Gauhati High Court
Londhoni Devi (A-14) vs The State Through National ... on 7 May, 2013
Bench: I A Ansari, P.K. Musahary
1
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MEGHALAYA,
MANIPUR, MIZORAM, TRIPURA AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
1. Criminal Appeal 9 of 2013
Londhoni Devi (A-14)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
2. Criminal Appeal 10 of 2013 Sougaijam Rakesh Singh
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
3. Criminal Appeal 75 of 2013 N. Bomi Singh
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
4. Criminal Appeal 74 of 2013 Wayenbam Noren Singh (A-8)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
5. Criminal Appeal 76 of 2013 Lourenbam Jatishore Singh @ Telemba (A-17)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent 2
6. Criminal Appeal 63 of 2013 A. Ibomcha Singh
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
7. Criminal Appeal 71 of 2013 Kh. Jeeten Singh (A-10)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
8. Criminal Appeal 77 of 2013 Y. Brajabidhu Singh
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
9. Criminal Appeal 78 of 2013 Mutum Ibohal Singh (A-12)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent
10. Criminal Appeal 70 of 2013 Naba Kumar Singh @ Maibam Sarat Singh (A-9)
- Accused/Appellant
-Versus-
The State through National Investigation Agency
- Respondent 3 BEFORE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE I A ANSARI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. MUSAHARY For the appellants:
Mr. MG Singh, Ms. Sheela Kh.
Mr. S.K. Singha, Mr. B. Basumatary, Advocates For the respondent ::
Mr. D. Das, Standing Counsel, NIA.
Date of hearing : 07.05.2013
Date of judgment : 07.05.2013
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(O R A L)
(Ansari, J.)
By this common judgment and order, we propose to dispose of all the above mentioned appeals, which have arisen out of the order, dated 06-09-2012, passed, in Special NIA Case No. 01 of 2010, by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam, Guwahati, whereby the learned Court below has framed charges under Sections 120B and 121A IPC read with Sections 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, against the present accused-appellants.
2. Before these appeals could be heard on merit, a preliminary objection has been raised by the respondent herein, namely, National Investigating Agency, the preliminary objection being that these appeals, which have been preferred under Section 21 of the National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 (in short, 'NIA Act, 2008'), is not maintainable in law inasmuch as an order framing charge in a case, which is investigated by the NIA and covered by the provisions of the NIA Act, 2008, is an interlocutory order and Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 specifically bars appeal from being entertained by High Court 4 against any interlocutory order of a Special Court, which is constituted under Section 11 or under Section 22 of the NIA Act, 2008, as the case may be.
3. On the preliminary objection having been raised, as indicated above, we have heard, on the preliminary objection, so raised, Mr. DK Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the NIA, and Mr. MG Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. We have also heard Mr. DK Mishra, learned Senior counsel, as Amicus Curiae.
4. Appearing on behalf of the respondents, Mr. DK Das, learned Senior counsel, has made us traverse through not only the Preamble, but also the Statement of Object and Reason for enactment of NIA Act, 2008, and various other provisions contained therein, particularly, Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 11 and Sub-Section (5) of Section 16 in order to show that the legislative intent, in the enactment of NIA Act, 2008, is to have an investigation agency to investigate, primarily, offences relating to 'terrorism', apart from other penal provisions, if required, and for setting up of Special Court with special scheme for investigation so that investigations are expeditious, fair and appropriately supervised and the trial of the cases, investigated by the NIA, be conducted expeditiously and concluded with great dispatch.
5. Trying to drive home his point, Mr. Das, learned, Senior counsel, has submitted that while the Parliament provided by Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, that an appeal shall lie before a Division Bench of High Court from any judgment, sentence or order, it consciously excluded the provisions for appeal in respect of an interlocutory order. This legislative intent, submits Mr. Das, is reiterated by specifically laying down in Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 that no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court other than High Court from any judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order, passed by a Special Court.5
6. An order framing charge by Special Court, according to Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, is an interlocutory order and no appeal or revision would, therefore, lie, in the light of the provisions of Section 21(1) read with Section 21(3) of the NIA Act, 2008, against an order framing charge by Special Court.
7. Referring to Section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008, Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, has also pointed out that Section 21 opens with a non-
obstante clause, which seeks to exclude the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, so far as appeal or revision, provided under the NIA Act, 2008, is concerned.
8. It is also submitted by Mr. Das, learned Standing counsel, NIA, that the provisions, embodied in Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, are in pari materia Section 34 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'POTA') and this Court has already held, in Redaul Hussain Khan -vs- National Investigation Agency, reported in 2009 (3) GLT 855, that the provisions of Section 21 are in pari materia Section 34 of the POTA.
