10.2019 had sent detailed account of sales and share of TRADEX in three equal parts clearly indicates that information regarding sale and demarcation of plots were sent to M/s Tradex. Such account also includes share of booking proceeds from M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd land. The alleged company had sent the list of demarcated plots falling in the share of M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd booked before 30.06.2019.
M/s St. Patricks Reality Pvt Ltd had already made a declaration in the Commercial Court, Gurgaon that the amount of Rs. 46 Crores are available against the sale of 33 plots in the scheduled property. Further, 10 plots in the scheduled property are already put on hold by the Cominercial Court vide Internim order dated 05.12.2024 and interest of M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd has been secured, subject to outcome of the Court proceedings. M/s St. Patricks Reality Pvt Ltd shall be obliged to pay/handover compensation /inventories to M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd.
Ms Tanushree Gupta, is found to be common Director in M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd as well as in Tradex, acknowledged the consolidated list of plots sold, including those attributed to Wharton's alleged share, On 20.3.2022. This acknowledgement after several years of plot sale activity, shows actual knowledge and acceptance.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.11 of 49 The issue of the present complaint between these parties is already sub-judice before Ld. ASJ, Commercial Court, Gurgaon as well as before Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh Both the parties have filed their Petitions in the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh over the issue of stay on further sale/alienation of remaining 10 plots in the property in question and these Petitions are pending adjudication in the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court. The NDOH is the Punjab and Haryan High Court is 06/11/2025.
During enquiry, it has been found that the complainant company offered its 8.8 Acres land to the alleged company for development in heu of developed area of 10,635 Sq yds as per the terms and conditions of collaboration agreement. The enquiry has also revealed that the allegation regarding concealment regarding demarcation and sale of developed area is not found to be factually correct in view of the email dated 18-10-2019. The parent company of the complainant company the Tradex was a co-developer in the entire project and there are communications between alleged company and Tradex which indicates that plots in scheduled property was mentioned in these communications/emails etc. Enquiry has also revealed that there are contractual violation by the alleged company about the terms and conditions set for in the collaboration agreement between both the parties. The complainant company in this regard has already filed a Civil Suit before the Commercial Court CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.12 of 49 in Gurugram which is sub-judice before Ld. ADDJ, Commercial Court, Gurgaon as well as before Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Hon'ble Commercial Court has already granted Interim relief to the complainant.
In view of the above-mentioned facts, enquiry conducted, the subject matter of this complaint is already sub-judice before Ld. ASJ, Commercial Court, Gurgaon as well as before Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. The matter is found to be civil in nature. Hence, the complaint has been closed.
Moreover, the undersigned is ready and willing to abide by the directions passed by this Hon'ble Court."
THIRD ATR REPORT DATED 23.12.2025 IO STATED THAT In continuation of the previous status report, it is further submitted that in the previous status report, it was mentioned that Ms. Tanushree Gupta was a common Director in M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd as well as in M/s Tradex India Corporation Ltd. This observation was made on the basis of the reply submitted by the alleged party during the enquiry. However, further scrutiny of the documents has revealed that M/s Tanushree Gupta is a director in M/s Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd and not in M/s Tradex India Corporation Ltd. It is further stated that observation regarding contention of the alleged company that M/s Tanushree CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.13 of 49 Gupta acknowledged the consolidated list of plots sold on 20-03-2022 is based on their submission and alleged party has not submitted any documents in support of this particular contention. This is for favour of information only."
5. Ld. Trial Court after considering the contents of application u/sec. 156(3) Cr.P.C./175(3) BNS and the said action taken report, allowed the application of the complainant vide impugned order dated 13.01.2026 for registration of FIR and the same was registered on 15.01.2026.
6. GROUNDS OF REVISION PETITION A. That the impugned order has been passed without assigning rationale reasons and passed in a mechanical way against the settled principles of law and contrary to the evidence.
B. That the impugned order is a non-speaking order and does not specify the reasons for passing the same.
C. That the Ld. Trial Court committed a grave error of law and procedure by failing to assign reasons for not accepting the Action Taken Report (ATR) filed by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) in which the dispute between the parties were stated to be of civil in nature and beyond jurisdiction.
D. That despite the Investigating Agency finding no evidence of criminality or misappropriation, the Ld. Trial Court proceeded to mechanically allow the application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Impugned Order fails to record any valid reason for discarding the findings of the ATR, thereby violating the principles laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in Ravinder Lal Airi vs S.Shalu Construction Pvt. Ltd And Ors W.P.(CRL) 209/2023 and Harpal Singh Arora and Ors. vs. State and Anr. 2008 (103) DRJ 282.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.14 of 49 E. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the Respondent No.3 complainant was evidently engaging in forum shopping and abuse of process by seeking to initiate the criminal law mechanism for a civil and contractual dispute which is pending trial before the concerned commercial court in Gurugram.
F. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that Respondent No.3/complainant had first filed a civil suit in September 2023 and thereafter filed a complaint with the PS EOW in April/May 2025 making substantially identical allegations as in the civil suit. G. That the Ld. Trial Court further failed to exercise its discretion reasonably and with a judicial mind since on the same day when the Impugned Order was passed (i.e. 13.01.2026), the Ld. Trial Court dismissed another application for registration of FIR filed by a sister company of the Respondent No. 3 complainant after noting, amongst other points, that the issue raised in the complaint was already pending before an arbitral tribunal. Therefore, even on principles of parity, the Ld. Trial Court ought not to have adopted completely opposite approaches while deciding the two applications. H. That the Ld. Trial Court has erroneously relied on the same set of allegations and materials which are subject matter of trial before the commercial court at Gurugram.
I. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the Investigating Officer did not conduct any inquiry is contrary to the materials on record including the EOW Notices received by the Petitioners and the materials submitted in response thereto.
J. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the entire dispute revolves around the interpretation of Clause 8 (Demarcation) and Clause 11.5 (Handing over possession) of the Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016. The grievance of the Complainant is essentially regarding the non-performance of contractual obligations, for which the remedy lies in Specific Performance and civil proceedings, not in criminal prosecution.
K. That the Impugned Order violates the settled law laid down in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court deprecated the growing tendency to convert purely civil CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.15 of 49 disputes into criminal cases to pressurize the other side. By directing the registration of an FIR on facts that constitute a breach of contract, the Ld. Trial Court has permitted the abuse of the process of law. L. That the initiation of criminal proceedings on the same set of facts and for the same cause of action amounts to "Forum Shopping"
and creates a risk of conflicting findings. Since the Commercial Court has already framed issues regarding the alleged breach and entitlement, the criminal investigation is an attempt to bypass the judicial process of the Civil Court and arm-twist the revisionist. M. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that a crucial development, namely the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed between the parties in 2025 (Annexure P/19). In this MOU, the parties had acknowledged the existence of the dispute and outlined a framework for amicable resolution/arbitration regarding the demarcation of plots. N. That the existence of the 2025 MOU conclusively demonstrates that the parties viewed their relationship as a continuing commercial engagement capable of resolution through negotiation. The filing of the criminal complaint subsequent to this MOU indicates mala fide intent, as the Complainant is using the criminal justice system to enforce terms that were the subject of commercial negotiation. The Impugned Order is silent on this vital document which negates the element of criminality. O. That to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC (Cheating) or Section 406 IPC (Criminal Breach of Trust), the element of mens rea (dishonest intention) must be present at the very inception of the transaction. In the present case, the bona fides of the Petitioner are evident from:
(a) The completion of the project and obtaining of the Completion Certificate în 2020;
(b) The transparency maintained by sharing lists of allottees in 2019 and 2023; and
(c) The investment by the Complainant's sister concern (Tradex) at the start of the project.
P. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that to distinguish between a "mere breach of contract" and "cheating." A subsequent failure to perform a promise (i.e., demarcation) does not amount to CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.16 of 49 cheating unless it is shown that the intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. No such material was placed on record to substantiate dishonest intent at the execution of the Agreement in 2016. Similarly there is nothing on record to infer any act of forgery or criminal breach of trust and on the face of the complaint no criminal offence is made out.
Q That the Impugned Order is non-speaking and cryptic. The Ld. CJM has failed to assign any cogent reasons as to why the civil remedy is insufficient or why police investigation is required in a documentary dispute where all evidence is documentary and is already in the possession of the Complainant.
R. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the inordinate delay in filing the complaint. The Agreement was signed in 2016, the Zoning Plan was approved in 2017, and the alleged cause of action regarding demarcation arose in June 2017. The Complainant remained silent for over six years and filed the present complaint only in 2025. Such a belated complaint, filed as an afterthought without any plausible explanation for the delay, ought to have been dismissed at the threshold. S. That the Ld. Trial Court has committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the application under Section 156(3) CrPC and directing the registration of an FIR, despite having no territorial jurisdiction over the alleged offences or the subject matter of the dispute. The entire cause of action has arisen exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Gurugram, Haryana, and not in Delhi, for the following reasons:
(a) Location of Immovable Property: The subject matter of the dispute is the land situated in Village Dhunela, Tehsil Sohna, District Gurugram, Haryana. Under Section 177 read with Section 178 of the CrPC, the ordinary place of inquiry and trial is where the offence was committed. Since the alleged "misappropriation" or "failure to demarcate" pertains to land located in Gurugram, the jurisdiction lies solely with the Gurugram Courts.
(b) Execution of Documents: The Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016, which forms the basis of the Complainant's rights, was registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Gurugram. The General CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.17 of 49 Power of Attorney (GPA) and Special Power of Attorney (SPA) were also executed and acted upon in Gurugram.
(c) Performance of Contract: The development of the township, the obtaining of licenses (from DTCP, Haryana), the construction activity, and the alleged sale of plots to third parties all occurred within the revenue district of Gurugram.
T. That the Complainant has artfully created a superficial jurisdiction in Delhi merely by citing its own registered office address or alleging that some meetings took place in Aerocity and New Delhi. However, it is settled law that jurisdiction cannot be created artificially where the core ingredients of the offence-namely, the property and the alleged act of misappropriation-are situated elsewhere. U. That the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the Complainant itself has admitted to the jurisdiction of the Gurugram Courts by filing the Civil Suit (CS No. 96/2023) in the Commercial Court at Gurugram. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the Gurugram Courts for the civil remedy, the Complainant is estopped from invoking the jurisdiction of the Delhi Courts for a criminal complaint on the exact same facts and cause of action. The Impugned Order, therefore, suffers from a patent defect of territorial jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
V. Maintainability: That the law is well settled that criminal revision petition is maintainable against an order deciding application U/s, 156(3) CrPC. Reliance in this regard is placed on Nishu Wadhwa vs Siddharth Wadhwa & Anr WP(Crl.) 1253/2016 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held as under:-
"13. The issue that since the accused has not been summoned as an accused and has no right to file a revision petition is alien. while deciding an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The said issue crops up when the Magistrate entertains the complaint and on taking cognizance proceeds as a complaint case. In case directions are issued for registration of FIR immediately, on registration of FIR, the person against whom allegations are made in the FIR attains the status of an accused. His rights in so far as the Police can summon him for investigation, arrest him without warrants for allegations of cognizable offences are duly affected. In a situation where the fundamental right of freedom and liberty of a person is affected, it cannot be held that he has CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.18 of 49 no right to be heard at that stage. Thus to hold that since directions only have been issued under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and no cognizance has been taken thus no revision would lie would be an erroneous reading of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, an order dismissing or allowing an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and a revision petition against the same is maintainable."
