Karnataka High Court
Karnataka State Road Transport ... vs The Workmen, Ksrtc Staff And Workers ... on 28 October, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)KARLJ333, (2005)IILLJ219KANT
Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty, S. Abdul Nazeer
JUDGMENT Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
1. Since all these appeal are directed against the common judgment dated 20lh March 2000 made in Writ Petition Nos. 23990 to 23991 of 1997, these appeals were taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The appellants-3 and 2 in Writ Appeal Nos. 3463 and 3464 of 2001 are the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation'), and Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Service respectively. The 3rd appellant is the Chief Labour and Welfare Officer of the Corporation.
3. The appellant in Writ Appeal Nos. 3856 to 3857 of 2001 is the Akila Karnataka Rajya Raste Sarige Nowkarara Mahamandali which is a registered trade union of workmen working in the Corporation.
4. The 1st respondent in Writ Appeal Nos. 3463 to 3464 of 2001 is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Staff and Workers Federation. The 2nd respondent is an employee and conductor in the Corporation and was also the Secretary of the Road Transport Corporation Employees' Death-cum-retircmcnt Benefit Fund. The Corporation and Metropolitan Transport Service have been constituted under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act with a view to provide efficient, economical and properly co-ordinated transport services to the members of the public in their respective regions. The Corporation came into existence on Is1 August 1961 and it is engaged in transport operations and is the biggest transport operator in the state. Prior to 1961, passenger road transport was being carried on as a departmental undertaking. In old Mysore area it used to function under the Mysore Government Road Transport Department; in Hyderabad -Karnataka area it was operated by the Hyderabad State Departmental Undertaking and in the Bombay -Karnataka area it was operated by the Government Transport Corporation.
5. The respondents - 1 and 2 filed Writ Petition Nos. 23990 to 23991 of 1997 praying for a direction in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate direction quashing the communication dated 3rd May 1997 in No. KST/CO/LAB/H3/119/97-98 issued by the Corporation, a copy of which was produced as Annexure - A to the Writ Petitions and seeking for a further direction to the appellants to hold referendum as has been done in the year 1991 and in terms of the proceedings of the meeting held on 25th November 1991 and 29th November 1991, copies of which have been produced as Anncxures-F and P1 to the Writ Petitions and also the circular dated 6lh December 1991, a copy of which was produced as Annexure-F2 to the Writ Petitions. The respondents - i and 2 also sought for a further direction to the 1st appellant - Corporation to continue the recognition of the Ist respondent - Federation, till new arrangements arc made as a result of the referendum to be held, and also to accord pay - roll check-off facility to the 1st respondent-Federation as recognised on 1s1 December 1993. The appellants in all these appeals filed statement of objections and resisted the prayer of the respondents-1 and 2.
6. The 1st respondent-Federation along with two others also had filed Writ Petition Nos. 7601 to 7603 of 1997 challenging the constitutional validity of Regulations 9(5) and 9(6) of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations'), The learned Single Judge heard all the petitions together and disposed of them by means of a common order dated 20th March 2000. The Road Transport Corporation aggrieved by the order made in Writ Petition Nos. 7601 to 7603 of 1997 filed Writ Appeal Nos. 3503 to 3505 of 2000 before this Court. The State of Karnataka also had filed Writ Appeal Nos. 3769 to 3774 of 2000 challenging the said order. By means of our judgment dated 10th August 2000 made in Writ Appeal Nos. 3503 to 3505 of 2000 we had set aside the order made by the learned Single Judge and held that the Regulations 9(5) and 9(6) of the Regulation are valid in law. Following the said decision, today by means of a separate judgment we have disposed of Writ Appeal nos. 3769 to 3774 of 2000 as having become unnecessary. Therefore, what remains to be considered in these appeals is with regard to the correctness of the order dated 201" March 2000 made in Writ Petition Nos. 23990 to 23991 of 1997. The learned Single Judge on consideration of the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, as noticed by us earlier, allowed the Writ Petitions by setting aside notification-Annexure~A dated 3rd May 1997 with a further direction to the Corporation to hold a referendum as before and without reference to notification - Annexure- A and complete the referendum within three months from the date of the order. The learned Judge further made an order declaring that the 1st respondent - Federation should be treated as a recognised union. However, so far as the prayer of the Federation to accord payroll check-off facility is concerned, the learned Judge refused to grant the said relief and directed them to await the decision in Writ Petition No. 31387 of 1999. It is on record that Writ Petition No. 31387 of 1999 came to be allowed granting pay-roll checkoff facility. Writ Appeal filed against the said order also came to be dismissed and the order made in appeal has also been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