9. It is further submitted by Mr. Das that not only Section 34 of the POTA, but even Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, are in pari materia, Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008. which fell for discussion in V. C. Shukla -vs- State through C.B.I., reported in 1980 Supp SCC 92, and a Four-Judge Bench, while considering the question as to whether an order, framing charge, shall be appealable or not under Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, came to the conclusion, in the light of the provisions of Special Courts Act, 1979, that though, ordinarily, an order, framing charge, is not an interlocutory order and the embargo, which is placed on the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court by Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 6 would not be attracted, an order, framing charge, of the Special Courts Act, 1979, is an interlocutory order
10. To put it a little differently, what Mr. Das, learned Senior counsel, contends is that while an order, framing charge, is, ordinarily, not an interlocutory order, an order, framing charge, under a special statute, such as, the NIA Act, 2008, cannot be treated as an interlocutory order, for, such an order, if not treated as an interlocutory order, would defeat the object with which a legislation, such as, the NIA Act, 2008, has been enacted, primarily aiming at expeditious and efficient investigation and also expeditious and effective trial in respect of terrorist acts and other acts related thereto.
11. Referring to the case of Bachraj Bengani alias B. R. Jain -vs- State and another, reported in 2004 Cri.L.J. 2204 (Del.), Mr. Das has pointed out that a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while dealing with Section 34 of the POTA, which is pari materia Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, reached the conclusion, relying upon V. C. Shukla's case (supra), that an order, framing charge, is an interlocutory order and no appeal against such an order would lie to the High Court under Section 34 of the POTA.
12. While dealing with the case of Bachraj Bengani alias B. R. Jain (supra), Mr. Das has also pointed out that Bachraj Bengani @ BR Jain (supra) has referred to the case of Peoples Union for Civil Liberties - vs- Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 456), too, wherein the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of various provisions of the POTA and as Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, is in pari materia Section 34 of the POTA, Section 21 is also constitutionally valid. Mr. Das, seeking to drive strength from the case of Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (supra), reiterates that Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, needs to be treated as constitutionally valid and it is, therefore, necessary that 7 the provisions, embodied in Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, be interpreted in such a manner as would advance the object of the enactment of the NIA Act, 2008, and not defeat the same, namely, the object of expeditious and effective investigation as well as trial.
13. Resisting the preliminary objection so raised on behalf of the respondents, Mr. MG Singh, learned counsel, has submitted that in a series of cases, decided by the Supreme Court, more particularly, Amar Nath -vs- State of Haryana, (AIR 1977 SC 2185) and Madhu Limaye
-vs- State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47), it has been made clear that an order, which is an order of moment, cannot be regarded as interlocutory order and, based on this principle, according to Mr. Singh, learned counsel, an order, framing charge, which, according to Mr. Singh, is an order of great moment, cannot be treated as an interlocutory order and revision against such an order is maintainable, notwithstanding the bar imposed, on the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and High Court, by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
14. As far as V. C. Shukla's case (supra) is concerned, Mr. MG Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the Supreme Court's decision, in V. C. Shukla's case (supra), that an order framing charge is an interlocutory order was really based on the reading of the Special Courts Act, 1979; whereas the scheme of the NIA Act, 2008, is not entirely same as the Special Courts Act, 1979.
15. Referring to the case of Prabhakaran -vs- Excise Circle Inspector, Wadakkancherry, reported in 1993 CRLJ 3599 (KER), Mr. Singh, learned counsel, has submitted that the question as to whether framing of charge shall or shall not amount to an interlocutory order depends on the facts of the case, the statute, wherein the proceeding has been initiated, and the nature of objection raised therein. 8
16. Appearing as Amicus Curiae, Mr. DK Mishra, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that the decision, in V. C. Shukla (supra), cannot be applied to a case arising out of NIA Act, 2008. In this regard, Mr. Mishra, referring to the cases of Amar Nath (supra) and Mohanlal Thakkar (AIR 1963 SC 733), has pointed out that these cases were considered in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) and the Court took the view that the expression interlocutory order, appearing in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., would not include an order, which, if had been passed in favour of the accused, would have terminated or ended the proceeding and since an order, framing charge, is such an order, which, if passed in favour of the accused, would have ended in the discharge of the accused, it would not be treated as an interlocutory order and the bar imposed by Section 379(2) Cr.P.C. would not be attracted to such a case.
17. Coupled with the above, it is also contended by Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, that since the provisions, embodied in Section 397(2), impose restrictions, on the right of an accused, such a provision needs to be construed strictly and it was for this reason, contends Mr. Mischra, that even in VC Sukla's case (supra), the Court distinguished the meaning and import of the expression interlocutory order between a case, which is covered by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the one hand, and the meaning of the interlocutory order as may be applicable to a case covered by a special statute, such as, the Special Courts Act, 1979.