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF REVISIONISTS
7. It has been argued that instant Revision Petition has been filed by Amarjit Singh Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi and Sanjit Bakshi. As they were directors of St. Patricks Realty Pvt. Ltd.; Sanjit Bakshi was merely a shareholder. It has been argued that the complainant in its complaint has alleged that 8.8 acres of scheduled land was provided by the Wharton Engineers and Developers Pt. Ltd./Complainant to St. Patrick's Realty Pvt. Ltd. under a Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016 for development as part of a residential project. In lieu thereof, St. Patrick's was required to deliver 1,200 sq. yds. of developed plotted area per acre, totaling 10,635 sq. yds. Alleged failure to hand over 10,635 sq. yds., revocation of the agreement, and sale of portions of scheduled land to third parties caused wrongful loss Wharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. The Complainant claims to have learnt of these sales only through the Written Statement in the civil suit.
8. That a valid license was granted by DTCP, Haryana for setting up of Residential Plotted Colony on 23.12.2016. A copy of the same was shared with Wharton Engineers and Developers Pt. Ltd. also Collaboration agreement as well as GPA and SPA was executed in Feb 2016 duly notarized and was later again executed and registered).
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.19 of 49
9. All details of inventory sold to third parties including plots from Wharton's land were shared with Kanj Goel (Finance Head) of Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd., the sister concern of the Complainant/co- collaborator of St. Patrick's Realty Pvt. Ltd. On 19.4.2023.
10.Financial details were also emailed to Sh. Yashpal (Complainant's official) on 18.10.2019. Ld. Magistrate had ordered to file an FIR against the revisionist on 19.1.2026 allegedly for not producing the same e-mail. Such e mail includes inventory as well as revenue and sales details of inventories of entire township as well as the scheduled property.
11.Tradex India Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (common ownership Sh. Ajay Gupta and Smt. Sonia Gupta are directors of both Tradex and Wharton) is a co-developer with 1/3rd revenue share and had itself received Rs. 60.50 lakhs as its revenue share till 2017. The claim that sales came to the Complainant's knowledge only through the Written Statement is false.
12.It is argued on behalf of revisionist that having common director Sh. AJAY Gupta. Tradex was already 1/3rd Partner of the entire township vide a separate collaboration Agreement dated 25.3.2013 with St. Patrick's Realty Pvt. Ltd. Scheduled property of 8.8625 acre is a part of the bigger township where Tradex regularly receives 1/3d share of revenues towards all bookings and sale proceeds. The aforesaid relationship between TARDEX and WHARTON has been stated and established by the Complainant himself in Civil Suit filed by them CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.20 of 49 before the commercial court of Gurugram (CS96/2023) which also show that the complainant was aware about all the dealing between revisionist and respondent. It has been argued that Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016 was signed between the parties. As per clause 3.1 of the collaboration agreement it was agreed between the parties that after development of the project the Petitioner was required to demarcate and allot a developed plotted area of 10635 sq.yds anywhere in the township project. Plots within the township of required area were always available. Further that the respondent/complainant did not apprise the trial court regarding MOU dated 23.10.2025 which was signed between the parties. Post MOU dated 23.10.2025. Complainant had selected 36 plots on 5.11.2025 covering the required area and those identified plots exists even today.
13.The Revisionist, vide replies dated 12.05.2025, 20.05.2025. 26.05.2025, 26.06.2025, 01.07.2025, and 25.07.2025, duly responded to the EOW Notices and, inter alia, informed Respondent No. 1 of the pendency of the Civil Suit, while categorically asserting that the filing of the Complaint constituted a gross abuse of the process of law. Respondent No. 2 had earlier filed a complaint for the same alleged offences with Economic Offences Wing, Section 1, Mandir Marg. New Delhi.
14.The Complainant was kept in the loop at every stage. The IO was satisfied with this; however, the Ld. Trial Court erroneously held that no such email was placed on record.
15.The Economic Offences Wing after conducting a detailed preliminary CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.21 of 49 enquiry into the allegations leveled by the Respondent No. 2, deemed it appropriate to close the said complaint as it was of the opinion that the disputes are purely civil in nature.
16.The Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to direct registration of an FIR because:
a. The subject land is situated in Gurugram; b. The Collaboration Agreement, including all transactions and the stamp paper, was executed in Gurugram. Clause 22 of the agreement expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on Courts at Gurugram. c. The Civil Suit is pending in Gurugram. It is clearly mentioned in the civil suit at para no. 36 that the commercial court at Gurugram has the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit as all the dealings took place in Gurugram.