7. In the course of the impugned order, the learned Judge took the view that since the Corporation had earlier recognised the Federation as the sole bargaining agent pursuant to the referendum held in the year 1987; and again in the year 1992; the Corporation was not justified in issuing Notification - Annexure-A for the first time when the referendum was about to be held in the year 1996 providing for recognition of such of those unions who secure 33.3 per cent or more valid votes polled both in the referendum at the Corporation and Divisional level would be eligible for recognition at the Corporation and Divisional level respectively; and therefore, the said notification was liable to be struck down as arbitrary and unreasonable. He was of the view that the recognition of unions in terms of the guidelines laid down in notification - Annexure-A would result in more than one bargaining agent which is not in the larger interest of the corporation in industrial peace and harmony; and the recognition having been once granted on the basis of the success in the referendum held by the Corporation, such rights cannot be altered by providing that the Federation which secures 33.3 per cent or more valid votes polled in the referendum is eligible for recognition. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the observation made by the learned Judge at paragraph 47 of the judgment which reads as hereunder:
"47. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Minhas v. Indian statistical Institute (1983 (4) SCC 583) has ruled in para 24 that respondent No. l has to follow the bye-laws if the bye-laws have been framed for the conduct of its affairs to avoid arbitrariness. Any administrative action is to adhere to the procedural standards fixed to avoid arbitrariness. Fair play and justice require avoidance of arbitrariness even in the matter of holding a referendum. A referendum has its own significance in industrial employment and industrial laws. Recognition is granted on account of a success in the referendum held by the Corporation. Such rights cannot be watered down by insisting on an arbitrary fixation of 33.3 per cent as in the case. In the circumstances, I am of the view the insistence of 33.3 per cent is arbitrary and requires my interference particularly in the light of the background preceding the present changed method of holding referendum as per the impugned order."
8. Sri L. Govindraj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants challenging the correctness of the impugned judgment submitted that in the absence of any statutory right conferred on a union or its members, the decision taken by the Corporation laying down guidelines as to the circumstances under which a Federation/Union is entitled to be recognised is not subject to judicial review by this Court in exercise of its power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the change of procedure for recognition of the unions was devised by the Corporation after due deliberations and with a view to permit democratic content and for the purpose of providing broader representation to prevent hegemony and monopoly of a single Federation or union which is not in the interest of both labour and the Corporation. It is his submission that since the Federation has no right to be recognised in law, it is for the employer to decide as to whether one or more unions in the establishment should be recognised; and what is the mode or method of such recognition. He pointed out that it is for the first time in December 1987 for the period commencing from 1st January 1988 to 31St December 1991 the Federation was given recognition by the Corporation and thereafter again from \5th July 1992 to 15th July 1996, the Federation was given recognition. It is also his submission that the policy decision notified in Anncxure-A is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. He also pointed out that in the State of Tamil Nadu whoever has got 10 per cent membership is given recognition and six federations have been recognised and in Kerala State under the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, the union which has got 20 per cent membership is given recognition and five federations have been recognised. Therefore, it is his submission that the policy decision taken by the Corporation as per Anncxure-A is also fair and reasonable and consistent with the policy decision taken by similar Corporations in the neighbouring stales. Learned Counsel in support of his contentions that the policy decision taken by the Corporation is not liable to be interfered with by this Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union Of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation and Anr., , in the case of Federation Of Railway Officers Association v. Union Of India, ; in the case of Comptroller And Auditor General v. Kamalesh Vadilal Mehta, ; in the case of Sher Singh and Ors. v. Union Of India and Ors., in the case of M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. v. State Of M.P. and Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 592 ; in the case of DELHI SCIENCE FORUM and Ors. v. UNION OF INDIA and Ors., in the; case of Balco Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union Of India and Ors., ; in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union Of India and Ors., ; in the case of Chairman, State Bank Of India and Anr. v. All Orissa State Bank Officers Association and Anr., 2004 SCC ( I. & S) 115 : and in the case of R.K. Garg v. Union Of India and Ors., .
9. Sri Prasanna learned Counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal Nos. 3856 and 3857 of 2000 while adopting the submission of Sri Govindraj pointed out that since the appellant in the above appeals was a necessary party to the Writ Petitions, the appellant having not been made as a party to the Writ Petitions filed by the Federation, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside on that short ground. In support of his submission, he also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State Of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., .