18. Attempting to draw distinction between the NIA Act, 2008, and the Special Courts Act, 1979, Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted that the most important reason why the Court, in V. C. Shukla (supra), took the view that an order, framing charge, ought to be regarded as interlocutory order was the fact that the trial was presided 9 over by sitting Judge of the High Court and it was specifically held, at para 46 in V. C. Shukla (supra), that one reason why no appeal was provided against an interlocutory order might have been the fact that it would be against the dignity and decorum of the very high status, which the Special Judge, under the Special Courts Act, 1979, enjoyed.
19. It is the submission of Mr. Mishra that the scheme of the Special Courts Act, 1979, is distinguishable from the present case inasmuch as the Special Court, under the Special Courts Act, 1979, was constituted by a sitting Judge of the High Court; whereas a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge can constitute the Special Court.
20. Coupled with the above, it is also the submission of Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, that it would be unfair to deny to an accused the right to go in appeal against framing of charge by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, merely because the case is not investigated by police, but by the NIA. Depending merely on the question as to who has investigated the case, it would be unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory to deny to an accused the benefit of appeal or revision against an interlocutory order.
21. Elaborating his above submissions, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, contends that if a case, involving any penal provision of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is investigated by police, the accused can move the Sessions Court or the High Court, against an order framing charge invoking its revisional jurisdiction, because the bar, imposed by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., would not be applicable and, hence, in such a situation, there is no logical reason as to why such a right shall be denied to an accused merely because the case, against him, happens to have been investigated by the NIA and a Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, 2008, would hold the trial. Two persons, made accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, 10 cannot be treated differently merely because investigation, in one case, is conducted by the NIA and, in the other, by the police in terms of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
22. The further submission of Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned amicus curiae, is that while POTA contained provisions relating to substantive as well as procedural law, the NIA Act, 2008, contains only procedureal part of the law and, therefore, the NIA Act, 2008, cannot be said to be exactly same as POTA.
23. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made before us.
24. Though it is not in dispute before us that an interlocutory order is neither appealable nor revisable under Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, what is in dispute is whether an order, framing charge, in a case, which has been investigated by the NIA, shall be treated as an interlocutory order or not and, for this purpose, one has to determine if an order, framing charge, in a case, investigated by the NIA, shall be held to be an interlocutory order so that the progress of the trial is not hampered or retarded and a trial, which once commences, comes to an end expeditiously and without any stoppage.
25. For better appreciation of the issues, raised before us, we reproduce hereinbelow Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, which reads as under:
"Appeals.
21. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) *** *** (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court."11
26. A bare reading of Section 21(1) very clearly shows that while providing for a right of appeal to the High Court under Section 21(1) from any judgment, sentence or order, passed by a Special Court, constituted under Section 11 or 22 of the NIA Act, 2008, as the case may be, what the Parliament has done is that it has denied any right of appeal from an order, which is interlocutory. This apart, while providing a right of appeal, the Parliament has completely denied to a person, covered by Section 21, the benefit, if any, of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 opens with the expression, "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code".
27. Coupled with the above, Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 makes it further explicit that no Court, other than the High Court, as provided under Section 21, shall have the power to entertain either an appeal or revision from the judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order, of a Special Court and even when a right of appeal is provided to the High Court, under Section 21, it is made explicit that no appeal will lie to the High Court if the order impugned is an interlocutory order.
28. When, therefore, Section 21 is read minutely and cautiously, it is found to have denied to an accused any right of appeal or revision from an order, which is interlocutory in nature, and has also ousted the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to an order passed by a Special Court, whether the order is interlocutory or otherwise.
29. Apart from the fact, as has been clearly brought out in the case of Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), that Section 34 of the POTA was in pari materia Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, which fell for consideration in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), is pari materia Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008. This is clearly 12 discernible if one reads the provisions, as stood embodied in Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, which we reproduce below:
"11. Appeal.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days."
30. Bearing in mind that Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, is pari materia Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, let us, first, determine as to what an interlocutory order means and how the expression, 'interlocutory order', has to be construed, while considering the provisions of Section 397(2) Cr.PC.
31. With regard to the above, we may point out that an order, framing charge, was clearly revisable by the High Court under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. While making the provisions for revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the legislature gave revisional jurisdiction to both, the High Court as well as Sessions Judge, but chose to place, at the same time, an embargo on the revisional Court's jurisdiction in respect of an interlocutory order by laying down that no revision would lie against an interlocutory order.
32. In other words, while conferring revisional jurisdiction on the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court against any finding, sentence or order, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, bars exercise of revisional jurisdiction so far as interlocutory orders are concerned. 13
33. Naturally, therefore, what an interlocutory order conveys and how it shall be construed, in the context of Section 397(2) CrPC, has been a subject of interpretation in a large number of judicial pronouncements, one of the principal decisions being Amar Nath's case (supra).
34. Before, however, we deal with the case of Amar Nath (supra), let us examine and ascertain the meaning and expression of the non obstante provisions embodied in Section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008, inasmuch as Section 21 opens, as already indicated above, with the non-obstante clause by stating, "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code". Similar provisions were available in Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, too, which came to be interpreted in V.C. Shukla's case (supra).
