Anoop Kumar C vs State Bank Of India on 23 January, 2026

[Cites 19, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

Anoop Kumar C vs State Bank Of India on 23 January, 2026

The appellant filed W.P.(C)No.46394 of 2025, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a declaration that the auction proceedings initiated by the respondents, i.e., the State Bank of India and its Authorised Officer is illegal; a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 sale notice dated 20.11.2025 issued by the 2nd respondent Authorised Officer as the same is illegal, void and violative of Rule 9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, due to non-publication on the designated portal and for arbitrary gross undervaluation; a writ of mandamus granting the petitioner a period of four months to clear the entire outstanding liability, by liquidating his foreign assets, keeping the sale proceedings in abeyance; and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to forthwith furnish a copy of the valuation report relied on in Ext.P4.

2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the appellant-petitioner availed a Home Loan from the 1st respondent Bank, on 17.10.2018, for a total limit of Rs.2,06,71,000/-. The said loan was secured by an equitable mortgage over 12.55 Ares W.A.No.3209 of 2025 3 2026:KER:5778 of land and a residential building situated in Re.Sy.No.159/12, Chirakkal Village, Kannur District. On account of the default committed by the petitioner in repayment, the account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) were initiated.

3. On 18.12.2025, when W.P.(C)No.46394 of 2025 came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Paragraphs 2 to 6 and also the last paragraph of that judgment read thus:

"2. The learned Standing Counsel, on instructions, submits that the petitioner has only deposited Rs.5 lakhs, though the amount was Rs.20 lakhs. Thereafter, the installments were also not remitted. The first installment was to be paid on 08.09.2025. According to the respondent Bank, even today they are ready to accept the amount remitted pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Ext.P2.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Bank has valued the property at the time of availing the loan to the tune of Rs.4,39,10,000/-, which is discernible from Ext.P1 sanction letter. But according to the petitioner, when Ext.P4 sale notice is issued, the reserved price fixed is Rs.1,65,00,000/-. So, the property is undervalued.

W.A.No.3209 of 2025 4 2026:KER:5778

4. The learned counsel for the respondent Bank submits that the Authorised Valuer has valued the property on 20.09.2025 and 23.09.2025, wherein the valuation is fixed as follows:

Value of the property as on 20.09.2025 Fair Market Value =Rs.1,78,01,000/- Realizable value =Rs.1,60,00,000/- Forced/Distress sale value =Rs.1,56,00,000/- Circle Value of the property as on 23.09.2025 Present Fair Market value of the property = Rs.1,72,28,000/-

Realisable value of the property = Rs.1,55,05,000/- Distress value of the property = Rs.1,37,82,000/-

5. The petitioner challenges Ext.P4 sale notice before this Court. It is seen that Ext.P4 was issued on 20.11.2025 for the sale of the property on 26.12.2025. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no public notice and the sale is not reflected on the website of the Bank even today.

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd v.

Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], has held as follows:

"Powers conferred under Art. 226 are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal."

W.A.No.3209 of 2025 5 2026:KER:5778 Under Article 226 of the Constitution, High Courts possess a broad discretionary power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights or any other legal purpose. While this jurisdiction is expansive, it is tempered by a "rule of exhaustion," meaning courts typically decline to entertain petitions when an efficacious alternate remedy is available, particularly when a statute prescribes a specific procedure for redress. This restriction is a matter of policy and convenience rather than a lack of power; however, the Court will bypass this rule and intervene directly if the petition involves a violation of fundamental rights, a breach of natural justice, an action taken without jurisdiction, or a challenge to the constitutionality of a law. While complex disputed questions of fact usually lead the Court to decline a case, it maintains the ultimate discretion to exercise its jurisdiction if the nature of the controversy objectively warrants judicial intervention. Therefore, this Court cannot go into contention regarding the factual disputes under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. (supra) the writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court at this stage. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner's right to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal."

4. Challenging the judgment dated 18.12.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.46394 of 2025, the appellant- petitioner is before this Court in this writ appeal.

5. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the W.A.No.3209 of 2025 6 2026:KER:5778 appellant-petitioner and also the learned Standing Counsel for State Bank of India for the respondents.

6. The issue that requires consideration is as to whether any interference is warranted in the judgment dated 18.12.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.46394 of 2025.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner would contend that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is one rendered without taking note of the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioner, and in such circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted in this intra-court appeal.

8. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the State Bank of India would submit that the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the judgment dated 18.12.2025 in W.P.(C)No.46394 of 2025, which is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warrants no interference in this intra-court appeal. The learned counsel would point out that the secured asset has already been sold on 26.12.2025. In case the appellant is aggrieved by the measures taken by the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, his remedy is to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the said Act.

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9. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal.

W.A.No.3209 of 2025 8 2026:KER:5778 The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression 'any person', who could approach the Tribunal.

10. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of W.A.No.3209 of 2025 9 2026:KER:5778 Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a W.A.No.3209 of 2025 10 2026:KER:5778 statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.