10. However, Sri Narasimhan, while strongly supporting the impugned order passed by the learned Judge pointed out that the entire object of the Corporation in issuing Notification-Annexure -A is to defeat the bargaining capacity of the Federation and thereby to weaken the labour force in the Corporation. In support of his submission be relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Karnal, Leather Karamchari Sanghatan (Regd.) v. Liberty Footwear Company (Regd.) and Ors., , in the case of Food Corporation Of India Staff Union v. Food Corporation Of India and Ors., ; and in the case of MANAGEMENT OF KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. KSRTC STAFF AND WORKERS' FEDERATION and Anr., It is his submission that since the Corporation had taken steps to conduct a referendum pursuant to the letter dated 10th November 1995 written by the Federation and the Deputy Labour Commissioner was appointed as the Returning Officer, it was not permissible for the Corporation to issue the notification- Annexure A impugned in these appeals. According to the learned Counsel, the sequence of events would clearly indicate that there is an agreement between the Corporation and the Federation to hold the referendum for determining the sole bargaining agent as per the procedure laid down in the minutes of the meeting held on 25th November 1991 and therefore, the Corporation was required to hold the referendum in terms of the communication dated 20th July 1996, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-G to the Writ Petition. It is his submission that the Corporation is estopped from going back on the promises held out by it. According to the learned Counsel, the change of policy as notified in Annexure -A by the Corporation is highly unreasonable, arbitrary in as much as no circumstances are shown to exist which could have persuaded a reasonable employer to effect the change in the procedure and the object of the change of policy being to divide the workers into different units, the impugned notification is liable to be quashed.
11. In the light of the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the only question that would arise for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge calls for interference in this appeal?
12. Before we proceed to consider the rival contentions advanced, it is useful to refer to the salient features of notification - Annexure-A. Clause (a) of the impugned notification provides that Class-III and IV employees of the Corporation excluding supervisory cadre and security personnel besides trainees are eligible to exercise their franchise in the referendum. In Writ appeal Nos. 3503 to 3505 of 2000 as noticed by us earlier, we have upheld the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(5) and 9(6) which prohibits the supervisory and security cadre personnel from associating themselves as members of the union with other workers' union. Therefore, the petitioners cannot have any objection with regard to Clause (a) of the notification which excludes the exercise of franchise of supervisory cadre and security personnel. Clause (b) of the Notification provides that the process of holding referendum by way of secret ballot will be entrusted to the senior officer of the Government in the Labour Department to function as a returning officer to ensure that the referendum is conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Clause (c) of the notification provides that the referendum will be conducted for the Federation at the corporation level. We do not find anything wrong in the said stipulation in the notification. Clause (d) of the Notification in respect of which a serious grievance is made, provides that the Federation which secured 33.3 per cent or more of valid votes in the referendum held at the Corporation level, will be eligible for recognition. In respect of the Divisional level also the Federation which secures 33.3 per cent or more valid votes in the referendum held will be eligible for recognition at the Divisional level. It is useful to extract the said provision which reads as hereunder:
"d(i) The Federation which secures 33.3 per cent or more of valid votes polled in the referendum at the Corporate level will be eligible for the recognition at the respondent level.
(ii) At the Divisional level the Federation /Federations which secures 33.3 per cent or more of valid votes polled in the referendum their affiliated unions in the divisions will be eligible for recognition at the respondent level."
Clause (h) of the notification provides for conditions under which Federations/Unions would be granted recognition.
Clause (k) of the notification further provides that since the mode of recognition is on the basis of percentage of votes secured in the referendum, the several committees referred to in the said clause would be reconstituted by giving representation to two Federations based on the percentage of votes secured etc. As noticed by us earlier, the thrust of the argument of Sri Narasimhan is that Clause (d) of the referendum referred to above would give scope for the Corporation recognizing more than one union or association which secures 33.3 per cent or more valid votes both at the Corporation level and at the Divisional level and the same would destroy the bargaining capacity of the labour. We are unable to accede to the submission of Sri Narasimhan that provision made for recognition of more than one union would have adverse affect on the bargaining capacity of the labour and it intended to divide the labour. As noticed by us earlier, the learned Judge has quashed the notification - Annexure -A mainly on the ground that the provision in the notification which provides for recognition of a Federation which secures 33.3 per cent or more valid voles polled in the referendum is illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable. From the materials on record, it cannot be disputed that it is only during the years 1987 and 1992, the Federation came to be recognised by the Corporation. It is the contention of the Corporation that prior to the year 1987, the Corporation did not recognise any one particular union or Federation. We are unable to agree with the contention of Sri Narasimhan. Sri Narasimhan, is unable to point out any statutory provision which confers on the employees of the Corporation to be recognised by the Corporation. It is well settled that an employer with a view to maintain industrial harmony and peace and to provide for a mechanism for negotiation with the unions or Federation representing the employees, recognises a Federation or a Union or more than one union or Federations. It is also not in serious dispute that Tamil Nadu Road Transport Corporation recognises a Union which secures 10 percent of the membership and as a matter of fact six Federations are recognised by the Tamil Nadu Road Transport Corporation. Fairly similar is the position in the State of Kerala. The Kerala State Road Transport Corporation recognises a union which gets 20 per cent of its membership and as a matter of fact six Federations have been recognised by the Kerala Road Transport Corporation. It is also well settled that it is not permissible for this Court in exercise of its power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the policy decision taken either by the State or the instrumentalities of the State unless such policy decisions are either arbitrary or unreasonable or discriminatory in nature or violative of any other constitutional rights guaranteed under the Constitution. In this connection, it is useful to refer to some of the decisions cited by the parties.