17.It has been argued that the dispute is Purely Civil in Nature. That the impugned order ignores that the dispute is entirely civil in nature, as a civil suit bearing CS No. 96 of 2023 is pending between the parties. instituted before the Commercial Court at Gurugram on 12.09.2023. arising from alleged breach of the Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016. The delay of approximately 9 years itself evidences that the Complainant is misusing the criminal justice system to harass the Revisionists.
18.The Issues framed by the Civil Court (particularly Issues 2, 3 and 4) are identical to the FIR allegations; the EOW was therefore fully justified in declining to register the FIR. A temporary injunction order dated CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.22 of 49 5.12.24, was passed by the Ld. Commercial Court. Certain appellate/revisional proceedings, emanating from the Civil Suit, are also pending consideration before the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court has been informed that the settlement talks are going on between the parties.
19.IO's status report dated 25.10.2025 arrived at the same conclusion that there are Contractual violation and Civil suits and appeals are already pending. Furthermore, the MOU dated 23.10.2025 amicably resolved the disputes. A fact deliberately concealed from the Trial Court by the Complainant to secure the impugned order.
20.It has been further argued that the Trial Court Applied Inconsistent Standards. That on the same day, the Ld. Trial Court dismissed a Section 156(3) application of an identical nature filed by the sister concern of the Complainant against the same Revisionists, holding the dispute to be civil since arbitration is pending. The same standard must apply here. The impugned order is therefore unsustainable.
21.It has been argued that No Offence Made Out and that Section 420 IPC (Cheating): No fraudulent misrepresentation to induce parting with property. All sale details were shared with the Complainant's representatives from inception; each page of the inventory is acknowledged by the Complainant's representative. b. Sections 406/409 IPC (Criminal Breach of Trust): No entrustment, dominion, or further misappropriation of property the requisite threshold is not met. c. Sections 468/471/477A IPC (Forgery): No manipulated document has CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.23 of 49 been placed on record. These offences cannot be alleged on the basis of bare assumptions. d. Of the 11 accused persons named in Column 7 of the FIR, 8 are neither signatories to the Collaboration Agreement dated 16.12.2016 nor connected with St. Patrick's Realty Pvt. Ltd. Their inclusion is wholly unjustified and amounts to harassment. e. There is no mens rea attributable to the Revisionists. The Revisionists proactively offered to earmark more than 10,635 sq. yds, within the township to safeguard the Complainant's interest. The rights of the Complainant remain fully secured.
22. Ld. Counsel relied upon following judgments in support of his arguments.
a. Shubhkaran Luharuka & Anr v. State & Anr.; ILR (2010) VI Delhi
495. (Pl see para nos. 56 and 57) On territorial jurisdiction. b. Navinchandra N Mathijia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.; (2000) 7 SCC 640. (Pl see para nos. 43 and 44-On territorial jurisdiction c. Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors.; 2024 (3) Mh. L.J. (F.B.) 709. (Pl See para no. 127) and Nishu Wadhwa vs Siddharth Wadhwa & Anr on 10 January, 2017 Delhi High Court W.P.(CRL) 1253/2016 and Crl. M.A. No.6591/2016.(CRL) 1253/2016 and Crl. M.A. No.6591/2016 (Pl See para 13) On maintainability. d. Vandana Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P, Criminal Appeal No. 1127 of 2026. (Pl see para nos 25-30) this judgment is on identical facts as that of the case at hand The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was pleased to hold that Civil disputes cannot be converted into criminal proceedings.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.2
23.It has been argued that at the outset, the present Revision Petition deserves outright dismissal as the Revisionists have approached this Hon'ble Court with unclean hands, having deliberately suppressed CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.24 of 49 material facts and advanced a distorted and misleading narrative to obtain a favourable order. It is settled law that a party invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of a Court must make a full, fair and candid disclosure, failing which it is not entitled to any relief. Reliance is placed on Moti Lal Songara vs. Prem Prakash @ Pappu & Anr.. (2013) 9 SCC 199 and Kusha Duruka vs. State of Odisha, Criminal Appeal No. 303/2024, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that suppression of material facts and misleading the Court disentitles a party from any equitable relief.
24.It has been argued that the most glaring instance of misrepresentation is the false chronology projected in relation to the MoU. That the Revisionists have sought to suggest that the proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC/175(3) BNSS were initiated subsequent to the execution of the MoU dated 23.10.2025, so as to portray the complaint as an afterthought. This is ex facie false. The complaint to EOW was filed on 22.04.2025 and the application under Section 156(3) was filed on 12.09.2025, both much prior to the alleged MoU.
25.It has been argued that while placing reliance on the MoU to argue that the dispute is civil, the Revisionists have consciously suppressed Clause 4 thereof, which expressly provides that the MoU is confidential and shall not be relied upon in any court proceedings. Not only have the Revisionists acted in breach of this express bar, but the sequence of events clearly demonstrates that the ATR was never genuinely acted upon and was instead designedly procured and relied upon in a pre- planned manner to create a defence for use before this Hon'ble Court, CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.25 of 49 despite the express embargo contained in the MoU itself. This conduct is nothing but a calculated attempt to manufacture a record to defeat criminal scrutiny.