35. In order to arrive at the decision as to what the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code" meant to convey, the Supreme Court took note of the case of Aswini Kumar Ghosh vs. Arobinda Bose (AIR 1952 SC 369) and the observations made therein. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh (supra), Patanjali Sastri, C.J., observed as follows:
"21. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the non obstante clause should be interpreted according to the salutary principles laid down by this Court. In support of his submission, he relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose where Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed as follows:
"It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment .... The true scope of the enacting clause must, as we have observed, be determined on a fair reading of the words used in their natural and ordinary meaning...."
36. Similar observations were made, in Aswini Kumar Ghosh (supra), by Mukherjea, J, when his Lordship observed as follows: 14
"In my opinion, the section on its negative side eliminates so far as the Supreme Court Advocates are concerned, all disabling provisions existing under any law in regard to persons who are not enrolled as Advocates of any particular High Court. On the positive side, the section confers on Supreme Court Advocates the statutory privilege of practising as of right, in any High Court in India, no matter whether he is enrolled as an Advocate of that court or not."
37. Das, J, as his Lordship then was, observed, in Aswini Kumar Ghosh (supra), as follows:
"In short, there is no escape from the conclusion that the ambit, scope and effect of the non obstante clause are to supersede the Indian Bar Councils Act and any other Act only insofar as they regulate the conditions referred to therein."
38. Having taken note of, and referring to the above observations made, in Aswini Kumar Ghosh (supra), particularly, the observations of Das, J., the Supreme Court, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), held at para 22 and 23 thus:
"22. The observations of Das, J. clearly show that the effect of non obstante clause was to supersede the Indian Bar Councils Act and any other Act insofar as they regulate the conditions referred to therein. If we apply this test to the present case, then it is manifest that the non obstante clause would have the effect of overriding and excluding the provisions of the Code. Applying the test laid down by Sastri, C.J., we find that the position may be summed up as follows:
"(1) We should exclude the statute concerned from consideration; in the instant case 'The Code'. (2) We should construe the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning instead of referring to the statute which is sought to be excluded."
23. We entirely agree with the approach indicated by Sastri, C.J. and which is also binding on us. Let us see what is the effect of interpreting the non obstante clause according to the test laid down by the decision, referred to above, and particularly, the observations of Sastri, C.J. Let 15 us for the time being forget the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code or the interpretation put by this Court on the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in the Code because the decisions were based purely on the interpretation of the provisions of the Code. We have, therefore, first to determine the natural meaning of the expression "interlocutory order". To begin with, in order to construe the term "interlocutory", it has to be construed in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. We are fortified by a passage appearing in THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 1976 (Vol. I, p. 853) where it is said that an interlocutory order is to be contrasted with a final order, referring to the decision of Salaman v. Warner. In other words, the words "not a final order" must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. That this is so was pointed out by Untwalia, J. speaking for the court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra as follows:
(SCC p. 557, para 12) "Ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order'."
Thus, the expression "interlocutory order" is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term "final order". Now, let us see how this term has been defined in the dictionaries and the textbooks. In WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Vol. II, p. 1179) the expression "interlocutory order" has been defined thus:
"Not final or definitive: made or done during the progress of an action: INTERMEDIATE, PROVISIONAL."
STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (4th Edition, Vol. 3, p. 1410) defines interlocutory order thus:
" 'Interlocutory order' Judicature Act, 1871 (clause 66), Section 25(8) was not confined to an order made between writ and find judgment, but means an order other than final judgment."
Thus, according to Stroud, interlocutory order means an order other than a final judgment. This was the view taken 16 in the case of Smith v. Cowel and followed in Manchester & Liverpool Bank v. Parkinson. Similarly, the term "final order"
has been defined in Vol. 2 of the same dictionary (p. 1037) thus:
"The judgment of a Divisional Court on an appeal from a county court in an interpleader issue was a 'final order' within the old R.S.C., Order 58 Rule 3 (Hughes v. Little); so was an order on further consideration (Cummins v. Herron), unless action was not thereby concluded.... But an order under the old R.S.C., Order 25 Rule 3, dismissing an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was not 'final' within the old Order 58, Rule 3, because had the decisions been the other way the action would have proceeded. HALSBURY'S LAWS Or ENGLAND (3rd Edn., Vol. 22, pp. 743-44) describes an interlocutory or final order thus: "Interlocutory judgment or order.--An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An interlocutory order though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals....
In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed 'final'."