13. In the case of Dinesh Engineering Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court while examining the validity of the lenders floated by the Controller of Stores, Diesel Locomotive Works, Varanasi for supply of certain items of spare parts for use in GE Governors used by the Indian Railways, has observed that where a decision of the authority is in regard to a policy matter, the Court will not ordinarily interfere since the policy decisions are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and the Courts are normally not equipped to understand the correctness of such policy decision. No doubt, in the said decisions, it is further pointed out by the Supreme Court that in a given case, it would be open to the Court to scrutinise whether the policy decision taken was formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the policy decision taken can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness. In this connection, it is useful to refer the observation made by the Supreme Court at paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as hereunder:
" 12........There is no doubt that this Court has had in more than one ease whatever the decision of the authority is in regard to a policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily interfere since the policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and Courts are normally not equipped to question the correctness of the policy decision. But when this does not mean that the Courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinise whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record.... Any decision be it a simple administrative decision or a policy decision, if taken without considering the relevant facts, can only be termed as an arbitrary decision. If it is so then be it a policy decision or otherwise it will be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution."
In the case of Federation of Railway Officers Association (supra), while examining the correctness of the challenge made to the formation of seven Railway Zones, the Supreme Court took the view that on matters affecting policy and required technical expertise, the Court would leave the matter for decision of those who are qualified to address the issues and unless the policy is so inconsistent with the constitution and laws or arbitrary or irrational or abusing the Court will not interfere with such matters, in the case of Balco Employees' Union (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus:
"46. Process of disinvestments is a policy decision involving complex economic factors. The Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the Court would decline to interfere. In matter relating to economic issues, the Government has while taking a decision, right to " trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within limits of authority. There is no case made out by the petitioner that the decisions to disinvest in BALCO is in any way capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed. Even though the workers may have interest in the manner in which the company is conducting its business in as much as its policy decision may have and an impact on worker's rights, nevertheless it is an incidence of service for an employee to accept a decision of the employer which has been honestly taken and which is not contrary to law. Even a Government servant, having the protection of not only Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but also of Article 311, has no absolute right to remain in service. Eg., apart from cases of disciplinary action the services of Government servants can be terminated if posts are abolished. If such employee cannot make a grievance based on Part - III of the Constitution or Article 311 then it cannot stand to reason that like the petitioners, non Government employees working in a company which by reason of judicial pronouncement may be regarded as a State for the purpose of Part -III of the Constitution and claim a superior or a better right than a government servant and impugn its change of status. In taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of natural justice have no role to play. While it is expected of a responsible employer to take all aspects into consideration including welfare of the labour before taking any policy decision, by itself, will not entitle the employees to demand the right of hearing or consultation prior to taking of the decision."
In the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), the Supreme Court has observed thus:
"234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the Courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the Court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the Court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or. views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision."