11. It is pertinent to note that, aggrieved by the sale notice and the proceedings initiated by the respondents under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in respect of the very same loan transaction, the appellant had approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.20121 of 2025. The said writ petition was disposed of by Ext.P2 judgment dated 10.07.2025. Paragraphs 3 and 4 and also the last paragraph of that judgment, read thus:

"3. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent Bank that the petitioner committed default in repayment of the loan and the outstanding amount as on 10.07.2025, after giving credit to the interim order passed by this Court, is Rs.2,57,93,788/- (Rupees two crores fifty seven lakhs ninety three thousand seven hundred and eighty eight only). It was further submitted that though proceedings for recovery have been initiated, as a matter of indulgence, the respondent Bank is willing to accept repayment of the outstanding amount in limited instalments. This is recorded.

4. In view of the above, I am of the view that the petitioner can be granted an opportunity to repay the outstanding amount on the following conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs only) on W.A.No.3209 of 2025 11 2026:KER:5778 or before 08.08.2025.

(ii) The balance outstanding, along with accrued interest, costs, and charges, if any, shall be paid in 8 equal monthly instalments starting from 8th September 2025, and subsequent instalments shall be paid on or before the 8th day of every succeeding month.

(iii) In the event of default of any one instalment, the respondent Bank shall be entitled to proceed in accordance with the law;

(iv) All coercive proceedings shall be kept in abeyance to enable the petitioner to repay the entire amount directed above.

The writ petition is disposed of as above."

12. Though the appellant made certain payments, he failed to repay the outstanding amount together with accrued interest, costs and charges, within the time limit stipulated in Ext.P2 judgment. As provided under the said judgment, on account of default, the respondents proceeded further, under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, which has resulted in the issuance of Ext.P4 sale notice dated 20.11.2025.

13. In Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam [AIR 1965 SC 1150], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, if the underlying rule of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take W.A.No.3209 of 2025 12 2026:KER:5778 one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time, and would be inconsistent with considerations of public policy.

14. 'Henderson Principle' is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res judicata, known as constructive res judicata, contained in Section 11, Explanation VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, originates from this principle.

15. In Henderson v. Henderson [(1843) 3 Hare 999], the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, Vice-Chancellor, held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due W.A.No.3209 of 2025 13 2026:KER:5778 to any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or omission. It was further held that the principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgment, but also to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time.

16. The above proposition of law came to be known as the 'Henderson Principle' and underwent significant evolution, adapting to changing judicial landscapes and procedural requirements. The House of Lords in Johnson v. Gore Wood and Co. [(2002) 2 A.C. 1], upon examining the 'Henderson Principle', authoritatively approved it. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd. [(2014) A.C. 160], Lord Sumption JSC further expounded the 'Henderson Principle' as although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel or res judicata yet having the same underlying public interest that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. Even in a common law action, it was said by Blackburn, J. in Newington v. Levy [(1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 180] that the doctrine of res judicata W.A.No.3209 of 2025 14 2026:KER:5778 applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the Court.

17. The 'Henderson Principle' was approvingly referred to and applied by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806] as the underlying principle for res judicata and constructive res judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The Three-Judge Bench found that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is, therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res W.A.No.3209 of 2025 15 2026:KER:5778 judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

18. In Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant-2nd respondent Bank, a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The 'Henderson Principle', in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceedings. A party that avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings W.A.No.3209 of 2025 16 2026:KER:5778 and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, which means that in the interest of the State, there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause.

18.1. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court reiterated that the 'Henderson Principle' is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional W.A.No.3209 of 2025 17 2026:KER:5778 circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.

18.2. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court noticed that there are four situations where, in second proceedings between the same parties, doctrine res judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process may be invoked; (i) cause of action estoppel, where the entirety of a decided cause of action is sought to be relitigated; (ii) issue estoppel or, 'decided issue estoppel', where an issue is sought to be relitigated, which has been raised and decided as a fundamental step in arriving at the earlier judicial decision; (iii) extended or constructive res judicata, i.e., 'unraised issue estoppel', where an issue is sought to be litigated which could, and should, have been raised in a previous action but was not raised; (iv) a further extension of the aforesaid to points not raised in relation to an issue in the earlier decision, as opposed to issues not raised in relation to the decision itself. As part of the broader rule against abuse of process, the 'Henderson Principle' is rooted in the idea of preventing the judicial process from being exploited in any manner that tends to undermine its integrity. This idea of W.A.No.3209 of 2025 18 2026:KER:5778 preventing abuse of judicial process is not confined to specific procedure rules, but rather aligned to a broader purport of giving quietus to litigation and finality to judicial decisions. The essence of this rule is that litigation must be conducted in good faith, and parties should not engage in procedural tactics that fragment disputes, prolong litigation, or undermine the outcomes of such litigation. It is not a rigid rule but rather a flexible principle to prevent oppressive, unfair, or detrimental litigation.

