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[Cites 0, Cited by 9]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

R.N. Tiwari vs State Bar Council Of Madhya Pradesh And ... on 31 January, 1994

Equivalent citations: AIR1994MP137, 1994(0)MPLJ548, AIR 1994 MADHYA PRADESH 137, (1994) 2 CIVILCOURTC 30, (1994) 1 CIVLJ 743, (1994) 2 LJR 291, (1994) MPLJ 20, (1994) 1 HINDULR 222, (1994) 2 KER LT 663, (1994) MPLJ 548

Bench: Chief Justice, P.P. Naolekar

JUDGMENT

 

 U.L. Bhat, C.J.
 

1. The petitioner is an advocate based at Durg. He is a member of Durg District Bar Association. Election of officer bearers of Association for the year 1993-94 was notified. He filed nomination for the post of President. Nominations were to be scrutinised on 30-8-1993. On the same day, the first respondent, State Bar Counsel of Madhya Pradesh sent Annexure-P4 communication to the third respondent Chief Election Officer informing him that the Bar Council had stayed the election. The petitioner challenges the purported order of stay passed by the State Bar Council. The writ petition was filed on 16-9-1993. The respondents 1 to 3 appear through different counsel. Certain members of the Bar have sought to intervene. We have permitted them to intervene. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. We may at once mention that Shri Tamaskar, who appeared for the first respondent, almost at the end of arguments prayed for time. We have declined his request for two reasons; namely, that the writ petition was filed on 16-9-1993, that is nearly five months ago and the State Bar Council had sufficient time to engage counsel and give instructions and that even this request comes not before commencement of the arguments, but almost at the end of arguments.

2. The question for consideration is whether the State Bar Council has any authority to interfere in the process of election being conducted for the various posts in the District Bar Association. According to all parties except the first respondent and the inter-veners, the Bar Counsel has no such authority. The State Bar Council asserts that it has authority; Learned counsel representing the State Bar Council sought to seek support from Section 28 of the Advocates act 1961, Section 16 of the M.P. Advocated Welfare Fund Act 1982 and the Rules framed thereunder.

3. Section 28 of the Act of 1961 confers on the State Bar Council power to frame rules. According to Sub-section (1) of Section 28, the Council may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Chapter. Sub-section (2) indicates some of the areas which could be covered by such rules. Sub-section (2) does not contemplate any power in the State Bar Council to frame rules for election to various posts under any Bar Association. We have carefully gone through the provisions of the Act of 1961. The Act confers certain powers on the Bar Council vis-a-vis enrolment of Advocates, disciplinary powers over them and the like. But the Act does not contemplate a situation where the Bar Council could interfere in the election of a Bar Association,

4. The Act of 1982 embodies the statutory scheme for establishement of a Welfare-fund for Advocates. Bar Association have been given some role in this behalf. Section 16 empowers the State Bar Counsel to grant recognition to a Bar Association or to withdraw recognition. The Association is required to apply for recognition and pay annual subscription or other fees as may be determined. Every application shall be accompanied by the Rules or bye-laws and every particulars referred to under Section 16 of the Act of 1982. The duties of Bar Association are enumerated in Section 17. There is nothing in either of these provisions or any of other provisions of the Act of 1982 which can be read as conferring on the Bar Council any power to interfere in the election process. Significantly, this Act does not confer on the Bar Council any power to make rules.

5. Our attention is invited to rules framed by the State Bar Council for the recognition of Bar Associations. Rule 3 contemplates certificate of recognition being granted by the Bar Council to the Bar Association on compliance with the conditions enumerated therein and on application in the prescribed form. The Bar Association must have a constitution and that must receive the approval for the Bar Council. The Bar Association must work regularly and its accounts must be maintained properly and audited annually. List of membership as well as list of officebearers as on 1st January must be sent to the Bar Council by 31st Jan., every year. The Bar Association must be prepared to execute the scheme sponsored by the Coucil and send such reports and information as may be desired by the State Bar Council. Rule 4 relates to withdrawal of recognition. The Bar Council may at any time withraw its recognition. The circumstances under which recognition can be made are not exhaustively set out. It the Bar Association is not working properly or if it has defaulted in compliance of the circulars of Bar Council, recognition may be withdrawn.

6. The Act of 1982 and the Rules referred to above may empower the Bar Council to grant or withdraw recognition to Bar Associations. Recognition my not be granted to a Bar Association which does not function properly or which does not function under approved constitution or bye-laws. It is one thing to say that recognition can be withdrawn and it is quite a different thing to say that the Bar Council can interefere in the electoral process. There does not appear to be any statutory foundation for the claim of the Bar Council that it has power to interfere in the electoral process. Learned counsel for the Bar Council submitted that the proposed bye-laws of the Association have not been approved and the election was scheduled to be held under the new-bye-laws and therefore if the election process is allowed to continue, there may be risk of the Bar Council withdrawing the recognition. We are not for the present concerned with the amplitude of such power vested in the Bar Council, Assuming that the Bar Council has such power, that cannot comprehend within its scope the power to interfere in the electoral process.

7. We therefore agree with the contention of the petitioner that the Bar Council had no authority or power or jurisdiction to order stay of the electoral process. The decision to stay the electoral process and the communication thereafter deserve to be and are hereby quashed. The petitioner is allowed but in the circumstances without costs Security if any deposited will be refunded.