(Emphasis is added)
39. From the above observations, made in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), what can be safely gathered is that in a case of present nature, while construing the non obstante provisions appearing in Section 21(1), one has to keep excluded the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, from consideration and one has to, therefore, construe the words, appearing in, or used in, the NIA Act, 2008, more particularly, the term interlocutory order according to their natural and ordinary meaning instead of referring to the construction of the term, interlocutory order, 17 as the said term has been interpreted in the context of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is, as pointed out above, sought to be excluded by the non obstante clause in Section 21 of the NIA Act.
40. In other words, when Section 21 opens with the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code", it implies the legislative intent of keeping excluded the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherever there is conflict between the provisions embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, 'the Code'), on the one hand, and the NIA Act, 2008, on the other.
41. What follows from the above observations is that when the application of the Code has been excluded, while providing for a right of appeal by Section 21, it means that the words or expressions, appearing in Section 21, have to be given their ordinary and natural meaning and not the meaning, which has been attributed to the term interlocutory order by the Courts in the context of the provisions of the Code.
42. No wonder, therefore, that the Supreme Court, at para 23, in V. C. Sukla's case (supra), while construing Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, observed, "We have, therefore, first, to determine the natural meaning of the expression, interlocutory order."
43. The essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought, but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue; whereas an intermediate order is one, which is made 'between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment'. It was, for this reason, that Untwalia, J., in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551, held that an order, framing charge, is not an interlocutory order, but an intermediate order and that the conclusion, so reached, has been agreed to by the 18 Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla's case (supra). The relevant observations, which appear at para 24, read as under:
"24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term "interlocutory order" as used in Section 11(1) of the Act. WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON (14th Edn., p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
"An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties."
Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act."
19
(Emphasis is added)
44. From the above observations, the conclusion, which is inescapable, is that an intermediate order is one, which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment and that an order, framing charge, being an intermediate order, squarely falls within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term interlocutory order. This would be the result if the term, interlocutory order, is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having taken resort to the Code or any other statute.
45. The position, therefore, which emerges, in the light of the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, CJ., in Aswini Kumar Ghosh (supra) read with the observations, made in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), by S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., is that the non-obstante clause would exclude application of the Code and, consequently, the words, used in the NIA Act, 2008, have to be construed according to their natural and ordinary meaning instead of construing them in the manner as may have been construed in the context of the Code, which is sought to be excluded by the NIA Act, 2008.
46. Logically extended, it would mean that while construing the term, interlocutory order, appearing in Section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008, the said term cannot be given the meaning, which has been applied to the term interlocutory order in the context of the provisions embodied in the Code.
47. When construed thus, the term, interlocutory order, would mean an order, which is in contrast to a final order. When so construed, the term, interlocutory order, will take, within its own sweep, intermediate order or quasi final order. No wonder, therefore, that in the Supreme Court Practice, 1976, (Vol.I, p.853), which stands referred to in para 23 of V.C. Shukla's case (supra), an interlocutory order has been described 20 to mean, in the light of the decision in Salaman Vs. Warner, reported in (1891) 1 QB 734, a final order and, deriving strength from the decision in Salaman (supra), the Supreme Court, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), has clearly pointed out that the words 'not a final order' must necessarily mean and include an interlocutory order or an intermediate order and this aspect was recognized even by Untwalia, J., speaking for the Court in Madhu Limaye (supra), when his Lordship observed: "We have, therefore, first, to determine the natural meaning of the expression 'interlocutory order'.
48. Thus, as held in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), the expression, interlocutory order, has to be understood, in its natural and ordinary meaning, as an order converse to the term final order. The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), read: "Thus, the expression interlocutory order is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term final order."
49. The Supreme Court has pointed out, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), that in Madhu Limaye (supra), Untwalia, J., mean to convey that an order, framing charge, is not an interlocutory order, but is an intermediate order and this conclusion, which was reached in Madhu Limaye (supra), has been, it is necessary to note, agreed to in V.C. Shukla's case (supra). It is for this reason that the Supreme Court observed, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), if we may reiterate, thus, "We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term interlocutory order as used in Section 11(1) of the Act." (Emphasis is added)
50. From the above discussion, what clearly surfaces is that the term, interlocutory order, which appears in Section 21(1) and 21(3) of the NIA 21 Act, 2008, includes an order framing charge meaning thereby that while the term, interlocutory order, in the context of the Code, has to be construed as an intermediate order and, therefore, revisable, the term, interlocutory order, which appears in the special statute, namely, Section 21(1) and 21(3) of the NIA Act, 2008, would have to be construed according to its ordinary and natural meaning and when attributed its natural and ordinary meaning, the term, interlocutory order, would convey any order, including even an order, framing charge, passed at the intermediate stage.
51. In short, an order, framing charge, is treated as an intermediate order and not strictly an interlocutory order, while applying provisions of the Code. The Supreme Court had held, in this context, in Madhu Limaye (supra), that an order, framing charge, is not an interlocutory order and revisional jurisdiction would not, therefore, stand barred by Section 397(2); whereas, in the case at hand, interlocutory order would mean and include even an order, whereby a charge against an accused, in a case investigated by the NIA, is framed by a Special Court constituted either under Section 11 or under Section 22 of the NIA Act, 2008, as the case may be.
