Allahabad High Court
Maan Singh Tomar And 5 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 11 January, 2023
Author: Rajeev Misra
Bench: Rajeev Misra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 66 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 24981 of 2022 Applicant :- Maan Singh Tomar And 5 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Shiva Kant Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Pradeep Chauhan Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
Heard Mr. Shiva Kant Srivastava, the learned counsel for applicants, the learned A.G.A. for State and Mr. Pradeep Chauhan, the learned counsel representing first informant/opposite party 2.
Challenge in this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 109 of 2013 (Ajay Singh Vs. Maan Singh and others), under Section 394 IPC, P.S. Sikandara, District Agra, in view of the compromise entered into by the parties.
Present application came up for admission on 19.12.2022 and this Court passed the following order:-
"Learned counsel for the applicants has filed supplementary affidavit today in Court, which is taken on record.
Shri Pradeep Chauhan, Advocate has filed his vakalatnama on behalf of opposite party no.2 today in Court, which is also taken on record.
Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned AGA for the State, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and perused the record.
Learned counsel for the applicants as well as learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has submitted that the parties are closely related to each other and they have already settled all their disputes and differences and have entered into a compromise and a settlement agreement has also been drawn between them.
Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 prays for and is granted ten days' time to file an affidavit on behalf of opposite party no.2, stating therein that in view of compromise made between the parties, he does not want to further pursue the criminal proceedings against the applicants.
Put up as fresh on 05.01.2023."
Pursuant to above order dated 19.12.2022, no affidavit has been filed by opposite party 2. However, Mr. Pradeep Chauhan, the learned counsel representing opposite party 2 submits that compromise application has been duly filed by the parties before Court below. Certified copy of the same is on record as Annexure SA 1 to the supplementary affidavit filed by applicants. On instructions, the learned A.G.A. does not dispute the said compromise entered into by the parties. In the aforesaid back ground, the learned counsel for applicants submits that dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute. Criminality alleged to have been committed by applicants is not a crime against society. During pendency of aforementioned criminal case, parties have amicably settled the dispute outside the Court. On the basis of settlement arrived at between the parties, a compromise application dated 5.9.2022 has already been filed before Court below.
In view of above, it is urged that no useful purpose shall be served in prolonging the proceedings of aforementioned criminal case. Interest of justice shall better be served, in case the proceedings of aforementioned criminal case are quashed by this Court itself in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. and Mr. Pradeep Chauhan, the learned counsel representing opposite party 2 do not oppose the prayer made by the learned counsel for applicants. They submit that once the complainant opposite party 2 has himself compromised with the accused applicants, he now cannot have any grievance, in case, the entire proceedings of aforementioned complaint case are quashed by this Court.
This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court:
1. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675
2. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582
3. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC 677]
4. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1
5. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 705
6. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
7. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226
8. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497
9. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466
10. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014) 9 SCC 653
11. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721
12. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
13. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350
14. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641
15. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 290
16. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)
17. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570
18. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688
19. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716
20. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC 736
21. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834
22. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.
23. State of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021 In Daxaben (supra) Court has held that there can be no compromise in matters under Section 306 IPC. Subsequently, in State of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021, Court held that there can be no compromise in proceedings under the POCSO Act.
wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra) that no compromise can be made in respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Reference may also be made to the judgement rendered by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.
Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report which read as under:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."
Considering the facts and circumstances of case, submissions made by counsel for parties and the material on record, this court is of considered opinion that dispute between parties is a purely private dispute and not a crime against society. Moreover, during pendency of present application, parties have already compromised their dispute. Compromise so entered into by parties have been acted upon and verified by Court below. As such, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned case. In view of compromise entered into by the parties, chances of conviction of accused applicant is remote and bleak. As such continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.
In view of above, aforementioned applications succeed and are liable to be allowed. Consequently, entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 109 of 2013 (Ajay Singh Vs. Maan Singh and others), under Section 394 IPC, P.S. Sikandara, District Agra, are, hereby, quashed.
Present application is, accordingly, allowed.
Cost made easy.
Order Date :- 11.1.2023 HSM