Patna High Court
Dukhiram Raut vs Jamuna Kuer And Anr. on 17 December, 1924
Equivalent citations: 86IND. CAS.985, AIR 1925 PATNA 704
JUDGMENT Ross, J.
1. The petitioner is a servant of one Babu Sham Behari Singh. He lodged a complaint before the Deputy Magistrate of Daltonganj to the effect that his master had advanced Rs. 14,500 to Dulhin-Jamuna Kuer on a zerpeshgi bond and had obtained possession of the mortgaged properties which included a store-room and culturable lands. Possession was taken but on the 10th July 1924 the opposite party, that is, Dulhin Jamuna Kuer and Bindni Debi accompanied by a large number of men who were armed with various arms committed trespass in the said store-room and forcibly dispossessed the petitioner and his master. The case was instituted under as. 147, 379 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate examined the complainant and dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Cr. P.C. recording the following order:
The facts stated by the complainant show that he left the bhandar at Saraidih when asked by the accused and their men. Beyond this nothing appears to have happened. No case is made out.
2. The petitioner then applied before the District Magistrate who also refused to interfere. His order was in the following terms:
The complainant left the bhandar when requested. Presumably he was rebuked for doing so by his master and then tried to get out of his trouble by saying he did it under threats. That two pardanashin ladies of very high rank would deliberately place themselves in a position where they might be involved in a brawl or disturbance is simply incredible. I cannot believe the complainant's story and consider the lower Court was quite right to summarily dismiss the case.
3. Two points have been urged in support of this application in revision. It is contended in the first place that the orders of the Courts below show that some occurrence took place and that there was some show of force and that at all events offences under Sections 448 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code have been committed. The facts of the alleged occurrence have not been disbelieved. In my opinion this is not a correct reading of the orders which have been passed. The order of the Deputy Magistrate does not show that the complainant submitted to any show of force, while the District Magistrate expressly states that the allegation, involving as it does two pardanashin ladies of very high rank in situation where a brawl or a disturbance might have taken place, was incredible. The view expressed by the District Magistrate appears to be sound and on the merits I see no ground to interfere with his order.
4. In the second place it is contended that under the amended Cr. P.C. it is not open, to the Magistrate to dismiss a complaint in this way. The learned Vakil referred to the change that has been made in the language of Section 203 of the Code Under Section 202 of the Code a Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process, and either inquire into the case himself or in certain circumstances direct an enquiry or investigation to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to him or by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. That section deals, with the postponement of the issue of process. Section 203 deals with the dismissal of a complaint. It enacts that the Magistrate may dismiss a complaint, if after considering the statement on oath, if any of the complainant and the result of any investigation or enquiry under Section 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, and in such a case he should briefly record his reasons for so doing. The learned Vakil contends that Section 203 is dependent upon Section 202. Prima facie I see no reason why the dismissal of a complaint should be necessarily dependent on the provisions for the postponement of the issue of process. But the argument is that whereas in the old Code the words were "the result, of the investigation, if any, made under Section 202" the words in the present Code are "t;he result of any investigation or enquiry under Section 202" and the inference is that an investigation or enquiry under Section 202 is now obligatory. There is, in my opinion, no substance in this argument. If the investigation or enquiry under Section 202 was obligatory then the words would have been "the investigation or enquiry under Section 202" but the words are "any investigation or enquiry under Section 202." The use of the word "any" clearly implies that an investigation or enquiry under Section 202 may or may not be made. In other words, the change is merely verbal and is not a change in substance.
5. The result is that the application must be dismissed.
John Bucknill, J.
6. I agree.