52. Pausing, this stage, for a moment, one may also point out that the Supreme Court, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), culled out various propositions, which emerge in the context of interpretation of interlocutory order. The relevant observations read:
"34. There is yet another aspect of the matter which has to be considered so far as this decision is concerned, to which we shall advert when we deal with the last plank of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. Suffice it to say at the moment that the case referred to also fully endorses the view taken by the Federal Court and the English decisions viz. that an order is not a final but an interlocutory one if it does not determine or decide the 22 rights of parties once for all. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the following propositions emerge:
"(1) that an order which does not determine the right of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue, because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi- final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused."
(Emphasis is added)
53. Applying the above tests, the Supreme Court concluded, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), that an order, framing charge, is purely an interlocutory order inasmuch as such an order does not terminate the proceeding, but the trial goes on until it culminates in either acquittal or conviction. The relevant observations, appearing at para 35, read: 23
"35. Applying these tests to the order impugned we find that the order framing of the charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true that if the Special Court would have refused to frame charges and discharged the accused, the proceedings would have terminated but that is only one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused and framed charges against him, then the order would be interlocutory because the trial would still be alive."
(Emphasis is added)
54. Interpreting the term, interlocutory order, in the context of Section 397(2) of the Code, the Supreme Court has pointed out, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), at para 66, that the term, interlocutory order, appearing in Section 397(2), has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and that any order, which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision and, on this basis, it has also been observed that orders, which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial, cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to fall outside the purview of revisional jurisdiction as contemplated by Section 397. The relevant observations, appearing at para 66, read thus:
"66. The matter came to this Court. It proceeded to examine the question whether the impugned order was interlocutory so as to justify the view that it was barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 and held as follows:
"It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an 24 interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
It has to be appreciated that the order of the Sessions Judge on the revision petition of the complainant for "further enquiry", left no option to the Magistrate but to summon the accused and proceed with their trial after framing a charge against them, but it was nevertheless held by this Court as follows:
"It is difficult to hold that the impugned order summoning the appellants straightaway was merely an interlocutory order which could not be revised by the High Court under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 397 of 1973 Code.... We are, therefore, satisfied that the order impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants."
(Emphasis is added)
55. It is because of the above reasons that it was concluded, in Amar Nath's case (supra), that the expression, interlocutory order, has been used in Section 397(2) in a restricted sense and it denotes only such an order, which is purely interim or temporary in nature, which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and that any order, which substantially affects the rights of the accused, is not an interlocutory order and it is on that reasoning that an order, framing charge, is treated as an order, which is not an interlocutory order. The relevant observations, appearing at para 67 and 68 of V.C. Shukla's case (supra), in this regard, read:
25
"67. This Court has therefore taken the view in Amar Nath case that the expression "interlocutory order" has been used in Section 397(2) of the Code in a restricted sense, that it "denotes" orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and that any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused is not an interlocutory order. On that reasoning, an order for the framing of a charge against the accused in this case cannot be said to be an interlocutory order.
68. The matter again came up for consideration in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra where one of us was a member of the Bench which heard the case, and one of the other two Judges was a party to the decision in Amar Nath case. The case arose on a complaint by the Public Prosecutor in the Court of Session, after obtaining sanction under Section 199(4)(a) of the Code, as the alleged offence was under Section 500 IPC for defaming a Minister. Process was issued against the accused. After the Chief Secretary had been examined to prove the sanction of the State Government, the accused filed an application for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the allegations were made in relation to what the Minister had done in his personal capacity and not as a Minister. The accused made two other contentions and challenged the legality and validity of the trial. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed a charge under Section 500 IPC. The accused challenged that order by a revision petition to the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised there to the maintainability of the revision petition with reference to the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code. The High Court upheld the objection, and the matter came in appeal to this Court at the instance of the accused. The question for consideration was whether the order of the Sessions Judge framing the charge under Section 500 IPC was interlocutory."
(Emphasis is added)
56. What is, therefore, in the light of the discussion held above, necessary to point out is that the purpose of the NIA Act, 2008, apart from constituting an agency, at the national level, is to investigate 26 offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of the country, is to create a Special Court to deal with special kind of offences and to lay down, deviating from the general procedure, a special procedure to deal with offenders and to complete the investigation in shortest possible period and the trial by having precedence over other cases as is stipulated in Section 19 .
57. Section 3 of the NIA Act, 2008, therefore, empowers the Central Government to constitute a special agency to be called National Investigating Agency for investigation of scheduled offences, which means that offences, other than the scheduled offences, are, ordinarily, left to be dealt with by other agency or the State agencies. Thus, the NIA Act, 2008, seeks to deal with a distinct class of offences and offenders.