18.3. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that piecemeal litigation where issues are deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of process of law and would also fall foul of the 'Henderson Principle'. Merely because one proceeding initiated by a party differs in some aspects from another proceeding or happens to be before a different forum, will not make the subsequent proceeding distinct in nature from the former, if the underlying subject matter or the seminal issues involved remains substantially similar to each other or connected to the earlier subject matter by a certain degree, then such proceeding would tantamount to 'relitigating' and the 'Henderson Principle' would be applicable. Parties cannot be allowed to W.A.No.3209 of 2025 19 2026:KER:5778 exploit procedural loopholes and different fora to revisit the same matters they had deliberately chosen not to pursue earlier. Thus, where a party deliberately withholds certain claims or issues in one proceeding with the intention to raise them in a subsequent litigation disguised as a distinct or separate remedy or proceeding from the initial one, such subsequent litigation will also fall foul of the 'Henderson Principle'. Similarly, where a plea or issue was raised in earlier proceedings but later abandoned, it is deemed waived and cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. Allowing such pleas to be resurrected in later cases would not only undermine the finality of judgments but also incentivize strategic behaviour, where parties could withdraw claims in one case with the intention of reintroducing them later. Abandonment signifies acquiescence, barring its reconsideration in subsequent litigation. This ensures that judicial processes are not misused for tactical advantage and that litigants are held accountable for their procedural choices. Parties must litigate diligently and in good faith, presenting their entire case at the earliest opportunity.

18.4. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that the 'Henderson Principle' operates on the broader W.A.No.3209 of 2025 20 2026:KER:5778 contours of judicial propriety and fairness, ensuring that the judicial system remains an instrument of justice rather than a platform for procedural manipulation. Judicial propriety demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters. Once a matter has been adjudicated, it should not be revisited unless exceptional circumstances warrant such reconsideration. Repeated litigation of the same issue not only wastes judicial resources but also subjects the opposing party to unnecessary expense and harassment. Judicial processes are not merely technical mechanisms but are rooted in principles of equity and justice.

19. As laid down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nawab Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806], the underlying principle for res judicata and constructive res judicata is for assuring finality to litigation. The same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res W.A.No.3209 of 2025 21 2026:KER:5778 judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is, therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

20. As reiterated by the Apex Court in Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the 'Henderson Principle' is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional W.A.No.3209 of 2025 22 2026:KER:5778 circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.

21. The 'Henderson Principle' operates on the broader contours of judicial propriety and fairness, ensuring that the judicial system remains an instrument of justice rather than a platform for procedural manipulation. Judicial propriety demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters. Once a matter has been adjudicated, it should not be revisited unless exceptional circumstances warrant such reconsideration. Repeated litigation of the same issue not only wastes judicial resources but also subjects the opposing party to unnecessary expense and harassment. Judicial processes are not merely technical mechanisms but are rooted in principles of equity and justice.

22. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, judicial propriety demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters. Therefore, after the disposal of W.P.(C)No.20121 of 2025 by Ext.P2 W.A.No.3209 of 2025 23 2026:KER:5778 judgment dated 10.07.2025, the appellant-petitioner cannot raise a valid challenge against Ext.P4 sale notice in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which has been issued as provided under Ext.P2 judgment, on account of the default committed by the appellant-petitioner in repaying the outstanding amount together with accrued interest, costs and charges, within the time limit stipulated in that judgment. Moreover, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in case the appellant is aggrieved by the measures taken by the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the remedy open to him is to invoke the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the said Act, instead of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted for not entertaining the writ petition, for the reason stated in the impugned judgment dated 18.12.2025.

In the result, this writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed; however, without prejudice to the right of the appellant-petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, raising appropriate legal W.A.No.3209 of 2025 24 2026:KER:5778 and factual contentions, against the measures taken by the 1st respondent Bank and its Authorised Officer, the 2nd respondent herein, under the provisions of the said Act.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-

MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE nak W.A.No.3209 of 2025 25 2026:KER:5778 APPENDIX OF WA NO. 3209 OF 2025 PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure-A1 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE SEARCH RESULTS FROM THE PORTAL BAANKNET.COM DATED 18.12.2025 SHOWING "NO RESULTS" FOR THE PETITIONER'S PROPERTY Annexure-A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE SEARCH RESULTS FROM THE PORTAL BAANKNET.COM DATED 19.12.2025 SHOWING "NO RESULTS"

Annexure-A3 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE SEARCH RESULTS FROM THE PORTAL BAANKNET.COM DATED 21.12.2025 SHOWING "NO RESULTS"

Annexure-A4 A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE SEARCH RESULTS FROM THE PORTAL BAANKNET.COM DATED 22.12.2025 SHOWING "NO RESULTS"

Annexure-A5 13. A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE SEARCH RESULTS FROM THE PORTAL BAANKNET.COM DATED 23.12.2025 SHOWING "NO RESULTS"

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