14. From the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above and other decisions, as noticed by us earlier, this Court will not interfere in respect of the policy decisions taken either by the Government or its authorities unless such policy decisions are either arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory in nature or violative of other rights guaranteed under the provisions of the Constitution or a Statute or is activated by mala fides. Therefore, keeping these principles in mind, we arc required to examine the validity of Clause (d) of the notification-Annexure-A referred to above. To our mind, it appears that the provision made in Annexure-A providing for such of those Unions/ Federations who secure 33.3 per cent or more valid votes are eligible for recognition either at the Corporation level or at the divisional level are not liable to be struck down either on the ground it is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory in nature or is violative of any statutory rights guaranteed to the 1St respondent - Federation or the employees of the Corporation. As rightly pointed out by Sri Govindraj, the Corporation being the employee employing over 65,000 employees along with the sister Corporations has taken a policy decision laying down the criteria for a Union or a Federation or an Association in the Corporation to be eligible for recognition. We do not find anything wrong in the criteria laid down in Annexure-A. The criteria laid down applies equally to all the Unions/ Federation or an Association of employees of the Corporation. No one Union or Federation of the employees is picked up for either preferential treatment or hostile discrimination. We are unable to accede to the submission of Sri Narasimhan that if more than one union is given recognition, it would weaken the capacity of the labour to bargain with the management and it would be against the interest of labour. It is necessary to point out that even in the scheme formulated under Clause (d) of the notification - Annexure -A, in a given situation, it is possible for one Union or a Federation alone to be recognised if such Union or Federation secures the support of more than 66.7 per cent or more valid votes. Therefore, the scheme formulated under Clause (d) of the notification provides for an opportunity to a Union or a Federation of employees to earn the goodwill of a large number of its employees and get itself recognised as a sole bargaining agent with the Corporation. When the scheme provides for an opportunity to any particular Union or Federation to secure the support of more than 66.7 per cent of its members and get itself recognised as a sole bargaining agent, as against the claim of other Union or Federations, we are unable to appreciate the contention of Sri Narasimhan how such a scheme would go against the interest of the employees. Even otherwise, the possibility of two or more unions being recognised on the basis of the percentage of valid votes, they are likely to poll in the referendum in our view, cannot be a ground to declare such a provision as illegal. It is not possible to take the view that such a provision is either arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory in nature; and recognition of more than one union by the Corporation is against the interest of labour or employees of the Corporation. As noticed by us earlier, the decision taken by the Corporation is in the nature of a policy decision. It is well settled merely because another or a different view could be taken than the one taken by the authorities, is not a ground for the Courts to interfere against such a policy decision. We are of the considered view that recognition of more than one union, as rightly pointed out by Sri Govindraj, would provide for each Union to work for the betterment of its members or the employees of the Corporation so that each Union or Federation may earn the goodwill and secure the support of large number of employees of the Corporation and get recognition of the Corporation either as a sole bargaining agent or along with one or other Unions, further when there is any issue or dispute relating to the welfare of the employees or labour is involved, it is open to all the Unions to join together and to put forward a common demand and bargain with the Corporation unitedly. If there are more than one union, we are inclined to think that each Union could be the watch dog of the activities of the other unions so far as the interest of the labour or employees of the Corporation is concerned. We do not find any merit in the submission of Sri Narasimhan that since the 1st respondent - Federation was recognised as the sole bargaining agent on the basis of the referendum taken in the years 1987 and 1992, it is not permissible for the Corporation to issue the impugned notification laying down the fresh guidelines for recognition of a Union/Federation of its employees in the Corporation. It is also necessary to point out that the recognition made in the year 1992 was only for a period of four years. Further, we are also unable to accede to the submission of Sri Narasimhan that since the steps were taken to hold the referendum and the returning officer was appointed for the said purpose, the Corporation is estopped from going back on that and therefore, the notification - Annexure~A is liable to be quashed. In our view, it is permissible for the Corporation as an employer in the course of its management or administration to change its policy regarding recognition of the unions formed by its employees at any time so long as it is not made as a part of the settlement entered into between the management and the labour. Sri Narasimhan has not been able to point out any settlement arrived at between the Corporation and the Federation wherein the Corporation has agreed to recognize only one Union. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Judge was not justified in taking the view that the impugned notification - Annexure A is not valid in law. In our view, none of the decisions relied upon by Sri Narasimhan referred to above is of any assistance to him to support the contentions advanced by him; and therefore, we are of the view it is unnecessary to refer to the principles enunciated in the said decisions. In the light of the above conclusion, the order impugned in these appeals is liable to be set aside. However, it is necessary to point out that the steps for holding the referendum was taken as back as in the month of July 1996 and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it would be in the interest of justice to direct the Corporation to take steps from the beginning to hold the referendum pursuant to notification - Annexure -A, instead of proceeding from the stage it has been intercepted by virtue of the interim order granted in the Writ Petition. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made above, we make the following order:
(i) The order dated 20th March 2000 made in Writ Petition Nos. 23990 to 23991 of 1997 & 36331 of 1997 is hereby set aside and the said writ petitions are dismissed.
(ii) The Corporation is reserved liberty to proceed with the holding of referendum by appointing a returning officer for the said purpose pursuant to notification - Annexure-A from the beginning.
15. In terms stated above, these appeals are allowed and disposed of. However, no order is made as to costs.