58. By Section 4, the Central Government is given the power of superintendence over the National Investigation Agency so as to ensure that no person is charged without evidence or is dealt with unfairly or that no unnecessary delay is caused in investigation.
59. Section 11 of the NIA Act, 2008, deals with constitution and appointment of Special Judge to deal with scheduled offences having precedent over trials of other cases. Section 16 (5) lays down the procedure as to how the Special Court shall proceed in absence of accused. Section 17 of the NIA Act, 2008, lays down special procedure regarding protection of witness, recording of evidence in camera, etc. Section 19 provides that trial of the cases, under the NIA Act, 2008, will have precedence over other cases. All interlocutory orders are, vide Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, barred from provisions of appeal and Section 21 also mandates that an appeal shall be disposed of within three months.
60. The dominant purpose of the NIA Act, 2008, is to achieve not only speedy determination, but determination with utmost dispatch as was 27 the case in V.C. Shukla (supra). Naturally, therefore, the Court, in V.C. Shukla (supra), held at para 19, thus:
"19. The aforesaid observations, therefore, clearly show that the heart and soul of the Act is speedy disposal and quick dispatch in the trial of these cases. It is, therefore, manifest that the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means of adopting dilatory tactics by plugging every possible loophole in the Act through which the disposal of the case may be delayed. Indeed if this be the avowed object of the Act, could it have been intended by the Parliament that while the Criminal Procedure Code gives a right of revision against an order which, though not purely interlocutory, is either intermediate or quasi-final, the Act would provide a full-fledged appeal against such an order. If the interpretation as suggested by the counsel for the appellant is accepted, the result would be that this Court would be flooded with appeals against the order of the Special Court framing charges which will impede the progress of the trial and delay the disposal of the case which is against the very spirit of the Act. We are of the opinion that it was for this purpose that a non obstante clause was put in Section 11 of the Act so as to bar appeals against any interlocutory order whether it is of an intermediate nature or is quasi-final."
(Emphasis is added)
61. In the case at hand, too, the heart and soul of the NIA Act, 2008, is speedy disposal and quick dispatch in the trial of these cases. It is, therefore, clear that the provisions of the NIA Act, 2008, must be interpreted in such a way that it eliminates all possible avenues of delay or means of adopting dilatory tactics by plugging every possible loophole in the NIA Act, 2008, through which the disposal of the case may be delayed.
62. In short, thus, the sole object and the scheme of the NIA Act, 2008, is to achieve speedy trial as well as speedy judicial determination. 28
63. If the above objects, embodied in the NIA Act, 2008, are kept in mind, it is not difficult to conclude that interlocutory order, which appears in Section 21, cannot be construed as an intermediate order as is done in the context of the Code and the term, interlocutory order, in the context of the NIA Act, 2008, has to be construed to mean an order passed during the progress of the trial and against which no special remedy has been provided.
64. It is, no doubt, true, as has been pointed out by the learned amicus curiae, that under the Special Courts Act, 1979, a sitting Judge of the High Court was to preside over the trial; whereas the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, can be presided over by an additional Sessions Judge. We are, however, unable to persuade ourselves to hold that the fact that the Presiding Judge of the Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979, was a sitting Judge of the High Court was the only reason for holding, as has been held in V.C. Shukla (supra), that an order, framing charge, is not an interlocutory order. Undoubtedly, the fact that it was a sitting Judge of the High Court, who was to preside over the trial under the Special Courts Act, 1979, was an important factor, but not the only factor inasmuch as a close and dispassionate analysis of the various observations made, the inferences drawn and conclusions reached in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), clearly demonstrate that the Court came to the conclusion that the Special Courts Act, 1979, meant to deal with cases expeditiously and with great dispatch and if that be so, the appeal shall not be allowed to be hindered by entertaining revision against interlocutory order including an order framing charge. Considered in this light, it is not difficult to construe, and we do construe, that the NIA Act, 2008, aims at expeditious and fair investigation by the NIA and also early and effective disposal of case by trial held by a Special Court. 29
65. In the circumstances indicated above, there is no reason to attribute to the term, interlocutory order, a meaning other than the one, which we have done above.
66. Mr. M. Singh, learned counsel, is not wholly incorrect, when he refers to the case of Prabhakaran (supra). In Prabhakaran (supra), the Kerala High Court observed:
"14. Legal position laid down by the Supreme Court as understood from the reading of the three decisions - (1) Amar Nath's case, (2) Madhu Limaye's case and (3) V. C. Sukla's case - is the following:
15. Framing of charge may or may not amount to interlocutory order as it depends upon facts of the case, the statute under which proceedings have been initiated, as also the nature of objections raised against it, etc. If the objection or objections raised against the order framing charge are such that upholding such objection/objections would result in termination of the proceedings, then framing of charge cannot be regarded as merely interlocutory order for the purpose of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 (2) of the Code."