26.It has been argued that the Revisionists have adopted mutually destructive and contradictory stands across proceedings, exposing a clear lack of bona fides. In the civil proceedings, it is alleged that Respondent No. 2 "never came forward for demarcation"; before the Investigating Officer, it is stated that the parties had "done away with demarcation" altogether, and in the present revision, it is contended that the details of demarcation, inventory and share were duly communicated to Tradex through emails. These stands cannot co-exist and are self-destructive, clearly demonstrating that the Revisionists are shifting positions to suit their convenience and to evade both civil and criminal consequences.
27.It has been argued that in these circumstances, the present Revision Petition is nothing but an attempt to mislead this Court through suppression, false averments and shifting stands. A litigant guilty of such conduct is not entitled to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, and the present revision deserves to be dismissed at the threshold on this ground alone.
28.It has been argued that the Revision Petition is Not Maintainable in Law; Reliance on Arun P. Gidh is Misconceived, Self-Defeating and Ex Facie Erroncous.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.26 of 49
29.At the outset, it is an admitted position that the FIR in the present case already stands registered on 15.01.2026 pursuant to the order dated 13.01.2026, and investigation is presently underway, as reflected from proceedings dated 20.02.2026. The matter, therefore, squarely falls within the post-registration stage, where the scope of interference by a revisional court is extremely narrow and well-settled.
30.It has been argued that it is now authoritatively settled that once an FIR is registered pursuant to an order under Section 156(3) CrPC, the said order stands worked out, and a revision petition ceases to be an efficacious remedy. The challenge, if any, thereafter lies only before the Hon'ble High Court under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC. This position stands conclusively reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Arvind Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2153, wherein, after considering Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2018, and Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra. It was further clarified that even if interference is warranted, the FIR already registered does not get quashed, and the matter must proceed in accordance with law.
31.It has been argued that the reliance placed by the Revisionist on Arun P. Gidh (supra) is wholly misplaced and, in fact, self-defeating. A plain reading of the judgment demonstrates that Gidh permits revisional interference only in exceptional cases involving patent jurisdictional errors, such as absence of a mandatory affidavit ( Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287), want of sanction under Section 197 CrPC, or categories like medical negligence requiring higher threshold scrutiny (Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1) (see Arun CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.27 of 49 P. Gidh, paras 119-122). The present case does not even allege, much less establish, any such foundational infirmity.
32.Significantly, the judgment in the case of Gidh does not even recognize territorial jurisdiction as a ground for interference at this stage and this omission is deliberate. Territorial jurisdiction is not a defect going to the root of the Magistrate's competence at the stage of directing investigation. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate can take cognizance irrespective of territorial jurisdiction, and such objections are premature at the stage of investigation.
33.In any event, it is settled beyond cavil that territorial jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash or stall investigation. In Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that investigation cannot be interdicted on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, and at best, the FIR may be transferred to the appropriate police station upon conclusion of investigation. This position has been further reinforced by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Satish Dharmu Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 186 wherein it was held that in view of Section 156(2) CrPC, no proceedings of a police officer can be called in question on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, and that courts ought not to interfere at the stage of investigation on such a plea The Court further clarified that even if the offence is ultimately found to be outside jurisdiction, the FIR can be forwarded to the competent police station, but the investigation itself cannot be stifled at CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.28 of 49 inception. A similar view has been taken in Malkiat Singh v. State, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 644: (2005) 121 DLT 668, holding that neither FIR nor investigation can be quashed on this ground.
34.Lastly, the statutory mandate under Section 156(2) CrPC puts the matter beyond any doubt by expressly barring any challenge to investigation on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The entire edifice of the present Revision Petition, therefore, stands in direct conflict with both binding precedent and statutory command Viewed thus, the present Revision Petition is nothing but a misconceived and impermissible attempt to obstruct a lawful investigation, dressed up under the garb of jurisdictional challenge The reliance on Arun P. Gidh is not only misplaced but is contrary to its very ratio, as clarified in Arvind Saraf (supra) The petition is, therefore, not maintainable in law and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.
35.The complaint specifically pleads and demonstrates that material parts of the cause of action arose within Delhi, being the place where the Respondent No. 2 has its registered office, where monies were received in its bank account, where meetings and inducements took place, where the consequences of the alleged offences ensued and where all communications were to be made as per the Collaboration Agreement itself (Delhi Address being explicitly mentioned). It is well settled that even a fraction of the cause of action is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. (Lee Kun Hee v. State of U.P., (2012) 3 SCC 132; Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640).
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.29 of 49
36.The statutory scheme under Sections 177-179 and 181(4) CrPC further reinforces this position by expressly providing that offences may be inquired into and tried not only where the act is done, but also where its consequence ensues, or where property is required to be returned or accounted for. In cases involving cheating and inducement through communications, Jurisdiction is attracted at places where such communications are sent or received. (Lee Kun Hee, supra). On the admitted factual matrix, therefore, Delhi courts clearly possess territorial jurisdiction.
37.In any event, the Revisional challenge proceeds on a fundamentally erroneous premise by equating civil jurisdiction with criminal jurisdiction. The plea that proceedings in Gurgaon civil courts exclude criminal jurisdiction in Delhi is legally untenable and stands contrary to settled principles. Under the CPC, Jurisdiction (Section 15-20) is tied to the defendant's residence or where the cause of action arises, often subject to contractual stipulations. In contrast, the criminal jurisdiction as discussed in the aforesaid paragraph is significantly wider. The two operate on distinct legal footings and cannot be conflated as held in Navinchandra N. Mathija (Supra). Notably, even the ATR/status reports do not raise any objection on territorial jurisdiction. The plea is thus an afterthought, devoid of merit, and liable to be rejected.
38.It has been argued that at the very threshold, the present Revision Petition is vitiated by a glaring internal contradiction. While the Revisionist places reliance on Arun P. Gidh (Supra) to sustain the maintainability of the present proceedings, the Petition simultaneously CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.30 of 49 ventures into a full-fledged merits challenge, which is expressly impermissible under the very judgment relied upon.
39.It has been argued that the Revisionist, having invoked Gidh, is bound by its clear mandate that post-registration of FIR, revisional scrutiny is confined only to jurisdictional errors of patent procedural illegality. and does not extend to appreciation of evidence or determination of whether the allegations disclose an offence. However, in complete disregard of this limitation, the Revisionist has, inter alia: contended that the dispute is purely civil in nature, (s) argued that the ATR was not properly considered by the learned Magistrate, and (it) asserted that no cognizable offence is made out on merits. Each of these submissions is a merits-based defence, falling wholly outside the permissible scope of revisional jurisdiction as circumscribed in Gidh.
40.This is not a case of mere over-argument, rather, it is a deliberate attempt to convert a limited revisional proceeding into a surrogate quashing petition, without satisfying the statutory or jurisprudential thresholds for the same. The argument relating to the ATR, in particular, seeks a re-evaluation of the material collected during preliminary inquiry, which is squarely barred at this stage, as the Magistrate is not bound by the ATR and is entitled to form an independent opinion on the existence of a prima facie case as authoritatively held in MGF Dev. Ltd. Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi & Ors 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2824.
41.It has been argued that the present petition is, therefore, nothing but an abuse of the process of law and deserves to be dismissed outright.
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.31 of 49
42.It has been argued that even otherwise, the Impugned Order is a Well- Reasoned Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on Prima Facie Material and Suffers from No Illegality or Perversity Without prejudice, the impugned order dated 13.01.2026 is a reasoned and legally sound order, reflecting due application of mind and disclosing no perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference. A plain reading of the order shows that the learned Magistrate has examined the complaint, the Collaboration Agreement, the ATR, all other documents part of the TCR and thereafter, recorded a prima facic satisfaction of commission of cognizable offences. The learned Magistrate has confined the inquiry to the settled parameters governing Section 156(3) CrPC namely, whether the complaint discloses a prima facie commission of cognizable offences and has rightly refrained from undertaking any impermissible evaluation on merits, as reiterated in MGF Developments Ltd. v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors., Crl. M.C. No. 3010/2021 . Upon being satisfied that the complaint discloses cognizable offences, the learned Magistrate has correctly directed registration of FIR in consonance with the law laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, thereby warranting no interference in revisional jurisdiction.
43.It is further well settled that in revisional jurisdiction, this Hon'ble Court is confined to the material which was before the learned Magistrate at the time of passing the impugned order and cannot travel beyond the record to consider new or extraneous material. The scope of revision does not permit a de novo evaluation on the basis of documents CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.32 of 49 subsequently produced. In the present case, reliance placed by the Revisionists on the MoU and alleged Tradex emails is wholly impermissible, as such material did not form part of the record before the teamed Magistrate and cannot now be introduced to assail an otherwise valid order.
44.The learned Magistrate has further specifically analysed the relevant contractual stopolations and recorded that the accused were obligated to demarcate and hand over the complainant's share prior to any third- party sale, yet proceeded to alienate the property while projecting themselves as absolute owners. These findings are not conjectural but arise directly from the material on record. Further, the ATR has been expressly considered and rejected on the ground that the Investigating Officer failed to conduct any meaningful inquiry and merely relied on the accused's version, thereby independently justifying the direction for registration of FIR.
45.In this backdrop, the present revision is a thinly veiled attempt to re- argue the merits and re-appreciate the very material already considered by the Magistrate, which is impermissible. It is settled that at the stage of FIR/investigation, courts cannot undertake a mini-trial or sift evidence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (para 103), it is held that quashing powers are to be exercised sparingly, without testing the reliability or genuineness of allegations. In Union of India v. B.R. Bajaj, (1994) 2 SCC 277 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned against entering into merits at the FIR stage as if in appeal, and in Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 3 SCC 259 , it was CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.33 of 49 held that a complaint need not meticulously reproduce every ingredient so long as the factual foundation is laid.
46.The attempt of the Revisionist to dissect the complaint and rely upon the ATR is thus wholly misconceived. The law is equally clear that investigation cannot be stifled at inception. In State of Punjah v. Dharam Singh, 1987 Supp SCC 89, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that quashing at the threshold amounts to restraining the police from performing statutory duties, and deprecated courts travelling beyond the FIR into merits prior to investigation. The consistent line of authority (including Prakash P. Hinduja) affirms that the field of investigation is exclusively reserved for the investigating agency.
47.Viewed thus, the impugned order reflects a proper and conscious exercise of jurisdiction based on prima facie material, whereas the present revision seeks an impermissible merits review under the guise of revisional jurisdiction. No case of illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error is made out. The petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.
48.I have heard contentions of Ld counsel for revisionist and also gone through the material available on record.