67. From the observations, made at para 15, it is clear that framing of charge may or may not amount to interlocutory order as it depends upon facts of the case, the statute whereunder proceedings have been initiated, and the nature of objections, which have been raised, etc with the observations, made in Prabhakaran (supra), we have, in principle, no difference.
68. As regards the learned amicus curiae's submission that depending upon the fact as to whether the NIA has investigated a case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, or the ordinary police, an accused cannot be denied his right to challenge an order, framing charge, by branding such an order as an interlocutory order, suffice it to point that the validity of Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, is 30 not in question before us in these appeals and, hence, we have to proceed to deal with these appeals by treating Section 21 as a valid piece of legislation. When so proceeded, we cannot attribute a meaning to the term, interlocutory order, other than a manner in which such a term has been construed in V.C. Shukla (supra).
69. Because of the fact that a restrictive meaning has been given to the expression interlocutory order, which appears in Section 397(2), the Courts have held that an order, framing charge, is an intermediate order and not, therefore, an interlocutory order; whereas in a case of present nature, particularly, when application of the Code stands excluded by the non obstante clause appearing in Section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008, one cannot, but construe the expression interlocutory order to mean every interlocutory order, be it in an order of great moment or otherwise, including an order framing charge.
70. In Bachraj Bengani (supra), which the learned Standing Counsel, NIA, has relied upon, the Court has pointed out that paramount object of the POTA being expeditious trial and quick dispatch of the case, the provisions, contained in the POTA, have to be necessarily interpreted keeping this legislative intent in view and because of the fact that Section 34 of POTA started with a non-obstante clause, which excluded the operation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court, in Bachraj Bengani (supra), took the view that the order, framing charge, has to be regarded as an interlocutory order.
71. Nothing has been shown, in the present case, on behalf of the appellants, to make us hold that an order, framing charge, shall not be given its natural and ordinary meaning, we have no option, but to hold, and we do hold, that as Section 21 aims at excluding the possibility of halting of trials at any stage, the expression interlocutory order, which appears in Section 21, shall be given its ordinary and natural meaning 31 and, if such a meaning is attributed to the expression interlocutory order, appearing in Section 21, then, the resultant effect is that even an order, whereby charge is framed, will be regarded as an interlocutory order.
72. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that under the scheme of the NIA Act, 2008, an order, framing charge, is an interlocutory order and no appeal would, therefore, lie against such an order.
73. Because of the conclusion, which we have reached above, we hold that these appeals are not sustainable and must, therefore, fail.
74. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, these appeals fail and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed.
JUDGE JUDGE
dutt
32
XCLUDED PART
In Madhu Limaye (supra), it was, therefore, clearly indicated that on the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. It is in this context, that the Supreme Court observed, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), "In such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of the words 'final order'. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding, which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami case; but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order -- pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two." It is further observed by the Supreme Court, in V.C. Shukla's case (supra), "By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of interlocutory orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2)." The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, read:
"70. Their Lordships considered S. Kuppuswami Rao and Salaman cases and examined the question whether the test that if the decision whichever way it was given, would, if it stood, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, was a proper test for deciding whether an order was interlocutory, and disapproved it. They went on to hold as follows: (SCC p. 558, para 13) "But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable 33 under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code."
After referring to the rule of interpretation of statutes, Their Lordships further stated that: (SCC pp. 558-59, para 13) "On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of the words 'final order'. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami case, but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order -- pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of interlocutory orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course."
(Emphasis is added) The Supreme Court has also pointed out, at para 77, in V.C. Shukla (supra), that an appeal, in substance, is in the nature of a judicial examination of a decision by a higher Court of a decision of an inferior Court, the purpose being to rectify any possible error in the order, which may have been appealed against, and, in that sense, revisional jurisdiction is regarded as a part and parcel of the appellate 34 jurisdiction. The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, at para 77, read:
"77. It has to be appreciated that an appeal, in substance, is in the nature of a judicial examination of a decision by a higher Court of a decision of an inferior court. The purpose is to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. In that sense the revisional jurisdiction is regarded as a part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction: Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat. Moreover, it is well settled that statutes pertaining to a right of appeal should be liberally construed. The position has been stated as follows in CRAWFORD ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, para 336, with particular reference to interlocutory orders:
"Moreover, statutes pertaining to the right of appeal should be given a liberal construction in favour of the right, since they are remedial. Accordingly, the right will not be restricted or denied unless such a construction is unavoidable. In a few states, however, where the statute pertains to appeals from interlocutory orders, the rule of strict construction has been applied. But, there seems to be no real justification for this departure from the general rule in accord with which a liberal construction would be given by the court."
Any doubt regarding the right of appeal should therefore be resolved in favour of the right." (Emphasis is added)