FINDINGS
49. Before deciding the present revision petition, it would be relevant to reproduce relevant provisions of law which are as under :
"Section 397 : Calling for records to exercise powers CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.34 of 49 of revision :--(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself; to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation.--All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.35 of 49 MAINTAINABILITY
50. Before testing the case of the revisionists on merits, the issue of the maintainability of the instant revision ought to be resolved first. What is an 'interlocutory order' has been discussed by the Apex Court in the decision reported as (1977) 4 SCC 137 Amar Nath v. State of Haryana:
"6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Section 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub- section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus:
"The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.36 of 49 those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.37 of 49
51. The issue is no more res integra in view of judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Nishu Wadhwa vs Siddharth Wadhwa & Anr on 10 January, 2017 , wherein it has been observed as under:-
"13. The issue that since the accused has not been summoned as an accused and has no right to file a revision petition is alien, while deciding an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The said issue crops up when the Magistrate entertains the complaint and on taking cognizance proceeds as a complaint case. In case directions are issued for registration of FIR immediately, on registration of FIR, the person against whom allegations are made in the FIR attains the status of an accused. His rights in so far as the Police can summon him for investigation, arrest him without warrants for allegations of cognizable offences are duly affected. In a situation where the fundamental right of freedom and liberty of a person is affected, it cannot be held that he has no right to be heard at that stage. Thus to hold that since directions only have been issued under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and no cognizance has been taken thus no revision would lie would be an erroneous reading of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, an order dismissing or allowing an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and a revision petition against the same is maintainable."
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.38 of 49
52. Thus, in light of the aforesaid legal position it is held that the instant revision petition is maintainable. Having resolved the issue of maintainability in favour of the revisionist, now I proceed to test the case of the revisionists on its merits.
53. Hon'ble Superior Courts have time and again deprecated the initiation of false criminal proceedings in cases having the elements of civil dispute. The quick relief offered by a criminal prosecution as opposed to a civil dispute incentivizes the litigant to initiate false and vexatious proceedings. Moreover, in a country suffering the scourge of world's largest backlog of cases, litigants often view criminal proceedings as a tool to pressurize and obtain a favourable settlement from other side. The Hon'ble Apex Court in G. Sagar Suri Vs State of UP, Crl Appeal No.91/2000, date of decision 28.01.2000 has categorically observed as under :-
"It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice".
CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.39 of 49
54. Further, in case titled as M/s Indian Oil Corporation VS M/s NEPC India Ltd & Ors, in Appeal (Crl) No. 834/2002 date of judgment 20.07.2006, Hon'ble Apex court has observed as under:-
"While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.
55. Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Ghai & Ors Vs The State of West Bengal & Ors , Crl Appeal No.463 of 2022 , held as under:-
"31. To establish the offence of Cheating in inducing the delivery of property, the following ingredients need to be proved:-
1. The representation made by the person was false CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.40 of 49
2. The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he made was false.
3. The accused made false representation with dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to whom it was made.
4. The act where the accused induced the person to deliver the property or to perform or to abstain from any act which the person would have not done or had otherwise committed.
56. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. Vs. Sudha Seetharam & Anr., (2019) 16 SCC 739 the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows:-
i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and
ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to;
a) deliver property to any person; or
b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security.
Thus, cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC.
57. The following observation made by this Court in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 336 with almost similar facts and circumstances may be relevant to note at this stage:-
"6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.41 of 49 whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of the complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under Section 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petitioner against the accused person is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs. 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs.2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. It was pointed out that on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons may take steps for moving the consumer forum in relation to the claim of Rs. 4,20,0000. It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases of breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case, it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception that there was intention on behalf of the accused person to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under 420 IPC. "7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.42 of 49 of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C which it has erroneously refused."
58. There can be no doubt that a mere breach of contract is not in itself a criminal offence and gives rise to the civil liability of damages. However, as held by this court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2000) 4 SCC 168 , the distinction between mere breach of contract and cheating, which is criminal offence, is a fine one. While breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of cheating.
59. In the case at hand, complaint filed by the Respondent No. 2 does not disclose dishonest or fraudulent intention of the appellants.
60. In Vesa Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Kerala & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 293 this Court made the following observation:-
"13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.43 of 49 complainant that itself cannot be ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case, there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any inception on behalf of an accused person to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence u/s 420 IPC. In our view, the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the courts. Superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings."
61. In the present matter the case of respondent before the Trial Court was primarily that the complainant M/s Waharton Engineers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. in its agreement in the year 2016 which was entered with the respondent M/s St. Patrix Realty Pvt. Ltd. entered into a collaboration agreement and that the land provided by the complainant be made part of the township being developed by the respondent/ revisionist. In lieu of such land given by complainant company, the revisionist shall CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.44 of 49 develop residential plotted area of 1200 square yards for each acre of the said land in total admeasuring 10035 square yards of developed area. That during January, 2016 to December, 2016 various meetings took place between complainant and revisionist and it has been averred by complainant that revisionist played fraud upon complainant by making false assurance and revisionist failed to comply collaboration agreement dated 16.12.2016 and moved application before Trial Court for registration of FIR and same was allowed.
62. Having gone through the complaint/FIR and the ATR filed by the IO before the Ld. Trial Court, it cannot be said that the averments in the FIR and the allegations in the complaint against the appellant constitute an offence under Section 405 & 420 IPC, 1860. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out. In the instant case, there is no material to indicate that the revisionist had any malafide intention against the complainant. It is admitted by both parties that the complainant in the present matter filed a civil suit before Ld. Court at Gurgaon, whereby sought an injunction and the same was granted by the Haryana Court at Gurgaon vide its order dated 05.12.2024 and restrained the revisionist from alienating all unsold plots in scheduled property and also restrained them from executing any sale deed in favour of third party over the scheduled property, relating to the share of the complainant and granted interim relief. Further, in the present matter the complainant initially invoked jurisdiction of the commercial court at CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.45 of 49 Haryana by filing a suit for specific performance and categorically mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Gurgaon Court was made out as all the dealings between the parties had taken place at gurgaon and the office of the revisionist was at Gurgaon and cause of action accrued within jurisdiction of Haryana Court. Further, in view of the aforesaid civil suit the revisionist filed the reply and subsequently an interim order was passed in favour of the complainant and issues were framed. Further, in present matter the complainant in its complaint before Trial Court has pleaded the jurisdiction of Delhi Court saying that dealings and meetings between parties had also taken place in some hotels situated in Delhi and further that the address of the complainant was of Delhi. The aforesaid factum of pendency of civil suit and proceedings between the parties was brought to notice of Trial Court by IO in the ATR filed. Further, the IO categorically mentioned regarding all the inquiry conducted by him and also the fact that jurisdiction of the Gurgaon Court was to be taken into consideration, however, Ld. Trial Court disagreed with opinion and conclusion of enquiry by IO and concluded that the application of the complainant was maintainable and subsequently allowed.
63. The impugned order dated 13.01.2026 of Ld. Trial Court has been carefully perused and perusal of same shows that para 2 mentions regarding facts of case. Para 3 mentions very briefly regarding the ATR filed and she does not discuss the inquiry and the proceedings already pending between the parties and mentioned in ATR. In para 5 to para 7 the Ld. Trial Court has discussed the law pertaining to application U/s 156(3) CrPC and thereafter has mentioned the clause in the CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.46 of 49 collaboration agreement dated 16.12.2016 in its para no. 8 to 11. The Ld. Trial Court in para 13 has concluded by saying that "the only contention raised by the IO for non registration of FIR is that the email dated 08.10.2019 was sent by alleged company to complainant company sharing detailed account of sales and shares of Tradex, which also includes shares of booking proceeds from complainant company. However, neither such email has placed on record by the IO nor it is clear as to why despite knowing the fact that the alleged company is selling plots to third party without giving the share of the complainant company, the complainant company failed to take any action. Moreoever, a part from believing the version of alleged company and fact that suit is pending before another court, it seems that IO has not conducted any inquiry." The Ld. Trial Court ordered for registration of FIR. She even failed to mention if by the contents of the complaint any cognizable offence was made out. The trial court failed to opine in her findings if any cognizable offence was made out but ordered for registration of FIR within 3 days which rendered revisionist with no opportunity to exercise the legal right. The complainant before the Trial Court also did not disclose during pendency of arguments that MOU had been entered between them and that even before proceedings at the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the parties had sought adjournment as they were in process of settlement.
64. Ld. Trial Court did not take into consideration that collaboration agreement between parties had taken place in Gurgaon regarding property situated at Gurgaon and also that all the transactions took place at Gurgaon. I am in agreement with Ld. Counsel for revisionist that Ld. CR No.62/2026 PS EOW Amarjit Singh Bakshi Vs. State Page No.47 of 49 Trial Court erred in passing impugned order and did not take into consideration the ATR report filed by IO and did not mention reasons to differ in the conclusion and defect in inquiry of investigating officer.
65. If the present case is tested upon the touchstone of the principles of law as laid down in aforesaid cases by Hon'ble Apex Court, the contention of revisionists that the matter is purely civil in nature, holds a lot of merit. In my considered view, failed obligation and frustrated expectations must not lead to registration of FIR which entails serious consequences.
66. It appears that Ld Magistrate was misled by the complainant by concealing all the material facts and execution of MOU between them on 23.10.2025 in which it mentions that they have amicably resolved the disputes, while passing the impugned order as it is clear from the status report filed by IO. In the said report, the IO categorically mentioned the relation between the parties and inquiry conducted by him at length and he concludes the said report by opining the matter pertains to breach of contract and is civil in nature. The said version of Inquiry Officer has remained not discussed by the Ld. Trial Court. The Ld. Trial court did not take into consideration that both the parties had all the proceedings at Gurgaon and therefore, the matter is purely of civil nature and no FIR was registered under section 154 (1) Cr.PC by the concerned Police Officials. Therefore, it is evident that the matter is purely civil in nature and appears to have been given a criminal color as a pressure tactics.
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67. In the case at hand, I find that the Ld. Magistrate erred in law by passing the impugned order and the same suffers from jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 13.01.2026 stands set aside. Though the FIR in the instant case has been registered pursuant to said order, however in my view, a patent illegality cannot be permitted to be continued merely because it has been endorsed by an executive action (i.e. registration of FIR) that too pursuant to an order (impugned order herein) which is not only amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this court but is also being set aside in view of the reasons as stated above. The instant revision stands allowed accordingly.
68. TCR along with copy of this judgment be sent to Ld Trial Court for information.
69. Revision file be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by Sheetal Announced in open Court Sheetal chaudhary
chaudhary Date:
2026.04.16
17:16:35 +0530
[Sheetal Chaudhary Pradhan]
ASJ-02, South-East/Saket/Delhi
16.04.2026(m)
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